Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

But in order that such an immediate illumination of the mind may exist in us, there is required, by the ordinary law of Providence, an object proposed from without, which is able to determine a pious thought.

I. That the illuminations of the mind, taken generally, pertain to actual graces, the whole Catholic tradition bears witness. For we are taught that God is He who gives the spirit of wisdom and of revelation and the enlightened eyes of the heart Ephes. I, 16. seq., that He Himself shines in our hearts 2ª Cor. IV, 6., that He Himself opens the eyes of men, that they may be converted from darkness to light Act. XXVI, 16. seq., that He illuminates our eyes and our darkness Psal. XII, 4. XVII, 20., that we hear and learn from the Father Ioan. VI, 45., and that our sufficiency of thinking (salutarily) is from God 2ª Cor. III, 5.. According to these things the Fathers teach that the Father does not send us the knowledge of His Son by sound or by voice, but by the illumination and enlightenment of the mind Cyril. Alex. in Ioan. L. IV. c. 7.; that the divine Word, as our pedagogue, admonishes, reproves, convicts, threatens us Clemens Alex. Pedag. L. I. c. 9.; and that God acts by the persuasions of things seen so that we will and believe, whether extrinsically through evangelical exhortations, or intrinsically, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind Aug. De Spir. et lit. c. 34.. And indeed «when we beseech from Him His help for the doing and the perfecting of justice, what else do we beseech but that He open what lay hidden and that what did not delight become sweet?»Idem. de pecc. merit. et remiss. L. II. c. 19. «For it is not in the power of men but of God that men have the power to become sons of God: from...» for they indeed receive it from Him, who gives pious thoughts to the human heart.»Idem De Spir. et lit. c. 8. Hence in the Council of Arausic. II, c. 7 it was defined: «if anyone asserts that by the vigour of nature he can think, as is expedient, or choose some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, or consent to the salutary, that is, evangelical preaching, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.»

It is established, therefore, that among the divine helps by which we are aided to act piously the illuminations or enlightenments of the mind have a place: but the help of God by which we are aided to act is actual grace: therefore. You will perhaps say that it must still be proved that those helps are grace, that is, given freely (gratis) or unowed to nature. But it must be noted that at present the question is not about the gratuitousness of grace, but about its nature; wherefore it must now be supposed — which, however, will be proved afterwards — that in the cited places there is question of those helps which are unowed to nature and are given freely. Besides, this is sufficiently clear from the adduced testimony of Augustine and from the definition of the council.

Furthermore, that actual helps of this kind, consisting in the illuminations of the mind, are had, reason taught by faith demonstrates, showing their necessity. For supernatural life in second act cannot be explained apart from the grace of God, since it is a work above the powers of nature; again, life in second act, which consists in knowledge and love, cannot begin without the illumination of the mind; therefore for supernatural life consisting in knowledge and love, a gratuitous illumination of the mind proceeding from God is required. Moreover, this gratuitous illumination is actual grace: therefore the illumination of the mind pertains to actual graces.

I. A twofold illumination of the mind must be distinguished, mediate and immediate. It is called mediate when God excites in the mind a knowledge or some apprehension only through extrinsic objects or means, just as by many things seen our mind can be moved to think something. Immediate illumination is called that apprehension or knowledge which God, with an object indeed proposed from without, Himself excites by His own power, physically acting in the mind and Himself touching the hearts of men by His own virtue, not indeed revealing anything, but strengthening the mind with unowed light so that it rightly apprehends the truth. There is a difference between the two. The first knowledge, when an extrinsic means is employed, arises naturally in the mind and therefore corresponds to the natural powers of the intellect: the other, inasmuch as it is immediate, is owed to God alone gratuitously acting physically in the intellect and illuminating it. Hence the former knowledge, considered subjectively and efficiently, is connected with extrinsic objects sufficiently proposed by a connection of natural consequence, so that, when these exist, it also exists. The other, however, again considered subjectively and efficiently, since it is from God gratuitously exciting it in us, does not cohere with the extrinsic object by the aforesaid connection of consequence. Considered objectively, however, it coheres with the extrinsic object. That these things may be explained at once, consider that the actual grace of illumination does not of itself aim at disclosing something new to us. For the revelation of those things which must be known in order to act rightly, and which is therefore necessary for all, is public and social, made by Christ to the Church through the Apostles; it is not private. Moreover, the actual grace of illumination is necessary to each one and is conferred on each one individually. I said 'of itself'; for God can, if He wills, by illuminating the intellect of someone, manifest something new to him. But this is a special grace pertaining to the gift of prophecy. Since, therefore, the actual grace of illumination does not of itself aim at revealing something new, it will aim at this: that the mind rightly, as it ought, apprehend and think that which is proposed to it from elsewhere for thinking. This extrinsic proposition of truth» therefore is required, in order that the immediate illumination of the mind may exist. And indeed naturally the intellect is determined to act by an extrinsic object; supernaturally, however, the preaching of the word of God is divinely instituted, so that through it men may be led to faith, to justification, and to the exercise of holiness (we take the word of God preached in all its amplitude, that is: whether simply preached, or equivalently, that is, whether written or recalled to memory or manifested in any way whatsoever or represented in sacred symbols and rites or in similar things). Since, therefore, only in this way is something new to be thought proposed to the mind by ordinary providence, it follows generally that an object naturally determining, which can excite a pious thought, is required by the law of ordinary Providence, in order that immediate illumination may be in us. Therefore the mediate illumination of the mind is not that which is excited in us by an object proposed from without; for this also belongs to the immediate; but it is that which is excited naturally in us by an extrinsic object divinely proposed: the immediate, however, is that which, given that condition, is excited by the power of God gratuitously acting in us and illuminating our faculty, elevating our faculty for acting more excellently, is excited in us. In this matter there is of itself room for a twofold question. The first is whether in the order of actual grace both illuminations are possible; the other, whether in the order of present providence both illuminations, one distinct from the other, are in fact given. But the solution of this second question also depends on certain principles which we shall bring forward later, from which it seems to be concluded that there is no grace of illumination that is only mediate. But because we are now treating only of the essence of actual grace, it is permissible to prescind for a little while from the examination of those principles, so that, if the negative opinion in this matter is true, what we say about the mediate illumination may be taken as said hypothetically and as pertaining to the order of possibility. We defend, therefore, that within the amplitude of actual graces there are contained not only mediate illuminations, but also and chiefly immediate ones.

III. As for the mediate ones, if only the question of possibility is raised, there is no difficulty. For divine revelation, the word of God daily heard or read, the examples of Christ and of the Saints, the other things instituted by God in the Church, and similar things aim at this: to excite in us salutary knowledges; and when these means have been rightly applied, they are able to excite those knowledges naturally, even with any other gratuitous help whatsoever set aside: but because these means are unowed and pertain to the supernatural order, all those knowledges are so many gratuitous illuminations, that is, graces of illumination. And indeed the extrinsic revelation itself is a grace of illumination in first act: but when from its application a knowledge is excited in us, this is a grace of illumination in second act, which, if it arises only naturally from the application of the object, is only a mediate illumination. To this place can be referred the testimonies of Scripture, as Psal. XVIII, 9: The law of the Lord is immaculate, converting souls; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, giving wisdom to little ones; the justices of the Lord are right, rejoicing hearts; the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes; and I Petri II, 21: Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you may follow his footsteps. Perhaps Augustine speaks of the same thing in De Spiritu et littera, c. 31: «By the persuasions of things seen God acts so that we will and so that we believe, whether extrinsically through evangelical exhortations... or intrinsically, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind.»

IV. As for the immediate illuminations, first of all it is clear that such gratuitous illuminations of the mind are possible; for, even with every question about the mode by which God can immediately illuminate the mind set aside, it must be certain antecedently to reason both that God can by Himself immediately do that which He does through secondary non-vital causes, of which kind are objects, and that the creator himself of the intellect can immediately modify it, and consequently also illuminate it. But moreover it is established that in fact immediate illuminations are also to be numbered among the actual graces of the illuminations of the mind. Indeed, Scripture speaks not infrequently of these. For a) in 2. Cor. III, 5 the Apostle says: Not that we are sufficient to think (the discourse is about salutary thought) anything from ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God. It must be noted that the sufficiency of thinking is something subjective, like a power; when, therefore, our insufficiency of thinking is spoken of, it is signified that the force of the intellect is not, of itself, subjectively equal to thinking as it ought. This interpretation, indeed, must first be defended. Surely it was approved by the Latin Fathers in the Pelagian controversy and confirmed by the decrees of the synods in a matter of faith (Syn. Arausic. II, c. 7): what, therefore, prevents us from judging this to be the sense of the Apostle, account being had also of the original text? The distinguished interpreter Iustinianus says that the sense of the Greek words οὐχ ὅτι ἱκανοί ἐσμεν, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν λογίσασθαί τι is this: that we can arrogate nothing to ourselves, impute nothing to ourselves, that we are not worthy to attribute anything to ourselves, because all our dignity ἐν ἱκανότητι is from God. He confirms this interpretation by the authority of Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius. He adds, moreover, that it coheres with the preceding, as the Apostle had said that he has confidence through Christ toward God.

But ἡ ἱκανότης is certainly also sufficiency, and ἱκανός means sufficient in the idiom also of the N. T. and of Paul: let there be compared in the same epistle c. II, 6; or, which comes to the same, ἱκανὸς means fit, as ibid. v. 16 and 2. Tim. II, 2. Likewise λογίζεσθαι is also to think or to meditate, 1. Cor. XIII, 5 and more evidently Philipp. IV, 8. And yet this interpretation, in our passage 2. Cor. III, 5, coheres with the preceding; indeed, it is demanded by the context. For the sense of the whole discourse comes back to this: we glory before God concerning our ministry toward you, meanwhile claiming nothing for ourselves, since from ourselves we are not even able to think anything. The particle xai in the following verse — «But our sufficiency is from God, who also made us fit ministers of the new testament» — would be redundant, supposing the other interpretation. For in that interpretation the dignity which is from God would be this very dignity of the ministry: but the particle et teaches that one thing and another are different, namely that we are said to have been made fit in the preceding verse and in the following one, which we clearly understand, if the discourse is first about sufficiency or fitness for thinking, then about fitness for the ministry.

These things being posited, it is certain that here there is discourse about thought in the salutary order, that is, about salutary thought: for the Apostle also seeks the proof or the declaration of his insufficiency from this: that God made him a fit minister of the New Testament; surely the insufficiency is in that order in which there is confidence (v. 1) toward God, who makes us sufficient and fit; but this confidence is had through Christ; confidence, however, leaning on the merits of Christ, pertains to the order of salvation.

But now our mind is said to be insufficient for thinking from itself either on account of that common reason — because God also created us, and without God conserving and cooperating we can do nothing — or on account of some special reason. The first cannot be admitted. For the sufficiency of which Paul speaks depends on the merits of Christ and is of the same order as the sufficiency for the ministry of the Apostleship: but sufficiency of this kind is not from creation, nor from that operation of God owed to nature, such as is conservation and cooperation. Moreover, the sufficiency which the Apostle says is from God is said by him at the same time also to be ours: «we think, namely, from ourselves, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν»; we have, therefore, the power of thinking, yet in such a way that we have this very thing from God, not as of ourselves, οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν: but this is more than the simple cooperation of God. But the special reason is either in this, that we need the extrinsic proposition of a thinkable object, or, moreover, an intrinsic illumination. The first, again taken separately, is not enough; for in reality that which we cannot think solely because the proposition of the object is lacking, and which, once the object has been proposed, we are able to think, with regard to that, speaking at least in human fashion, we are said to be sufficient by ourselves. Therefore this sufficiency of thinking, which is from God, must be said to be some intrinsic gift perfecting the mind, so that the mind, furnished with it, is able to do what by itself alone it could not do: this, however, is that which is called immediate illumination. Therefore we are taught that, even though the object exists, unless God helps, supplying strength from within, the mind cannot think as it ought.

b) 1. Cor. III, 7: Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. What is signified by the metaphor of planting and watering is evident: namely, to exhibit the institution of the Faith, or the erudition of the intellect in the order of salvation, through an extrinsic ministry. But to give the increase is to effect that the plant unfolds and grows, namely to effect that whole which is the end of the planting and of the watering. God, therefore, ὡς ἀληθῶς giving the increase, performs all that both he who plants and he who waters intend. «He who gives the increase does not strengthen the tree or the vine, but creates. For by that increase it comes about that even the planted wood produces and fixes a root. By that increase it comes about that the cast seed sends forth a shoot.» (Aug. L. III. cont. epist. Petiliani). Wherefore in this business God alone is said to be something, namely something great, achieving (cf. Philipp. II, 13). But how does God provide increase of this kind? Consider that that which is done through the extrinsic ministry, that same thing God, as principal cause, works through His ministers. Moreover, besides that, God giving the increase works another thing, and indeed a more excellent one, without external ministry. I say without external ministry: for if He did that also through ministers, just as the two former things, which God does as principal cause, are attributed to the ministers because God acts through them, so there would be no reason why this third also should be denied to the ministers, if this too were done by God through them. Therefore this increase is supplied by God through something else besides the mediate illumination, which is had through the extrinsic ministry. It is supplied, namely, the very subjective sufficiency of thinking and of willing as one ought, by which it comes about that the seeds cast are rightly received and cultivated and grow in us. Wherefore again it is rightly said that he who plants and he who waters is nothing, namely, that he confers little and something by itself alone insufficient in this business, but that he who gives the increase is something; not because they confer nothing under God, but because they do not supply the powers, nor are they related to the work as efficient cause, but only as a condition. «He Himself (says August., De Grat. Christi c. 19) works the fruit in the good trees, who both waters and cultivates from without through any minister whatsoever, and by Himself gives the increase intrinsically.» c) 1a. Ioan. II, 20: You have the unction (χρῖσμα) from the Holy One and you know all things; and 27: His unction (χρῖσμα) teaches you about all things. But now, comparing Act. IV, 27; X, 38; Hebr. I, 9; 2a. Cor. I, 21, χρῖσμα is indeed received in many ways by the interpreters, an ointment but one poured out (for otherwise, what would it confer? whence the Vulgate rightly rendered it unctio): yet it easily agrees among all that there is signified by it some infused gift, a gift, however, of wisdom or of prudence; for there is question of doctrine.

Moreover, this unction is first interior as to its effect; namely, it is the intellect that is taught: moreover, it is also interior as to its efficiency, so that the Spirit teaches the intellect not only through the extrinsic legitimate and authentic magisterium, but also, and moreover, by an immediate interior efficiency or operation. The reason is that the operation of God which is the extrinsic magisterium of His ministers cannot be called the unction of the Spirit teaching; for unction represents an immediate operation upon the subject which is said to be anointed, which here is the intellect, which is taught. Therefore the intellect is steeped in an immediate interior unction, that is, it is illuminated by an immediate illumination. August. on this passage, Tract. III in I. Ioann.: «Do not think that anyone learns anything from a man. We can admonish through the sound of our voice; if there is not one who teaches, our sound is vain.... Where His inspiration and unction is not, words resound vainly from without.» «For man hears (says the same, de peccat. merit. et remiss. I. I. c. 25) a man or an angel speaking; but that he may feel and know that what is said is true, his mind is sprinkled within by that light which is eternal, which also shines in darkness.»

Finally, if the testimonies of Scripture adduced in the preceding part, from the epistle to the Ephesians and from the Psalms, are compared, it is manifest that the illumination of the mind is besought from God for those who have already received and hold the extrinsic revelation, and it is besought that the due knowledge may be had, lest they be overtaken by the darkness of death; therefore, besides the mediate illumination, mention is made of some other interior one, which proceeds immediately from God. Therefore.

V. The Fathers also teach this expressly. Besides Augustine already cited, Prosper sings thus in Carm. de ingratis c. 14: Not by counsel alone and by benign exhortation — persuading and teaching, as though it had the form of law — does Grace work, but changing the mind within and reforming it, and fashioning a new vessel from the broken one by the power of creating.» The Author of De Vocatione omnium gentium, L. 1, c. 3: «When, therefore, the word of God is brought to the ears of the flesh through the ministry of those preaching, the operation of divine power is mingled with the sound of the human voice, and He who stirred up the office of the evangelizer also strengthened the affection of the hearer; for the food of the soul, the Word, grows sweet, the old darkness is driven out by new light, and the interior gaze is stripped of the darkness of ancient error.» Because, namely, «the divine discourse sounds in vain to the outward ears, unless God opens the hearing of the interior man by a spiritual gift:» as, with Fulgentius in the conclusion of the book De Incarn. et Grat., teach Gregory the Great, hom. VIII in Ezechielem, Bernard, De Conver. ad Clericos c. 1, Thomas, Lect. VI in Ioan. XIV, 26, and those who above all are to be heard, the Fathers of the Council of Arausic. II, cn. 7, by which we are taught that for believing as one ought the illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary. Moreover, let it be noted that this definition was laid down against the Semi-Pelagians and the Pelagians, who readily admitted the external grace of revelation and the mediate illumination.

VI. It remains to be proved that the immediate illumination is more excellent than the mediate. Indeed, if you consider each separately, a comparison cannot truly be made; because the immediate is never given alone, and alone it would accomplish nothing: but they must be considered as they are in the concrete. Moreover, with the immediate inspiration supervening, a more excellent effect is obtained; for it is this which intrinsically elevates the faculty and supplies the power and the strength for thinking as one ought, and this is what, according to the Fathers, is required in order that we may operate rightly. Therefore.

I. By the name of inspiration there is understood in general that help by which the will is aroused and rendered capable of willing and operating as it ought. A twofold divine inspiration is distinguished, insofar as the will is affected, namely mediated and immediate. Of course, on account of the ontological connection between the exercise of the intellect and the exercise of the will, it comes about that, the illumination of the mind existing, a certain motion arises of itself in the will proportionate to that illumination. Wherefore he who illuminates the mind is also to be said, through this illumination, to move and arouse the will. This is the mediated motion or inspiration. That divine inspiration of the will is therefore called mediated which exists in the will on account of the divine illumination of the intellect. The reason why it is called mediated inspiration is that through it God does not act upon the will except through the mediation of the intellect, which, since it is already in act on account of the identity of the thinking and willing subject and on account of the natural connection of both operations, moves the will objectively. Mediated inspiration can be distinguished as twofold: extrinsic, namely that which takes place through an extrinsic and mediated illumination; and intrinsic, that which takes place through an immediate illumination.

Moreover, besides this twofold mediated inspiration, which we have described thus far, there is another, which is called immediate, namely that by which God acts physically upon the very principle of willing and perfects and elevates it. This other inspiration is a grace distinct from the illumination of the mind; and by the nature of the case, the illumination of the mind could be had without this inspiration of the will, and, conversely, the immediate inspiration of the will could be had without the immediate illumination of the intellect. It must be proved that both inspirations are to be numbered among actual graces.

II. Mention of that grace which we call inspiration of the will is most frequent among the Fathers. Indeed, just as in Augustine there occur appellations proper to that grace which is formally in the intellect, such as pious thought De bono persev. c. 8., high and secret calling Epist. ad Vitalem CCXVII, speech in thought Serm. XI, de Elia et Vidua Sarept., certain knowledge De pecc. merit. et remis I. II. c. 18, opening what lay hidden Ibid. c. 19., «knowledge of the truth»Serm. XVII in Psal. CXVII, 11. 3: so likewise there occur most frequently formulas by which is signified the grace that formally inheres in the will, such as infusion of charity Cont. duas epistt. pelag. L. II. c. 8., inspiration of love Ibid. I. IV. c. 5, spirit of charity ad Simplic. L. I, q. I., the grace by which the charity of God is poured out in our hearts De Grat. Christi c. 20, delight De Spirit. et lit. cap. 29, heavenly delight Serm. XLII. de verbis Isaiae n. 3, joyfulness in Psalm. LXXXV, condelectation de Nupt. et Concup. L. I. c. 38, pleasure in Ioann. Tract. 20, inspiration of sweetness Serm.

XVII in Psalm. CXVIII. n1. 3) desire for the good (Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. II. c. 9) holy desire (Cont. Maxim. L. I. c. 9) good will (De Gratia Christi. c. 24). Now, that mediated inspiration pertains to actual grace is left certain from the preceding thesis. For mediated inspiration is necessarily connected with the illumination of the mind; for, this being posited, by the nature of the case a certain motion follows in the will: since therefore the illumination of the mind pertains to actual grace, the mediated inspiration of the will will also necessarily pertain to it, since the illumination of the intellect itself is given for the sake of operation. Wherefore also the interior mediated inspiration must be certain. The question, therefore, cannot properly be about anything but the immediate inspiration.

III. It must therefore be proved that the interior immediate inspiration also is to be numbered in the class of actual graces. But it must be noted that the question now is not about the necessity of this grace, but it is only asked whether it is contained in the class of actual graces: which question indeed, as we said above about the illumination, can be raised either about the mere possibility or about the fact. Now, that it is possible, i.e., that in the order of possible actual graces this immediate inspiration also has a place, is easily clear. Immediate inspiration is that which, God acting physically in our will, exists in respect of some object proposed by the intellect. But it is certain that God can act physically upon the will by exciting acts both natural and supernatural; which indeed God brings about in the simplest way, i.e., by the command of His efficacious will; therefore.

But that inspirations of this kind are found also in the real order of actual graces is demonstrated from the fact that Tradition speaks of them as of graces which God confers. Indeed, in the Council of Carthag., ch. 4, it is defined that we are helped not only by the grace of God »because through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us; but also through it it is granted to us that what we have known must be done we may also love and be able to do.... since both are a gift of God, both to know what we ought to do and to love so that we do it, so that, charity building up, knowledge may not be able to puff up. A twofold grace is therefore distinguished, namely the one by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us; the other by which it is granted to us that what we have known must be done we may be able to love and to do.

But the former is the interior grace of immediate illumination; which is thus proved. For that which is placed by the Fathers in the lower position (not only), namely that the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, comprises whatever Pelagius conceded to the grace of God; but, as we shall say shortly and will certainly prove in its place, Pelagius also conceded the grace of interior illumination: therefore. Indeed, the very force of the words to reveal and open the understanding of the commandments designates that operation of God which acts upon the intellect, the commandments of God being present, i.e., proposed from without or in whatever way taken up for thought. Therefore here the Fathers speak of this immediate illumination.

Moreover, that is already of itself the grace of mediated inspiration. But besides this grace, which is knowledge and already the interior mediated inspiration, another grace is asserted, which is called charity, by which it comes about that we love those things which we have known must be done. That this is indeed another grace distinct from the former is evident even from this, that this latter builds up lest that one puff up, which cannot be said of one and the same grace merely having several effects. This other grace, moreover, besides the interior illumination, which is already the interior mediated inspiration, will necessarily be the grace of immediate inspiration. To this also pertains the statement adduced by Celestine among the authorities of the Apostolic See, ch. 8, namely «that God so works in the hearts of men and in the very free will itself, that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of good will are from God.» The emphasis is in that phrase, and He works in the very free will itself, by which the immediate action of God in the will is signified.

IV. Nor is the doctrine of Augustine different, who, having distinguished a twofold grace of illumination and of inspiration, calls the one greater than the other and supposes that the former can be without the latter. Indeed, it is certain that Augustine admitted the necessity of the interior grace of immediate illumination. It is established from his testimonies cited in the preceding Th., p. 20 ff. Therefore, although Augustine more frequently and chiefly inculcated the help of the will, because the principal question was about it, nevertheless, when occasion was given, Augustine also both taught and vindicated the immediate illumination, as is clear from the cited testimonies. Now, the certain opinion of Augustine, which he defended against the Pelagians, is that the grace of God is twofold, namely of knowledge and of love, the one distinct from the other. De Grat. Christi. c. XXVI. «Let Pelagius too manifestly confess that grace of God which is manifest in the divine utterances.... Let him distinguish knowledge and love, as they are to be distinguished. Nay, knowledge puffs up, charity builds up. And then knowledge does not puff up, when charity builds up. And since both are a gift of God, but one is less, the other greater, let him not so exalt our justice above the praise of our justifier, as to attribute the lesser of these two to divine help, and usurp to the human free will the greater.»Cf. also De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 19. But if the inspiration of the will is that which exists naturally in the will from the illumination of the intellect, besides the fact that, as we have said, in the order of favor there is not a twofold but one grace; it does not appear how the grace of illumination is the lesser, which is that which is done immediately by God and through which God is properly the principle of good works. And indeed it cannot be conceived how Augustine could have thought that the grace of illumination was conceded by God to Pelagius, and yet that love is vindicated for the powers of the free will, if Augustine had thought of that gift in the will which naturally follows upon the illumination. You will say that the grace of knowledge, of which Augustine speaks, is the external grace of the law and of doctrine. That is false; for if Augustine spoke only of an external grace of knowledge, and, as must be supposed in this objection, he thought the mediated inspiration sufficient, which is formally the interior grace of knowledge, he would not oppose the grace of knowledge to the grace of love, but the external grace of illumination to the simply internal grace of illumination. Since, moreover, he himself admitted and vindicated the immediate illumination, it is easy to infer from these things that the grace of knowledge, of which Augustine speaks, comprises also the immediate illumination of the mind. This indeed is a gift of God no less than the immediate inspiration of the will, although it is less; moreover, Augustine simply numbers both under the notion of a gift of God. And in very truth here Augustine proposes that grace of knowledge of which the Fathers of Carthage also spoke in canon 4.Moreover, it is, as we have seen, an interior grace. The grace is therefore twofold for Augustine according to the very notion of grace and favor; for the one is a lesser grace, the other a greater. Hence he also thinks that the former can be without the latter, De peccat. merit. et remiss. L. III, c. 17: «Men do not will to do what is just; either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight.» (to be sure, even if it is not hidden). But that what lay hidden may become known, and what did not delight may become sweet, is of the grace of God.»

But you will say: can it come about that grace puffs up? First, it is certain that knowledge is exhibited not as a cause but simply as an occasion of elation. Now what forbids such an occasion from being also the grace of interior illumination? Is it because it is a gift of God? but that is common to all other things: is it because it is an entirely gratuitous gift of God? but that also befits revelation: moreover, you will at least accept the words of the Fathers about this, if you reject our interpretation: is it because it is an interior gift and, as we shall see in its place, intrinsically supernatural? but even if this is known by the one possessing it, I do not see what it contributes, unless it be that one puffs up more easily, unless charity stand in the way. In sum, the vice of such elation in no way redounds upon the gifts of God but upon our weakness or malice; and just as one can be puffed up, undeservedly indeed, on account of the graces freely given, so too on account of others. But charity brings it about that it checks elation, and true actual charity cannot coexist with that sense of swelling.

V. What we have vindicated thus far borrows evident light from the following observation upon the heresy of Pelagius. Namely, Pelagius at length conceded the help of interior illumination, although not as necessary simply, but as opportune for acting more easily; but, this help being posited, the mediated help of the will also followed necessarily; and nevertheless Pelagius was always reprobated by Augustine, not only because he wanted grace to be given only for acting more easily, but because he denied simply the help of the will. This we shall place in its own light in its place, when we shall give the historical synopsis of the Pelagian heresy. For now cf. Petavius, De Pelag. et semip. haer., c. 4, n. 2; Livinus De Meyer, De pelagg. et massill. erroribus, c. 6.

Thus indeed, if the error of Pelagius is well weighed, it consisted in this, that he distinguished these three things, possibility or power, will (i.e., volition), and action, conceded that possibility is helped, but denied that the help of will and of action is necessary (August., De grat. Christi, c. 3 ff.). What, moreover, is it that possibility is helped, not the will? Namely, the power implanted in the nature of free will, in order to be constituted in proximate first act, needs certain extrinsic aids by which it may be made known what it is necessary or expedient to do: wherefore a help of this sort is referred by Augustine to the law and doctrine. The will, however, is not helped according to Pelagius, because the power of free will, constituted in first act through those things which are extrinsic to it, is already of itself capable of willing and acting well. On the contrary, the Fathers contended that the will itself is helped, because the good will itself (the volition) is a gift of God, who not only gives the power, but gives the very act, inasmuch as by His illumination and inspiration He prepares free will, and, prepared, helps it to will. Now, if the immediate inspiration of the will is not admitted, that Pelagian error does not appear to be sufficiently excluded, namely that only possibility is helped, but not the will; for the interior illumination itself, since it is extrinsic to the will, pertains rather to those aids by which possibility is helped, and it could be admitted by Pelagius and indeed at some time actually was admitted, without his confessing the help of the will.

VI. But a help of the will of this sort, whose profession the Fathers defended so strenuously, someone would wrongly and unskillfully confound with that concurrence of God which is necessary for all actions by the law of nature, so that a created operation may exist. Indeed, since Pelagius placed the grace of God in this, that God gave us the power of acting well, i.e., free will, Augustine pointed out (De Gratia Christi, c. 17 ff.) that this power implanted in free will is indifferent to good and to evil, and therefore is capable of both roots, namely of the good tree and of the evil tree; but the grace of God is the cause of nothing but good; through it we are made good trees, receiving from God the good will or charity: but we ourselves make ourselves evil trees through free will, falling away from the unchangeable good. Just as, therefore, it is false that the grace of God, by which we are helped to will and to act rightly, is that which we use both when acting well and when acting badly, so it is false that free will is grace. Now, those things which exclude free will from the dignity of grace exclude also that natural concurrence; for it too is indifferent, and it is at hand for those acting well and badly. Wherefore, when free will is excluded from the dignity of grace, that concurrence too, which is its necessary sequel, must be deemed excluded. Of it, however, Pelagius is never read to have made a detailed mention, nor were the Fathers solicitous about it (cf. what we shall say in the Synopsis of the Pelagian heresy under n. IV.).

VII. Having premised that observation which we gave in the preceding Th., n. VI, we demonstrate the last part of this thesis. Among actual graces, those hold the principal place to which the others are ordered as means, those which are the efficacious principle of salutary works: but such are the immediate inspirations of the will, which render the will powerful for meriting, and to which the illuminations of the mind are ordered as means. Whence Augustine, and chiefly about a grace of this sort, speaks against the Pelagians and prefers it to the former, and with him the Council of Carthage, as may be seen in the places cited above.

I. Now it must be declared more distinctly what this twofold grace of illumination and inspiration is. The opinion which we now propose here is not exclusive. We establish only that actual grace certainly comprises vital acts of the intellect and of the will: the exclusive question, however, will be treated a little later in Thesis XVI. The argument of this Thesis, clear and demonstrative, comes down to this. The notion of actual grace, namely what precisely it is, cannot be gathered except from those monuments from which alone we are infallibly taught the existence of the same and its offices: the Theologian, therefore, must strive to form in his own mind the notion of actual grace from those monuments. Wherefore if it is certainly established that the dignity of actual grace is claimed for some determinate thing, that thing will without doubt be to be numbered among the actual graces. But whether the Scriptures are consulted or the Councils or the Fathers, and those who have discoursed on grace most frequently and most abundantly both thetically and polemically, it is evident that actual grace is set forth as consisting in vital acts of the intellect and of the will. The assumption is proved. It is enough to compare what we have adduced in the two preceding theses. For it is manifest that the grace by which we are aided is called thought, opinion, operation of the truth, persuasion, speaking in thought, revelation, calling, illumination, illumination of the born eyes, inspiration and infusion of charity, charity, desire, longing, pleasure, sweetness, delight, delectation, most frequently a good will (i.e., volition).

But 1) Cognition, knowledge, charity, desire, delight and the like are formally vital acts both of the intellect and of the will, nor can they be conceived apart from those. 2) Illumination, revelation, opening of the truth, speaking are themselves also vital acts, both because the preceding appellations are used as synonyms of these, and because illumination of the intellect, revelation to it of some truth, speaking to it, cannot formally be obtained except through some act of thought excited in it. Hence inspiration of love, infusion of knowledge and the like signify the very vital acts of knowledge and love insofar as they are excited in us by God. Therefore all the appellations by which grace is represented in all Christian monuments are such that they formally exhibit some vital act either of the intellect or of the will: wherefore at least this must be concluded: therefore some vital acts are to be numbered in the census of actual graces.

II. And in truth the confused concept of actual grace received by all comes down to this, that actual grace is a certain divine motion of our faculties; but the motion existing in the intellect and in the will, insofar as it is received in them, must consist in some act of the same faculties; for motion is the act of the movable, just as mechanical motion is the act of the body; but the act of a vital faculty, which is moved insofar as it is vital, namely insofar as it is cognitive or volitive, cannot be anything but vital; therefore the divine motion existing in our faculties comes down to some vital act. Therefore that which exists in us when God moves us and which is called actual grace is at least some vital act.

I. A vital act is either indeliberate or deliberate: therefore actual grace, which consists in a vital act, will be either the one or the other, or both. Now indeed it is certain 1) that indeliberate acts can be actual grace. For a thought can be supernaturally excited in the mind and a spontaneous affection in the will, by which thought and affection man is moved and affected toward a good and salutary act: but this thought and affection is a certain help for acting, i.e., actual grace: therefore.

It is certain 2) that actual grace is in fact contained in indeliberate acts. For a) all the appellations which are given to actual grace (Th. VIII. n. II.) apply of themselves above all to indeliberate acts. $) Thus its origin in the soul is set forth, so that the first indeliberate movement of the faculties is evidently signified. August. ad Simplic. I. I. q. 2. n. 21. «Who can believe unless he is touched by some calling, i.e., by some testimony of things? Who has it in his power that his mind be touched by such a vision, by which his will is moved to faith?» And ibid. n. 22. «The will itself, unless something occurs which delights and invites the mind, can in no way be moved; but that this occurs is not in man's power.» Prosper adv. Collat. c. 71. «And who could perceive or relate through what effects the visitation of God leads the human mind, so that it follows what it fled, loves what it hated, hungers for what it loathed, and by a wonderful sudden change what had been closed to it are opened, what were burdensome are light, what were bitter are sweet, what were obscure are clear?» August. De Spir. et lit. c. 34. «By the persuasions of visions God acts so that we will and so that we believe, whether externally through evangelical exhortations... or internally, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind.» v) Actual grace, and therefore vital acts, are said to be in us, to be made in us by God without us; but this is proper to indeliberate acts, which man indeed elicits physically, but not insofar as he is master of his acts, whence they are not human acts. August. cont. duas epist. Pelagg. I. II, c. 9. «God does many good things in man which man does not do (he speaks of the pious thoughts by which the heart is prepared); but man does nothing which God does not do, that man may do it.» And De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 17. «He Himself works that we will, beginning; He who cooperates with those willing, perfecting. That we will, therefore, He works without us; but when we will and so will that we act, He cooperates with us.» Bernardus De Gratia. et lib. arbit. n. 14, he says the same: «God works these three things in us: to think the good, to will, to perfect. The first indeed without us, the second with us, the third through us; inasmuch as by sending a good thought He precedes us.» Grace precedes meritorious good works; but every meritorious work is deliberate; therefore grace preceding all good works must be placed in some indeliberate act. August. De natura et gratia c. 31. on those words: Reveal to the Lord your way and He will act, says: «He seems to have attended to no one when he said: and He will act, except those who say: we do it, i.e., we ourselves justify ourselves. Where indeed we also work: but we cooperate with Him working, because His mercy precedes us. It precedes that we may be healed, because it also follows that, healed, we may be nourished; it precedes that we may be called, it follows that we may be glorified; it precedes that we may live piously, it follows that we may live with Him forever.»

II. Furthermore, the indeliberate acts which pertain to the illumination of the mind are both simple apprehension and comparative apprehension, which precedes judgment, or judgment itself. And indeed simple apprehensions contribute to pious and salutary acts and are the beginning of holy life, and the same are signified by the testimonies already adduced. But among the illuminations of the mind those apprehensions are also to be numbered which immediately precede the act of judging and contain the knowledge of the thing to be judged or, which amounts to the same, the judgments themselves are to be numbered, which flow spontaneously from the excited apprehensions. For these also contribute, and indeed more, to salutary acts, and these too are counted by the Fathers among the graces. For that is surely signified when it is attributed to grace to know what we ought to do (Conc. Carthag. c. 1), to be persuaded by exhortations (Auctor De vocatione omnium Gentium L. II. c. 9), to be taught (August. De Gratia Christi c. 14), and to this pertains what Bernardus says De Interiori domo c. 26: «When does God move you? when He admonishes. He admonishes thus: you are vainly occupied, o wise heart: it does not become you to be subject to these things, but to preside over them: you do not need these for beatitude.» To this also pertains what August. says in Psal. XXXIV: «When He shall have said to my soul: I am your salvation, then it will live justly.»

III. That the indeliberate acts of the will pertain to actual graces has now been proved. It remains to be proved that also deliberate salutary acts, not indeed all indiscriminately, but certain ones and those many, are to be numbered among actual graces. To be sure, in order that a vital act can be called actual grace (i.e., a help preparing for operating salutarily), this is required: that it be a gratuitous gift of God, a principle of a good and salutary work. Now some salutary act, e.g., a free act of charity, can be the principle of other pious acts which it itself determines; but that prior act, by the fact that it itself was also made from actual grace, is in reality a gift of God and therefore grace: therefore this deliberate act must be called actual grace of God. Namely, some deliberate meritorious act can be of such a kind that it can be the cause of no other pious act, e.g., the last good act at the end of life: this act is a gift and grace of God, because made from grace, and therefore given by God; but it is not properly actual grace, because it cannot be the cause of a good act. But if some good act is the reason and principle of another, which is or can be; then that act, insofar as it depends on another preceding grace, is a gift of God and simply grace, because it proceeds from the gratuitous operation of God: insofar, however, as this act obtains both — both to be from God and to be the principle of a good act — it deserves the appellation of actual grace. These things sufficiently stand by themselves: but moreover they are certain also by the testimony of the Fathers. «How do I believe by will, if I am drawn? (says August.Tract. XXVI. in Ioan. n. 4. on those words: No one can come to me, unless the Father who sent me has drawn him) I say: it is little to be drawn by will; you are drawn even by delight. What is it to be drawn by delight? Delight in the Lord (this act of delight, since the Prophet exhorts man to it, is deliberate) and He will give you the petitions of your heart. There is a certain delight of the heart, to which that heavenly bread is sweet. Moreover, if the poet was allowed to say: each one is drawn by his own delight, not necessity but delight, not obligation but delectation: how much more strongly must we say that man is drawn to Christ, who delights in truth, delights in beatitude, delights in justice, delights in everlasting life, which all is Christ?» Moreover the Council of Arausic. II. after canon 25 says: «God, with no preceding merits, inspires in us both faith and love of Himself, so that we may faithfully seek the sacraments of baptism, and after baptism with His help may be able to fulfill those things which are pleasing to Him.» And in canon 17: «The fortitude of the gentiles worldly desire makes; the fortitude of Christians the charity of God makes, which is diffused in our hearts, not through the choice of the will which is from us, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us." Hence is that celebrated sentence of Augustinus De Gratia et lib. arbit. c. 16: «He makes us act by providing most efficacious powers to the will.» But what sort these powers are he soon explains, namely a pious, deliberate and likewise great will, such as the Martyrs had. «Who therefore wills to do the commandments of God and cannot, has indeed a good will, but as yet small and weak: he will be able, however, when he has a great and robust one: since the martyrs did those great commandments, they did them with a great will, i.e., with a great charity.»

I. An absolute deliberate act of the will willing to please God, to keep the law, to resist temptations, is, as we have proved, actual grace or assistance; but this act is of such a kind that, while it exists, that which is proposed by that act cannot fail to be, and it alone can be lacking if that act ceases. Therefore that good will is efficacious, and intrinsically, that is, by its own nature efficacious of further good; just as an absolute intention of the end efficaciously moves by its own nature to the choice of means, and an absolute will of believing, of keeping the precept, efficaciously moves by its own nature to the act of faith, to the observance of the precept. There is therefore some assistance placed in a deliberate act that is efficacious by itself, not indeed with an efficacy that would destroy free choice, but with an efficacy that presupposes free will aided by grace and depends on it.

II. To this point certain testimonies of Augustine look, in which the grace of God is set forth in such a way that it is intrinsically bound to its effect, that is, is efficacious by itself. He speaks, namely, of that grace which consists in a deliberate act, which is a gift of God and by itself efficacious of a further meritorious act. Such is De Grat. et lib. arbit. c. 16: «It is certain that we act when we act, but He makes us act by supplying the most efficacious powers to the will. When He says: I will make you act, what else does He say, but I will take away from you a heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh, whereby you act? and what is this, but I will take away the hard heart, whereby you did not act, and give you an obedient heart, whereby you act?" Truly an obedient heart cannot exist and the observance of the law not exist; but an obedient heart is an assistance placed in a deliberate act, which, since it is a gift of God and is efficacious by itself of further good, can and must be called the grace and assistance of God, and a most efficacious assistance. To the same point looks what Augustine says in De Corrept. et Grat. c. 11: «that the first man had received from God the power, if he willed; but he did not have the willing that he was able to have, for if he had had it, he would have persevered.» For this willing, which he did not receive, is a deliberate act of the will efficacious of persevering, that is, of obeying God. And of the gift of perseverance c. 8: «But why, he says, is the grace of God not given according to the merits of men? I answer, because God is merciful. Why then, he says, not to all? And here I answer, because God is a (just) judge.» The grace, which is not given to all, is grace placed in a deliberate act, that is, that prevenient grace infallibly connected with the deliberate act.

NOTE. We have just proved that deliberate acts also belong to actual graces, and that the same are efficacious by themselves; how, however, these graces are conferred upon us, we have not said, nor is it the question of this place.

I. We presuppose 1) that the vital acts of the senses precede the rational acts; 2) that the sensitive appetite is here assumed to be a faculty distinct from the will; for if it is the same faculty, what has been said in general about the indeliberate acts of the will is to be understood of the will insofar as it is also inclined toward sensible things. But if the sensitive appetite is a distinct faculty (which we by no means affirm), it can be asked whether, besides the acts of the will, the acts of this sensitive appetite can pertain to actual grace.

II. Therefore, in order that the indeliberate vital acts of the senses and of the appetite may obtain the character of actual grace, it is required and suffices that they be gratuitously excited in us by God and that they avail us for salutary works. Now it is evident a) that God can excite in the phantasy some determinate imagination, and indeed in two ways, namely either with no imagination preceding or with some imagination preceding. Furthermore, if some imagination precedes, many other imaginations can naturally be excited from it; but God can also determine one of these rather than another, namely that one which proposes an object fitting for the intellect. It is evident b) that God can excite in the appetite a determinate act of appetition. For, once some object is proposed through the sense, some act necessarily arises in the appetite; but this act is also naturally diverse, being either of pursuit or of flight, not only according to the diverse character of the object, but also according to the diverse disposition of the subject; so that, on account of the disposition contracted from a preceding direction of reason, even toward an object in itself delightful and apprehended by sense, 1° the appetite does not immediately blaze up, 2° but rather awaits the motion of the rational part and, following it, shrinks from the baseness, which is also sensible. These things are established by experience; and they are indeed more easily explained if it is the will itself that is borne toward good sensible objects (cf. de Deo Creant. Th. XLIV. n. 111). Consequently, when an object is proposed by the sense under a certain delightful character, a motion of flight and aversion is possible in the appetite. But God can excite in the appetite those motions that are possible to it, even if their natural disposition does not yet exist, i.e., that disposition contracted by the force of reason: God can therefore determine in the appetite those acts that are conformable to reason. Likewise, God can prevent the motions of the flesh from being excited, by which the imagination is sharpened and the appetite grows hot, whether mediately by removing extrinsic causes, or immediately by curbing those motions, or by exciting in the appetite opposite or diverse motions, or by presenting to the phantasy or the intellect diverse objects that call the mind more to themselves. It is evident c) that from a vehement delight of the spirit a certain delight is poured back into the sense, or that the sense also shares in the delight of the spirit; and this sensible delight contributes greatly to the exercise of virtue. But God, who can infuse any delight whatever into the spirit, will also be able to communicate delight to the sense accordingly. But if God excites in the sensitive part these motions, which we have so far enumerated, then He both works something gratuitous in man and works that which greatly contributes to salutary acts: therefore.

III. And in truth, that something occurs to us which stirs a pious thought in the mind pertains to the grace of the illumination of the mind, as Augustine teaches; but extrinsically the excitation of a fitting phantasm contributes most to this, which is indeed extrinsic to the intellect, but intrinsic to man. But the grace of inspiration, of which the Fathers speak, is such that it can belong also to the sensitive appetite. For that grace is called the inspiration of delight, through which what did not delight becomes sweet; and this lack of delight occurs most especially when we are attacked by concupiscence; but this sweetness can be excited in the sense itself. And indeed the Acts of the Martyrs bear witness that in many martyrs a sweetness of this kind was excited in the sense against the very pains of the body. Furthermore, the faithful are accustomed to ask of God not only victory against the impulses of the flesh, but also the cessation of the same (2. Corinth. XII, 8): but God bestows this grace either by removing extrinsic causes, or by acting physically on the organs of sense, or by exciting opposite or diverse acts of the appetite. Therefore such operations of God are to be numbered among the actual graces.

IV. You will ask whether sensitive acts of this kind are to be judged supernatural. I answer that they are certainly supernatural as regards the mode and by reason of the end to which they are ordered; which is enough for them to be grace supernatural in a certain respect. See more in Ripalda De Ente Supernat. D. XLIV. sect. 9.

External providence is said to be that which disposes those things which are around us or around our soul, effecting nothing in it really. Of this there are several effects. Of those effects which immediately and of themselves look to this, that our intellect be illuminated and the will be excited to act rightly, of which sort are the preaching of the word, the examples of Christ, etc., we have already spoken when we treated of the grace of illumination. But there are also other effects which, although in themselves indifferent, nevertheless by the disposition of divine benevolence and with the circumstances in which man finds himself considered, can conduce to promoting his supernatural good, of which sort are, e. g., either fortunate events or calamities themselves, association with certain persons, having been born among Catholics, infirmities, premature death, the removal of occasions of sin, and the like. From these things it is clear that this providence can be distinguished by reason of its term into positive, insofar as it does something, and into negative, insofar as it removes something. It is to be supposed that all these things which happen to us are ruled by divine Providence, and that it loves us and ordains us to the last end.

II. Now indeed it cannot be denied that this external providence, which works so much and so manifoldly around us, is a certain actual grace. It is grace, for these are benefits proceeding from the love of God which, considered individually, are not owed to the individuals to whom they are conferred; besides the fact that the whole economy of Providence, since it is supernatural at least by reason of its end, is, insofar as it is such, unowed to the whole of nature. But they are benefits which of themselves conduce to the eternal salvation of men and are conferred to this end. To how very many have adversities and infirmities profited, and also honors and riches, and likewise death anticipated for some, but for others a prolonged life? It is actual grace; because it consists in a transient operation of God, which works this and that for our benefit.

This doctrine is implanted in the minds of the faithful; the Fathers commend it cf. the testimony of Augustine cited in Th. IV. n. IV. and Scripture teaches it both in many other places and also when it refers to the grace of God (Sap. IV, 12) that the just man was taken away lest malice change his understanding, as the Fathers explain, about which matter we shall have to speak when the grace of perseverance is to be discussed.

Providence of this sort, or the execution of this providence, is supernatural by reason of its end, and is likewise also supernatural according to its effects, namely when miracles are wrought.

I. We supposed in the preceding theses that powers are conferred on man by actual grace, as the very definition of this same grace teaches; now we ask whether this is true and of what kind these powers are. This thesis is not exclusive; for we shall teach in the following Thesis that grace also confers powers of another order.

It is certain that actual grace exercises a moral causality with respect to the human will. For it calls, stirs, draws, and allures the will to the good: indeed, because it is itself the calling, stirring, etc., it obtains this moral causality after the manner of a form: but God, who is the author of the calling, stirring, etc., namely He who calls, stirs, etc., is under this respect the efficiently moral cause of the acts of those who are done because of that calling, stirring, etc. However, this moral causality of grace must be distinguished, at least in concept (whether it is really distinct we shall discuss at the end of the thesis), from those moral powers which in the thesis we say are conferred on the will by grace. For the moral power of grace is called that power by which it comes about that it is more or less easy to overcome the difficulties arising from the inclination innate in us to those things whose love is not conformable to reason; insofar as because of certain thoughts and affections toward the good implanted in us by God we are able to overcome those difficulties, whether because the inclination to the good is increased, or because the inclination to evil is diminished. This power is therefore called moral, because it is situated in a certain knowledge, delight, inclination, etc., by which, as such, not a physical but a moral faculty for the act is obtained, for the reason that a certain difficulty is removed and facility is procured, while even without it there exists in us the physical power for the act.

But now it is manifest that actual grace provides such powers to the will. For it is itself the knowledge opportune for acting honestly, it is itself the delight, the sweetness of the good, the affection of soul and the inclination to acting honestly, it is itself the love and complacency in the good, the ardor of charity and the inclination toward the good; but when these exist, the proneness to evil is at least diminished and facility to the good is added or increased: therefore the soul formally equipped with these obtains moral powers for the good. Certainly experience teaches us that when we experience difficulty in acting honestly, this proceeds from the fact that we feel a certain inclination, more or less vehement, to dishonest things, which if some supervening light of truth and affection and sweetness of the honest should occupy the soul, immediately the difficulty vanishes, at least in great part, and we feel ourselves eager for performing every arduous honest deed: but this is done through actual graces: therefore.

III. But it will not be inopportune to discuss something about the force and necessity of indeliberate acts in the natural order itself, so that the analogous character of grace may be understood more fully.

a) Do such indeliberate movements of the will, then, always exist in us before deliberate acts? If we consult experience first, it is certain that most frequently from the knowledge of the intellect indeliberate movements are stirred up in the will, which are an affection toward that which is proposed as good or an aversion from that which is proposed as evil, and it is frequently certain that both movements are stirred up at the same time in the will, according as the objects proposed together are diverse, or the diverse respect which is considered by the intellect in one object. But the eliciting cause of these movements is not free; because the exercise of liberty is not yet present, but it is a necessary cause; the will elicits these movements, namely, insofar as it is nature. But a necessary cause in the same circumstances always acts in the same way: therefore such movements always exist in those circumstances. But the circumstances in which experience shows those indeliberate movements to exist are either the mere knowledge of some thing going before, or at most the knowledge of a thing which in some respect regards us and can procure for us some good or evil. Therefore, as often as such knowledge goes before, such spontaneous movements must exist.

b) But if the question be raised why these acts exist, we first answer that this is the nature of the human will, that when it passes from potency to act it proceeds gradually, as it were by steps, and therefore before deliberate acts it bursts forth into such imperfect spontaneous acts, which are a certain way and disposition to those deliberate acts. We answer secondly that the final cause of these indeliberate movements, or that which nature itself intends through them (which indeed is that which naturally follows from them), is the preparation of the will for deliberate acts, whether it be a preparation necessary simply that a deliberate act may exist, or necessary in a certain respect, namely, that the deliberate act may exist in a sweet and easy manner. We certainly experience this in ourselves, that unless something pleases us under some respect, we do not choose it. And indeed the will, even when it acts most orderly, seeks its own good, for the good is proper to each one; therefore it is necessary that the intellect propose that which is to be chosen also as a good of the will. But now, whether because from this proposition of the intellect that spontaneous complacency of the will follows necessarily, or because it is required that the will choose (for one or the other must be the case, since these acts exist, as we have seen, with natural necessity), it will always be true that these acts are the natural element of the disposition and preparation of the will for deliberate acts.

Nevertheless, just as some knowledge is indeed required for the exercise of liberty, but it is not necessary that that be chosen which is apprehended with clearer and more certain knowledge, so although some spontaneous complacency be required, it is nevertheless not necessary that the will, which is mistress of its own act, follow the more vehement one: although this not infrequently happens.

c) But concerning the necessity of this spontaneous affection or complacency excited in the will from the knowledge that goes before, Augustine speaks in L. I. ad Simplician. 9. II, n. 21: «Who, he says, would embrace in his mind something that does not delight him?» and in the following n. «the will itself, unless something occurs that delights and invites the mind, can in no way be moved: but that this should occur is not in man's power.»

From these considerations moreover it follows that when the spontaneous affection toward something is weak and, on the contrary, vehement toward another, it is difficult and rarely happens that the will is freely borne toward the former.

IV. This grace, insofar as it bestows sweetness and facility on the will, is healing grace, insofar as this is understood as that grace which heals the wound, namely of concupiscence, whose necessity arises from the loosened rein of concupiscence; for a certain impotence of acting honestly has been introduced because of the relaxed concupiscence in us from the sin of the first parent. This impotence, with respect to individual acts, is diminished or removed by healing or medicinal grace, about which Augustine speaks so frequently. In this matter, lest you be deceived, note that this grace is in the present order supernatural, and besides this office of healing the wound of concupiscence it also performs another, about which in the following Th. But in the state of integrity, in place of this grace insofar as it is medicinal against the movements of concupiscence, there was the habitual gift of integrity, which was itself also gratuitous.

V. Briefly now the question is to be settled which above we left in the middle: namely, whether the moral causality of grace is the same as the moral power which it confers. We answer, however, that in reality they are the same. For moral causality belongs formally to grace, insofar as it is formally a calling, a stirring, and the like: but this calling, stirring, etc. is in reality nothing other than knowledge, persuasion, delight, complacency, sweetness, etc., which are all vital acts; moreover, the will equipped with these is formally made morally more powerful for acting: therefore. But they differ in concept; because the moral causality of grace is regarded insofar as grace is from God provoking man to the good, while the powers are regarded insofar as grace itself, existing formally in the faculty, makes it expedite for acting.

VI. But what we have taught about the moral powers conferred by actual grace is not so universally and exclusively to be taken, as if we wished to say that there are no moral powers for acting honestly without actual grace, or that any actual grace by itself alone confers powers sufficient for the perfection of the work: but we have affirmed only that actual grace, when it is conferred, provides moral powers, and indeed any actual grace confers some moral powers toward something.

APPENDIX.

The perfection of the indeliberate movements, which God excites in the soul to obtain some consent of the will, can be so great that the opposite dissent of the will becomes morally impossible.

I. We call morally impossible that which, although it is physically possible, is nevertheless extremely difficult for our nature and therefore, considering the common manner of acting of men, either never or almost never happens. Now with these principles laid down which we stated in the preceding Thesis, it is manifest that when knowledge either represents two opposite objects, or one object both under the respect of the eligible and under the respect of the non-eligible, it can happen that the indeliberate movement of the will toward one object or toward one respect of the object is most vehement, and the indeliberate movement toward the opposite is very slight. In this hypothesis, however, it is morally impossible, i.e. extremely difficult, that the will choose that toward which there exists a very slight indeliberate movement. But by not choosing that, it will choose that toward which it is borne most vehemently; for the will constituted in first act necessarily does something, liberty existing toward either alternative. But God can excite indeliberate movements toward some eligible good in such a way that they are most vehement and the movements toward the opposite are very slight: therefore. The physical possibility nevertheless remains, because that very slight movement toward the opposite is sufficient for the will, because of its own indifference, to embrace it, but the moral possibility is lacking.

Indeed Ripalda, De Ente Supern. D. CIX. Sect. 2. says that this is the common opinion of the Theologians and that he knows no one who denies it. He brings forth, however, from authority, to prove this, an argument from Prov. XXI, 1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it — and from August. Enchir. c. 98. «Who would so impiously rave as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, which He wills, when He wills, into the good?» and other similar testimonies of the same author. Moreover, for this to be true, it is necessary that this power be ascribed to grace, by which, with the physical possibility indeed remaining, the moral impossibility of dissent can be engendered. Suarez, in the posthumous work De vera Intelligentia auxilii efficacis c. 35., proves that God can impose a certain necessity on the will toward the act: he disputes, however, how this could come to be; he supposes that some quality is possible, but he says it is more probable that it would come about through the action of God, n. 12. Then in n. 17. he makes mention of the kind of necessity which we have explained.

1. Indeed if it be supposed that the will cannot freely will that toward which it has not first been affected (at least by nature) with a spontaneous movement, it must also be said, speaking of the possible, that the divine excitation of indeliberate movements of this kind can also be such a cause, that together with these the deliberate movement of the will toward the opposite is physically impossible. Namely, God can bring it about not only that a most vehement indeliberate movement of inclination toward something exists, but also that any indeliberate movement of inclination toward the opposite ceases or is not excited, but rather that only a movement of aversion toward it exists: but in this hypothesis the dissent of the will is impossible not only morally, but physically; because, no natural indeliberate inclination existing toward something, there is lacking — as we suppose from the preceding Th. n. III. — the sufficient reason of the free consent of the will toward it. But if in this the will does not consent, it will certainly consent in that; because it must will something, as we have already reminded. Cf. Ripalda ibid. Sect. 3.

III. Note that when we claim this power for God and His grace, we do not teach that God in reality acts thus, much less that this is the ordinary and common manner of divine Providence, but we wish only to show what the grace of God can do, so that its moral efficacy may be thoroughly understood. But we think it is not absurd to judge that God has repeatedly so acted and acts with His Saints; for whom if at that time the expedite power of meriting is actually lacking, this defect (which otherwise is present in us very frequently, as when e.g. we sleep) will be compensated by that good which is a certain foretaste of heavenly beatitude. Cannot God grant to some wayfarer the vision of Himself for some brief space of time? Or will it be judged impossible or illicit for God, because then the power of meriting would cease?

Moreover, there must be ascribed to God the power of bringing it about, short of the communication of His immediate vision and with no coercion applied, that sin be physically impossible in the will. It is proved from the fact that natural beatitude is possible; but with the certainty and inamissibility of beatitude, the expedite physical power for the act of sinning cannot cohere; and God does not seem able to impede this in any better way than that which we have now proposed. Therefore.

Note. The doctrine on the moral efficacy of grace delivered in the preceding Th. is to be held accurately; because, as we shall teach later, the distinction between congruous and non-congruous grace, between efficacious and purely sufficient grace, depends on that moral efficacy of grace.

I. That prevenient grace adds moral powers is evident from what has been said. This moral power, if considered in itself alone, does not alter the physical power of acting. It is asked, therefore, whether grace also confers physical powers on us, so that through it the power of acting is physically greater. Physical power, or physical force, is the efficient principle of the act, so that without it that which is done through it can be brought about not merely with difficulty, but absolutely not at all. Physical power arises from the entitative perfection itself of the agent principle; indeed, it is that very perfection insofar as it is ordered to acting.

When, therefore, it is asserted that through grace physical powers for acting are added to the faculty, it is said 1) negatively, that the power absolutely necessary for eliciting salutary acts is not wholly from nature it is said 2) positively, that that power is also from grace; and therefore through grace formally existing in nature the physical power of the faculty is greater, so that the faculty can produce an act or effect more perfect in the order of being than without grace.

This, moreover, is what we defend, setting aside, however, the question that will have to be treated later, namely what and in what manner nature together with grace contribute to eliciting the salutary act. The demonstration for proving this must be sought from that concept of grace which all the Fathers, disputing about it accurately, formed in their minds and handed down to us.

II. Thus the manner of speaking of the divine witnesses concerning the power and efficacy of grace comes down to this: a) that without grace we do nothing that is expedient for salvation; that God works in us to will and to accomplish; that without grace we are not sufficient to think in a salutary manner; that through grace it is brought about that we are able to do what we have known to be done; that without grace we cannot fulfill the divine commandments; that it is brought about in us through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit that we are able to act as we ought: that grace is given not only that we may be able to fulfill the commandments easily, but that we may be able to fulfill them at all; that by the mere vigor of nature we are not able, not to say all or more, but nor to do anything that pertains to the salvation of eternal life; that God, by preparing the will through His grace, confers the power: c) that without grace no good work can be done, not even the least: indeed d) that neither Adam in integral nature, nor the Angels in the state of the way, could do anything good without the actual help of God. Cf. the authorities of the Apostolic See cited by Celestine, the Councils of Carthage and Orange II, Augustine passim in the works against the Pelagians, Prosper adv. the Collator, etc. It is clear that in these formulas the discourse is not about some dignity alone of the act, which accrues to it from the grace of God, but of itself and directly the discourse is always about the power of acting, which is conferred through grace, through the help of God, and through the help of God alone, and about the powerlessness of nature alone to do the same. Therefore, unless we wish to play with words, or to judge that the Fathers played with words, a certain power and efficacy of grace for salutary works is asserted in these formulas. Now this power is either moral only, or also physical: and it must be one or the other, because between them there is no middle. But it is evident that it is not only moral. For it is manifest that, if only moral power were conferred, it would be false that without grace no salutary work is possible, even that work which suffers no difficulty from the corruption of nature, such as thinking, so that it would have been impossible even for integral and angelic nature: for if only moral powers were conferred through grace, the salutary work would be only difficult without it, and therefore not every work would be impossible; but some work, in which especially there is no difficulty and where nature is not corrupted, could be done, and in fact would be done, and not infrequently. Therefore the power which is asserted of grace is a physical power. You will say that without a fitting natural thought no natural good whatsoever can be brought about by the will, and yet that thought confers not physical, but moral powers. I answer that it is false that without that thought and the subsequent fitting indeliberate affection a good cannot be done, if another thought of the same thing is present: but only this is true, that it is not done, and for this reason it is not done, because the will does not will it. But the Fathers do not teach only that without grace nothing of salutary good is done, but that nothing can be done, that there is not in nature the vigor for eliciting any good, whether a pious thought or a pious love; even if other thoughts bearing toward it are present.

II. It may also be proved from the analogy of faith. For it must be held that actual grace is a principle of life seated in second act, which is proper to the supernatural order; and therefore that the same grace intrinsically pertains to the supernatural order. Now it is evident from what has been said in the Treatise on the Supernatural Order (de Deo Creant. Th. XXX. seq.) that this order, in respect of ontological perfection, exceeds the natural order; consequently, the power of acting proper to the supernatural order must ontologically surpass the power of the natural order: since, therefore, that power is conferred through grace, it is necessary that grace bestow on our faculties a more excellent ontological perfection, which is nothing other than to confer physical powers on them. How this is done we can declare from those things which we will establish in Th. seq.