Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali
Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)
First published 1885
Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.
Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae
Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.
Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.
Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.
Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.
Although not every internal grace is, in the order of being, more excellent than any external grace; nevertheless, in the order of benefit, internal grace of itself surpasses external grace.
I. This is not a division of the grace of Christ, but of supernatural grace; for this division, no less than the following ones, can hold also for the grace of God. Indeed, this division, of which we treat in this Thesis, can find a place also in natural grace; we divide, however, only supernatural grace, because we do not have to treat of natural grace.
II. Internal grace consists in the divine gifts that are in us as in a subject; external grace consists in those gifts that are outside us and affect us. That both graces exist in the supernatural order is manifest. For external grace is the positive law of God, revelation, the preaching of faith, the incarnation and the examples of Christ, the divine Scripture, the magisterium of the Church, and other things of this kind, by which men are advanced toward eternal life. It is clear that these are both graces, because they are unowed, and supernatural graces — either in a qualified sense, as the positive manifestation of the natural law and the revelation of certain natural truths, or absolutely, as the revelation of the mysteries, the incarnation, the sacraments, and the like; for the former are an unowed means of nature for a clearer knowledge of the law and of the truths, while the latter are unowed to the whole of nature and are causes or instruments by which men are elevated to participation in the divine order. Internal grace is the justice of God, by which God makes the unjust just; it is the habits of the infused virtues; it is the illuminations of the mind and the inspirations of the will — by which gifts we are also made adopted children and live the divine life, in which matter the supernatural order itself essentially consists. Cf. s. Thomam I Ilae q. CVI. a. 2.
III. The distinction between external and internal grace manifests itself clearly in the Pelagian controversy; for Pelagius did not deny every grace, nor was he on that account regarded as a heretic: but while he conceded that for acting rightly and salutarily we are helped by the grace of God consisting in the law, the doctrine, and the examples of Christ, he nevertheless denied that the will is helped internally through the supply of the power of the Holy Spirit. This denying part was reprobated in him as heretical: he was not, however, regarded as a heretic because he held the graces to be external — which all the Fathers professed together with him — but because he excluded internal grace, especially that of the will, which, compared with external grace and having regard to operation, is called κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν grace, because it is precisely that which elevates the operating faculty and is the efficacious principle of the supernatural good work. The Fathers, therefore, distinguished between external and internal grace and preferred the latter to the former, so that external grace without internal grace was held useless; but nevertheless they confessed that those exterior gifts are also graces of God. Nowhere (says Aug. Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II) do those enemies of grace lay more hidden snares for attacking that same grace more vehemently than where they praise the law, which without doubt is to be praised. For by diverse modes of speech and a variety of words, in all their disputations, they want the law to be understood as grace, namely that we have from the Lord God the help of knowledge, by which we may know those things which are to be done, not the inspiration of love, that knowing them we may do them with holy love, which is properly grace.Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II
IV. The very protection of God, by which temptations and occasions of sinning are warded off, and that providence by which a man is brought to the end of life, when he is fit to attain eternal life, since they place nothing really in the soul, are extrinsic grace; yet they are truly grace: which grace, by reason of the end for which it is conferred, must be called supernatural; for it pertains to supernatural providence. Hence Aug. Serm. XCIX, n. 6, brings in God speaking: «This your God says to you: I was ruling you for myself, I was keeping you for myself: that you would not commit adultery, a persuader was lacking: that a persuader should be lacking, I brought it about: place and time were lacking, and that these should be lacking, I brought it about.... Acknowledge, therefore, the grace of him to whom you owe even what you did not commit. That man owes to me what was done and you saw forgiven: you also owe to me what you did not do. For there is no sin that a man commits which another man could not commit, if the Ruler by whom man was made were absent.» As for the other benefit, that is surely indicated by the words of Sapient. IV. 11 (even if we wish those words to be said specifically of Enoch, cf. Gen. V. 24): He was taken away lest malice change his understanding, etc.; and that this is a grace is evident of itself and is attested by August. De Praedest. Sanct. c. XIV, n. 29: «Our brethren, who together with us attack, for the catholic faith, the ruin of the pelagian error, ought not to favor this pelagian opinion, by which they think that the grace of God is given according to our merits, to such an extent that they should strive to destroy what they cannot dare to deny: the sentence plainly true and Christian from ancient times: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding.... For so it is clear that what we say is invincible, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.»
V. The Apostle had lucidly handed down the distinction between external and internal grace, inculcated by the Fathers, both in the Epistle to the Romans and in the Epistle to the Galatians. For Paul distinguishes the law given by God to the people of the Jews, through which is the knowledge of sin, from the faith by which we believe in Christ, by which we are justified, the Holy Spirit dwelling in us and diffusing the charity of God. Faith, therefore, and charity are interior gifts, by which we are made just. But the Apostle denies that justice is through the law; otherwise Christ would have died in vain: and he calls faith grace, Gal. II, 20. 21. Rom. III, 21. seqq. Now, that the law given by God is a gift of God, or grace, is clear of itself; for it is a commandment of God unto life, a commandment holy, just, and good, Rom. VII, 10. 12; but nevertheless it is not that which is called grace absolutely by Paul; besides the law, he teaches another grace, which is necessary, which makes us just, which gives us life intrinsically. Since, therefore, the law is external grace and faith, which gives us life intrinsically and makes us just, is internal, it is clear that internal grace is distinguished by Paul from external grace.
VI. We call that greater in the order of benefit which is more useful to us for attaining our perfection and happiness. Now external and internal grace are so related that, in the present order, if external grace alone were conferred, man would not be made just and saved; on the contrary, if internal grace alone were conferred, man would be justified and saved: therefore internal grace is more useful to man than external grace. And in very truth internal grace is the end of the other external benefits, insofar as they are benefits, or are ordered to our good and utility: but the end, as such, surpasses those things which are for the end. And assuredly by internal grace man is really elevated formally to the supernatural order; but external grace is either a cause or a certain disposition that he may be elevated and may remain and advance in that state. Therefore internal grace is a greater benefit than external grace. Moreover, since internal grace is thus preferred to external grace, each is to be considered separately with respect to what is proper to it and insofar as it is distinguished from the other and can be separated from it. But if some external grace is considered insofar as it at the same time includes the internal, or vice versa, then under this respect a comparison cannot be made; because there is no opposition.
VII. Nevertheless, if both graces are compared in the order of being. Namely, considering the intrinsic ontological perfection of both: it is evident that at least some external grace surpasses the internal; for the incarnation, e. g., of the Word, which is external grace, exceeds by its perfection any other gift conferred upon us. Therefore.