Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri

Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

Domenico Palmieri (1829–1909)

First published 1885

Dominicus Palmieri, S.J.'s Tractatus de gratia divina actuali (Gulpen, 1885) is a systematic Roman-school treatise on actual grace. After defining grace and its divisions, Palmieri examines its effects, necessity for fallen humanity, gratuitous character, efficacy, distribution, and relation to predestination, engaging Augustine, the Fathers, councils, Jansenism, and the scholastic disputes over physical predetermination. The sixty-two-thesis format exemplifies late nineteenth-century neo-scholastic dogmatic method: historical authorities are gathered into tightly argued theological conclusions. Schola presents the Latin work from the 1885 edition.


Prolegomenon I: Prolegomenon. De notione et partitionibus praecipuis gratiae divinae

Thesis I: Gratia, prout dicitur de bono aliquo alteri collato, definitur: beneficium ex benevolentia collatum citra exigentiam eius, cui confertur: ad quam definitionem redit illa communis Scholasticorum: donum gratis datum.

Thesis II: Gratia creata tum in donum naturale tum in donum supernaturale dispesci potest: supernaturale tamen donum potiore iure et magis proprie gratia dicitur; ita ut ea dona in ipsa ratione gratiae specifice differant.

Thesis III: Ratione habita tum status sive integritatis sive lapsus creaturae rationalis, tum principii meritori, quod proprium est alterius status, gratia supernaturalis distinguitur in gratiam Dei et gratiam Christi.

Thesis IV: Gratia supernaturalis alia est externa, alia interna.

Although not every internal grace is, in the order of being, more excellent than any external grace; nevertheless, in the order of benefit, internal grace of itself surpasses external grace.

I. This is not a division of the grace of Christ, but of supernatural grace; for this division, no less than the following ones, can hold also for the grace of God. Indeed, this division, of which we treat in this Thesis, can find a place also in natural grace; we divide, however, only supernatural grace, because we do not have to treat of natural grace.

II. Internal grace consists in the divine gifts that are in us as in a subject; external grace consists in those gifts that are outside us and affect us. That both graces exist in the supernatural order is manifest. For external grace is the positive law of God, revelation, the preaching of faith, the incarnation and the examples of Christ, the divine Scripture, the magisterium of the Church, and other things of this kind, by which men are advanced toward eternal life. It is clear that these are both graces, because they are unowed, and supernatural graces — either in a qualified sense, as the positive manifestation of the natural law and the revelation of certain natural truths, or absolutely, as the revelation of the mysteries, the incarnation, the sacraments, and the like; for the former are an unowed means of nature for a clearer knowledge of the law and of the truths, while the latter are unowed to the whole of nature and are causes or instruments by which men are elevated to participation in the divine order. Internal grace is the justice of God, by which God makes the unjust just; it is the habits of the infused virtues; it is the illuminations of the mind and the inspirations of the will — by which gifts we are also made adopted children and live the divine life, in which matter the supernatural order itself essentially consists. Cf. s. Thomam I Ilae q. CVI. a. 2.

III. The distinction between external and internal grace manifests itself clearly in the Pelagian controversy; for Pelagius did not deny every grace, nor was he on that account regarded as a heretic: but while he conceded that for acting rightly and salutarily we are helped by the grace of God consisting in the law, the doctrine, and the examples of Christ, he nevertheless denied that the will is helped internally through the supply of the power of the Holy Spirit. This denying part was reprobated in him as heretical: he was not, however, regarded as a heretic because he held the graces to be external — which all the Fathers professed together with him — but because he excluded internal grace, especially that of the will, which, compared with external grace and having regard to operation, is called κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν grace, because it is precisely that which elevates the operating faculty and is the efficacious principle of the supernatural good work. The Fathers, therefore, distinguished between external and internal grace and preferred the latter to the former, so that external grace without internal grace was held useless; but nevertheless they confessed that those exterior gifts are also graces of God. Nowhere (says Aug. Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II) do those enemies of grace lay more hidden snares for attacking that same grace more vehemently than where they praise the law, which without doubt is to be praised. For by diverse modes of speech and a variety of words, in all their disputations, they want the law to be understood as grace, namely that we have from the Lord God the help of knowledge, by which we may know those things which are to be done, not the inspiration of love, that knowing them we may do them with holy love, which is properly grace.Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II

IV. The very protection of God, by which temptations and occasions of sinning are warded off, and that providence by which a man is brought to the end of life, when he is fit to attain eternal life, since they place nothing really in the soul, are extrinsic grace; yet they are truly grace: which grace, by reason of the end for which it is conferred, must be called supernatural; for it pertains to supernatural providence. Hence Aug. Serm. XCIX, n. 6, brings in God speaking: «This your God says to you: I was ruling you for myself, I was keeping you for myself: that you would not commit adultery, a persuader was lacking: that a persuader should be lacking, I brought it about: place and time were lacking, and that these should be lacking, I brought it about.... Acknowledge, therefore, the grace of him to whom you owe even what you did not commit. That man owes to me what was done and you saw forgiven: you also owe to me what you did not do. For there is no sin that a man commits which another man could not commit, if the Ruler by whom man was made were absent.» As for the other benefit, that is surely indicated by the words of Sapient. IV. 11 (even if we wish those words to be said specifically of Enoch, cf. Gen. V. 24): He was taken away lest malice change his understanding, etc.; and that this is a grace is evident of itself and is attested by August. De Praedest. Sanct. c. XIV, n. 29: «Our brethren, who together with us attack, for the catholic faith, the ruin of the pelagian error, ought not to favor this pelagian opinion, by which they think that the grace of God is given according to our merits, to such an extent that they should strive to destroy what they cannot dare to deny: the sentence plainly true and Christian from ancient times: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding.... For so it is clear that what we say is invincible, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.»

V. The Apostle had lucidly handed down the distinction between external and internal grace, inculcated by the Fathers, both in the Epistle to the Romans and in the Epistle to the Galatians. For Paul distinguishes the law given by God to the people of the Jews, through which is the knowledge of sin, from the faith by which we believe in Christ, by which we are justified, the Holy Spirit dwelling in us and diffusing the charity of God. Faith, therefore, and charity are interior gifts, by which we are made just. But the Apostle denies that justice is through the law; otherwise Christ would have died in vain: and he calls faith grace, Gal. II, 20. 21. Rom. III, 21. seqq. Now, that the law given by God is a gift of God, or grace, is clear of itself; for it is a commandment of God unto life, a commandment holy, just, and good, Rom. VII, 10. 12; but nevertheless it is not that which is called grace absolutely by Paul; besides the law, he teaches another grace, which is necessary, which makes us just, which gives us life intrinsically. Since, therefore, the law is external grace and faith, which gives us life intrinsically and makes us just, is internal, it is clear that internal grace is distinguished by Paul from external grace.

VI. We call that greater in the order of benefit which is more useful to us for attaining our perfection and happiness. Now external and internal grace are so related that, in the present order, if external grace alone were conferred, man would not be made just and saved; on the contrary, if internal grace alone were conferred, man would be justified and saved: therefore internal grace is more useful to man than external grace. And in very truth internal grace is the end of the other external benefits, insofar as they are benefits, or are ordered to our good and utility: but the end, as such, surpasses those things which are for the end. And assuredly by internal grace man is really elevated formally to the supernatural order; but external grace is either a cause or a certain disposition that he may be elevated and may remain and advance in that state. Therefore internal grace is a greater benefit than external grace. Moreover, since internal grace is thus preferred to external grace, each is to be considered separately with respect to what is proper to it and insofar as it is distinguished from the other and can be separated from it. But if some external grace is considered insofar as it at the same time includes the internal, or vice versa, then under this respect a comparison cannot be made; because there is no opposition.

VII. Nevertheless, if both graces are compared in the order of being. Namely, considering the intrinsic ontological perfection of both: it is evident that at least some external grace surpasses the internal; for the incarnation, e. g., of the Word, which is external grace, exceeds by its perfection any other gift conferred upon us. Therefore.

Thesis V: Rursus gratia supernaturalis dividi debet in gratiam gratis datam, et gratiam gratum facientem, quae potior est illâ.

Thesis VI: Gratia gratum faciens alia est in habitu sita et permanens, alia actualis et transiens.

Caput I: De Gratiae actualis natura

Articulus I: De iis, quibus gratiae actualis ratio competit

Thesis I: Ad gratias actuales spectant mentis illustrationes tum quae tantum ab extrinseco excitantur in nobis, tum potissimum quas operatur quoque immediate Spiritus in mente nostra.

Thesis II: Ad gratiam actualem spectant quoque inspirationes voluntatis tum mediatae tum immediatae atque inspirationes immediatae inter gratias actuales enumeratas principem obtinent locum.

Thesis III: Gratiae actuales illustrationis et inspirationis continentur certe actibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.

Thesis IV: Actus vitales, quibus continetur gratia actualis illustrationis et inspirationis, quae principium est deliberati actus et operis boni, sunt primo quidem actus indeliberati utriusque facultatis tum vero etiam actus deliberati.

Thesis V: Ex quo corollarii instar consequitur inter auxilia, quibus voluntas adiuvatur, aliqua exsistere, quae sint per se efficacia.

Thesis VI: Ratio gratiae actualis extendi potest etiam ad actus indeliberatos sensus et appetitus sensitivi.

Thesis VII: Ratio gratiae actualis ad universam quoque providentiam externam tum positivam tum negativam, qua ad opera salutaria et ad beatitudinem homines promoventur, extendi debet. 1.

Articulus II: De viribus quas gratia actualis confert

Thesis I: Gratia actualis confert vires morales voluntati ad honeste agendum.

Thesis II: Tenendum est actualem gratiam nedum morales, sed physicas quoque vires addere facultatibus nostris ad actus salutares eliciendos.

Thesis III: Non demonstratur inter gratias actuales recensendas esse qualitates quasdam reales, non vitales et suapte natura fluentes, quae principium intrinsecum sint actus vitalis indeliberati supernaturalis: tenere autem licet quod actualis gratia absolvatur tum actibus vitalibus tum divina operatione elevante facultatem et cum ea producente actus supernaturales.

Articulus III: De generali habitudine gratiae ad voluntatem

Thesis I: Constat ita addi per gratiam formaliter vires tum physicas tum morales voluntati, ut ex voluntate et gratia unum constituatur principium actus deliberati salutaris, quod est nempe voluntas elevata, illustrata, inspirata.

Thesis II: Gratia actualis interior multipliciter dividitur, nempe in excitantem seu vocantem et adiuvantem, in operantem et cooperantem, in praevenientem et subsequentem, in antecedentem et concomitantem.

Caput II: De Gratia actuali necessaria hominibus lapsis

Articulus I: De potestate naturae ad actus ordinis naturalis

Thesis I: In ipsa natura intellectus humani positum est, ut per solas naturae vires sit ei impossibile cognoscere veritates sibi naturales omnes simul collective sumptas.

Thesis II: Liberum quoque arbitrium gaudet naturaliter potestate physica semper honeste agendi servandique legem naturalem; quamvis ad idem praestandum impotentia quadam morali laboret.

Thesis III: Merito proscripta est doctrina, quae statuit omne, quod agit peccator, peccatum esse et omnia opera infidelium esse peccata liberumque arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valere.

Articulus II: Quid natura humana per se sola non possit

Thesis I: Certum est, quoties in monumentis Ecclesiasticis doctrinam revelatam proponentibus legimus credendum esse quod bonum aliquod esse non possit in nobis vel actus aliquis fieri a nobis non possit citra auxilium gratiae, id de bonis et actibus salutaribus intelligendum esse.

Thesis II: Cum testificatione catholica satis constet citra gratiam nihil boni et salutaris in hominibus esse posse, speciatim affirmamus gratiae quoque deberi fidem saluturam eisdemque pium quodvis initium spiritumque precum.

Thesis III: Necessitas gratiae actualis ad agendum sicut oportet asserta a Patribus contra pelagianos, est necessitas non solum moralis, sed physica et absoluta.

Thesis IV: Ex qua doctrina Patrum consequitur actus salutares esse intrinsece h. e. entitate sua supernaturales.

Thesis V: Eamdem doctrinam necessitatis gratiae, quae saeculo V. a Patribus contra pelagianos propugnata est, iam Patres praecedentium saeculorum in Oriente et Occidente continenter tradiderant. 1.

Thesis VI: Gratia porro necessaria ad salutariter agendum iis, qui necdum sunt conversi ad Deum et quovis habitu supernaturali carent, est gratia duplex interior immediata, nempe illustrationis mentis et inspirationis voluntatis.

Thesis VII: Ut tandem de necessitate gratiae actualis pro iustis quoque disseramus, primum advertendum est quod cum gratia praeveniens dicitur necessaria ad omnes actus salutares, non eo ipso dicitur quod ad singulos actus nova gratia praeveniens sit necessaria.

Thesis VIII: Praestituto Tridentinae Synodi Sess.

Appendix I: De sententia Augustini circa necessitatem gratiae actualis in statu integritatis

Parergon I: De quadam sententia Ripalda

Caput III: De Gratiae actualis gratuitate et de praeparatione ad gratiam

Thesis I: Distincto merito operis condigno et congruo, docemus nullum esse posse in natura meritum, quo gratia comparetur atque utrumque pariter meritum naturae condignum et congruum a Patribus fuisse reiectum. 1.

Thesis II: Negandum est quoque naturam viribus suis posse sibi positivam dispositionem ad gratiam comparare.

Thesis III: Neque precibus naturae adseri potest vis impetratoria gratiae, ratione saltem habita huius, in quo versamur, providentiae ordinis.

Thesis IV: Calumnia est plurimos graecos Patres et nominatim Chrysostomum primas partes in ordine salutis tribuisse naturae et idcirco gratiam merito cuidam naturae congruo rependi affirmasse. 1.

Thesis V: Etsi illius theologici effati: *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*; interpretatio, quae statuit facientem quod in se est viribus naturae, se disponere negativa dispositione ad gratiam, permitti possit tanquam non derogans dignitati gratiae; attamen animadvertendum^[15.

Thesis VI: Gratuitas gratiae optime componitur cum impetrutione et meritis ope praecedentis gratiae comparatis.

Thesis VII: Formalis perseverantia, licet sit per gratiam, quae ex divina ordinatione ipsis debetur, in potestate omnium iustorum; est tamen adhuc donum Dei, distinctum a donis tum iustificationis tum illius potestatis divinitus collatae, ideoque donum speciale atque est donum iustis gratuitum; quod tamen iustus potest suppliciter emereri.

Caput IV: De Gratiae actualis efficacia

Articulus I: Synopsis historica controversiae Patres inter et Massilienses

Thesis I: Massilienses negarint ad salutare fidei initium necessariam esse gratiam interiorem immediatam praevenientem.

Thesis II: Gratia, quam Massilienses ad cetera opera necessariam fussi sunt, si in se spectetur prout est auxilium ad operandum, est illa eadem gratia, quam Augustinus contra pelagianos defendit.

Articulus II: Controversia circa gratiae efficaciam

Controversia cum haereticis

Thesis I: Haeretica est sententia, quae statuit ita voluntatem humanam per gratiam Dei antecedenter moveri, ut libertate indifferentiae sub eadem gratia sit destituta.

Thesis II: Sententia Iansenii: gratiam Dei ita esse efficacem, ut inter ipsam et libertatem exsistat habitus line quidem delectationis inde liberatae praevenientis victricis, inde autem voluntatis victae et ad unum insuperabiliter determinatae, qua parte statuit gratiam necessitatem inferentem, haeretica est nec a praecedente differt; quatenus vero gratiam, quae necessitatem infert, in delectatione collocat, falsa est.

Thesis III: Haeretica est haec divinae gratiae notio, quam Quesnellus systema Iansenii emendaturus tradidit, ut sit nempe ipsa omnipotens Dei voluntas vel operatio manus sive voluntatis Dei omnipotentis.

Thesis IV: Inepte vero ad plures Scripturarum locutiones provocant haeretici, ut suam haeresim tueantur.

Thesis V: Perperam ex iis, quae pelagiani ac massilienses contra Augustini doctrinam obiciebant atque ex difficultate, quam ipse Augustinus se experiri fatebatur in conciliando utroque dogmate libertatis et gratiae, colligunt haeretici sententiam, quam ipsi defendunt, esse ipsam Augustini doctrinam.

Thesis VI: Neque proficiunt magis afferentes doctrinam Augustini, qua traditur et explicatur sive gratiam operari ipsum velle, facere ut velimus, dare bonam voluntatem, dare omnia merita, totum esse gratiae, sive gratiam esse, quae nos discernit et opus bonum non esse volentis aut currentis, sed miserentis Dei, sive gratiam esse omnipotentissimam, efficacissimam, insuperabilem, indeclinabilem et a nullo duro corde respui.

Thesis VII: Inscite quoque Jansenius abutitur Augustini doctrina in Expositione Epistolae ad Galatas: quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est atque appellatione victricis facta gratiae, ut evincat a maiori delectatione voluntatis consensum necessario extorqueri.

Thesis VIII: Falsa est doctrina, quam Iansenius asserit, enarrans distinctionem ab Augustino (*De Correp. et Grat.* cc. 10. 11. 12.) traditam duplicis adiutorii, nempe adiutorii sine quo non et adiutorii quo; falsaque est pariter interpretatio ab eodem Iansenio adlibita in Augustini locis.

Thesis IX: Gratia omnis potestatem tribuens operandi est vere sufficiens ad id propter quod datur, sive operatio consequatur sive non.

Thesis X: Ut gratiae pure sufficientis doctrina catholica impugnetur, frustra obiicitur 1) quod Augustinus aliam gratiam non agnoverit nisi efficacem sive praeter hanc non agnoverit nisi naturalem possibilitatem pelagianam, quod docuerit gratiam Dei nullo duro corde respui negaveritque gratiam Dei omnibus dari; 2) quod idem censuerit frequenter gratiam deesse, qua tentationes superari ac praecepta servari possint.

Controversia inter scholasticos

Thesis I: Sunt qui putant gratiam efficacem, per quam Deus praestat ut velimus, esse motionem Dei in voluntate receptam eamque praeviam prioritate saltem naturae ad actum secundum, quae ex ipsa sua natura sit efficax ita, ut eam necessario necessitate consequentiae sequatur voluntatis consensus atque ita necessario sequatur, ut quamvis voluntas libere vere agat, attamen contradictionem implicet ea gratia praeparari voluntatem eandemque voluntatem ei gratiae non consentire.

Thesis II: Omissa, quia non amplius necessaria, responsione ad argumenta quae ex testimoniis Scripturarum petuntur, ad Augustinum quod spectat, cui praecipue vel unice ex Patribus innituntur Thomistae, docemus Augustinum eam tradere notionem gratiae, quae theoriam gratiae physice praedeterminantis prorsus excludat.

Thesis III: Ex principio philosophico, cui sententia gratiae praedeterminantis innititur, petito ex dignitate causae primae, necessario consequitur Deum praedeterminare ad entitatem actus mali, quod nequit admitti.

Thesis IV: Alterum principium philosophicum, cui doctrina gratiae praedeterminantis innititur: nempe voluntatem, utpote facultatem indifferentem, indigere determinatione accepta ab alio, si eo intelligatur sensu, quo in hac quaestione adhiberi solet, infert libertatis interemptionem et est idcirco prorsus falsum.

Thesis V: Immerito tandem Thomistae obiiciunt nobis doctrinam s.

Thesis VI: lisdem pene omnibus argumentis hactenus allatis reiiciendum censemus quoque systema illud circa gratiam, quod Augustinianum audit. 1.

Thesis VII: Suppositis principiis fidei in hac materia: gratiam nempe interiorem praevenire et adiuvare nostram voluntatem, omnium actuum salutarium principium esse gratiam Dei, gratiam Dei vere sufficientem dari, liberum arbitrium integrum manere sub gratia gratiamque Dei abiicere posse seu Dei gratiae resistere: ita doctrinam catholicam hanc explicandam censemus.

Thesis VIII: Infallibilis proinde connexio futura gratiae, si haec datur, cum bono opere non est adaequate petenda ex efficacia virtutis gratiae et ex divina omnipotentia, sed ea supposita, formaliter petenda est ex divina praescientia, quae noscit quid sub qualibet gratia actura sit voluntas creata, si ea gratia ipsi donetur.

Thesis IX: Quum non modo bene agendi facultas, sed ipse bonus actus et consensus voluntatis a gratia pendeant, si fiat, quippe qui est a voluntate non per se sed per gratiam praeparata ut fiat; pronum est colligere, eum, qui bene operatur, nihil habere quod non acceperit Deumque esse qui illum discernit.

Thesis X: Talis autem explicatio doctrinae catholicae idoneis fundamentis innititur.

Caput V: De distributione gratiarum

Thesis I: Nulla Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes, quas habent, vires, sunt impossibilia: praesto quoque illis est semper gratia necessaria, qua possibilia fiant.

Thesis II: Nemo est in hac vita adeo obstinatus in malo, ut quavis gratia sufficiente ad resipiscendum et salutem consequendam sit destitutus.

Thesis III: Nullis hominibus adultis vel infidelibus media opportuna aut gratiae sufficientes negantur, quibus ad agnitionem valeant venire veritatis salutemque tandem obtinere.

Thesis IV: Quemadmodum Deus nemini neget auxilia sufficientia ad salutem assequendam, non eadem tamen est quoad singulos distributio gratiarum.

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