Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. Natural goods are both nature itself and the things which follow upon nature and are required by it, and all things which are contained in the order of these (De Deo Creant. Th. XXXI). Now it is evident that goods of this kind are simply honored by the Fathers with the appellation of grace. Truly the natural light of reason, or the image of God, which man, insofar as he is rational, bears, is called the grace of God (Athanasius De Incarn. c. 12. Epiphanius ad Joannem hierosolym. ep. CX. among the works of Jerome, who translated it); immortality is called the grace of God, which the spirits enjoy, who are indeed incorruptible and immortal, but otherwise than God; for the former has it from himself, the latter have it from God, who freely creates, that they be such (Sophronius hierosolym. in the synodal letters read in Conc. VI. Act. XI. Jerome, Dialogue II cont. Pelag. n. 7); and in general whatever inheres in men according to being and nature is called grace (Damascene De Fide II. 12).

Hence it is that the Church in its liturgy and in its public prayers asks of God not only supernatural goods but also natural ones, of which sort are the health of the body, the averting of pestilence, famine, storms, rain or serenity of the air, victory in war, and the like; and it begs these of God in such a way that it implores divine indulgence, mercy, and loving-kindness, and gives thanks to God when it has obtained them.

What of the fact that the Providence of God, which rules all things, is called by the author of Wisdom XVI, 25 παντοτρόφος ἀρετῇ, and is rendered by the Vulgate interpreter as the grace that nourishes all things?

This doctrine was expressly attested by the five African prelates Aurelius, Alypius, Augustine, Evodius, Possidius in those letters which they sent to Innocent in the Pelagian cause: «Although (they say) the grace of God by which we were created is called in a certain manner of speaking not to be disapproved, that we might not be nothing, nor be something in such a way as a corpse, which does not live, and a tree, which does not feel, and a beast, which does not understand, but men, who would be and live and feel and understand, and ought to give thanks to our Creator for so great a benefit: whence even this can deservedly be called grace, because it was given not by the merits of any preceding works, but by the gratuitous goodness of God: yet there is another, by which, being predestined, we are called, justified, glorified.»

II. The same is established by reason, which the African bishops also indicated. For in order that something be grace, it must be some benefit conferred spontaneously with no necessity, which no merits that would require it preceded: but it cannot be denied that the gift of creation is of this sort, and in general whatever is connected with the creation of nature. But specifically, if natural gifts are considered one by one, it is clear that very many of them, besides that common character which is present in creation, also claim for themselves a special character of grace. Truly we have said (De Deo Creat. l. c.) that the natural are those gifts which are required by nature lest it be in vain, and consequently all those things which are contained in the same order of perfection as those which are required by nature, of which they are nothing but a certain amplification. For very many of those things which are owed to nature are not contained within a definite number, but extend themselves indefinitely. Now indeed 1) since every species admits indefinite degrees in its perfection, as the intellective power in respect of the keenness of talent, each one of these degrees taken singly, no less than the creation of nature, is unowed even granted creation, and therefore has the character of grace. 2) The very amplification of natural goods, which is not necessary of itself, such as shows itself e.g. in so many and such varied lower natures, which were created for our advantage, has a special character of grace; for that amplitude is not properly owed. 3) Many things which are owed to nature of themselves are not owed to concrete nature or to the person, because some higher order, to which nature or persons are subject, requires that they be deprived of this; thus e.g., although the integrity of the members, the health of the organs, and things of this sort are owed to nature, if nevertheless those physical causes concur which disturb the work of generation, which affect the body badly, it is necessary that a defect exist in the body, so that the physical laws by which the world is governed may remain safe: wherefore if in some person those causes are prevented from acting by other causes, that will be attributed to grace. Indeed 4) although in general the physical order in which human nature is engaged is owed to it; nevertheless, because the physical order could have been disposed by God in many ways, this present order, which was freely chosen by God, from which so many benefits come to men, insofar as these benefits follow which would not exist in another order, which God could have chosen, again acquires the character of grace. Finally 5) although rational nature has need of certain helps by which it may exercise its faculties, and accordingly demands them in general, nevertheless these same helps, considered singly, claim for themselves a certain character of the gratuitous. Truly, in order that the will act, it is necessary that it be placed in certain circumstances and that the knowledge of the intellect precede; but in order that the intellect actually think, it is necessary that something occur to it by which it is determined to the act; and although in general something is required by the intellect by which it be determined, yet that this rather than that should occur to it, that these rather than those should be the circumstances of the operation, depends on Providence, which freely chose this order of things rather than another. Therefore those circumstances in which the will operates well, though it would not operate in others, the occurrence of that thing which determines the fitting or opportune thought to the good act of the will, are to be numbered among the divine graces. Moreover, the Philosopher himself saw this truth, whose testimony St. Thomas cites in Quodlib. I. a. 7, and the words of the Philosopher are found in L. VII. Eudemiorum (if indeed it is his work) c. 14: «On this someone will doubt whether fortune is the cause of this, namely that we think what is fitting and when it is fitting, and so fortune would be the cause of all things, since it is the cause of thought and deliberation. For no one deliberates because he previously deliberated that he would deliberate, and he deliberated this very thing. But there is some principle. Nor does anyone think because he previously thought to think, and this to infinity. Therefore the principle of thinking is not the mind, nor of deliberation is deliberation. What else therefore but fortune? so that all things depend on fortune, if there is some principle beyond which there is no other. But in what way is this such that it can do this? Surely what is sought is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul. It is manifest indeed that, just as in the universe God, so also in it the principle of motion is God. For the divine thing that exists in us moves all things. But the principle of reason is not reason, but something more excellent: and what can be more excellent than even science itself except God?»

It is established, therefore, that in the very order of nature there is a place for many divine graces, and that many reasons occur why we should beseech God and give thanks to Him for His benefits.

Corollary. From what has been said under n. 5) it is permitted to gather that one must not immediately think of some supernatural help as soon as mention is made of some divine help by which our faculties are aided, as if in the order of nature there were no divine helps of this kind. For even in the order of pure nature, if it had existed, there would have been its own fitting natural helps, by which man would have been aided toward the attainment of the natural end. Wherefore the economy of Divine Providence in that order would not have been merely that which now exists, with the supernatural gifts and helps removed; but it would have been different in the supplying of fitting helps according to the exigency of the proper end of that state.

III. A supernatural gift is a perfection which neither constitutes the essence of a thing nor necessarily follows upon the essence of a thing nor is required by it lest it and its powers be in vain, nor is contained under the genus of those perfections which are required by nature: but if that which is simply supernatural is kept before one's eyes, it is a perfection exceeding the perfection of all natural goods. cf. De Deo Creant. Th. XXXI, whose doctrine we here presuppose. Therefore the supernatural is a gift unowed to nature and therefore gratuitous. Moreover, if natural gifts are compared with supernatural ones, it is evident 1°) that, although natural gifts too, as we have said, can be reckoned as the grace of God, supernatural gifts claim the name of grace for themselves by stronger right and more properly. For although they agree in this, that both proceed from the benevolent mind of God, they differ nevertheless, whether the character of good in itself or the character of the gratuitous is considered. For in supernatural gifts, if at least those are regarded which are simply supernatural, such as adoption, the indwelling in us of the Holy Spirit, beatitude, the Incarnation, etc., the good is greater, since they are gifts greater according to perfection. But if in these goods the character of the gratuitous is considered, one may note this. a) If among natural gifts the very nature which is created is regarded, this is not positively unowed to anyone, since there is no subject to whose merits it would not be owed; but it is only negatively unowed, because God was not bound to create it: whence in the gift of nature the character of the unowed is not proper; for the unowed denotes an order to something to which it is not owed; but in the creation of nature there is lacking a real terminus to which it could be said to be unowed. But supernatural gifts are positively unowed, for they are referred to nature, to which they accede and to which they are not owed. If b) those natural gifts are regarded which follow upon nature and are required by it, they exclude indeed merit from works, but not the merit of nature; but supernatural gifts exclude both merits, as is evident from the very definition. Cf. the testimony of St. Thomas in the preceding Thesis. If c) the amplitude of natural gifts is regarded, which is not owed of itself, and that certain natural order of providence, which again is not owed; nevertheless these although they are not owed specifically, they are owed generically and are contained in the same order of those perfections which are owed to nature. But supernatural gifts are owed neither specifically nor generically, and altogether exceed the perfection of those things which are owed to nature. Therefore the supernatural is positively unowed, unowed not only to the merits of works but also to the merits of nature, and it is owed neither specifically nor generically. And so by stronger right and more properly the supernatural gift is called and is grace; for whether the character of benefit is regarded, which consists in conferred perfection, or the character of the unowed is regarded, each is greater in supernatural gifts. Whence Augustine says, Serm. XI. De Verbis Apostoli: «Except that grace by which human nature was founded — for this is common to Christians and pagans — this is the greater grace, not that through the Word we were created as men, but that through the Word made flesh we were made believers.» Hence it is that, as the same Augustine warns, when the name of grace is used simply in the Church, supernatural goods, not natural ones, are wont to be understood: for this is the grace which Catholic bishops have been accustomed to read in the books of God and to preach to the peoples (epist. cit. ad Innocentium), and the grace which the Apostle commends is not that by which we were created that we might be men, but that by which we were justified, when we were evil men (epist. CXCIV. ad Sixtum n. 8).»

IV. But the question can be whether that distinction, which in the character of grace intervenes between natural and supernatural gifts, is only according to degrees — which Augustine seems to suggest by the testimony cited a little earlier, saying that this is the greater grace — or whether it is according to species. A distinction according to species is a distinction according to essence. Now indeed those things specifically differ which, under one common character, whether univocal or analogical, are so disposed that one of them has a positive note, which determines or circumscribes the very character of the genus, while the other lacks it: or those things specifically differ which under a common character consist of different essential notes, whether positive on both sides, as green and red under the character of color, vice and virtue under the character of moral habit: or positive on one side and negative on the other, as the rational and irrational animal under the character of animal. But if those goods are considered which are called natural in the stricter sense, i.e. owed to nature, which namely presuppose nature, to which they are referred, and they are compared with supernatural ones, it is clear that although both are in a certain respect graces, nevertheless for the former it is essential to be owed to nature, for the latter to be unowed: which two notes indeed differ essentially. Therefore at least these gifts differ essentially under the character of grace. But if the very creation of nature is regarded and compared with supernatural goods, it is again evident that the former is grace because there is lacking a subject to which it could be conferred and therefore to which it could also be owed, while the latter are grace with respect to nature itself, to which they are not owed, although it exists: but these two — to be grace because there is lacking a subject to which it could be conferred, and to be grace because it is not owed to an existing subject, to which it is conferred — differ certainly not accidentally but essentially. The notes, therefore, which are essential to the enumerated gifts are different, and the very common character of grace is determined and circumscribed in supernatural gifts by a positive note which is lacking to the others. As for the other natural gifts, however, which are not owed according to indivisible species or according to number; since nevertheless they are owed at least generically, they are not even according to essence of the same character as supernatural gifts, which are not owed even generically. You will say: God does not owe natural goods to nature, but to Himself. Namely, given the creation of nature, the divine perfections require that they be conferred, so that in that hypothesis God is not free for either. But the opposite holds with regard to supernatural goods. Therefore. Cf. I. II. q. CXI, a. L. ad 2m. Augustine, however, does not deny what we defend: but he used a certain looser manner of speaking. But we would wrongly always require in the Fathers the stricter manner of speaking which the school afterwards took up.