Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. «According to the common manner of speaking (says St. Thomas, 1ª 2ae q. CX, a. 1), grace is wont to be taken in three ways: in one way, for the love of someone, as we are wont to say that this soldier has the grace of the king, that is, the king holds him in favor; secondly, it is taken for some gift freely given, as we are wont to say: I do you this grace; thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a freely given benefit, according to which we say that we give thanks for benefits.» Another signification of the same name can be added, namely insofar as it signifies that which draws love, to wit, the beauty and comeliness of a thing or person. It is clear that these significations are connected. Our discourse is about grace according to the second signification indicated by St. Thomas, namely insofar as it is understood as some good conferred upon another; which, in order that it be grace, requires the conditions set forth in the thesis. To explain, then, the definition: a benefit is a thing or action placed to the advantage or utility of another. Benevolence is the love by which we will good to another. Moreover, if account is taken of the disposition with which a benefit is conferred, one cannot act or do something for the good of another in only one way: for one can act unwillingly, and one can act spontaneously, and this either from love of oneself alone, which is the love of concupiscence, or from love of him on whom the benefit is conferred, which is the love of friendship or benevolence. It must further be noted that it is one thing to benefit another with benevolence, and another to benefit from benevolence. For we are said to benefit from benevolence when benevolent love is the reason why we confer a good on another; if this love is present only concomitantly, the benefit will have been conferred merely with benevolence. In the definition, however, the words "from benevolence" are taken in such a way that benevolence is the reason for benefiting.

II. True benevolence can be the reason for benefiting either inadequately or adequately. It is an inadequate reason when, besides it, there is another motive for benefiting, namely insofar as the good that is conferred is owed in some way, as can happen in the conferral of goods by distributive justice, or is even simply owed (whether it is owed directly to him on whom the good is conferred, or to another who requires that that good be conferred on someone), yet in such a way that, since it is physically free for a man not to do what he owes, he is drawn by love to discharge the debt. Benevolence is the adequate reason when, on the contrary, benevolent love is the whole reason why someone confers a good on another; so that the good is in no way owed either to him on whom it is in fact conferred, or to another who could require that that good be conferred on someone else, unless this very requirement has arisen from some gratuitous gift. Now both of these things are signified when it is said "apart from the exigency of him on whom it is conferred": for when someone does good to another because a third party has a right that good be done to him by the benefactor, the benefit is conferred not only on him who actually receives the good, but also on the other who requires it. Furthermore, a thing is then properly said to be conferred from benevolence when benevolence is the adequate reason of the conferral; so that insofar as a thing is not conferred from benevolence, neither is it grace on that account.

Therefore there are two elements by which the concept of grace is brought to completion: the benefit and gratuitous benevolence, the former holding the place of matter, the latter as it were of form.

III. Now, that this is properly the concept of that thing which is called gratia by the Latins, χάρις by the Greeks, and חֵן and חִנָּם by the Hebrews, when by these words there is signified that which is conferred by one person on another, is established by common usage, both profane and sacred.

Of profane usage Aristotle is the witness. For thus in II Rhetor., c. 7, he defines grace: «ἔστι δὲ χάρις, καθ᾽ ἣν λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν τῷ δεδωκότι, ἵνα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ αὑτοῦ τὸ ποιοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τι μέγα ᾖ, ἢ φθάνει δεόμενος, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁμοίως, ἢ φίλων». «ἔστι δὲ ἡ χάρις ἡ δι᾽ ἣν ὁ ἔχων χάριν λέγεται παρέχειν τῷ δεομένῳ, οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι, οὐδ᾽ ἵνα τι προσγένηται τῷ παρέχοντι, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἀγαθόν τι ᾖ τῷ παρεχομένῳ. μεγάλη δὲ ἡ χάρις ἔσται, ἐὰν διδῶται σφόδρα δεομένοις ἢ ἐὰν μεγάλα καὶ δυσχερῆ παρέχηται ἢ ἐν τοιούτοις κακοῖς ἢ ἐὰν ὁ εὐεργετῶν ᾖ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα εὐεργετῇ.»¹

As witnesses of sacred usage we give Augustine and Thomas: of whom the latter, in 1a 2ae q. CXI, a. 1, ad 2m, has this: «Gratia, secundum quod gratis datur, excludit rationem debiti. Potest autem intelligi duplex debitum, unum quidem ex merito proveniens, quod refertur ad personam, cuius est agere meritoria opera… Aliud est debitum secundum conditionem naturae: puta si dicamus, debitum esse homini quod habeat rationem et alia quae ad humanam pertinent naturam… Dona naturalia carent primo debito, non autem carent secundo. Sed dona supernaturalia utroque debito carent et ideo specialius sibi nomen gratiae vindicant.» Augustine, however, in De Gestis Pelagii, c. 14, says: «Ipsum gratiae nomen et eius nominis intellectus aufertur, si non gratis datur, sed eam qui dignus est accipit… Quisque dignus est, debitum est ei: si autem debitum est, gratia non est; gratia quippe donatur, debitum redditur. Gratia ergo donatur indignis, ut reddatur debitum dignis.» Furthermore, the universal Church approved this acceptation of grace by her suffrage, when she proscribed the error of the Pelagians, that the grace of God is given according to our merits; which opinion was reprobated for this reason, because if it is given on account of merits, it is no longer grace.

All these things are confirmed by biblical usage. For by the name of grace there is signified 1) the benefit itself: Act. XI, 17; Rom. I, 5. 2) the benevolence or favor of him from whom the benefit is received, and to this that phrase pertains by which χάρις is said to find grace before someone: Gen. VI, 7, 8; XXXIX, 1-4; Esther II, 17. also 3) gratuitous benevolence, so that a debt may be excluded: Rom. IV, 4; XI, 6; Ephes. II, 7, 8, 9. Cf. the use of the adverb חִנָּם, gratis: Gen. XXIX, 15; Exod. XXI, 2, 11; 2 Sam. XXIV, 24.

IV. It is manifest, therefore, by usage not only profane but sacred, that when grace is said, and by it is signified that which one person receives from another, what is really signified is a benefit conferred from gratuitous benevolence. This, accordingly, is the formal ratio of grace, namely that a gift be conferred from a benevolent heart, freely, that is, apart from any exigency of another; so that some benefit is called grace to the extent that it is freely conferred, and the greater the gratuitous character is, the more it is grace, even if perhaps it is not greater in the order of good. Hence, although in the biblical and ecclesiastical manner of speaking there is also called grace that which is repaid to our merits, or which is given to us on account of the merits of Christ, it is nevertheless called grace for this reason, insofar as in it the gratuitous character toward us at least has a place.

V. Grace is customarily defined by the scholastics as a gift freely given. That this definition expresses the same thing as the preceding one is clear by an extrinsic argument; for all the scholastics will the grace they define to be altogether gratuitous, proceeding to men from the sole benevolence of God. But this is also clear by an intrinsic argument, namely by an analysis of the terms. Surely he who says "gift" properly says some benefit which is given spontaneously and with no necessity, as Petavius warns in the place cited in the note above, a benefit, namely, whose reason of conferral is the sole benevolence of the giver. Nevertheless, because that which is conferred on account of some merit is also frequently wont to be called a gift, in order that the notion of merit may be expressly excluded, "freely given" is added, i.e., apart from any exigency of him on whom it is conferred, and therefore conferred from gratuitous benevolence. Whence Augustine, Tr. III in Ioann., n. D: »Quid est gratia? gratis data, quid est gratis data? donata, non reddita.« But he would be foolish who should disdain this definition, because grace is explained through the gratis, which seems to amount to the same thing. For the concept that underlies the gratis is more determined from the common manner of speaking than the concept that is expressed by the simple word gratia, and the notion of the unowed, or of what is conferred apart from any merit, appears more clearly in the τῇ gratis than in the τῇ gratia. Whence it came about that the Pelagians, although they did not shrink from calling certain divine gifts by the name of grace, nevertheless denied that this grace is freely given, but contended that the grace of God is given according to merits; the Fathers, on the contrary, maintained that the grace of God is freely given.

Corollary I. The principle of grace, therefore, is benevolence, and that an active benevolence, which namely diffuses itself into gifts. Hence the first grace is benevolence itself. For as St. Thomas says, I p., q. XXXVIII, a. 2: „Ratio gratuitae donationis est amor, ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo, quod damus ei, est amor, quo volumus ei bonum." For since love is toward another and for the good of another, it is rightly said that the love of the lover is given to the beloved. Therefore benevolence is the first gift, or first grace, which is given to those to whom we do good. And since it belongs to this gift not, indeed, to be from benevolence efficiently, but formally to be benevolence itself and to contain in itself the reason why it is given to another, it is assuredly the chief gift, when the formal ratio of grace is considered.

Corollary II. Since the divine benevolence, which is the fountain of the other gifts by which God has enriched his creatures, is eternal, some grace of God is eternal.

Note. For those about to deliver the divisions of divine grace, the beginning would have to be made from the first division, which is into uncreated and created grace; but since uncreated grace, which is the Holy Spirit and the whole Trinity, has been expressly treated in the Treatise on the Most Holy Trinity, in order that we may save time and pursue only those things that are proper to our treatise, we gladly pass it over here. We call "principal partitions" those which embrace, as it were, the highest genera, to which the rest can and ought to be reduced.

I. Natural goods are both nature itself and the things which follow upon nature and are required by it, and all things which are contained in the order of these (De Deo Creant. Th. XXXI). Now it is evident that goods of this kind are simply honored by the Fathers with the appellation of grace. Truly the natural light of reason, or the image of God, which man, insofar as he is rational, bears, is called the grace of God (Athanasius De Incarn. c. 12. Epiphanius ad Joannem hierosolym. ep. CX. among the works of Jerome, who translated it); immortality is called the grace of God, which the spirits enjoy, who are indeed incorruptible and immortal, but otherwise than God; for the former has it from himself, the latter have it from God, who freely creates, that they be such (Sophronius hierosolym. in the synodal letters read in Conc. VI. Act. XI. Jerome, Dialogue II cont. Pelag. n. 7); and in general whatever inheres in men according to being and nature is called grace (Damascene De Fide II. 12).

Hence it is that the Church in its liturgy and in its public prayers asks of God not only supernatural goods but also natural ones, of which sort are the health of the body, the averting of pestilence, famine, storms, rain or serenity of the air, victory in war, and the like; and it begs these of God in such a way that it implores divine indulgence, mercy, and loving-kindness, and gives thanks to God when it has obtained them.

What of the fact that the Providence of God, which rules all things, is called by the author of Wisdom XVI, 25 παντοτρόφος ἀρετῇ, and is rendered by the Vulgate interpreter as the grace that nourishes all things?

This doctrine was expressly attested by the five African prelates Aurelius, Alypius, Augustine, Evodius, Possidius in those letters which they sent to Innocent in the Pelagian cause: «Although (they say) the grace of God by which we were created is called in a certain manner of speaking not to be disapproved, that we might not be nothing, nor be something in such a way as a corpse, which does not live, and a tree, which does not feel, and a beast, which does not understand, but men, who would be and live and feel and understand, and ought to give thanks to our Creator for so great a benefit: whence even this can deservedly be called grace, because it was given not by the merits of any preceding works, but by the gratuitous goodness of God: yet there is another, by which, being predestined, we are called, justified, glorified.»

II. The same is established by reason, which the African bishops also indicated. For in order that something be grace, it must be some benefit conferred spontaneously with no necessity, which no merits that would require it preceded: but it cannot be denied that the gift of creation is of this sort, and in general whatever is connected with the creation of nature. But specifically, if natural gifts are considered one by one, it is clear that very many of them, besides that common character which is present in creation, also claim for themselves a special character of grace. Truly we have said (De Deo Creat. l. c.) that the natural are those gifts which are required by nature lest it be in vain, and consequently all those things which are contained in the same order of perfection as those which are required by nature, of which they are nothing but a certain amplification. For very many of those things which are owed to nature are not contained within a definite number, but extend themselves indefinitely. Now indeed 1) since every species admits indefinite degrees in its perfection, as the intellective power in respect of the keenness of talent, each one of these degrees taken singly, no less than the creation of nature, is unowed even granted creation, and therefore has the character of grace. 2) The very amplification of natural goods, which is not necessary of itself, such as shows itself e.g. in so many and such varied lower natures, which were created for our advantage, has a special character of grace; for that amplitude is not properly owed. 3) Many things which are owed to nature of themselves are not owed to concrete nature or to the person, because some higher order, to which nature or persons are subject, requires that they be deprived of this; thus e.g., although the integrity of the members, the health of the organs, and things of this sort are owed to nature, if nevertheless those physical causes concur which disturb the work of generation, which affect the body badly, it is necessary that a defect exist in the body, so that the physical laws by which the world is governed may remain safe: wherefore if in some person those causes are prevented from acting by other causes, that will be attributed to grace. Indeed 4) although in general the physical order in which human nature is engaged is owed to it; nevertheless, because the physical order could have been disposed by God in many ways, this present order, which was freely chosen by God, from which so many benefits come to men, insofar as these benefits follow which would not exist in another order, which God could have chosen, again acquires the character of grace. Finally 5) although rational nature has need of certain helps by which it may exercise its faculties, and accordingly demands them in general, nevertheless these same helps, considered singly, claim for themselves a certain character of the gratuitous. Truly, in order that the will act, it is necessary that it be placed in certain circumstances and that the knowledge of the intellect precede; but in order that the intellect actually think, it is necessary that something occur to it by which it is determined to the act; and although in general something is required by the intellect by which it be determined, yet that this rather than that should occur to it, that these rather than those should be the circumstances of the operation, depends on Providence, which freely chose this order of things rather than another. Therefore those circumstances in which the will operates well, though it would not operate in others, the occurrence of that thing which determines the fitting or opportune thought to the good act of the will, are to be numbered among the divine graces. Moreover, the Philosopher himself saw this truth, whose testimony St. Thomas cites in Quodlib. I. a. 7, and the words of the Philosopher are found in L. VII. Eudemiorum (if indeed it is his work) c. 14: «On this someone will doubt whether fortune is the cause of this, namely that we think what is fitting and when it is fitting, and so fortune would be the cause of all things, since it is the cause of thought and deliberation. For no one deliberates because he previously deliberated that he would deliberate, and he deliberated this very thing. But there is some principle. Nor does anyone think because he previously thought to think, and this to infinity. Therefore the principle of thinking is not the mind, nor of deliberation is deliberation. What else therefore but fortune? so that all things depend on fortune, if there is some principle beyond which there is no other. But in what way is this such that it can do this? Surely what is sought is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul. It is manifest indeed that, just as in the universe God, so also in it the principle of motion is God. For the divine thing that exists in us moves all things. But the principle of reason is not reason, but something more excellent: and what can be more excellent than even science itself except God?»

It is established, therefore, that in the very order of nature there is a place for many divine graces, and that many reasons occur why we should beseech God and give thanks to Him for His benefits.

Corollary. From what has been said under n. 5) it is permitted to gather that one must not immediately think of some supernatural help as soon as mention is made of some divine help by which our faculties are aided, as if in the order of nature there were no divine helps of this kind. For even in the order of pure nature, if it had existed, there would have been its own fitting natural helps, by which man would have been aided toward the attainment of the natural end. Wherefore the economy of Divine Providence in that order would not have been merely that which now exists, with the supernatural gifts and helps removed; but it would have been different in the supplying of fitting helps according to the exigency of the proper end of that state.

III. A supernatural gift is a perfection which neither constitutes the essence of a thing nor necessarily follows upon the essence of a thing nor is required by it lest it and its powers be in vain, nor is contained under the genus of those perfections which are required by nature: but if that which is simply supernatural is kept before one's eyes, it is a perfection exceeding the perfection of all natural goods. cf. De Deo Creant. Th. XXXI, whose doctrine we here presuppose. Therefore the supernatural is a gift unowed to nature and therefore gratuitous. Moreover, if natural gifts are compared with supernatural ones, it is evident 1°) that, although natural gifts too, as we have said, can be reckoned as the grace of God, supernatural gifts claim the name of grace for themselves by stronger right and more properly. For although they agree in this, that both proceed from the benevolent mind of God, they differ nevertheless, whether the character of good in itself or the character of the gratuitous is considered. For in supernatural gifts, if at least those are regarded which are simply supernatural, such as adoption, the indwelling in us of the Holy Spirit, beatitude, the Incarnation, etc., the good is greater, since they are gifts greater according to perfection. But if in these goods the character of the gratuitous is considered, one may note this. a) If among natural gifts the very nature which is created is regarded, this is not positively unowed to anyone, since there is no subject to whose merits it would not be owed; but it is only negatively unowed, because God was not bound to create it: whence in the gift of nature the character of the unowed is not proper; for the unowed denotes an order to something to which it is not owed; but in the creation of nature there is lacking a real terminus to which it could be said to be unowed. But supernatural gifts are positively unowed, for they are referred to nature, to which they accede and to which they are not owed. If b) those natural gifts are regarded which follow upon nature and are required by it, they exclude indeed merit from works, but not the merit of nature; but supernatural gifts exclude both merits, as is evident from the very definition. Cf. the testimony of St. Thomas in the preceding Thesis. If c) the amplitude of natural gifts is regarded, which is not owed of itself, and that certain natural order of providence, which again is not owed; nevertheless these although they are not owed specifically, they are owed generically and are contained in the same order of those perfections which are owed to nature. But supernatural gifts are owed neither specifically nor generically, and altogether exceed the perfection of those things which are owed to nature. Therefore the supernatural is positively unowed, unowed not only to the merits of works but also to the merits of nature, and it is owed neither specifically nor generically. And so by stronger right and more properly the supernatural gift is called and is grace; for whether the character of benefit is regarded, which consists in conferred perfection, or the character of the unowed is regarded, each is greater in supernatural gifts. Whence Augustine says, Serm. XI. De Verbis Apostoli: «Except that grace by which human nature was founded — for this is common to Christians and pagans — this is the greater grace, not that through the Word we were created as men, but that through the Word made flesh we were made believers.» Hence it is that, as the same Augustine warns, when the name of grace is used simply in the Church, supernatural goods, not natural ones, are wont to be understood: for this is the grace which Catholic bishops have been accustomed to read in the books of God and to preach to the peoples (epist. cit. ad Innocentium), and the grace which the Apostle commends is not that by which we were created that we might be men, but that by which we were justified, when we were evil men (epist. CXCIV. ad Sixtum n. 8).»

IV. But the question can be whether that distinction, which in the character of grace intervenes between natural and supernatural gifts, is only according to degrees — which Augustine seems to suggest by the testimony cited a little earlier, saying that this is the greater grace — or whether it is according to species. A distinction according to species is a distinction according to essence. Now indeed those things specifically differ which, under one common character, whether univocal or analogical, are so disposed that one of them has a positive note, which determines or circumscribes the very character of the genus, while the other lacks it: or those things specifically differ which under a common character consist of different essential notes, whether positive on both sides, as green and red under the character of color, vice and virtue under the character of moral habit: or positive on one side and negative on the other, as the rational and irrational animal under the character of animal. But if those goods are considered which are called natural in the stricter sense, i.e. owed to nature, which namely presuppose nature, to which they are referred, and they are compared with supernatural ones, it is clear that although both are in a certain respect graces, nevertheless for the former it is essential to be owed to nature, for the latter to be unowed: which two notes indeed differ essentially. Therefore at least these gifts differ essentially under the character of grace. But if the very creation of nature is regarded and compared with supernatural goods, it is again evident that the former is grace because there is lacking a subject to which it could be conferred and therefore to which it could also be owed, while the latter are grace with respect to nature itself, to which they are not owed, although it exists: but these two — to be grace because there is lacking a subject to which it could be conferred, and to be grace because it is not owed to an existing subject, to which it is conferred — differ certainly not accidentally but essentially. The notes, therefore, which are essential to the enumerated gifts are different, and the very common character of grace is determined and circumscribed in supernatural gifts by a positive note which is lacking to the others. As for the other natural gifts, however, which are not owed according to indivisible species or according to number; since nevertheless they are owed at least generically, they are not even according to essence of the same character as supernatural gifts, which are not owed even generically. You will say: God does not owe natural goods to nature, but to Himself. Namely, given the creation of nature, the divine perfections require that they be conferred, so that in that hypothesis God is not free for either. But the opposite holds with regard to supernatural goods. Therefore. Cf. I. II. q. CXI, a. L. ad 2m. Augustine, however, does not deny what we defend: but he used a certain looser manner of speaking. But we would wrongly always require in the Fathers the stricter manner of speaking which the school afterwards took up.

I. By this division no other author of grace is indicated, since God is the author of every supernatural grace, but there is indicated one and another relation of grace to the diverse states of the rational creature, namely the state of integrity and of lapse: 2) the special relation of grace to its principle is indicated; for the grace which is given to fallen men is referred to Christ the Redeemer, as meritorious cause, the merit of which Redeemer has no place in the other state. Since, therefore, with respect to the state of lapse grace has this as proper to itself, that it depends on the merits of Christ the Redeemer, for that reason it is called by its proper name the Grace of Christ, the common appellation grace of God being retained for signifying that grace which regards the other state. The grace of Christ is also called the Grace of God through Jesus Christ. Cf. Aug. De Gratia Christi c. 17. For it is established that God elevated human nature in the first parent to the gratuitous supernatural order (De Deo Creant Th. XLVIII. seqq.), and it is established that fallen human nature is not restored and recalled to its pristine state except through Christ, who by the offering of himself on the cross took away the sin of the world and brought salvation to all who had perished. Whence in the state of fallen nature Christ the Redeemer is the meritorious cause of every supernatural gift.

II. Now indeed, having regard to this twofold state, the grace which regards both is deservedly distinguished. For grace is deservedly distinguished, according to the very notion of a gratuitous gift, between the grace which is conferred merely upon one not worthy and the grace which is conferred upon one positively unworthy: between the grace which proceeds from benevolence alone and the grace which issues from benevolence and mercy at the same time: between the grace which is conferred simply to elevate and the grace which is conferred to heal and elevate at the same time: between the grace which is conferred simply gratuitously and the grace which is so conferred gratuitously to others that it is conferred also on account of merits another has acquired. But the former is the grace conferred upon integral nature and is called the grace of God; the latter is the grace conferred upon fallen nature and is called the grace of Christ. For the grace of Christ is conferred upon sinful nature, and therefore positively unworthy nature, to which nature, miserable on account of sin, assistance is given through mercy, which sinful nature, when it is freed from sin and its effects, is moreover restored to health, and these things are granted to it by God on account of the merits of Christ the Redeemer. But because sin was lacking in integral nature, when it was enriched with gratuitous gifts, the grace conferred upon it lacked these special characters. Hence to the grace of God pertains not only the grace conferred upon Adam, but also the grace conferred upon the Angels.

III. The grace of God is called elevating grace, but the grace of Christ is called healing grace, medicinal grace, not because this accomplishes only that, but because it alone does that. For human nature, changed for the worse in body and soul, as the Council of Trent says, now needs a physician, because it is not healthy, which indeed in the state of elevation it did not need. But it must be noted that healing and medicinal grace is not for that reason alone so called, because it heals some weakness which, in fallen nature, would not have been in integral nature; but generally because it repairs nature collapsed and changed for the worse in soul and body. For healing and medicinal grace according to Augustine (De natura et gratia. cc. 2. et 3.) is not only that by which the weakness of concupiscence is healed, but that by which infants and those of advanced age are saved, namely that by which all men are freed from sin and justified; which indeed is done through grace simply supernatural and elevating. To remember this will help in what follows. That, however, does not prevent that, when the double effect of this same grace of Christ is distinguished, the same grace be also distinguished and one be called elevating grace, the other be specially called healing and medicinal, which heals the wounds of nature in the very order of nature. Furthermore, Augustine treats of the grace of Christ especially against the Pelagians.

The testimonies Eph. IV, 23. 24. Coloss. III, 8. 10. Gen. I, 26. Eecli. XVII. 1 (Vulg.), compared with the interpretation of the Fathers (De Deo Creant. Th. XLII.), set forth the grace of God.

The testimonies 1. Cor. XV, 10. Ephes. I, 3. 2. Tim. 1, 9. etc. refer to the grace of Christ.

Nota. If anyone should contend that all grace, even that conferred upon Adam and the Angels, was conferred from the merits of Christ, about which matter we do not now wish to dispute; yet the distinction between the grace of God and the grace of Christ would remain, both on account of the diverse relation to the diverse states, and because the merits of Christ for nature not fallen would not be the merits of a Redeemer, whereas they are the merits of a Redeemer for fallen nature.

Although not every internal grace is, in the order of being, more excellent than any external grace; nevertheless, in the order of benefit, internal grace of itself surpasses external grace.

I. This is not a division of the grace of Christ, but of supernatural grace; for this division, no less than the following ones, can hold also for the grace of God. Indeed, this division, of which we treat in this Thesis, can find a place also in natural grace; we divide, however, only supernatural grace, because we do not have to treat of natural grace.

II. Internal grace consists in the divine gifts that are in us as in a subject; external grace consists in those gifts that are outside us and affect us. That both graces exist in the supernatural order is manifest. For external grace is the positive law of God, revelation, the preaching of faith, the incarnation and the examples of Christ, the divine Scripture, the magisterium of the Church, and other things of this kind, by which men are advanced toward eternal life. It is clear that these are both graces, because they are unowed, and supernatural graces — either in a qualified sense, as the positive manifestation of the natural law and the revelation of certain natural truths, or absolutely, as the revelation of the mysteries, the incarnation, the sacraments, and the like; for the former are an unowed means of nature for a clearer knowledge of the law and of the truths, while the latter are unowed to the whole of nature and are causes or instruments by which men are elevated to participation in the divine order. Internal grace is the justice of God, by which God makes the unjust just; it is the habits of the infused virtues; it is the illuminations of the mind and the inspirations of the will — by which gifts we are also made adopted children and live the divine life, in which matter the supernatural order itself essentially consists. Cf. s. Thomam I Ilae q. CVI. a. 2.

III. The distinction between external and internal grace manifests itself clearly in the Pelagian controversy; for Pelagius did not deny every grace, nor was he on that account regarded as a heretic: but while he conceded that for acting rightly and salutarily we are helped by the grace of God consisting in the law, the doctrine, and the examples of Christ, he nevertheless denied that the will is helped internally through the supply of the power of the Holy Spirit. This denying part was reprobated in him as heretical: he was not, however, regarded as a heretic because he held the graces to be external — which all the Fathers professed together with him — but because he excluded internal grace, especially that of the will, which, compared with external grace and having regard to operation, is called κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν grace, because it is precisely that which elevates the operating faculty and is the efficacious principle of the supernatural good work. The Fathers, therefore, distinguished between external and internal grace and preferred the latter to the former, so that external grace without internal grace was held useless; but nevertheless they confessed that those exterior gifts are also graces of God. Nowhere (says Aug. Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II) do those enemies of grace lay more hidden snares for attacking that same grace more vehemently than where they praise the law, which without doubt is to be praised. For by diverse modes of speech and a variety of words, in all their disputations, they want the law to be understood as grace, namely that we have from the Lord God the help of knowledge, by which we may know those things which are to be done, not the inspiration of love, that knowing them we may do them with holy love, which is properly grace.Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II

IV. The very protection of God, by which temptations and occasions of sinning are warded off, and that providence by which a man is brought to the end of life, when he is fit to attain eternal life, since they place nothing really in the soul, are extrinsic grace; yet they are truly grace: which grace, by reason of the end for which it is conferred, must be called supernatural; for it pertains to supernatural providence. Hence Aug. Serm. XCIX, n. 6, brings in God speaking: «This your God says to you: I was ruling you for myself, I was keeping you for myself: that you would not commit adultery, a persuader was lacking: that a persuader should be lacking, I brought it about: place and time were lacking, and that these should be lacking, I brought it about.... Acknowledge, therefore, the grace of him to whom you owe even what you did not commit. That man owes to me what was done and you saw forgiven: you also owe to me what you did not do. For there is no sin that a man commits which another man could not commit, if the Ruler by whom man was made were absent.» As for the other benefit, that is surely indicated by the words of Sapient. IV. 11 (even if we wish those words to be said specifically of Enoch, cf. Gen. V. 24): He was taken away lest malice change his understanding, etc.; and that this is a grace is evident of itself and is attested by August. De Praedest. Sanct. c. XIV, n. 29: «Our brethren, who together with us attack, for the catholic faith, the ruin of the pelagian error, ought not to favor this pelagian opinion, by which they think that the grace of God is given according to our merits, to such an extent that they should strive to destroy what they cannot dare to deny: the sentence plainly true and Christian from ancient times: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding.... For so it is clear that what we say is invincible, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.»

V. The Apostle had lucidly handed down the distinction between external and internal grace, inculcated by the Fathers, both in the Epistle to the Romans and in the Epistle to the Galatians. For Paul distinguishes the law given by God to the people of the Jews, through which is the knowledge of sin, from the faith by which we believe in Christ, by which we are justified, the Holy Spirit dwelling in us and diffusing the charity of God. Faith, therefore, and charity are interior gifts, by which we are made just. But the Apostle denies that justice is through the law; otherwise Christ would have died in vain: and he calls faith grace, Gal. II, 20. 21. Rom. III, 21. seqq. Now, that the law given by God is a gift of God, or grace, is clear of itself; for it is a commandment of God unto life, a commandment holy, just, and good, Rom. VII, 10. 12; but nevertheless it is not that which is called grace absolutely by Paul; besides the law, he teaches another grace, which is necessary, which makes us just, which gives us life intrinsically. Since, therefore, the law is external grace and faith, which gives us life intrinsically and makes us just, is internal, it is clear that internal grace is distinguished by Paul from external grace.

VI. We call that greater in the order of benefit which is more useful to us for attaining our perfection and happiness. Now external and internal grace are so related that, in the present order, if external grace alone were conferred, man would not be made just and saved; on the contrary, if internal grace alone were conferred, man would be justified and saved: therefore internal grace is more useful to man than external grace. And in very truth internal grace is the end of the other external benefits, insofar as they are benefits, or are ordered to our good and utility: but the end, as such, surpasses those things which are for the end. And assuredly by internal grace man is really elevated formally to the supernatural order; but external grace is either a cause or a certain disposition that he may be elevated and may remain and advance in that state. Therefore internal grace is a greater benefit than external grace. Moreover, since internal grace is thus preferred to external grace, each is to be considered separately with respect to what is proper to it and insofar as it is distinguished from the other and can be separated from it. But if some external grace is considered insofar as it at the same time includes the internal, or vice versa, then under this respect a comparison cannot be made; because there is no opposition.

VII. Nevertheless, if both graces are compared in the order of being. Namely, considering the intrinsic ontological perfection of both: it is evident that at least some external grace surpasses the internal; for the incarnation, e. g., of the Word, which is external grace, exceeds by its perfection any other gift conferred upon us. Therefore.

I. «Since grace, says St. Thomas, I-II, q. CXI, a. 1, is ordered to this end, that man be led back into God, this is brought about in a certain order, namely that some are led back into God through others. According to this, therefore, grace is twofold: one by which man himself is united to God, which is called sanctifying grace; the other, by which one man cooperates with another to the end that he be led back to God: and this kind of gift is called grace freely given, because it is granted to man above the capacity of nature and above the merit of the person.» Therefore sanctifying grace is a gift by which man is made intrinsically acceptable to God; grace freely given is a gratuitous supernatural gift conferred to promote the spiritual salvation of others by way of ministry.

This appellation "freely given" is not to be understood in the sense of an excluded subject, as if this alone were given freely; for both graces are gratuitous: but since sanctifying grace obtains a determinate appellation from its own proper function, the other grace, in order to be distinguished from it, retains the appellation of the genus, which accordingly must be taken in the sense of an excluded predicate, i.e., a gift freely given only, namely not sanctifying. This appellation "freely given" derives from Matt. 10:8, where, after enumerating certain of these graces, Christ adds: freely you have received: freely give.

That this is another supernatural gift conferred on man besides that which makes man pleasing to God is established from the doctrine of Paul, 1 Cor. 12:4 ff. For there the discourse is about the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which the Spirit distributes to each one as He wills; they are therefore supernatural and gratuitous. Moreover, there the discourse is about gifts which are not destined for all men, but to one is given this gift, to another another; and it is clear that to many men, even if they place no obstacle, none of these gifts is given; whereas sanctifying grace is destined for all men and is conferred on all, unless the men themselves place an obstacle. Furthermore, these gifts are there called by Paul the manifestation of the Spirit: but the manifestation of the Spirit is not of itself for the good of him in whom the manifestation takes place, but of him to whom the manifestation is made, i.e., of others to whom it is manifested; although among these there can also be the one in whom the manifestation takes place. This, however, is proper to that grace which we have said is freely given. Whence Paul says that the manifestation of the Spirit is for the utility of τοῦ συμφέροντος, i.e., for the utility of those to whom it is manifested; which interpretation is confirmed also by the special nature of these gifts. For, e.g., the word of wisdom, the grace of healings, the working of mighty deeds, which are enumerated there, manifest indeed the Spirit, who is the cause of these effects; but the utility, which is the end of this manifestation, is not proper to him who speaks, who heals, who works miracles, but is proper to all those to whom the Spirit is manifested through them. Therefore the gift that makes pleasing does not of itself suppose anything but the person to whom it is conferred; the gift freely given supposes a society in which some can be helped by others. Cf. Matt. 10:7-8; Mark 16:20.

II. There is, therefore, a twofold distinction between the two graces. The first is that sanctifying grace is given of itself for the utility of the one who receives it, and indeed to this end, that he be just and pleasing to God: although by reason of it he is thereby rendered able to help others; but this is per accidens, that is intended per se, when this grace is conferred. On the contrary, grace freely given is conferred for the utility, and that spiritual, of others: although it can also bring utility to the very one who receives it; but this is per accidens, that is intended per se. Whence in the definition it was said per se. The other distinction, however, is that sanctifying grace is destined for all and at least something of it is conferred on all men, so that the works of sanctifying grace are placed within the power of each one's free will, and it is from this alone that men do not come to be holy and saved; whereas grace freely given is neither destined for all as something promised nor, at least generally, is it in our power to acquire it. I say at least generally: for two things must be excepted, namely the character of sacred orders and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, because it is open to anyone to acquire them, some deny are to be numbered among the graces freely given. Which we judge to be done without justification: since the proper ratio of grace freely given remains also in them, namely a supernatural gift given for the utility of others. Wherefore rather a subdivision of this genus is to be made than a new genus sought out. Namely, in order that the division of grace freely given be adequate, the division can be instituted thus: that grace freely given is either ordinary (character, ecclesiastical jurisdiction) or extraordinary (the remaining gifts). The Apostle indeed in 1 Cor., loc. cit., enumerates both species of the graces freely given.

Which, however, are individually the graces freely given, and how they are conferred, you can learn from St. Thomas, II, q. CXI, a. 4, together with Suárez, Prolegom. III, De Gratia, cc. 4, 5, Bellarmine, De Grat. et lib. arb., L. I, c. 10, and other theologians on the cited question of Thomas.

III. That sanctifying grace is more excellent than grace freely given is proved by the testimony of Paul, 1 Cor. 12, where, after he has enumerated the graces freely given, he adds at v. 31: but be zealous for the better charisms, and I show you a still more excellent way. Immediately, however, there follows the discourse and the praise of charity, which is sanctifying grace. And indeed, as St. Thomas argues, I-II, q. CXI, a. 5: «Each virtue is the more excellent the higher good it is ordered to. But the end is always more excellent than those things which are for the end. Sanctifying grace, however, orders man immediately to the union with the ultimate end: whereas the graces freely given order man to certain preparations for the ultimate end, just as through prophecy and miracles and other things of this kind men are led to this, that they be united to the ultimate end. And therefore sanctifying grace is much more excellent than grace freely given.»

I. Habitual grace is simply said to be that gift by which a man is formally and permanently just and acceptable to God, even if he does nothing. There are, moreover, other supernatural habits which perfect a man formally, although they do not justify, such as the habits of faith and hope, which, lest confusion arise, are not called habitual grace, but simply habits or virtues. What is proper to all of these is that a man is perfected by them according to his state.

Actual grace is that by which a man is perfected according to act or operation, which can both precede and follow sanctification. It is proper to actual grace to dispose to justification, although it does not accomplish this alone: it is proper to habitual grace, simply so called, to sanctify formally. Habitual grace and the other habits are something permanent; for that is proper to a habit.

Actual grace is both the help of God, which is in us the principle of a salutary act, and the act itself, which is itself a gift of God and can be the principle of another salutary act, as we shall see later. This latter grace, however, which is either placed in the act or given for the sake of the act, is something transient, just as the act passes away.

II. The existence of both graces is manifest. And first, indeed, from the analogy of faith. For it is established that the just live a certain supernatural and divine life. Moreover, life can be regarded in two ways, that is, both in first act and in second act. In first act it is the very essence of the living thing, the principle itself from which acts of life can be elicited. In second act, life is the very operation of that same principle: the former is permanent, the latter transient. But since the divine life is in us only through some participation, the principle of supernatural life cannot be had except in the manner of an accidental form inhering permanently, and this is habitual grace, by which we are made like God and constituted his sons and friends. Its existence is evident in baptized infants, who have the grace of God, but not actual grace, for they are incapable of acts: therefore they have habitual grace. But in order that the divine life be exercised in second act, divine help is required, which is given so that the act may be, and which therefore ceases when the act ceases; it is therefore something transient.

II. And assuredly the same thing is evinced from the divine testimony. For testimonies occur frequently in Scripture which signify both graces. For habitual and permanent grace is signified when mention is made of the new creature, Gal. VI. 15; of adoption, Rom. VIII. 15. 23: of filiation, Rom. VIII. 14: Ioan. I. 12; of regeneration, Tit. III. 5; Ioan. III. 5; of the recall to the original likeness in which man was created, Ephes. IV. 23.For all these things presuppose something habitual and permanent. Actual and transient grace, however, is signified when God is said to make men fit in good, so that they do his will, working in them what is pleasing before him, Hebr. XIII, 21; when God is said to work in us both to will and to accomplish, Philip. II, 13; when we are taught that no one can say: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit, I. Cor. XII, 3; when we are taught that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, 2. Cor. III, 5. For these things, which are shown to be done through God helping, are acts, and they pass away; whence also, when they have passed, that help ceases which is given on account of them.

There comes next the authentic magisterium of the Church. The Council of Trent, Sess. VI, On Justification, canon 3, says this about actual grace: «If anyone shall say that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help a man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him: let him be anathema.» And canon 2 has this about habitual grace: «If anyone shall say that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of the grace and charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit and inheres in them, or even that the grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God: let him be anathema.»

IV. And let these things suffice for the demonstration of the thesis, since the whole following treatise on actual grace is to be set forth most fully. Habitual grace, however, claims for itself another treatise, which, God willing, we shall publish later. We must therefore treat of created, supernatural, actual grace, which in the business of justification is prior, unless the subject is unfit for eliciting acts, and whose notion the Tridentine Synod therefore premised to the other: Cf. Sess. VI. capp. 5. 6. Moreover, the whole treatise on actual grace will be completed in five questions: 1ª on the nature, 2ª on the necessity, 3ª on the gratuitousness, 4ª on the efficacy, 5ª on the distribution of actual grace.