Tractatus de Gratia Divina Actuali

I. «According to the common manner of speaking (says St. Thomas, 1ª 2ae q. CX, a. 1), grace is wont to be taken in three ways: in one way, for the love of someone, as we are wont to say that this soldier has the grace of the king, that is, the king holds him in favor; secondly, it is taken for some gift freely given, as we are wont to say: I do you this grace; thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a freely given benefit, according to which we say that we give thanks for benefits.» Another signification of the same name can be added, namely insofar as it signifies that which draws love, to wit, the beauty and comeliness of a thing or person. It is clear that these significations are connected. Our discourse is about grace according to the second signification indicated by St. Thomas, namely insofar as it is understood as some good conferred upon another; which, in order that it be grace, requires the conditions set forth in the thesis. To explain, then, the definition: a benefit is a thing or action placed to the advantage or utility of another. Benevolence is the love by which we will good to another. Moreover, if account is taken of the disposition with which a benefit is conferred, one cannot act or do something for the good of another in only one way: for one can act unwillingly, and one can act spontaneously, and this either from love of oneself alone, which is the love of concupiscence, or from love of him on whom the benefit is conferred, which is the love of friendship or benevolence. It must further be noted that it is one thing to benefit another with benevolence, and another to benefit from benevolence. For we are said to benefit from benevolence when benevolent love is the reason why we confer a good on another; if this love is present only concomitantly, the benefit will have been conferred merely with benevolence. In the definition, however, the words "from benevolence" are taken in such a way that benevolence is the reason for benefiting.

II. True benevolence can be the reason for benefiting either inadequately or adequately. It is an inadequate reason when, besides it, there is another motive for benefiting, namely insofar as the good that is conferred is owed in some way, as can happen in the conferral of goods by distributive justice, or is even simply owed (whether it is owed directly to him on whom the good is conferred, or to another who requires that that good be conferred on someone), yet in such a way that, since it is physically free for a man not to do what he owes, he is drawn by love to discharge the debt. Benevolence is the adequate reason when, on the contrary, benevolent love is the whole reason why someone confers a good on another; so that the good is in no way owed either to him on whom it is in fact conferred, or to another who could require that that good be conferred on someone else, unless this very requirement has arisen from some gratuitous gift. Now both of these things are signified when it is said "apart from the exigency of him on whom it is conferred": for when someone does good to another because a third party has a right that good be done to him by the benefactor, the benefit is conferred not only on him who actually receives the good, but also on the other who requires it. Furthermore, a thing is then properly said to be conferred from benevolence when benevolence is the adequate reason of the conferral; so that insofar as a thing is not conferred from benevolence, neither is it grace on that account.

Therefore there are two elements by which the concept of grace is brought to completion: the benefit and gratuitous benevolence, the former holding the place of matter, the latter as it were of form.

III. Now, that this is properly the concept of that thing which is called gratia by the Latins, χάρις by the Greeks, and חֵן and חִנָּם by the Hebrews, when by these words there is signified that which is conferred by one person on another, is established by common usage, both profane and sacred.

Of profane usage Aristotle is the witness. For thus in II Rhetor., c. 7, he defines grace: «ἔστι δὲ χάρις, καθ᾽ ἣν λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν τῷ δεδωκότι, ἵνα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ αὑτοῦ τὸ ποιοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τι μέγα ᾖ, ἢ φθάνει δεόμενος, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁμοίως, ἢ φίλων». «ἔστι δὲ ἡ χάρις ἡ δι᾽ ἣν ὁ ἔχων χάριν λέγεται παρέχειν τῷ δεομένῳ, οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι, οὐδ᾽ ἵνα τι προσγένηται τῷ παρέχοντι, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἀγαθόν τι ᾖ τῷ παρεχομένῳ. μεγάλη δὲ ἡ χάρις ἔσται, ἐὰν διδῶται σφόδρα δεομένοις ἢ ἐὰν μεγάλα καὶ δυσχερῆ παρέχηται ἢ ἐν τοιούτοις κακοῖς ἢ ἐὰν ὁ εὐεργετῶν ᾖ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα εὐεργετῇ.»¹

As witnesses of sacred usage we give Augustine and Thomas: of whom the latter, in 1a 2ae q. CXI, a. 1, ad 2m, has this: «Gratia, secundum quod gratis datur, excludit rationem debiti. Potest autem intelligi duplex debitum, unum quidem ex merito proveniens, quod refertur ad personam, cuius est agere meritoria opera… Aliud est debitum secundum conditionem naturae: puta si dicamus, debitum esse homini quod habeat rationem et alia quae ad humanam pertinent naturam… Dona naturalia carent primo debito, non autem carent secundo. Sed dona supernaturalia utroque debito carent et ideo specialius sibi nomen gratiae vindicant.» Augustine, however, in De Gestis Pelagii, c. 14, says: «Ipsum gratiae nomen et eius nominis intellectus aufertur, si non gratis datur, sed eam qui dignus est accipit… Quisque dignus est, debitum est ei: si autem debitum est, gratia non est; gratia quippe donatur, debitum redditur. Gratia ergo donatur indignis, ut reddatur debitum dignis.» Furthermore, the universal Church approved this acceptation of grace by her suffrage, when she proscribed the error of the Pelagians, that the grace of God is given according to our merits; which opinion was reprobated for this reason, because if it is given on account of merits, it is no longer grace.

All these things are confirmed by biblical usage. For by the name of grace there is signified 1) the benefit itself: Act. XI, 17; Rom. I, 5. 2) the benevolence or favor of him from whom the benefit is received, and to this that phrase pertains by which χάρις is said to find grace before someone: Gen. VI, 7, 8; XXXIX, 1-4; Esther II, 17. also 3) gratuitous benevolence, so that a debt may be excluded: Rom. IV, 4; XI, 6; Ephes. II, 7, 8, 9. Cf. the use of the adverb חִנָּם, gratis: Gen. XXIX, 15; Exod. XXI, 2, 11; 2 Sam. XXIV, 24.

IV. It is manifest, therefore, by usage not only profane but sacred, that when grace is said, and by it is signified that which one person receives from another, what is really signified is a benefit conferred from gratuitous benevolence. This, accordingly, is the formal ratio of grace, namely that a gift be conferred from a benevolent heart, freely, that is, apart from any exigency of another; so that some benefit is called grace to the extent that it is freely conferred, and the greater the gratuitous character is, the more it is grace, even if perhaps it is not greater in the order of good. Hence, although in the biblical and ecclesiastical manner of speaking there is also called grace that which is repaid to our merits, or which is given to us on account of the merits of Christ, it is nevertheless called grace for this reason, insofar as in it the gratuitous character toward us at least has a place.

V. Grace is customarily defined by the scholastics as a gift freely given. That this definition expresses the same thing as the preceding one is clear by an extrinsic argument; for all the scholastics will the grace they define to be altogether gratuitous, proceeding to men from the sole benevolence of God. But this is also clear by an intrinsic argument, namely by an analysis of the terms. Surely he who says "gift" properly says some benefit which is given spontaneously and with no necessity, as Petavius warns in the place cited in the note above, a benefit, namely, whose reason of conferral is the sole benevolence of the giver. Nevertheless, because that which is conferred on account of some merit is also frequently wont to be called a gift, in order that the notion of merit may be expressly excluded, "freely given" is added, i.e., apart from any exigency of him on whom it is conferred, and therefore conferred from gratuitous benevolence. Whence Augustine, Tr. III in Ioann., n. D: »Quid est gratia? gratis data, quid est gratis data? donata, non reddita.« But he would be foolish who should disdain this definition, because grace is explained through the gratis, which seems to amount to the same thing. For the concept that underlies the gratis is more determined from the common manner of speaking than the concept that is expressed by the simple word gratia, and the notion of the unowed, or of what is conferred apart from any merit, appears more clearly in the τῇ gratis than in the τῇ gratia. Whence it came about that the Pelagians, although they did not shrink from calling certain divine gifts by the name of grace, nevertheless denied that this grace is freely given, but contended that the grace of God is given according to merits; the Fathers, on the contrary, maintained that the grace of God is freely given.

Corollary I. The principle of grace, therefore, is benevolence, and that an active benevolence, which namely diffuses itself into gifts. Hence the first grace is benevolence itself. For as St. Thomas says, I p., q. XXXVIII, a. 2: „Ratio gratuitae donationis est amor, ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo, quod damus ei, est amor, quo volumus ei bonum." For since love is toward another and for the good of another, it is rightly said that the love of the lover is given to the beloved. Therefore benevolence is the first gift, or first grace, which is given to those to whom we do good. And since it belongs to this gift not, indeed, to be from benevolence efficiently, but formally to be benevolence itself and to contain in itself the reason why it is given to another, it is assuredly the chief gift, when the formal ratio of grace is considered.

Corollary II. Since the divine benevolence, which is the fountain of the other gifts by which God has enriched his creatures, is eternal, some grace of God is eternal.

Note. For those about to deliver the divisions of divine grace, the beginning would have to be made from the first division, which is into uncreated and created grace; but since uncreated grace, which is the Holy Spirit and the whole Trinity, has been expressly treated in the Treatise on the Most Holy Trinity, in order that we may save time and pursue only those things that are proper to our treatise, we gladly pass it over here. We call "principal partitions" those which embrace, as it were, the highest genera, to which the rest can and ought to be reduced.

I. Natural goods are both nature itself and the things which follow upon nature and are required by it, and all things which are contained in the order of these (De Deo Creant. Th. XXXI). Now it is evident that goods of this kind are simply honored by the Fathers with the appellation of grace. Truly the natural light of reason, or the image of God, which man, insofar as he is rational, bears, is called the grace of God (Athanasius De Incarn. c. 12. Epiphanius ad Joannem hierosolym. ep. CX. among the works of Jerome, who translated it); immortality is called the grace of God, which the spirits enjoy, who are indeed incorruptible and immortal, but otherwise than God; for the former has it from himself, the latter have it from God, who freely creates, that they be such (Sophronius hierosolym. in the synodal letters read in Conc. VI. Act. XI. Jerome, Dialogue II cont. Pelag. n. 7); and in general whatever inheres in men according to being and nature is called grace (Damascene De Fide II. 12).

Hence it is that the Church in its liturgy and in its public prayers asks of God not only supernatural goods but also natural ones, of which sort are the health of the body, the averting of pestilence, famine, storms, rain or serenity of the air, victory in war, and the like; and it begs these of God in such a way that it implores divine indulgence, mercy, and loving-kindness, and gives thanks to God when it has obtained them.

What of the fact that the Providence of God, which rules all things, is called by the author of Wisdom XVI, 25 παντοτρόφος ἀρετῇ, and is rendered by the Vulgate interpreter as the grace that nourishes all things?

This doctrine was expressly attested by the five African prelates Aurelius, Alypius, Augustine, Evodius, Possidius in those letters which they sent to Innocent in the Pelagian cause: «Although (they say) the grace of God by which we were created is called in a certain manner of speaking not to be disapproved, that we might not be nothing, nor be something in such a way as a corpse, which does not live, and a tree, which does not feel, and a beast, which does not understand, but men, who would be and live and feel and understand, and ought to give thanks to our Creator for so great a benefit: whence even this can deservedly be called grace, because it was given not by the merits of any preceding works, but by the gratuitous goodness of God: yet there is another, by which, being predestined, we are called, justified, glorified.»

II. The same is established by reason, which the African bishops also indicated. For in order that something be grace, it must be some benefit conferred spontaneously with no necessity, which no merits that would require it preceded: but it cannot be denied that the gift of creation is of this sort, and in general whatever is connected with the creation of nature. But specifically, if natural gifts are considered one by one, it is clear that very many of them, besides that common character which is present in creation, also claim for themselves a special character of grace. Truly we have said (De Deo Creat. l. c.) that the natural are those gifts which are required by nature lest it be in vain, and consequently all those things which are contained in the same order of perfection as those which are required by nature, of which they are nothing but a certain amplification. For very many of those things which are owed to nature are not contained within a definite number, but extend themselves indefinitely. Now indeed 1) since every species admits indefinite degrees in its perfection, as the intellective power in respect of the keenness of talent, each one of these degrees taken singly, no less than the creation of nature, is unowed even granted creation, and therefore has the character of grace. 2) The very amplification of natural goods, which is not necessary of itself, such as shows itself e.g. in so many and such varied lower natures, which were created for our advantage, has a special character of grace; for that amplitude is not properly owed. 3) Many things which are owed to nature of themselves are not owed to concrete nature or to the person, because some higher order, to which nature or persons are subject, requires that they be deprived of this; thus e.g., although the integrity of the members, the health of the organs, and things of this sort are owed to nature, if nevertheless those physical causes concur which disturb the work of generation, which affect the body badly, it is necessary that a defect exist in the body, so that the physical laws by which the world is governed may remain safe: wherefore if in some person those causes are prevented from acting by other causes, that will be attributed to grace. Indeed 4) although in general the physical order in which human nature is engaged is owed to it; nevertheless, because the physical order could have been disposed by God in many ways, this present order, which was freely chosen by God, from which so many benefits come to men, insofar as these benefits follow which would not exist in another order, which God could have chosen, again acquires the character of grace. Finally 5) although rational nature has need of certain helps by which it may exercise its faculties, and accordingly demands them in general, nevertheless these same helps, considered singly, claim for themselves a certain character of the gratuitous. Truly, in order that the will act, it is necessary that it be placed in certain circumstances and that the knowledge of the intellect precede; but in order that the intellect actually think, it is necessary that something occur to it by which it is determined to the act; and although in general something is required by the intellect by which it be determined, yet that this rather than that should occur to it, that these rather than those should be the circumstances of the operation, depends on Providence, which freely chose this order of things rather than another. Therefore those circumstances in which the will operates well, though it would not operate in others, the occurrence of that thing which determines the fitting or opportune thought to the good act of the will, are to be numbered among the divine graces. Moreover, the Philosopher himself saw this truth, whose testimony St. Thomas cites in Quodlib. I. a. 7, and the words of the Philosopher are found in L. VII. Eudemiorum (if indeed it is his work) c. 14: «On this someone will doubt whether fortune is the cause of this, namely that we think what is fitting and when it is fitting, and so fortune would be the cause of all things, since it is the cause of thought and deliberation. For no one deliberates because he previously deliberated that he would deliberate, and he deliberated this very thing. But there is some principle. Nor does anyone think because he previously thought to think, and this to infinity. Therefore the principle of thinking is not the mind, nor of deliberation is deliberation. What else therefore but fortune? so that all things depend on fortune, if there is some principle beyond which there is no other. But in what way is this such that it can do this? Surely what is sought is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul. It is manifest indeed that, just as in the universe God, so also in it the principle of motion is God. For the divine thing that exists in us moves all things. But the principle of reason is not reason, but something more excellent: and what can be more excellent than even science itself except God?»

It is established, therefore, that in the very order of nature there is a place for many divine graces, and that many reasons occur why we should beseech God and give thanks to Him for His benefits.

Corollary. From what has been said under n. 5) it is permitted to gather that one must not immediately think of some supernatural help as soon as mention is made of some divine help by which our faculties are aided, as if in the order of nature there were no divine helps of this kind. For even in the order of pure nature, if it had existed, there would have been its own fitting natural helps, by which man would have been aided toward the attainment of the natural end. Wherefore the economy of Divine Providence in that order would not have been merely that which now exists, with the supernatural gifts and helps removed; but it would have been different in the supplying of fitting helps according to the exigency of the proper end of that state.

III. A supernatural gift is a perfection which neither constitutes the essence of a thing nor necessarily follows upon the essence of a thing nor is required by it lest it and its powers be in vain, nor is contained under the genus of those perfections which are required by nature: but if that which is simply supernatural is kept before one's eyes, it is a perfection exceeding the perfection of all natural goods. cf. De Deo Creant. Th. XXXI, whose doctrine we here presuppose. Therefore the supernatural is a gift unowed to nature and therefore gratuitous. Moreover, if natural gifts are compared with supernatural ones, it is evident 1°) that, although natural gifts too, as we have said, can be reckoned as the grace of God, supernatural gifts claim the name of grace for themselves by stronger right and more properly. For although they agree in this, that both proceed from the benevolent mind of God, they differ nevertheless, whether the character of good in itself or the character of the gratuitous is considered. For in supernatural gifts, if at least those are regarded which are simply supernatural, such as adoption, the indwelling in us of the Holy Spirit, beatitude, the Incarnation, etc., the good is greater, since they are gifts greater according to perfection. But if in these goods the character of the gratuitous is considered, one may note this. a) If among natural gifts the very nature which is created is regarded, this is not positively unowed to anyone, since there is no subject to whose merits it would not be owed; but it is only negatively unowed, because God was not bound to create it: whence in the gift of nature the character of the unowed is not proper; for the unowed denotes an order to something to which it is not owed; but in the creation of nature there is lacking a real terminus to which it could be said to be unowed. But supernatural gifts are positively unowed, for they are referred to nature, to which they accede and to which they are not owed. If b) those natural gifts are regarded which follow upon nature and are required by it, they exclude indeed merit from works, but not the merit of nature; but supernatural gifts exclude both merits, as is evident from the very definition. Cf. the testimony of St. Thomas in the preceding Thesis. If c) the amplitude of natural gifts is regarded, which is not owed of itself, and that certain natural order of providence, which again is not owed; nevertheless these although they are not owed specifically, they are owed generically and are contained in the same order of those perfections which are owed to nature. But supernatural gifts are owed neither specifically nor generically, and altogether exceed the perfection of those things which are owed to nature. Therefore the supernatural is positively unowed, unowed not only to the merits of works but also to the merits of nature, and it is owed neither specifically nor generically. And so by stronger right and more properly the supernatural gift is called and is grace; for whether the character of benefit is regarded, which consists in conferred perfection, or the character of the unowed is regarded, each is greater in supernatural gifts. Whence Augustine says, Serm. XI. De Verbis Apostoli: «Except that grace by which human nature was founded — for this is common to Christians and pagans — this is the greater grace, not that through the Word we were created as men, but that through the Word made flesh we were made believers.» Hence it is that, as the same Augustine warns, when the name of grace is used simply in the Church, supernatural goods, not natural ones, are wont to be understood: for this is the grace which Catholic bishops have been accustomed to read in the books of God and to preach to the peoples (epist. cit. ad Innocentium), and the grace which the Apostle commends is not that by which we were created that we might be men, but that by which we were justified, when we were evil men (epist. CXCIV. ad Sixtum n. 8).»

IV. But the question can be whether that distinction, which in the character of grace intervenes between natural and supernatural gifts, is only according to degrees — which Augustine seems to suggest by the testimony cited a little earlier, saying that this is the greater grace — or whether it is according to species. A distinction according to species is a distinction according to essence. Now indeed those things specifically differ which, under one common character, whether univocal or analogical, are so disposed that one of them has a positive note, which determines or circumscribes the very character of the genus, while the other lacks it: or those things specifically differ which under a common character consist of different essential notes, whether positive on both sides, as green and red under the character of color, vice and virtue under the character of moral habit: or positive on one side and negative on the other, as the rational and irrational animal under the character of animal. But if those goods are considered which are called natural in the stricter sense, i.e. owed to nature, which namely presuppose nature, to which they are referred, and they are compared with supernatural ones, it is clear that although both are in a certain respect graces, nevertheless for the former it is essential to be owed to nature, for the latter to be unowed: which two notes indeed differ essentially. Therefore at least these gifts differ essentially under the character of grace. But if the very creation of nature is regarded and compared with supernatural goods, it is again evident that the former is grace because there is lacking a subject to which it could be conferred and therefore to which it could also be owed, while the latter are grace with respect to nature itself, to which they are not owed, although it exists: but these two — to be grace because there is lacking a subject to which it could be conferred, and to be grace because it is not owed to an existing subject, to which it is conferred — differ certainly not accidentally but essentially. The notes, therefore, which are essential to the enumerated gifts are different, and the very common character of grace is determined and circumscribed in supernatural gifts by a positive note which is lacking to the others. As for the other natural gifts, however, which are not owed according to indivisible species or according to number; since nevertheless they are owed at least generically, they are not even according to essence of the same character as supernatural gifts, which are not owed even generically. You will say: God does not owe natural goods to nature, but to Himself. Namely, given the creation of nature, the divine perfections require that they be conferred, so that in that hypothesis God is not free for either. But the opposite holds with regard to supernatural goods. Therefore. Cf. I. II. q. CXI, a. L. ad 2m. Augustine, however, does not deny what we defend: but he used a certain looser manner of speaking. But we would wrongly always require in the Fathers the stricter manner of speaking which the school afterwards took up.

I. By this division no other author of grace is indicated, since God is the author of every supernatural grace, but there is indicated one and another relation of grace to the diverse states of the rational creature, namely the state of integrity and of lapse: 2) the special relation of grace to its principle is indicated; for the grace which is given to fallen men is referred to Christ the Redeemer, as meritorious cause, the merit of which Redeemer has no place in the other state. Since, therefore, with respect to the state of lapse grace has this as proper to itself, that it depends on the merits of Christ the Redeemer, for that reason it is called by its proper name the Grace of Christ, the common appellation grace of God being retained for signifying that grace which regards the other state. The grace of Christ is also called the Grace of God through Jesus Christ. Cf. Aug. De Gratia Christi c. 17. For it is established that God elevated human nature in the first parent to the gratuitous supernatural order (De Deo Creant Th. XLVIII. seqq.), and it is established that fallen human nature is not restored and recalled to its pristine state except through Christ, who by the offering of himself on the cross took away the sin of the world and brought salvation to all who had perished. Whence in the state of fallen nature Christ the Redeemer is the meritorious cause of every supernatural gift.

II. Now indeed, having regard to this twofold state, the grace which regards both is deservedly distinguished. For grace is deservedly distinguished, according to the very notion of a gratuitous gift, between the grace which is conferred merely upon one not worthy and the grace which is conferred upon one positively unworthy: between the grace which proceeds from benevolence alone and the grace which issues from benevolence and mercy at the same time: between the grace which is conferred simply to elevate and the grace which is conferred to heal and elevate at the same time: between the grace which is conferred simply gratuitously and the grace which is so conferred gratuitously to others that it is conferred also on account of merits another has acquired. But the former is the grace conferred upon integral nature and is called the grace of God; the latter is the grace conferred upon fallen nature and is called the grace of Christ. For the grace of Christ is conferred upon sinful nature, and therefore positively unworthy nature, to which nature, miserable on account of sin, assistance is given through mercy, which sinful nature, when it is freed from sin and its effects, is moreover restored to health, and these things are granted to it by God on account of the merits of Christ the Redeemer. But because sin was lacking in integral nature, when it was enriched with gratuitous gifts, the grace conferred upon it lacked these special characters. Hence to the grace of God pertains not only the grace conferred upon Adam, but also the grace conferred upon the Angels.

III. The grace of God is called elevating grace, but the grace of Christ is called healing grace, medicinal grace, not because this accomplishes only that, but because it alone does that. For human nature, changed for the worse in body and soul, as the Council of Trent says, now needs a physician, because it is not healthy, which indeed in the state of elevation it did not need. But it must be noted that healing and medicinal grace is not for that reason alone so called, because it heals some weakness which, in fallen nature, would not have been in integral nature; but generally because it repairs nature collapsed and changed for the worse in soul and body. For healing and medicinal grace according to Augustine (De natura et gratia. cc. 2. et 3.) is not only that by which the weakness of concupiscence is healed, but that by which infants and those of advanced age are saved, namely that by which all men are freed from sin and justified; which indeed is done through grace simply supernatural and elevating. To remember this will help in what follows. That, however, does not prevent that, when the double effect of this same grace of Christ is distinguished, the same grace be also distinguished and one be called elevating grace, the other be specially called healing and medicinal, which heals the wounds of nature in the very order of nature. Furthermore, Augustine treats of the grace of Christ especially against the Pelagians.

The testimonies Eph. IV, 23. 24. Coloss. III, 8. 10. Gen. I, 26. Eecli. XVII. 1 (Vulg.), compared with the interpretation of the Fathers (De Deo Creant. Th. XLII.), set forth the grace of God.

The testimonies 1. Cor. XV, 10. Ephes. I, 3. 2. Tim. 1, 9. etc. refer to the grace of Christ.

Nota. If anyone should contend that all grace, even that conferred upon Adam and the Angels, was conferred from the merits of Christ, about which matter we do not now wish to dispute; yet the distinction between the grace of God and the grace of Christ would remain, both on account of the diverse relation to the diverse states, and because the merits of Christ for nature not fallen would not be the merits of a Redeemer, whereas they are the merits of a Redeemer for fallen nature.

Although not every internal grace is, in the order of being, more excellent than any external grace; nevertheless, in the order of benefit, internal grace of itself surpasses external grace.

I. This is not a division of the grace of Christ, but of supernatural grace; for this division, no less than the following ones, can hold also for the grace of God. Indeed, this division, of which we treat in this Thesis, can find a place also in natural grace; we divide, however, only supernatural grace, because we do not have to treat of natural grace.

II. Internal grace consists in the divine gifts that are in us as in a subject; external grace consists in those gifts that are outside us and affect us. That both graces exist in the supernatural order is manifest. For external grace is the positive law of God, revelation, the preaching of faith, the incarnation and the examples of Christ, the divine Scripture, the magisterium of the Church, and other things of this kind, by which men are advanced toward eternal life. It is clear that these are both graces, because they are unowed, and supernatural graces — either in a qualified sense, as the positive manifestation of the natural law and the revelation of certain natural truths, or absolutely, as the revelation of the mysteries, the incarnation, the sacraments, and the like; for the former are an unowed means of nature for a clearer knowledge of the law and of the truths, while the latter are unowed to the whole of nature and are causes or instruments by which men are elevated to participation in the divine order. Internal grace is the justice of God, by which God makes the unjust just; it is the habits of the infused virtues; it is the illuminations of the mind and the inspirations of the will — by which gifts we are also made adopted children and live the divine life, in which matter the supernatural order itself essentially consists. Cf. s. Thomam I Ilae q. CVI. a. 2.

III. The distinction between external and internal grace manifests itself clearly in the Pelagian controversy; for Pelagius did not deny every grace, nor was he on that account regarded as a heretic: but while he conceded that for acting rightly and salutarily we are helped by the grace of God consisting in the law, the doctrine, and the examples of Christ, he nevertheless denied that the will is helped internally through the supply of the power of the Holy Spirit. This denying part was reprobated in him as heretical: he was not, however, regarded as a heretic because he held the graces to be external — which all the Fathers professed together with him — but because he excluded internal grace, especially that of the will, which, compared with external grace and having regard to operation, is called κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν grace, because it is precisely that which elevates the operating faculty and is the efficacious principle of the supernatural good work. The Fathers, therefore, distinguished between external and internal grace and preferred the latter to the former, so that external grace without internal grace was held useless; but nevertheless they confessed that those exterior gifts are also graces of God. Nowhere (says Aug. Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II) do those enemies of grace lay more hidden snares for attacking that same grace more vehemently than where they praise the law, which without doubt is to be praised. For by diverse modes of speech and a variety of words, in all their disputations, they want the law to be understood as grace, namely that we have from the Lord God the help of knowledge, by which we may know those things which are to be done, not the inspiration of love, that knowing them we may do them with holy love, which is properly grace.Cont. duas epist. pelagg. L. IV. c. 15. n. II

IV. The very protection of God, by which temptations and occasions of sinning are warded off, and that providence by which a man is brought to the end of life, when he is fit to attain eternal life, since they place nothing really in the soul, are extrinsic grace; yet they are truly grace: which grace, by reason of the end for which it is conferred, must be called supernatural; for it pertains to supernatural providence. Hence Aug. Serm. XCIX, n. 6, brings in God speaking: «This your God says to you: I was ruling you for myself, I was keeping you for myself: that you would not commit adultery, a persuader was lacking: that a persuader should be lacking, I brought it about: place and time were lacking, and that these should be lacking, I brought it about.... Acknowledge, therefore, the grace of him to whom you owe even what you did not commit. That man owes to me what was done and you saw forgiven: you also owe to me what you did not do. For there is no sin that a man commits which another man could not commit, if the Ruler by whom man was made were absent.» As for the other benefit, that is surely indicated by the words of Sapient. IV. 11 (even if we wish those words to be said specifically of Enoch, cf. Gen. V. 24): He was taken away lest malice change his understanding, etc.; and that this is a grace is evident of itself and is attested by August. De Praedest. Sanct. c. XIV, n. 29: «Our brethren, who together with us attack, for the catholic faith, the ruin of the pelagian error, ought not to favor this pelagian opinion, by which they think that the grace of God is given according to our merits, to such an extent that they should strive to destroy what they cannot dare to deny: the sentence plainly true and Christian from ancient times: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding.... For so it is clear that what we say is invincible, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.»

V. The Apostle had lucidly handed down the distinction between external and internal grace, inculcated by the Fathers, both in the Epistle to the Romans and in the Epistle to the Galatians. For Paul distinguishes the law given by God to the people of the Jews, through which is the knowledge of sin, from the faith by which we believe in Christ, by which we are justified, the Holy Spirit dwelling in us and diffusing the charity of God. Faith, therefore, and charity are interior gifts, by which we are made just. But the Apostle denies that justice is through the law; otherwise Christ would have died in vain: and he calls faith grace, Gal. II, 20. 21. Rom. III, 21. seqq. Now, that the law given by God is a gift of God, or grace, is clear of itself; for it is a commandment of God unto life, a commandment holy, just, and good, Rom. VII, 10. 12; but nevertheless it is not that which is called grace absolutely by Paul; besides the law, he teaches another grace, which is necessary, which makes us just, which gives us life intrinsically. Since, therefore, the law is external grace and faith, which gives us life intrinsically and makes us just, is internal, it is clear that internal grace is distinguished by Paul from external grace.

VI. We call that greater in the order of benefit which is more useful to us for attaining our perfection and happiness. Now external and internal grace are so related that, in the present order, if external grace alone were conferred, man would not be made just and saved; on the contrary, if internal grace alone were conferred, man would be justified and saved: therefore internal grace is more useful to man than external grace. And in very truth internal grace is the end of the other external benefits, insofar as they are benefits, or are ordered to our good and utility: but the end, as such, surpasses those things which are for the end. And assuredly by internal grace man is really elevated formally to the supernatural order; but external grace is either a cause or a certain disposition that he may be elevated and may remain and advance in that state. Therefore internal grace is a greater benefit than external grace. Moreover, since internal grace is thus preferred to external grace, each is to be considered separately with respect to what is proper to it and insofar as it is distinguished from the other and can be separated from it. But if some external grace is considered insofar as it at the same time includes the internal, or vice versa, then under this respect a comparison cannot be made; because there is no opposition.

VII. Nevertheless, if both graces are compared in the order of being. Namely, considering the intrinsic ontological perfection of both: it is evident that at least some external grace surpasses the internal; for the incarnation, e. g., of the Word, which is external grace, exceeds by its perfection any other gift conferred upon us. Therefore.

I. «Since grace, says St. Thomas, I-II, q. CXI, a. 1, is ordered to this end, that man be led back into God, this is brought about in a certain order, namely that some are led back into God through others. According to this, therefore, grace is twofold: one by which man himself is united to God, which is called sanctifying grace; the other, by which one man cooperates with another to the end that he be led back to God: and this kind of gift is called grace freely given, because it is granted to man above the capacity of nature and above the merit of the person.» Therefore sanctifying grace is a gift by which man is made intrinsically acceptable to God; grace freely given is a gratuitous supernatural gift conferred to promote the spiritual salvation of others by way of ministry.

This appellation "freely given" is not to be understood in the sense of an excluded subject, as if this alone were given freely; for both graces are gratuitous: but since sanctifying grace obtains a determinate appellation from its own proper function, the other grace, in order to be distinguished from it, retains the appellation of the genus, which accordingly must be taken in the sense of an excluded predicate, i.e., a gift freely given only, namely not sanctifying. This appellation "freely given" derives from Matt. 10:8, where, after enumerating certain of these graces, Christ adds: freely you have received: freely give.

That this is another supernatural gift conferred on man besides that which makes man pleasing to God is established from the doctrine of Paul, 1 Cor. 12:4 ff. For there the discourse is about the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which the Spirit distributes to each one as He wills; they are therefore supernatural and gratuitous. Moreover, there the discourse is about gifts which are not destined for all men, but to one is given this gift, to another another; and it is clear that to many men, even if they place no obstacle, none of these gifts is given; whereas sanctifying grace is destined for all men and is conferred on all, unless the men themselves place an obstacle. Furthermore, these gifts are there called by Paul the manifestation of the Spirit: but the manifestation of the Spirit is not of itself for the good of him in whom the manifestation takes place, but of him to whom the manifestation is made, i.e., of others to whom it is manifested; although among these there can also be the one in whom the manifestation takes place. This, however, is proper to that grace which we have said is freely given. Whence Paul says that the manifestation of the Spirit is for the utility of τοῦ συμφέροντος, i.e., for the utility of those to whom it is manifested; which interpretation is confirmed also by the special nature of these gifts. For, e.g., the word of wisdom, the grace of healings, the working of mighty deeds, which are enumerated there, manifest indeed the Spirit, who is the cause of these effects; but the utility, which is the end of this manifestation, is not proper to him who speaks, who heals, who works miracles, but is proper to all those to whom the Spirit is manifested through them. Therefore the gift that makes pleasing does not of itself suppose anything but the person to whom it is conferred; the gift freely given supposes a society in which some can be helped by others. Cf. Matt. 10:7-8; Mark 16:20.

II. There is, therefore, a twofold distinction between the two graces. The first is that sanctifying grace is given of itself for the utility of the one who receives it, and indeed to this end, that he be just and pleasing to God: although by reason of it he is thereby rendered able to help others; but this is per accidens, that is intended per se, when this grace is conferred. On the contrary, grace freely given is conferred for the utility, and that spiritual, of others: although it can also bring utility to the very one who receives it; but this is per accidens, that is intended per se. Whence in the definition it was said per se. The other distinction, however, is that sanctifying grace is destined for all and at least something of it is conferred on all men, so that the works of sanctifying grace are placed within the power of each one's free will, and it is from this alone that men do not come to be holy and saved; whereas grace freely given is neither destined for all as something promised nor, at least generally, is it in our power to acquire it. I say at least generally: for two things must be excepted, namely the character of sacred orders and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, because it is open to anyone to acquire them, some deny are to be numbered among the graces freely given. Which we judge to be done without justification: since the proper ratio of grace freely given remains also in them, namely a supernatural gift given for the utility of others. Wherefore rather a subdivision of this genus is to be made than a new genus sought out. Namely, in order that the division of grace freely given be adequate, the division can be instituted thus: that grace freely given is either ordinary (character, ecclesiastical jurisdiction) or extraordinary (the remaining gifts). The Apostle indeed in 1 Cor., loc. cit., enumerates both species of the graces freely given.

Which, however, are individually the graces freely given, and how they are conferred, you can learn from St. Thomas, II, q. CXI, a. 4, together with Suárez, Prolegom. III, De Gratia, cc. 4, 5, Bellarmine, De Grat. et lib. arb., L. I, c. 10, and other theologians on the cited question of Thomas.

III. That sanctifying grace is more excellent than grace freely given is proved by the testimony of Paul, 1 Cor. 12, where, after he has enumerated the graces freely given, he adds at v. 31: but be zealous for the better charisms, and I show you a still more excellent way. Immediately, however, there follows the discourse and the praise of charity, which is sanctifying grace. And indeed, as St. Thomas argues, I-II, q. CXI, a. 5: «Each virtue is the more excellent the higher good it is ordered to. But the end is always more excellent than those things which are for the end. Sanctifying grace, however, orders man immediately to the union with the ultimate end: whereas the graces freely given order man to certain preparations for the ultimate end, just as through prophecy and miracles and other things of this kind men are led to this, that they be united to the ultimate end. And therefore sanctifying grace is much more excellent than grace freely given.»

I. Habitual grace is simply said to be that gift by which a man is formally and permanently just and acceptable to God, even if he does nothing. There are, moreover, other supernatural habits which perfect a man formally, although they do not justify, such as the habits of faith and hope, which, lest confusion arise, are not called habitual grace, but simply habits or virtues. What is proper to all of these is that a man is perfected by them according to his state.

Actual grace is that by which a man is perfected according to act or operation, which can both precede and follow sanctification. It is proper to actual grace to dispose to justification, although it does not accomplish this alone: it is proper to habitual grace, simply so called, to sanctify formally. Habitual grace and the other habits are something permanent; for that is proper to a habit.

Actual grace is both the help of God, which is in us the principle of a salutary act, and the act itself, which is itself a gift of God and can be the principle of another salutary act, as we shall see later. This latter grace, however, which is either placed in the act or given for the sake of the act, is something transient, just as the act passes away.

II. The existence of both graces is manifest. And first, indeed, from the analogy of faith. For it is established that the just live a certain supernatural and divine life. Moreover, life can be regarded in two ways, that is, both in first act and in second act. In first act it is the very essence of the living thing, the principle itself from which acts of life can be elicited. In second act, life is the very operation of that same principle: the former is permanent, the latter transient. But since the divine life is in us only through some participation, the principle of supernatural life cannot be had except in the manner of an accidental form inhering permanently, and this is habitual grace, by which we are made like God and constituted his sons and friends. Its existence is evident in baptized infants, who have the grace of God, but not actual grace, for they are incapable of acts: therefore they have habitual grace. But in order that the divine life be exercised in second act, divine help is required, which is given so that the act may be, and which therefore ceases when the act ceases; it is therefore something transient.

II. And assuredly the same thing is evinced from the divine testimony. For testimonies occur frequently in Scripture which signify both graces. For habitual and permanent grace is signified when mention is made of the new creature, Gal. VI. 15; of adoption, Rom. VIII. 15. 23: of filiation, Rom. VIII. 14: Ioan. I. 12; of regeneration, Tit. III. 5; Ioan. III. 5; of the recall to the original likeness in which man was created, Ephes. IV. 23.For all these things presuppose something habitual and permanent. Actual and transient grace, however, is signified when God is said to make men fit in good, so that they do his will, working in them what is pleasing before him, Hebr. XIII, 21; when God is said to work in us both to will and to accomplish, Philip. II, 13; when we are taught that no one can say: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit, I. Cor. XII, 3; when we are taught that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, 2. Cor. III, 5. For these things, which are shown to be done through God helping, are acts, and they pass away; whence also, when they have passed, that help ceases which is given on account of them.

There comes next the authentic magisterium of the Church. The Council of Trent, Sess. VI, On Justification, canon 3, says this about actual grace: «If anyone shall say that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help a man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him: let him be anathema.» And canon 2 has this about habitual grace: «If anyone shall say that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of the grace and charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit and inheres in them, or even that the grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God: let him be anathema.»

IV. And let these things suffice for the demonstration of the thesis, since the whole following treatise on actual grace is to be set forth most fully. Habitual grace, however, claims for itself another treatise, which, God willing, we shall publish later. We must therefore treat of created, supernatural, actual grace, which in the business of justification is prior, unless the subject is unfit for eliciting acts, and whose notion the Tridentine Synod therefore premised to the other: Cf. Sess. VI. capp. 5. 6. Moreover, the whole treatise on actual grace will be completed in five questions: 1ª on the nature, 2ª on the necessity, 3ª on the gratuitousness, 4ª on the efficacy, 5ª on the distribution of actual grace.

But in order that such an immediate illumination of the mind may exist in us, there is required, by the ordinary law of Providence, an object proposed from without, which is able to determine a pious thought.

I. That the illuminations of the mind, taken generally, pertain to actual graces, the whole Catholic tradition bears witness. For we are taught that God is He who gives the spirit of wisdom and of revelation and the enlightened eyes of the heart Ephes. I, 16. seq., that He Himself shines in our hearts 2ª Cor. IV, 6., that He Himself opens the eyes of men, that they may be converted from darkness to light Act. XXVI, 16. seq., that He illuminates our eyes and our darkness Psal. XII, 4. XVII, 20., that we hear and learn from the Father Ioan. VI, 45., and that our sufficiency of thinking (salutarily) is from God 2ª Cor. III, 5.. According to these things the Fathers teach that the Father does not send us the knowledge of His Son by sound or by voice, but by the illumination and enlightenment of the mind Cyril. Alex. in Ioan. L. IV. c. 7.; that the divine Word, as our pedagogue, admonishes, reproves, convicts, threatens us Clemens Alex. Pedag. L. I. c. 9.; and that God acts by the persuasions of things seen so that we will and believe, whether extrinsically through evangelical exhortations, or intrinsically, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind Aug. De Spir. et lit. c. 34.. And indeed «when we beseech from Him His help for the doing and the perfecting of justice, what else do we beseech but that He open what lay hidden and that what did not delight become sweet?»Idem. de pecc. merit. et remiss. L. II. c. 19. «For it is not in the power of men but of God that men have the power to become sons of God: from...» for they indeed receive it from Him, who gives pious thoughts to the human heart.»Idem De Spir. et lit. c. 8. Hence in the Council of Arausic. II, c. 7 it was defined: «if anyone asserts that by the vigour of nature he can think, as is expedient, or choose some good which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, or consent to the salutary, that is, evangelical preaching, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.»

It is established, therefore, that among the divine helps by which we are aided to act piously the illuminations or enlightenments of the mind have a place: but the help of God by which we are aided to act is actual grace: therefore. You will perhaps say that it must still be proved that those helps are grace, that is, given freely (gratis) or unowed to nature. But it must be noted that at present the question is not about the gratuitousness of grace, but about its nature; wherefore it must now be supposed — which, however, will be proved afterwards — that in the cited places there is question of those helps which are unowed to nature and are given freely. Besides, this is sufficiently clear from the adduced testimony of Augustine and from the definition of the council.

Furthermore, that actual helps of this kind, consisting in the illuminations of the mind, are had, reason taught by faith demonstrates, showing their necessity. For supernatural life in second act cannot be explained apart from the grace of God, since it is a work above the powers of nature; again, life in second act, which consists in knowledge and love, cannot begin without the illumination of the mind; therefore for supernatural life consisting in knowledge and love, a gratuitous illumination of the mind proceeding from God is required. Moreover, this gratuitous illumination is actual grace: therefore the illumination of the mind pertains to actual graces.

I. A twofold illumination of the mind must be distinguished, mediate and immediate. It is called mediate when God excites in the mind a knowledge or some apprehension only through extrinsic objects or means, just as by many things seen our mind can be moved to think something. Immediate illumination is called that apprehension or knowledge which God, with an object indeed proposed from without, Himself excites by His own power, physically acting in the mind and Himself touching the hearts of men by His own virtue, not indeed revealing anything, but strengthening the mind with unowed light so that it rightly apprehends the truth. There is a difference between the two. The first knowledge, when an extrinsic means is employed, arises naturally in the mind and therefore corresponds to the natural powers of the intellect: the other, inasmuch as it is immediate, is owed to God alone gratuitously acting physically in the intellect and illuminating it. Hence the former knowledge, considered subjectively and efficiently, is connected with extrinsic objects sufficiently proposed by a connection of natural consequence, so that, when these exist, it also exists. The other, however, again considered subjectively and efficiently, since it is from God gratuitously exciting it in us, does not cohere with the extrinsic object by the aforesaid connection of consequence. Considered objectively, however, it coheres with the extrinsic object. That these things may be explained at once, consider that the actual grace of illumination does not of itself aim at disclosing something new to us. For the revelation of those things which must be known in order to act rightly, and which is therefore necessary for all, is public and social, made by Christ to the Church through the Apostles; it is not private. Moreover, the actual grace of illumination is necessary to each one and is conferred on each one individually. I said 'of itself'; for God can, if He wills, by illuminating the intellect of someone, manifest something new to him. But this is a special grace pertaining to the gift of prophecy. Since, therefore, the actual grace of illumination does not of itself aim at revealing something new, it will aim at this: that the mind rightly, as it ought, apprehend and think that which is proposed to it from elsewhere for thinking. This extrinsic proposition of truth» therefore is required, in order that the immediate illumination of the mind may exist. And indeed naturally the intellect is determined to act by an extrinsic object; supernaturally, however, the preaching of the word of God is divinely instituted, so that through it men may be led to faith, to justification, and to the exercise of holiness (we take the word of God preached in all its amplitude, that is: whether simply preached, or equivalently, that is, whether written or recalled to memory or manifested in any way whatsoever or represented in sacred symbols and rites or in similar things). Since, therefore, only in this way is something new to be thought proposed to the mind by ordinary providence, it follows generally that an object naturally determining, which can excite a pious thought, is required by the law of ordinary Providence, in order that immediate illumination may be in us. Therefore the mediate illumination of the mind is not that which is excited in us by an object proposed from without; for this also belongs to the immediate; but it is that which is excited naturally in us by an extrinsic object divinely proposed: the immediate, however, is that which, given that condition, is excited by the power of God gratuitously acting in us and illuminating our faculty, elevating our faculty for acting more excellently, is excited in us. In this matter there is of itself room for a twofold question. The first is whether in the order of actual grace both illuminations are possible; the other, whether in the order of present providence both illuminations, one distinct from the other, are in fact given. But the solution of this second question also depends on certain principles which we shall bring forward later, from which it seems to be concluded that there is no grace of illumination that is only mediate. But because we are now treating only of the essence of actual grace, it is permissible to prescind for a little while from the examination of those principles, so that, if the negative opinion in this matter is true, what we say about the mediate illumination may be taken as said hypothetically and as pertaining to the order of possibility. We defend, therefore, that within the amplitude of actual graces there are contained not only mediate illuminations, but also and chiefly immediate ones.

III. As for the mediate ones, if only the question of possibility is raised, there is no difficulty. For divine revelation, the word of God daily heard or read, the examples of Christ and of the Saints, the other things instituted by God in the Church, and similar things aim at this: to excite in us salutary knowledges; and when these means have been rightly applied, they are able to excite those knowledges naturally, even with any other gratuitous help whatsoever set aside: but because these means are unowed and pertain to the supernatural order, all those knowledges are so many gratuitous illuminations, that is, graces of illumination. And indeed the extrinsic revelation itself is a grace of illumination in first act: but when from its application a knowledge is excited in us, this is a grace of illumination in second act, which, if it arises only naturally from the application of the object, is only a mediate illumination. To this place can be referred the testimonies of Scripture, as Psal. XVIII, 9: The law of the Lord is immaculate, converting souls; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, giving wisdom to little ones; the justices of the Lord are right, rejoicing hearts; the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes; and I Petri II, 21: Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you may follow his footsteps. Perhaps Augustine speaks of the same thing in De Spiritu et littera, c. 31: «By the persuasions of things seen God acts so that we will and so that we believe, whether extrinsically through evangelical exhortations... or intrinsically, where no one has it in his power what comes into his mind.»

IV. As for the immediate illuminations, first of all it is clear that such gratuitous illuminations of the mind are possible; for, even with every question about the mode by which God can immediately illuminate the mind set aside, it must be certain antecedently to reason both that God can by Himself immediately do that which He does through secondary non-vital causes, of which kind are objects, and that the creator himself of the intellect can immediately modify it, and consequently also illuminate it. But moreover it is established that in fact immediate illuminations are also to be numbered among the actual graces of the illuminations of the mind. Indeed, Scripture speaks not infrequently of these. For a) in 2. Cor. III, 5 the Apostle says: Not that we are sufficient to think (the discourse is about salutary thought) anything from ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God. It must be noted that the sufficiency of thinking is something subjective, like a power; when, therefore, our insufficiency of thinking is spoken of, it is signified that the force of the intellect is not, of itself, subjectively equal to thinking as it ought. This interpretation, indeed, must first be defended. Surely it was approved by the Latin Fathers in the Pelagian controversy and confirmed by the decrees of the synods in a matter of faith (Syn. Arausic. II, c. 7): what, therefore, prevents us from judging this to be the sense of the Apostle, account being had also of the original text? The distinguished interpreter Iustinianus says that the sense of the Greek words οὐχ ὅτι ἱκανοί ἐσμεν, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν λογίσασθαί τι is this: that we can arrogate nothing to ourselves, impute nothing to ourselves, that we are not worthy to attribute anything to ourselves, because all our dignity ἐν ἱκανότητι is from God. He confirms this interpretation by the authority of Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius. He adds, moreover, that it coheres with the preceding, as the Apostle had said that he has confidence through Christ toward God.

But ἡ ἱκανότης is certainly also sufficiency, and ἱκανός means sufficient in the idiom also of the N. T. and of Paul: let there be compared in the same epistle c. II, 6; or, which comes to the same, ἱκανὸς means fit, as ibid. v. 16 and 2. Tim. II, 2. Likewise λογίζεσθαι is also to think or to meditate, 1. Cor. XIII, 5 and more evidently Philipp. IV, 8. And yet this interpretation, in our passage 2. Cor. III, 5, coheres with the preceding; indeed, it is demanded by the context. For the sense of the whole discourse comes back to this: we glory before God concerning our ministry toward you, meanwhile claiming nothing for ourselves, since from ourselves we are not even able to think anything. The particle xai in the following verse — «But our sufficiency is from God, who also made us fit ministers of the new testament» — would be redundant, supposing the other interpretation. For in that interpretation the dignity which is from God would be this very dignity of the ministry: but the particle et teaches that one thing and another are different, namely that we are said to have been made fit in the preceding verse and in the following one, which we clearly understand, if the discourse is first about sufficiency or fitness for thinking, then about fitness for the ministry.

These things being posited, it is certain that here there is discourse about thought in the salutary order, that is, about salutary thought: for the Apostle also seeks the proof or the declaration of his insufficiency from this: that God made him a fit minister of the New Testament; surely the insufficiency is in that order in which there is confidence (v. 1) toward God, who makes us sufficient and fit; but this confidence is had through Christ; confidence, however, leaning on the merits of Christ, pertains to the order of salvation.

But now our mind is said to be insufficient for thinking from itself either on account of that common reason — because God also created us, and without God conserving and cooperating we can do nothing — or on account of some special reason. The first cannot be admitted. For the sufficiency of which Paul speaks depends on the merits of Christ and is of the same order as the sufficiency for the ministry of the Apostleship: but sufficiency of this kind is not from creation, nor from that operation of God owed to nature, such as is conservation and cooperation. Moreover, the sufficiency which the Apostle says is from God is said by him at the same time also to be ours: «we think, namely, from ourselves, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν»; we have, therefore, the power of thinking, yet in such a way that we have this very thing from God, not as of ourselves, οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν: but this is more than the simple cooperation of God. But the special reason is either in this, that we need the extrinsic proposition of a thinkable object, or, moreover, an intrinsic illumination. The first, again taken separately, is not enough; for in reality that which we cannot think solely because the proposition of the object is lacking, and which, once the object has been proposed, we are able to think, with regard to that, speaking at least in human fashion, we are said to be sufficient by ourselves. Therefore this sufficiency of thinking, which is from God, must be said to be some intrinsic gift perfecting the mind, so that the mind, furnished with it, is able to do what by itself alone it could not do: this, however, is that which is called immediate illumination. Therefore we are taught that, even though the object exists, unless God helps, supplying strength from within, the mind cannot think as it ought.

b) 1. Cor. III, 7: Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. What is signified by the metaphor of planting and watering is evident: namely, to exhibit the institution of the Faith, or the erudition of the intellect in the order of salvation, through an extrinsic ministry. But to give the increase is to effect that the plant unfolds and grows, namely to effect that whole which is the end of the planting and of the watering. God, therefore, ὡς ἀληθῶς giving the increase, performs all that both he who plants and he who waters intend. «He who gives the increase does not strengthen the tree or the vine, but creates. For by that increase it comes about that even the planted wood produces and fixes a root. By that increase it comes about that the cast seed sends forth a shoot.» (Aug. L. III. cont. epist. Petiliani). Wherefore in this business God alone is said to be something, namely something great, achieving (cf. Philipp. II, 13). But how does God provide increase of this kind? Consider that that which is done through the extrinsic ministry, that same thing God, as principal cause, works through His ministers. Moreover, besides that, God giving the increase works another thing, and indeed a more excellent one, without external ministry. I say without external ministry: for if He did that also through ministers, just as the two former things, which God does as principal cause, are attributed to the ministers because God acts through them, so there would be no reason why this third also should be denied to the ministers, if this too were done by God through them. Therefore this increase is supplied by God through something else besides the mediate illumination, which is had through the extrinsic ministry. It is supplied, namely, the very subjective sufficiency of thinking and of willing as one ought, by which it comes about that the seeds cast are rightly received and cultivated and grow in us. Wherefore again it is rightly said that he who plants and he who waters is nothing, namely, that he confers little and something by itself alone insufficient in this business, but that he who gives the increase is something; not because they confer nothing under God, but because they do not supply the powers, nor are they related to the work as efficient cause, but only as a condition. «He Himself (says August., De Grat. Christi c. 19) works the fruit in the good trees, who both waters and cultivates from without through any minister whatsoever, and by Himself gives the increase intrinsically.» c) 1a. Ioan. II, 20: You have the unction (χρῖσμα) from the Holy One and you know all things; and 27: His unction (χρῖσμα) teaches you about all things. But now, comparing Act. IV, 27; X, 38; Hebr. I, 9; 2a. Cor. I, 21, χρῖσμα is indeed received in many ways by the interpreters, an ointment but one poured out (for otherwise, what would it confer? whence the Vulgate rightly rendered it unctio): yet it easily agrees among all that there is signified by it some infused gift, a gift, however, of wisdom or of prudence; for there is question of doctrine.

Moreover, this unction is first interior as to its effect; namely, it is the intellect that is taught: moreover, it is also interior as to its efficiency, so that the Spirit teaches the intellect not only through the extrinsic legitimate and authentic magisterium, but also, and moreover, by an immediate interior efficiency or operation. The reason is that the operation of God which is the extrinsic magisterium of His ministers cannot be called the unction of the Spirit teaching; for unction represents an immediate operation upon the subject which is said to be anointed, which here is the intellect, which is taught. Therefore the intellect is steeped in an immediate interior unction, that is, it is illuminated by an immediate illumination. August. on this passage, Tract. III in I. Ioann.: «Do not think that anyone learns anything from a man. We can admonish through the sound of our voice; if there is not one who teaches, our sound is vain.... Where His inspiration and unction is not, words resound vainly from without.» «For man hears (says the same, de peccat. merit. et remiss. I. I. c. 25) a man or an angel speaking; but that he may feel and know that what is said is true, his mind is sprinkled within by that light which is eternal, which also shines in darkness.»

Finally, if the testimonies of Scripture adduced in the preceding part, from the epistle to the Ephesians and from the Psalms, are compared, it is manifest that the illumination of the mind is besought from God for those who have already received and hold the extrinsic revelation, and it is besought that the due knowledge may be had, lest they be overtaken by the darkness of death; therefore, besides the mediate illumination, mention is made of some other interior one, which proceeds immediately from God. Therefore.

V. The Fathers also teach this expressly. Besides Augustine already cited, Prosper sings thus in Carm. de ingratis c. 14: Not by counsel alone and by benign exhortation — persuading and teaching, as though it had the form of law — does Grace work, but changing the mind within and reforming it, and fashioning a new vessel from the broken one by the power of creating.» The Author of De Vocatione omnium gentium, L. 1, c. 3: «When, therefore, the word of God is brought to the ears of the flesh through the ministry of those preaching, the operation of divine power is mingled with the sound of the human voice, and He who stirred up the office of the evangelizer also strengthened the affection of the hearer; for the food of the soul, the Word, grows sweet, the old darkness is driven out by new light, and the interior gaze is stripped of the darkness of ancient error.» Because, namely, «the divine discourse sounds in vain to the outward ears, unless God opens the hearing of the interior man by a spiritual gift:» as, with Fulgentius in the conclusion of the book De Incarn. et Grat., teach Gregory the Great, hom. VIII in Ezechielem, Bernard, De Conver. ad Clericos c. 1, Thomas, Lect. VI in Ioan. XIV, 26, and those who above all are to be heard, the Fathers of the Council of Arausic. II, cn. 7, by which we are taught that for believing as one ought the illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary. Moreover, let it be noted that this definition was laid down against the Semi-Pelagians and the Pelagians, who readily admitted the external grace of revelation and the mediate illumination.

VI. It remains to be proved that the immediate illumination is more excellent than the mediate. Indeed, if you consider each separately, a comparison cannot truly be made; because the immediate is never given alone, and alone it would accomplish nothing: but they must be considered as they are in the concrete. Moreover, with the immediate inspiration supervening, a more excellent effect is obtained; for it is this which intrinsically elevates the faculty and supplies the power and the strength for thinking as one ought, and this is what, according to the Fathers, is required in order that we may operate rightly. Therefore.

I. By the name of inspiration there is understood in general that help by which the will is aroused and rendered capable of willing and operating as it ought. A twofold divine inspiration is distinguished, insofar as the will is affected, namely mediated and immediate. Of course, on account of the ontological connection between the exercise of the intellect and the exercise of the will, it comes about that, the illumination of the mind existing, a certain motion arises of itself in the will proportionate to that illumination. Wherefore he who illuminates the mind is also to be said, through this illumination, to move and arouse the will. This is the mediated motion or inspiration. That divine inspiration of the will is therefore called mediated which exists in the will on account of the divine illumination of the intellect. The reason why it is called mediated inspiration is that through it God does not act upon the will except through the mediation of the intellect, which, since it is already in act on account of the identity of the thinking and willing subject and on account of the natural connection of both operations, moves the will objectively. Mediated inspiration can be distinguished as twofold: extrinsic, namely that which takes place through an extrinsic and mediated illumination; and intrinsic, that which takes place through an immediate illumination.

Moreover, besides this twofold mediated inspiration, which we have described thus far, there is another, which is called immediate, namely that by which God acts physically upon the very principle of willing and perfects and elevates it. This other inspiration is a grace distinct from the illumination of the mind; and by the nature of the case, the illumination of the mind could be had without this inspiration of the will, and, conversely, the immediate inspiration of the will could be had without the immediate illumination of the intellect. It must be proved that both inspirations are to be numbered among actual graces.

II. Mention of that grace which we call inspiration of the will is most frequent among the Fathers. Indeed, just as in Augustine there occur appellations proper to that grace which is formally in the intellect, such as pious thought De bono persev. c. 8., high and secret calling Epist. ad Vitalem CCXVII, speech in thought Serm. XI, de Elia et Vidua Sarept., certain knowledge De pecc. merit. et remis I. II. c. 18, opening what lay hidden Ibid. c. 19., «knowledge of the truth»Serm. XVII in Psal. CXVII, 11. 3: so likewise there occur most frequently formulas by which is signified the grace that formally inheres in the will, such as infusion of charity Cont. duas epistt. pelag. L. II. c. 8., inspiration of love Ibid. I. IV. c. 5, spirit of charity ad Simplic. L. I, q. I., the grace by which the charity of God is poured out in our hearts De Grat. Christi c. 20, delight De Spirit. et lit. cap. 29, heavenly delight Serm. XLII. de verbis Isaiae n. 3, joyfulness in Psalm. LXXXV, condelectation de Nupt. et Concup. L. I. c. 38, pleasure in Ioann. Tract. 20, inspiration of sweetness Serm.

XVII in Psalm. CXVIII. n1. 3) desire for the good (Cont. duas epistt. pelagg. I. II. c. 9) holy desire (Cont. Maxim. L. I. c. 9) good will (De Gratia Christi. c. 24). Now, that mediated inspiration pertains to actual grace is left certain from the preceding thesis. For mediated inspiration is necessarily connected with the illumination of the mind; for, this being posited, by the nature of the case a certain motion follows in the will: since therefore the illumination of the mind pertains to actual grace, the mediated inspiration of the will will also necessarily pertain to it, since the illumination of the intellect itself is given for the sake of operation. Wherefore also the interior mediated inspiration must be certain. The question, therefore, cannot properly be about anything but the immediate inspiration.

III. It must therefore be proved that the interior immediate inspiration also is to be numbered in the class of actual graces. But it must be noted that the question now is not about the necessity of this grace, but it is only asked whether it is contained in the class of actual graces: which question indeed, as we said above about the illumination, can be raised either about the mere possibility or about the fact. Now, that it is possible, i.e., that in the order of possible actual graces this immediate inspiration also has a place, is easily clear. Immediate inspiration is that which, God acting physically in our will, exists in respect of some object proposed by the intellect. But it is certain that God can act physically upon the will by exciting acts both natural and supernatural; which indeed God brings about in the simplest way, i.e., by the command of His efficacious will; therefore.

But that inspirations of this kind are found also in the real order of actual graces is demonstrated from the fact that Tradition speaks of them as of graces which God confers. Indeed, in the Council of Carthag., ch. 4, it is defined that we are helped not only by the grace of God »because through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us; but also through it it is granted to us that what we have known must be done we may also love and be able to do.... since both are a gift of God, both to know what we ought to do and to love so that we do it, so that, charity building up, knowledge may not be able to puff up. A twofold grace is therefore distinguished, namely the one by which the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us; the other by which it is granted to us that what we have known must be done we may be able to love and to do.

But the former is the interior grace of immediate illumination; which is thus proved. For that which is placed by the Fathers in the lower position (not only), namely that the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, comprises whatever Pelagius conceded to the grace of God; but, as we shall say shortly and will certainly prove in its place, Pelagius also conceded the grace of interior illumination: therefore. Indeed, the very force of the words to reveal and open the understanding of the commandments designates that operation of God which acts upon the intellect, the commandments of God being present, i.e., proposed from without or in whatever way taken up for thought. Therefore here the Fathers speak of this immediate illumination.

Moreover, that is already of itself the grace of mediated inspiration. But besides this grace, which is knowledge and already the interior mediated inspiration, another grace is asserted, which is called charity, by which it comes about that we love those things which we have known must be done. That this is indeed another grace distinct from the former is evident even from this, that this latter builds up lest that one puff up, which cannot be said of one and the same grace merely having several effects. This other grace, moreover, besides the interior illumination, which is already the interior mediated inspiration, will necessarily be the grace of immediate inspiration. To this also pertains the statement adduced by Celestine among the authorities of the Apostolic See, ch. 8, namely «that God so works in the hearts of men and in the very free will itself, that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of good will are from God.» The emphasis is in that phrase, and He works in the very free will itself, by which the immediate action of God in the will is signified.

IV. Nor is the doctrine of Augustine different, who, having distinguished a twofold grace of illumination and of inspiration, calls the one greater than the other and supposes that the former can be without the latter. Indeed, it is certain that Augustine admitted the necessity of the interior grace of immediate illumination. It is established from his testimonies cited in the preceding Th., p. 20 ff. Therefore, although Augustine more frequently and chiefly inculcated the help of the will, because the principal question was about it, nevertheless, when occasion was given, Augustine also both taught and vindicated the immediate illumination, as is clear from the cited testimonies. Now, the certain opinion of Augustine, which he defended against the Pelagians, is that the grace of God is twofold, namely of knowledge and of love, the one distinct from the other. De Grat. Christi. c. XXVI. «Let Pelagius too manifestly confess that grace of God which is manifest in the divine utterances.... Let him distinguish knowledge and love, as they are to be distinguished. Nay, knowledge puffs up, charity builds up. And then knowledge does not puff up, when charity builds up. And since both are a gift of God, but one is less, the other greater, let him not so exalt our justice above the praise of our justifier, as to attribute the lesser of these two to divine help, and usurp to the human free will the greater.»Cf. also De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 19. But if the inspiration of the will is that which exists naturally in the will from the illumination of the intellect, besides the fact that, as we have said, in the order of favor there is not a twofold but one grace; it does not appear how the grace of illumination is the lesser, which is that which is done immediately by God and through which God is properly the principle of good works. And indeed it cannot be conceived how Augustine could have thought that the grace of illumination was conceded by God to Pelagius, and yet that love is vindicated for the powers of the free will, if Augustine had thought of that gift in the will which naturally follows upon the illumination. You will say that the grace of knowledge, of which Augustine speaks, is the external grace of the law and of doctrine. That is false; for if Augustine spoke only of an external grace of knowledge, and, as must be supposed in this objection, he thought the mediated inspiration sufficient, which is formally the interior grace of knowledge, he would not oppose the grace of knowledge to the grace of love, but the external grace of illumination to the simply internal grace of illumination. Since, moreover, he himself admitted and vindicated the immediate illumination, it is easy to infer from these things that the grace of knowledge, of which Augustine speaks, comprises also the immediate illumination of the mind. This indeed is a gift of God no less than the immediate inspiration of the will, although it is less; moreover, Augustine simply numbers both under the notion of a gift of God. And in very truth here Augustine proposes that grace of knowledge of which the Fathers of Carthage also spoke in canon 4.Moreover, it is, as we have seen, an interior grace. The grace is therefore twofold for Augustine according to the very notion of grace and favor; for the one is a lesser grace, the other a greater. Hence he also thinks that the former can be without the latter, De peccat. merit. et remiss. L. III, c. 17: «Men do not will to do what is just; either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight.» (to be sure, even if it is not hidden). But that what lay hidden may become known, and what did not delight may become sweet, is of the grace of God.»

But you will say: can it come about that grace puffs up? First, it is certain that knowledge is exhibited not as a cause but simply as an occasion of elation. Now what forbids such an occasion from being also the grace of interior illumination? Is it because it is a gift of God? but that is common to all other things: is it because it is an entirely gratuitous gift of God? but that also befits revelation: moreover, you will at least accept the words of the Fathers about this, if you reject our interpretation: is it because it is an interior gift and, as we shall see in its place, intrinsically supernatural? but even if this is known by the one possessing it, I do not see what it contributes, unless it be that one puffs up more easily, unless charity stand in the way. In sum, the vice of such elation in no way redounds upon the gifts of God but upon our weakness or malice; and just as one can be puffed up, undeservedly indeed, on account of the graces freely given, so too on account of others. But charity brings it about that it checks elation, and true actual charity cannot coexist with that sense of swelling.

V. What we have vindicated thus far borrows evident light from the following observation upon the heresy of Pelagius. Namely, Pelagius at length conceded the help of interior illumination, although not as necessary simply, but as opportune for acting more easily; but, this help being posited, the mediated help of the will also followed necessarily; and nevertheless Pelagius was always reprobated by Augustine, not only because he wanted grace to be given only for acting more easily, but because he denied simply the help of the will. This we shall place in its own light in its place, when we shall give the historical synopsis of the Pelagian heresy. For now cf. Petavius, De Pelag. et semip. haer., c. 4, n. 2; Livinus De Meyer, De pelagg. et massill. erroribus, c. 6.

Thus indeed, if the error of Pelagius is well weighed, it consisted in this, that he distinguished these three things, possibility or power, will (i.e., volition), and action, conceded that possibility is helped, but denied that the help of will and of action is necessary (August., De grat. Christi, c. 3 ff.). What, moreover, is it that possibility is helped, not the will? Namely, the power implanted in the nature of free will, in order to be constituted in proximate first act, needs certain extrinsic aids by which it may be made known what it is necessary or expedient to do: wherefore a help of this sort is referred by Augustine to the law and doctrine. The will, however, is not helped according to Pelagius, because the power of free will, constituted in first act through those things which are extrinsic to it, is already of itself capable of willing and acting well. On the contrary, the Fathers contended that the will itself is helped, because the good will itself (the volition) is a gift of God, who not only gives the power, but gives the very act, inasmuch as by His illumination and inspiration He prepares free will, and, prepared, helps it to will. Now, if the immediate inspiration of the will is not admitted, that Pelagian error does not appear to be sufficiently excluded, namely that only possibility is helped, but not the will; for the interior illumination itself, since it is extrinsic to the will, pertains rather to those aids by which possibility is helped, and it could be admitted by Pelagius and indeed at some time actually was admitted, without his confessing the help of the will.

VI. But a help of the will of this sort, whose profession the Fathers defended so strenuously, someone would wrongly and unskillfully confound with that concurrence of God which is necessary for all actions by the law of nature, so that a created operation may exist. Indeed, since Pelagius placed the grace of God in this, that God gave us the power of acting well, i.e., free will, Augustine pointed out (De Gratia Christi, c. 17 ff.) that this power implanted in free will is indifferent to good and to evil, and therefore is capable of both roots, namely of the good tree and of the evil tree; but the grace of God is the cause of nothing but good; through it we are made good trees, receiving from God the good will or charity: but we ourselves make ourselves evil trees through free will, falling away from the unchangeable good. Just as, therefore, it is false that the grace of God, by which we are helped to will and to act rightly, is that which we use both when acting well and when acting badly, so it is false that free will is grace. Now, those things which exclude free will from the dignity of grace exclude also that natural concurrence; for it too is indifferent, and it is at hand for those acting well and badly. Wherefore, when free will is excluded from the dignity of grace, that concurrence too, which is its necessary sequel, must be deemed excluded. Of it, however, Pelagius is never read to have made a detailed mention, nor were the Fathers solicitous about it (cf. what we shall say in the Synopsis of the Pelagian heresy under n. IV.).

VII. Having premised that observation which we gave in the preceding Th., n. VI, we demonstrate the last part of this thesis. Among actual graces, those hold the principal place to which the others are ordered as means, those which are the efficacious principle of salutary works: but such are the immediate inspirations of the will, which render the will powerful for meriting, and to which the illuminations of the mind are ordered as means. Whence Augustine, and chiefly about a grace of this sort, speaks against the Pelagians and prefers it to the former, and with him the Council of Carthage, as may be seen in the places cited above.

I. Now it must be declared more distinctly what this twofold grace of illumination and inspiration is. The opinion which we now propose here is not exclusive. We establish only that actual grace certainly comprises vital acts of the intellect and of the will: the exclusive question, however, will be treated a little later in Thesis XVI. The argument of this Thesis, clear and demonstrative, comes down to this. The notion of actual grace, namely what precisely it is, cannot be gathered except from those monuments from which alone we are infallibly taught the existence of the same and its offices: the Theologian, therefore, must strive to form in his own mind the notion of actual grace from those monuments. Wherefore if it is certainly established that the dignity of actual grace is claimed for some determinate thing, that thing will without doubt be to be numbered among the actual graces. But whether the Scriptures are consulted or the Councils or the Fathers, and those who have discoursed on grace most frequently and most abundantly both thetically and polemically, it is evident that actual grace is set forth as consisting in vital acts of the intellect and of the will. The assumption is proved. It is enough to compare what we have adduced in the two preceding theses. For it is manifest that the grace by which we are aided is called thought, opinion, operation of the truth, persuasion, speaking in thought, revelation, calling, illumination, illumination of the born eyes, inspiration and infusion of charity, charity, desire, longing, pleasure, sweetness, delight, delectation, most frequently a good will (i.e., volition).

But 1) Cognition, knowledge, charity, desire, delight and the like are formally vital acts both of the intellect and of the will, nor can they be conceived apart from those. 2) Illumination, revelation, opening of the truth, speaking are themselves also vital acts, both because the preceding appellations are used as synonyms of these, and because illumination of the intellect, revelation to it of some truth, speaking to it, cannot formally be obtained except through some act of thought excited in it. Hence inspiration of love, infusion of knowledge and the like signify the very vital acts of knowledge and love insofar as they are excited in us by God. Therefore all the appellations by which grace is represented in all Christian monuments are such that they formally exhibit some vital act either of the intellect or of the will: wherefore at least this must be concluded: therefore some vital acts are to be numbered in the census of actual graces.

II. And in truth the confused concept of actual grace received by all comes down to this, that actual grace is a certain divine motion of our faculties; but the motion existing in the intellect and in the will, insofar as it is received in them, must consist in some act of the same faculties; for motion is the act of the movable, just as mechanical motion is the act of the body; but the act of a vital faculty, which is moved insofar as it is vital, namely insofar as it is cognitive or volitive, cannot be anything but vital; therefore the divine motion existing in our faculties comes down to some vital act. Therefore that which exists in us when God moves us and which is called actual grace is at least some vital act.