Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

« Since, according to the most certain doctrine, there cannot be in divine things a real distinction except according to the relation of principle and of that which proceeds from a principle, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be distinct persons, unless one proceeded from the other ».

Almost all the Scholastic theologians, on 1. dist. 11. and on S. Th. I. q. 36. a. 2., treat at length, but often not a little obscurely, the question whether the Holy Spirit, if He did not proceed from the Son, would nevertheless be distinguished from Him. Even after the Council of Florence there are not wanting those who answer in the affirmative; but by far the more common and, on theological arguments, true opinion is ¹ , that there is not and cannot be understood to be any distinction between the divine persons, and hence also between the Son and the Holy Spirit, except by reason of principle and of that which proceeds from a principle. The proposed question cannot be understood of objective reality, but of our manner of conceiving and proving; I would almost say, the question is not ontological but dialectical. For in the matter itself it is established by the infallible revelation of the deep things of God, that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son by an intimate and absolute necessity and exigency of the divine nature and life; the Holy Spirit proceeds, I say, also from the Son with the same necessity with which He Himself exists, with which the Son exists, with which the Father exists, with which God is who He is. In this sense, therefore, the answer to the proposed question would be: from the absurd follows the absurd; if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, neither would He exist; nay, neither would the Son exist, because the Word with the same necessity is breathing the Holy Spirit with which the Word is; and if He does not breathe, neither is He the Word. The same must be said of the Father, who begets the Word by communicating the spirating power, and is one principle of the Holy Spirit not otherwise than with the Word, with the same necessity with which the Father is. In this sense, therefore, there could no longer be any question about the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son, but « the divine entity being changed, all contradictions follow, and every order of things is overthrown », as Pallavicinus speaks (1. VIII. c. 60. n. 449). Thus did those older theologians take this question, who thought it wholly useless and absurd.

But the state of the question is far different. The Photians agree with the Catholics that the Holy Spirit is really distinguished from the Son, but they deny that He proceeds from the Son; and by this very fact they affirm, that besides the relation of origin of one person from another there must be admitted in divine things another reason of real distinction between two persons, namely a diverse mode of procession, so that, although each person proceeds from the Father alone, the one nevertheless proceeds by generation as Son, the other by spiration as Holy Spirit. It is asked, therefore, whether it can be demonstrated either immediately from revelation, or be certainly deduced from those things which are both evidently understood by reason about God and become known by revelation about the divine persons ² , that there is in God no real distinction except through the relation of origin, by which the divine persons are constituted really distinct. If this can be demonstrated, the inference will be true and the consequence evident: the Holy Spirit is a person really distinct not only from the Father but also from the Son; therefore (since the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, as all confess, and according to the internal revealed economy of the Most Holy Trinity), the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son; and hence, from the opposite: if the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son is denied, the real distinction of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is virtually denied. That proposition, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be really distinguished from Him, has the sense which we have called dialectical. Some Catholic theologians, as we have said, deny this, because they think that besides the relation of origin of one person from another there is still another reason of real distinction, namely relations not indeed opposed but diverse and disparate; nevertheless the same men certainly confess what is of faith, that the Holy Spirit is in fact distinguished from the Son also by the relation of origin. The schismatics, on the contrary, both deny that the persons are distinguished by the relation of origin alone, and affirm that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son solely by a disparate relation or a diverse mode of proceeding from the Father, and in no way by procession also from the Son. In one word, therefore, that question, whether the Holy Spirit, if He did not proceed from the Son, would nevertheless still be really distinguished from Him, is reduced to this other, more general one: whether the divine persons are really distinguished among themselves solely by the relations of origin, insofar as the one proceeds from the other. Which question is certainly not useless and void of sense, but most opportune both universally for knowing the economy of the Trinity more distinctly, and particularly for understanding the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit and, if the affirmative answer is proved true, for demonstrating the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son, as John the theologian used this argument in the Council of Florence, the rest consenting, sess. XVIII., and Bessarion in orat. dogm. c. 6.

Moreover, that the truth is to be held in the manner of a theological principle, that in God all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, which is constituted in the very origin of one person from another (above p. 188), there can be no doubt after all those things which about unity and distinction in God have been demonstrated everywhere in the preceding pages.

1°. Indeed, in God, although many perfections and formal reasons can be distinguished among themselves by the consideration of the mind, nevertheless really all things are one without real distinction, except insofar as there is the formal reason of a principle producing ad intra and of that which proceeds from a producing principle; and this is true not only of the absolutes, but also of the relative formal reasons. Thus not only essence, wisdom, goodness etc. are one most simple Being without real distinction, because the one does not really proceed from the other; but also essence, generation, and (active) spiration are in the same way one without real distinction for the same reason, because neither do generation and spiration really proceed from essence, nor does spiration proceed from generation. But the Father under the formal reason of Father is really distinguished from the Son under the formal reason of Son, and indeed solely under this formal reason, insofar as the one is the principle, the other really proceeding in the manner of the begotten from the principle; in all other formalities, however, the Father and the Son are one. In the same way, as is evident, one must think about the unity and distinction of the spirating one and of the one proceeding through spiration.

The foundation of this matter is the divine simplicity, which coincides with the infinite perfection of God (see Tract. de Deo th. XXVII.). Because, namely, the most simple essence of God is the whole fullness of perfect being, we can indeed consider that essence under diverse reasons of perfections and relations, which nevertheless are all the divine essence itself and are in no way really distinguished among themselves, except solely insofar as the procession of one from another is real; under which formal reason of one proceeding relatively to another as to its producing principle, another and another is constituted, yet not another and another thing.

Just as, therefore, the infinity of perfection would be taken away and the perfections would be placed as limited, if the absolute perfections, e. g. wisdom and power, were assumed as really distinct, because then neither would comprehend the whole fullness of perfect being; so no less would the same limitation be introduced, if a real distinction were placed in God between disparate relations, as they call them, i. e. those which are not relations of origin of one from another; for instance, if in the Father generation and spiration, of which the one does not arise from the other, were placed as really distinct from one another. For formalities of this kind are relations only in order to their produced term (generation to the Son, spiration to the Holy Spirit); but compared among themselves, by the very fact that they do not have the reason of principle and of that which proceeds from a principle, they are already not relations to one another but, if it is lawful so to speak, follow the law of absolutes; and so they are really altogether one, just as the divine intellection and volition are one, which is in itself absolute, and relative only to its term produced intrinsically, namely to the Word and to the Holy Spirit.

2°. Hence the holy Fathers, when they declare that there is no real distinction in God except only by reason of relations, always understand relations to one another, namely the relations of principle and of that which proceeds from a principle. « Just as the Son is joined to the Father, having being from Him... so likewise the Holy Spirit depends on the Only-begotten, so that by thought alone, according to the reason of principle, the Son is pre-understood as to the subsistence of the Holy Spirit... and so, the reason of principle being excepted, the Holy Trinity is discerned in itself in nothing (ὥστε τῆς προϋποστάσεως λόγου προεπινοουμένου ἐν μηδενὶ τὴν ἁγίαν Τριάδα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀσυμφώνως ἔχειν) Nyss. (above p. 431). In all other things, says Gregory Nazianzen, the divine persons are altogether one, because one is God; but the distinction and the diverse names of the distinct things are solely « from the diversity of the relation to one another » (τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως διαφορὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πεποίηκε) orat. 31. al. 37. n. 9. Augustine and the other Latin Fathers very often inculcate this. « We have said elsewhere, that those things are properly said in that Trinity to pertain distinctly to the individual persons, which are said relatively to one another, as Father and Son and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit... But that which each is said to himself, is said not plurally as three but as one, the Trinity itself » Aug. Trin. VIII. n. 1. Whence also for the relations themselves, by which alone there is there a real distinction, they simply say principle and that which is from a principle, τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν. Thus Nyssenus: « confessing the immutable unity of nature, we do not deny the distinction according to that which is principle and from principle (τὴν κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν διαφοράν), in which alone we admit the one to be distinguished from the other, in that we believe the one indeed to be principle, the other however from principle ». Since moreover both the Son and the Holy Spirit are both from a principle and are not ἀγεννήτως, and this is common to them, by which they would not be distinguished from one another, Gregory likewise places the distinction between them from the relation of origin, because the Son is from the Father alone, the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son or through the Son (sup. p. 494).

Moreover, just as by the name of Son is expressed one who is relative to the Father and thus distinguished from the Father by the relation of origin, in the same way the name of Spirit is relative, as if one said proceeding by spiration (πνοῇ). See th. XXXII. n. II. He is therefore said relatively to be the Spirit of someone, and by this relation, that He is of someone, i. e. proceeding from another by spiration, He is constituted distinct from the other. For this reason also in the Scriptures and among the Fathers those are synonyms: that He is the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, i. e. spirated by the Father and the Son, and that He proceeds from the Father and the Son; as we showed l. c. Whence, unless He were relatively the Spirit of the Son, i. e. spirated by the Son, πνοὴ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, then the Spirit would be something relative solely to the Father, not however to the Son; compared therefore with the Son He would be a spirit in an absolute signification, not relative to the Son Himself. But a spirit said not relatively to the Son is not a person distinct from the Son. For in this hypothesis the proceeding charity would be said to be relative to the Father alone and produced by the Father alone, but in no way would it be relative to the Son or produced by the Son. But this would be really the same and the same person as the wisdom produced or begotten by the Father alone, i. e. with the Word. The person distinct from the Son is only he who in the Scriptures is revealed as the Spirit of the Son, i. e. spirated by the Son, and love produced by the Son through dilection.

These things being so, the real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit is from nothing else than that the one is the principle, the other proceeding from Him as from his principle. Whoever therefore denies the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, by that very fact takes away the reason of distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, which in divine things is none other than the relation of origin of the one from the other. Just as the Father and the spirator are not two persons but one, because the formal reason of the begetter and of the spirator are not opposed to one another through the origin of the one from the other, and therefore are not really distinguished, as we said a little before; so in the assumed hypothesis the reason of proceeding through generation and through spiration would not be opposed to one another, and therefore neither would they be really distinguished among themselves, and by that very fact they would not be two really distinct proceeding persons, but the person proceeding as the expressed term of intellection and at the same time of volition would be one. Wherefore in this twofold truth, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons, and that the distinction between the divine persons is solely from the relations of origin of the one from the other, there is contained implicitly the truth, that the Holy Spirit proceeds as from the Father so also from the Son, and that the Father and the Son by active spiration are really distinguished not from one another but from the Holy Spirit proceeding from them through spiration. The former proposition is explicitly revealed, as the schismatics confess together with us; the latter is demonstrated against them both from the common teaching of the Fathers and from the certain principles about the unity and simplicity of the divine perfection in the persons, which are constituted distinct solely by relations.

3°. The single difficulty needing some illustration is this, that the holy Fathers are wont to trace the distinction of the Son and of the Holy Spirit from the very diverse mode of procession. The Son indeed proceeds by generation, the Holy Spirit by another diverse mode, which can be called spiration or, keeping the name as it were generic, procession. «The difference of the radiation (τὸ διάφορον τῆς ἐκφάνσεως) made the diverse names for them». Naz. or. 31. n. 9. «The Holy Spirit goes forth not as born but as given, and therefore is not called Son, because neither was He born as the Only-begotten». Aug. Trin. V. c. 14. And indeed, the objection which Pallavicinus calls difficult, «in fact passive spiration is distinguished not only from active spiration but also from filiation; therefore, active spiration (in the Son) being removed, a sufficient distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son would still remain» Pallav. 1. c. n. 454.

But indeed a) The Fathers trace the difference of procession, from which is the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, from this very thing as from the root, that the Son alone proceeds from the alone (μόνος μονογενής), the Holy Spirit however not from the alone but from the Father through the Son. Basil, Gregory Nyss. etc. (see p. 535. note 2). Gregory Nazianzen in that very place which is objected and which we cited a little before, places the «difference of the radiation» in the relation to one another (τὸ διάφορον τῆς ἐκφάνσεως καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως). b) There are two very diverse questions: whether, if the opposition of relation did not stand in the way between the Son and the Holy Spirit, they would nevertheless be really distinguished among themselves; and the other, whether, the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son being supposed and thus the opposition of relation and the real distinction of the two persons being supposed, each person proceeds in a diverse mode, so that the one is truly the Son of the Father, the other is not the Son of the Son, as the Fathers say (above p. 428. sq.), or the Son of the Father and of the Son. To the former question we have demonstrated that the answer must be negative; to the latter, from the manifest doctrine of Scripture and of the Fathers it is established, and by us long since demonstrated, that the answer is affirmative (th. XXX. XXXI.).

In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the testimony adduced, by which Frassenius wished to prove his thesis. As often as Augustine asks how the divine persons, and hence also the Son and the Holy Spirit, are distinguished among themselves, he always answers, as we said at the beginning, that in divine things there can be no real distinction except from the relation to one another. In the cited place, however, he does not treat of the distinction, but supposes it and even declares that it is from this, that the Spirit proceeds in the manner of a gift, i. e. through dilection, as from the Father so also from the Son. For the question of Augustine there is, whether, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as given and not as born, nevertheless the Father and the Son can truly be said to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. He affirms: « it must be confessed, that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles; but just as the Father and the Son are one God and, relative to the creature, one creator and one Lord, so relative to the Holy Spirit one principle; but relative to the creature the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle, just as one creator and one God ». He then incidentally notes, that for this reason, because He proceeds as given and not as born, the Spirit does not have the account of Son, not as if from this there were per se the reason of distinction from the only Son, but because, the distinction being already supposed, from this mode of procession through dilection it appears why the Spirit does not also Himself have the account of Son and so there are not two Sons.

From these things also the answer to the objection, which was proposed as « difficult », is evident. Passive spiration is really distinguished from filiation solely for this reason, that the opposition of relation intervenes, i. e. because the Spirit is spirated by the Son; for apart from this real procession of one from another no real distinction is given in divine things. In other words: the account of Son (filiation) is identified in the Son with active spiration, and for that reason filiation, insofar as it is at the same time active spiration, is the principle of the procession and is opposed to the account of the spirated or to passive spiration, and therefore the one is really distinguished from the other. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would be no opposition between the procession in the mode of generation and in the mode of spiration, and therefore there would be no real distinction between these two accounts, just as in the Father generation and active spiration are not really distinguished. See s. Thom. de potent. q. 10. a. 5. and Petav. 1. VII. c. 9.