Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

Johannes Baptist Franzelin

Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

Johannes Baptist Franzelin (1816–1886)

First published 1869

Johannes Baptist Franzelin, S.J.'s Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas is a Roman-school dogmatic treatment of the Trinity, first published in Rome in 1869 and represented here by the fourth edition of 1895. Its forty-eight theses move from the unity of the divine nature and distinction of persons through the analogical concept of the mystery, the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the missions of the divine persons. Franzelin combines patristic and conciliar authorities with tightly structured scholastic argument, a method that made his treatises influential seminary texts and important background to nineteenth-century Catholic dogmatics. Schola presents the 1895 Latin edition with an English translation.


§ I: Revelata doctrina de unitate naturae et reali distinctione personarum divinarum

Caput I: Doctrina Scripturarum Sacrarum de hac unitate et distinctione

Thesis I: Numerica unitas deitatis in universa revelatione sicut veteris ita novi Testamenti docetur

Thesis II: Complexus doctrinae in Scripturis novi Testamenti de unitate et distinctione

Thesis III: Distinctio personarum et unitas naturae ex specialibus testimoniis novi Testamenti demonstratur

Thesis IV: Ex principiis theologicis textus 1. Io. V. 7. genuinus demonstratur

Thesis V: Demonstratio SS. Trinitatis ex 1. Io. V. 7.

Thesis VI: Doctrina veteris Testamenti de distinctis personis divinis

Thesis VII: Distinctio personarum divinarum exhibita in veteri Testamento descriptionibus Sapientiae genitae

Caput II: Doctrina Traditionis de unitate numerica naturae divinae in personis realiter distinctis

Thesis I: Communis fides christiana saeculo IV. ineunte in distinctas personas unius divinae naturae demonstratur ex historia haeresis Arianae eiusque condemnatione in Concilio Nicaeno

Thesis II: Unitas naturae in distinctis personis tam a Concilio Nicaeno quam a Patribus subsequentibus intellecta est unitas singularitatis

Thesis III: De SS. Trinitate professio catholica eadem ante Conc. Nicaenum demonstratur ex Patribus III et II saeculi

Thesis IV: De difficilioribus concipiendi et loquendi modis, quibus Patres vetusti distinctionem realem divinarum personarum significant

Caput III: De consectariis connexis cum unitate naturae et distinctione personarum

Thesis I: De communitate reali attributorum et omnis operationis ad extra

Thesis II: De ratione qua attributa quaedam et operationes appropriantur uni personae prae alia

Thesis III: De mutua divinarum personarum circuminsessione

Thesis IV: De unitate perfectionis in personis sive singulis sive tribus simul spectatis

Thesis V: De aequalitate et similitudine divinarum personarum

§ II: De analogico nostro conceptu mysterii SS. Trinitatis

Caput I: De superrationali indole mysterii

Thesis I: In revelatione ipsa docetur, Trinitatis esse mysterium proprie dictum excedens vim rationis humanae

Thesis II: De fallacia et periculo tentaminum ad demonstrationem mere rationalem mysterii

Caput II: De non repugnantia mysterii SS. Trinitatis

Thesis I: Supernaturalis eminentia mysterii non impedit, quominus illud supposita revelatione conceptu analogico apprehendi possit

Thesis II: Mysterium SS. Trinitatis quod est supra rationem, non tamen potest convinci esse contra rationem

Caput III: De modo nostro concipiendi mysterium SS. Trinitatis per distinctionem absoluti ac relativi

Thesis I: De identitate reali et distinctione in SS. Trinitate per distinctionem absoluti ac relativi

Thesis II: Relationes divinae sunt reales et ideo substantiales

Thesis III: Declaratio, quomodo divinae personae relationibus constitui intelligantur

Thesis IV: De modo significandi, quem habet nomen persona, et de opinione theologorum asserentium in Deo subsistentiam absolutam

Thesis V: De notionibus spirationis activae et ingeniti

Caput IV: Distinctior consideratio divinarum processionum per intellectum et voluntatem

Thesis I: Modus processionis Verbi per intellectum, Spiritus Sancti per voluntatem ex Scriptura et Patrum doctrina demonstratur

Thesis II: Supposita revelatione deducitur aliqua analogica intellectio processionum divinarum

Thesis III: De intellectione et dilectione notionali comparata cum attributis absolutis, et de numero processionum in Deo

Thesis IV: De obiectis, quorum intellectione et dilectione sint processiones divinae; et quomodo Pater Verbo sapiens, Pater et Filius Spiritu Sancto amans dici possit

« The Word proceeds by the intellection both of the essence and of the divine persons and of all necessary truth; and in like manner the Holy Spirit proceeds by the love of the good necessarily loved. Although, therefore, neither does the Word proceed by the vision of contingent creatures, nor the Holy Spirit by the love of the same; nevertheless the Word as Wisdom proceeds with respect to the creature to be made, and the Holy Spirit as love with respect to the creature to be loved. Hence further, the Father can be called wise by the Word, the Father and the Son loving by the Holy Spirit, not formally but terminatively, inasmuch as the Word and the expressed love are the necessary term, without which divine wisdom and love cannot be ».

In the question, by the intellection of what things the Word is expressed, and by the love of what things the Holy Spirit is produced, there is no small diversity of opinions among theologians, according as they are either more solicitous of our manner of understanding according to analogies drawn from creatures, and of distinguishing what in God are altogether one, or more strive to transcend these analogies and, as far as is possible, to conceive the matter as it is objectively. In the manner of considering, first of all one ought to keep before one's eyes what is demonstrated in the Tractatus de Deo about divine simplicity, about knowledge and will, and about the objects of both.

I. As regards the production of the Word: because the divine intellect is one necessary substantial act comprehending from its infinite perfection all truth, according to all intelligible aspects, for this very reason the objects which are comprehended by that one most simple act are very diverse among themselves. As pertains to the present matter, the objects are either necessary in themselves or not necessary, that is, contingent. The necessary objects are, in the order of existence, God alone — both according to the absolute aspects in Himself (according to essence and attributes), and according to the relative aspects (ad intra), and according to the essence as to its imitability ad extra, which imitability of the essence we can call by other names: the objective divine ideas, the eternal reasons of things, the eminent being of creatures in God. Whence from this last there belongs to the necessary objects the whole metaphysical order of possibles, which in themselves are nothing in act, but could be according to the actually existing and necessary imitability ad extra of the divine essence. Then the non-necessary objects are all things existing besides God (formally as existing) for any difference of time, to which, as is evident, as regards contingency are reduced all those conditionals which would actually be done to creatures freely under any hypothesis. Hence further, the divine intellect comprehends the necessary objects necessarily, so that, if it comprehended not any one of them, there would be a defect on the part of the intellect itself, and it would no longer be an infinitely perfect act. On the contrary, although on the hypothesis that contingents exist for some time, the divine intellect necessarily comprehends them as existing, it would nevertheless remain equally perfect if they never existed and were so understood as mere possibles. This vision, therefore, of existing creatures is in God nothing other than the very intellection of the divine essence according to all aspects distinguished only by our manner of considering, with the non-necessary connotation of existing creatures, which are subjected to the same infinite act, comprehending all necessary truths, without any change of it, if they exist, or to which the same one infinite act of intellection extends itself as it were without any change of itself. S. Th. de verit. q. 3. a. 3. ad 8.

With these things most briefly recalled to memory from the other treatise, the first part of the proposed thesis is demonstrated.

1°. The infinite intellectual act from its internal necessary perfection produces by understanding the Word adequate to itself; under this formal aspect of producing the Word it is the relative intellection, that is, the notional act, and really God the Father. Now indeed, according to what has been said, that infinite act from its internal necessary perfection understands most perfectly itself — both as the divine essence (with all the attributes, which we distinguish by reason); and in itself it comprehends the production of the Word, that is, itself as fruitful of the Word, and in this very thing it understands the Word as the immanent term; and further it comprehends the intellection as it is at once love and the fruitful love of the Holy Spirit, and in this again it comprehends the Holy Spirit as its term; and finally it comprehends the essence according to the whole imitability ad extra, that is, according to all the eternal reasons of things, and in this very thing all possibles, both by simple intellection and by wisdom practical in first act (Tract. de Deo th. XLII. n. II.). Moreover, this one most simple necessary act of intellection by itself, that is, as such an intellection, produces the Word adequate to itself; but the adequate Word would not be, unless it were expressed according to all the aspects understood. Therefore the Word is expressed by the intellection both of the essence (with all the absolute attributes), and of the three divine persons, and of the whole metaphysical order of possibles ad extra, founded in the imitability of the divine essence, that is, in the divine ideas.

« The Father, by understanding Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and all other things which are contained in His knowledge, conceives the Word, so that thus the whole Trinity is spoken by the Word, and also every creature » S. Th. I. q. 34. a. 1. ad 3. « In God, in order that His Word be perfect, it is necessary that His Word express whatever is contained in that from which it arises, and especially since God sees all things in one glance, not dividedly. Thus, therefore, it is necessary that whatever is contained in the knowledge of the Father be wholly expressed through this one Word of His, and in the manner in which it is contained in the knowledge, so that it be a true Word corresponding to its principle through knowledge, and that His Word express the Father Himself principally and consequently all other things, which the Father knows by knowing Himself. And thus the Son, from this very fact that He is the Word perfectly expressing the Father, expresses every creature........ The Word regards directly God, who is first expressed through the Word, and consequently creatures; and because creatures, according as they are in God, are one (one divine essence imitable ad extra), of all creatures there is one Word » S. Th. de verit. q. 4. a. 4. corp. et ad 5.

Some feel an insuperable difficulty as to how the Word can be conceived to proceed through the intellection of the Word itself, and much more through the intellection of the Holy Spirit, because, they say, in that sign in which is conceived the intellection producing the Word, the Word does not yet exist, and so could be understood only as future, not by intuitive cognition as existing; which same difficulty seems to them still greater and more evident as regards the cognition of the Holy Spirit, since this third person is posterior in origin to the Word, as proceeding from the Word. Explanations of this matter, several and not all agreeing, are given by various theologians; but the whole difficulty rests on a false, or certainly too imperfect, concept of the prior and posterior in the origins of the divine persons, as is evident even from the very proposition of the objection, where they speak of the Word not yet existing and of the Word as future (apud Vasquez disp. 142. c. 2. n. 6.; c. 4. n. 15.). By the correction, therefore, of this concept the matter must be explained.

The intellection producing the Word is not an action properly so called, as it were going forth from a potency, but is a pure necessary eternal act having an internal necessary eternal term, which is the Word; and so to produce it is eternally to have in complete act a term intrinsically necessary; it is an eternal substantial relation which without its correlative eternal term can neither be nor truly be conceived. Conversely, to be produced is to be eternally produced in act, as necessary as the divine understanding is necessary.

If, therefore, there is question of the prior and posterior of origins, there is not a priority as if the relative paternal understanding could be conceived without the Word, just as, e. g., God can be conceived without the will of creating or of operating ad extra, which is called priority in quo; but what we call prior and posterior in the divine origins is solely this, that the relative B, namely the Word, by internal necessity is and exists eternally from the relative A, namely from the paternal intellection necessarily and eternally expressing the Word; but not, conversely, is the relative A from the relative B. This is wont to be called priority a quo (vide Franc. de Lugo disp. II. c. 5. n. 6. sq.). There is therefore (if it is lawful so to speak) a simultaneity in quo of the relatives, and only a priority a quo of the one to the other. Whence the paternal intellect, a pure act, understands itself as in complete second act fruitful of the Word, and by this intellection of itself it is the principle of the Word eternally proceeding and always produced. But the Father, by understanding Himself in second act fruitful of the Word, understands the Word not now as to be produced or future (which some most absurdly say), but as eternally proceeding in act and necessarily existing. Therefore the paternal intellection, by understanding itself and the Word proceeding from itself, is the principle of the proceeding Word. This order is so far from being repugnant that it is altogether necessary; since the infinite producing intellection and the Word proceeding and immanent to the intellection are simultaneous not only really but also in reason, with the simultaneity in quo, and there is only a priority a quo of the producing intellection to the coeternal Word.

From the same foundation is to be solved the difficulty against the procession of the Word through the intellection also of the Holy Spirit. The intellection producing in eternal act and the Word eternally produced, and the love producing in eternal act and the love as internal term produced, are simultaneous with the simultaneity in quo, that is, one without the other, as it is on the side of the thing, can neither be nor be conceived; the priority, however, namely between the produced Word and the produced love, is solely a priority a quo, because the spirated love is by eternal relation from the Word as from a principle with the Father, but the Word is not from the love as from a principle. That simultaneity in quo suffices that all these things be understood simultaneously, and hence as the Word so also the Holy Spirit, by one most simple act, by which the Father is the eternal principle of the Word. Namely, the Father, by understanding Himself as the principle of the Word, understands also the Word, and at the same time understands Himself and the Word as eternally producing the love, the immanent term which is the Holy Spirit, and by this very one most simple intellection He is the principle expressing the Word adequate to Himself.

2°. The question remains, why it is not to be said that the Word proceeds through the intellection, that is, the vision, of existing creatures. Lest we be deceived in the state of the question: the Word indeed proceeds through that intellection which is also the intellection of existing creatures, since the divine intellection is in itself one, not one which has God for its object and another whose object is creatures; but by the very same [intellection] by which God understands Himself, He understands all intelligible things. We say only that the Word does not proceed through the intellection formally inasmuch as this is referred to existing creatures. The reason is chiefly twofold: a) that God subsisting in three persons is prior by the priority of reason in quo to any decree of operating ad extra being able to be conceived; or in other words: that the necessary notional acts ad intra according to which the persons proceed are prior with the priority of reason in quo to the free acts ad extra, without which there can be no intellection of existing creatures (S. Th. I. q. 33. a. 3. ad 1). b) The other reason is that the Word proceeds through an absolutely necessary intellection, whereas the intellection of existing creatures, or rather the relation of the intellection to existing creatures, is not in itself necessary, but only on the hypothesis of a creature existing for some difference of time.

3°. Nevertheless it can be said that the Word proceeds with a relation (of reason) to creatures, which respect Augustine thought to be signified in the very name of Word. Better, he says, is it called Word than reason, « so that there is signified not only the respect to the Father, but also to those things which have been made through the Word, by operative power » l. qq. 83. q. 63. For the Word is expressed, as we have said, through the paternal intellection of the divine essence, even formally as it is imitable ad extra and the exemplary cause containing the eternal reasons, according to which whatever things are possible are possible, and according to which therefore, with free will supervening, all things are created. Hence the Word which is expressed by this intellection, not only as it were materially inasmuch as the divine essence is communicated to it, but formally from the very mode of proceeding through the intellect, as begotten wisdom, contains the ideas and eternal reasons of all creatable things and of the whole created order, « as a perfect Word to which nothing is lacking, and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all living unchangeable reasons, and all are one in it (the art), as it itself is one of one, with whom one; there God knows all things, which He has made through it » Aug. Trin. l. VI. c. 10. n. 11. Therefore, although the expression of the Word is not through the vision of the creature made, it is nevertheless as the expression of subsistent wisdom and art with a respect as it were radical to the creature to be made. Vide Suarez l. IX. c. 4-7.

II. The question about the Holy Spirit, by the love of which goods He proceeds, after those things which have been said about the procession of the Word, has no further difficulty.

1°. The Father and the Son by one common love of infinite goodness produce the love as an immanent term, which is the Holy Spirit. And so the love through which the Holy Spirit proceeds is the love of the divine essence (with all the attributes); by this very fact, inasmuch as it is in the Father, it is the love of Himself and of the Son; in the Son it is the love of Himself and of the Father. This is what the Fathers mean when they say that the Holy Spirit is produced by the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Nor indeed is it lawful so to understand this doctrine as if a twofold love were said, which as it were conspiring would produce the love as one term; but it must be understood that the two distinct persons love by a substantial love, which is one in number of both as of a subject, and has both for its object, both inasmuch as they are one in essence and inasmuch as they are distinguished by hypostasis. Moreover, no less does the same love comprise as it were reflexively the love itself as producing, and at the same time as its internal term the Holy Spirit eternally proceeding. For the love is of the divine essence, as it is in itself, according to all aspects of lovableness; and thus the essence is both every absolute perfection and the three persons together, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The difficulty wont to arise as to this last point from our imperfect manner of understanding, by which the producing love is conceived as prior in reason to the produced love, is to be resolved from what has been said above. For just as the producing intellection and the produced Word, so also the relative love and its eternal correlate, i. e. the love eternally proceeding in complete act, are simultaneous not only in duration but also in reason, with the simultaneity in quo, and the order is solely according to origin a quo. Whence what we have said about the intellection we can conceive still more easily about the love; namely, the substantial love, in complete act fruitful of the eternally proceeding love, by loving itself and in itself the proceeding love, is the principle of the proceeding love.

2°. The same love, formally as producing the love, is also the love of the essence, inasmuch as this is goodness communicable ad extra through participated good, chiefly through participated holiness, which most nearly imitates the substantial divine goodness and holiness. Whence, just as the Word proceeds through intellection with a radical respect ad extra (if it is lawful to say) and in first act, as begotten wisdom and « art full of ideas »; so the love, the Holy Spirit, from the very mode of His procession through such a love, is proceeding goodness and a gift as it were in first act, namely as giveable to the rational creature through sanctification and for its sanctification, and thus He proceeds with a (radical) respect ad extra. « Just as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by the Word which He begot, inasmuch as the begotten Word sufficiently represents the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the first goodness, according to which the Father loves Himself and every creature. And thus also it is evident that a respect is imported to the creature both in the Word and in the proceeding love as it were secondarily, inasmuch as, namely, divine truth and goodness is the principle of understanding and loving every creature » S. Th. I. q. 37. a. 2. ad 3. cf. q. 38. a. 2.

3°. Finally, from what has just been said there arises the question whether the Holy Spirit proceeds not only through the love of divine goodness as communicable ad extra through analogical participation, of which we have spoken, but also through the love of creatures, whether possible, or actually to be produced or produced. We judge that this last must be denied in the same way and for the same reasons from which we denied that the Word proceeds through the intellection of existing creatures.

As regards the orders of possibles, which we have said are comprehended in the intellection through which the Word is expressed, here the response depends on another question, whether possibles, just as — not only according to their eminent being in the divine essence but formally according to their possible being — they are most certainly a necessary object of divine intellection, so also can they be called an object of necessary love.

To this question it must be said: if the love of God ad extra is taken in the sense in which it is the will of conferring (actual) good, evidently there is no such love of God toward possibles, by this very fact that they are and are left in the state of mere possibles. But if love is taken for the complacency and approbation of possible goods, then it is first of all the infinite and necessary love of the divine essence as imitable and participable ad extra, of which love of the essence was said a little before; but inasmuch as there is considered the simple approbation of possible goods in themselves, thus it is rather intellection than love of the good. It follows, therefore, that properly so-called love of God toward creatures in themselves is nothing absolutely necessary, although the love of divine goodness is necessary, even inasmuch as this goodness, imitable ad extra and communicable through analogous perfections, contains the supreme reason of every possible good. This latter, therefore, and not the love of possible creatures, pertains to the love by which is expressed the love proceeding from internal necessary perfection, which is the Holy Spirit. Vide Suarez l. XI. c. 2. cf. Ruiz disp. 63. sect. 5.

III. There follows the question, whether and in what sense the Father understands by the Word, and both [Father and Son] love by the Holy Spirit.

The holy Fathers, both Greek and, in imitation of them, Latin, disputing against the Arians, most frequently affirm that the Father without the Word would be devoid of intelligence and wisdom (ἄλογον καὶ ἄσοφον). Read the opinions of the Fathers apud Ruiz disp. 74. sect. 4.; Petav. l. VI. c. 9. Among them St. Thomas in not one place alone hands down and explains the same doctrine. « We attribute to God another kind of operation (besides the operation ad extra), inasmuch as we call Him understanding and willing, in which His perfection is signified; for He would not be perfect, unless He were understanding and willing in act, and hence it is that we confess Him living... according to this kind of operation we say in divine things the procession of the Word and of love; and this is the procession of the person of the Son from the Father, who is His Word, and of the Holy Spirit who is His love and the breath of life. Whence Athanasius says in a certain sermon, that the Arians, positing the Son and the Holy Spirit not to be consubstantial with the Father, consequently seemed to say that God is not living and intelligent but dead and without mind » S. Th. de Potent. q. 10. a. 1.

But these things can be taken in two different senses. If it is said

that the Father is formally wise through the Word, the Father and the Son formally loving through the Holy Spirit, the sense is false and absurd. For a divine person cannot be formally wise or loving through another really distinct from itself; but it understands and loves through its very own essence, which is absolute wisdom and absolute will, that is, love, and therefore the absolute wisdom and will of the three persons is one in number.

The sense, therefore, of that saying of the holy Fathers is another. The divine intellection (as it is of the Father) from its internal perfection produces the Word by understanding as necessarily as it is necessarily divine intellection, nor can there be divine understanding (of the Father) without its intrinsic term produced being the Word; and in like manner there cannot be divine love (of the Father and the Son) without having the produced love as its immanent term; « because (as St. Thomas says, contr. gent. IV. c. 14.) the intellect in act is never without the Word », and by the same reason love in act is never without the produced love. Whence it is most rightly inferred, that if at any time the Word or the Holy Spirit did not exist, as the Arians said, neither would divine intellection and love have been in act, and so the divine intellect and divine love would simply be denied, and thus the divine life, which necessarily always are in perfect act. Vide Ruiz disp. 111.

Of the matter itself, therefore, enough is established. The Father formally understanding, the Father and the Son formally loving, is through the essence, which is itself absolute wisdom and love; nevertheless the Father by understanding necessarily produces the Word; nor could He be understanding without this; and both by loving necessarily produce the love (the Holy Spirit), nor could there be divine love without the produced love. The Father, therefore, is wise by the Word not formally but as by the necessary immanent term of His fruitful wisdom, without which the wisdom itself would not be; and by the same reason the Father and the Son are loving by the Holy Spirit as by the necessary internal term of love, without which the love itself would not be.

Only the doubt about the manner of speaking remains, whether the Father can simply be said to understand by the Word, the Father and the Son to love by the Holy Spirit. Theologians differ not a little in opinions and in ways of explaining these locutions; in few words the matter can be settled thus. The verbs must be distinguished which signify only the absolute act, and which signify also the notional act, i. e. the production of the term ad intra. The former cannot be construed with ablatives of this kind of distinct persons. Hence, because to understand, simply put, is wont to be used with only absolute signification, it would be less rightly said: the Father understands by the Word; for this would seem to signify that the Father is constituted formally wise, that is, understanding, through the Word, which is known to be false from the above. The notional word designating the production of the Word is to speak. Moreover, to love is used not only with absolute but also with notional signification, in which latter it is the same as to produce by loving the love as immanent term.

Now in this notional sense, those things which the Father speaks (i. e. understands and by understanding expresses or represents by the Word), and those which the Father and the Son love, can be signified as object (in the accusative), and because such speaking and loving is as it were in complete act through the term intrinsically produced, without which the speaking and loving would not be, rightly this term is added in the ablative as produced by the speaking and the loving. Thus, therefore, the Father speaks by the Word Himself and all other things which He speaks (i. e. which He comprehends by the intellection producing the Word); the Father and the Son love by the Holy Spirit themselves (and whatever they comprise by the love producing the immanent love). For by these words, says Ruiz, is signified « to love by the Holy Spirit as by a term produced simply necessary, so that the operation of loving can be exercised about the loved objects. » Vide Ruiz disp. 74. sect. 2; disp. 111. sect. 2-6. Cf. S. Th. I. q. 37. a. 2; Suarez l. IX. c. 10; l. XI. c. 3.

Thesis V: De modo quo processio secundae personae ut generatio, processio vero tertiae personae ut alia distincta manifestatur in revelatione

Thesis VI: De ratione, cur processio tertiae personae non sit generatio

§ III: De processione Spiritus Sancti ex Patre et Filio

Caput I: De immanente processione Spiritus Sancti a Patre Filioque revelata in SS. Scripturis

Thesis I: Processio Spiritus Sancti etiam a Filio demonstratur ex disserta doctrina Scripturarum

Thesis II: Eiusdem veritatis demonstratio ex necessario personarum ordine originis, et ex missione Spiritus a Filio

Thesis III: Explicatio dogmatis affirmantis, quod Spiritus a Patre procedit

Caput II: De eadem processione Spiritus Sancti declarata in traditione

Thesis I: Demonstratio ex disserta doctrina Patrum

Thesis II: De sensu catholico formulae, qua dicitur Spiritus Sanctus procedere a Patre per Filium

Thesis III: De comparatione relationis Spiritus Sancti ad Filium cum relatione Filii ad Patrem

Thesis IV: De sensu ac modo, quo in oppositione adversus Pneumatomachos explicite declarata est Spiritus Sancti processio a Patre

Thesis V: De oppositis argumentis Photianorum

Thesis VI: De distinctione Filii et Spiritus Sancti per solam relationem originis

Thesis VII: De professione processionis etiam ex Filio inserta in symbolum fidei

§ IV: De missione divinarum personarum et singillatim de missione Spiritus Sancti

Caput I: De missione visibili et invisibili et de inhabitatione personarum divinarum considerata ex parte creaturae sanctificatae

Thesis I: De notione missionis in persona divina, et de distinctione inter missionem visibilem ac invisibilem

Thesis II: De missione invisibili et inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti in sanctificatis ex doctrina Scripturae et Patrum

Thesis III: Explicatio aliqua huius inhabitationis divinae ex parte termini

Caput II: De inhabitatione spectata ex parte divinarum personarum, quae unum sunt natura, et distinctae characteribus personalibus

Thesis I: De inhabitatione communi tribus personis, quia unum sunt natura

Thesis II: De proprio charactere Spiritus Sancti in ratione doni

Thesis III: Explicatio aliqua huius velut habitudinis peculiaris in Spiritu Sancto ad inhabitationem sanctificantem

Thesis IV: De inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti in iustis veteris Testamenti

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