Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

« From what has been said it follows that these divine relations are not only respects according to a manner of considering, but are real relations. Therefore 1° they are substantial relations, because in God there is no accident; yet they must be considered not as realities superadded to the essence, but as the very reality of the essence under the formal aspect and function of relatives. That both points, 2°, is confirmed and illustrated from the doctrine of St. Thomas. »

I. If, from what has been demonstrated and in particular from the Lateran definition, just as the one supreme thing is the absolute, under which formal aspect the one divine essence is said, so also the same supreme thing is the relative, under which formal aspect the three are mutually distinct; it is now evident both that the divine relations are substantial and that they superadd nothing of reality to the infinite essence. A real relation in creatures is an accident in a subject, by virtue of which the subject has an order to another real term. If, therefore, relation is said to be the very order to another — a respect which, considered so abstractly, the ancients call the being-to (the term) of the relation — that respect is not an entity distinct from the term (to which it is referred) and from the accident that founds such an order, and which is therefore called the foundation of the relation, or by the ancients also the being-in (the subject) of the relation. Hence relations viewed according to their foundation, i.e. according to being-in a subject, are inherent; viewed according to the mere being-to a term they are called assisting, i.e. placing nothing of reality in the subject. Hence, further, it is evident that all real relations necessarily have their being-in a subject; for this signifies nothing other than that they are a reality, or are founded in a reality inhering in the related subject. On the contrary, relations which are conceived merely as being-to a term without the reality of a foundation in the subject, i.e. which are merely assisting and in no way inherent, are not true reality; but they are conceived only as reality (the ancients used to say: they are a being not of first intention but of second intention), and therefore they are relations of reason and not real relations.

Now according to this more probable theory of relations in creatures, which a little later we shall confirm also from the doctrine of St. Thomas, the divine relations are in some way explained by us. They are without doubt real (we are speaking of the internal relations), and so they are some entity in the very term which is referred, not a mere respect externally assisting, as Gilbert Porretanus maintained. For if this were so, the divine persons themselves would either not be really distinguished or would be distinguished not by the relations alone but also by absolutes; of which the former pertains to the heresy of the Sabellians, the latter to the Arian or Tritheist heresy. But, the reality of the divine relations being supposed, both the things that we say in the thesis — namely the substantiality of the same relations as well as their identity with the divine essence — after those things which have been proved above require not a new demonstration but only a declaration.

1°. That entity or relation according to being-in a subject is not in God an accident inhering in a subject, but is the very divine substance formally as relative. Namely, the divine substantial intellection itself is not only an absolute intellection but has from its inmost nature a necessary order to its Word as to a term eternally and necessarily produced; likewise the Word is the very same absolute substantial intellection, but one which, under the formal aspect of the produced Word, has a necessary order to the one producing. The same holds of the Holy Spirit as substantial love and immanent term of the love of the Father and the Son. Therefore the entity of the relation is the divine substance itself, not indeed as this is formally absolute, but formally inasmuch as from its intrinsic perfection it expresses the order of the one producing to the immanent produced term; therefore each term, both the producing and the produced, since it is not another existing entity nor has another reality than that of the divine substance, is assuredly substantial.

2°. The respect or order to the term, or (as they say) the being-to, we can indeed consider abstractly by itself, and the relation as assisting; but the respect so considered, or the formal being-to, superadds nothing of entity beyond the reality of the relation viewed according to being-in. I do not say that the relation according to being-to is not a reality — which Ruiz, disp. IX, sect. 6, n. 14, says is dangerous and close to error; but I say with St. Thomas, Card. Pallavicino in the places soon to be cited, and with Card. Cienfuegos, that being-to does not superadd any reality, even one distinct by reason alone, to the reality which the relation has according to being-in. «The concept of the relation as superadded cannot be real but is purely of reason (in divine things), although, if the formality of being-to is not conceived as superadded, it is by itself simply real, i.e. formally the same entitatively as the divine absolute predicate. It is therefore real if that formality of being-to is conceived according to itself and as it exists on the side of the thing; it is, however, of reason only if it is conceived as accruing to or as added to the absolutes» Cienfuegos, Aenigm. theol., disp. V, sect. 3, n. 9. There remains, therefore, the entity of the relation according to being-in, and this entity itself is none other than the entity of the absolute essence, which on account of its eminence has in its most simple Being the aspect of both the absolute and the relative. Therefore nothing is superadded by the relations to the infinite essence, both because this necessarily comprehends every divine reality, absolute and relative, and considering the very nature of the relations themselves.

To embrace the whole in few words, a) just as in creatures a real relation is an accident inhering in a subject, so in God (since God is the most simple Being) the relation is the divine substance. b) As in creatures the relation is not an accident in any manner whatsoever, but an accident by which the subject has an order to a real term; so in God the relation is substance, formally inasmuch as this intrinsically has an order to a real term. But c) in creatures, by the very fact that the relation is an accident, the terms to be mutually related are presupposed as distinct from one another as substances; in God, on the contrary, because the relation is substance, the relation itself is the term, which by itself has an order to the other, i.e. is referred by itself; and because the absolute in God is entirely one, the terms are distinguished from one another under the sole formal aspect of the substantial relations.

II. The doctrine thus far expounded concerning the substantial divine relations and the manner of considering them according to being-in and being-to is most expressly handed down by St. Thomas, 1, q. 28, a. 2; Potent., q. 8, a. 2; 1, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1. I shall transcribe the words of De Potentia, loc. cit.

«Supposing that the relations are in divine things, it must of necessity be said that they are the divine essence, otherwise one would have to posit composition in God, and that the relations in divine things would be accidents, because every thing inhering in something besides its own substance is an accident; it would also have to be that some thing would be eternal which would not be the divine substance; all of which are heretical. For the evidence of this, therefore, it must be known that among the nine genera which are contained under accident ¹, some are signified according to the notion of accident; for the notion of accident is to be in (another), and therefore I say those are signified in the manner of accident which are signified as inhering in another, such as quantity and quality... But relation (the category πρός τι, i.e. of relation) is not signified according to the notion of accident; for it is not signified as something of that in which it is, but as toward that which is outside.... Whence some, attending to the manner of signifying in relatives, said that they are not inhering in substances, namely as it were assisting them, because they are signified as a certain medium between the substance which is referred and that to which it is referred. And from this it followed that in created things relations are not accidents, because the being of an accident is to be in (another). Whence also certain theologians, namely the Porretans, extended an opinion of this kind even to the divine relation, saying that the relations are not in the persons but as it were assist them. And because the divine essence is in the persons, it followed that the relations are not the divine essence; and because every accident inheres, it followed that they would not be accidents..... But to this opinion it follows that relation is not some thing, but only according to reason; for every thing is either substance or accident. Whence also certain ancients posited that relations are among the second intentions (beings of reason, i.e. of second intention). And therefore the Porretans too must say this, that the divine relations are only according to reason; and so it will follow that the distinction of the persons is not real, which is heretical. Whence it must be said that nothing prevents something from being inhering which nevertheless is not signified as inhering...... Although relation is not signified as inhering, nevertheless it must be inhering, and this when the relation is some thing; when however it is only according to reason, then it is not inhering. And just as in created things it must be an accident, so it must be substance in God, because whatever is in God is His substance. The relations must therefore be in reality the divine substance, which however do not have the manner of substance, but have another manner of predicating» S. Th., loc. cit.

For a better declaration the Angelic (Doctor) objects to himself: a) no substance is a relation; b) if the relation is the divine substance in the very reality itself, and is only another formal aspect of it, the relation seems to be nothing real. Whence, if the relation superadds nothing real to the substance, it seems further to follow that the divine persons, since they cannot be distinguished except under the formal aspect of the relations, are not really distinguished among themselves, which is the Sabellian heresy.

The holy Doctor answers the first. «No substance which is in a genus (i.e. finite and limited according to being, including only some certain degree of being) can be a relation, because it is determined to one genus... But the divine essence is not in the genus of (restricted) substance, but is above every genus, comprehending in itself the perfections of all genera (and consequently also of relatives); whence nothing prevents that which is of relation from being found in it» (ib. ad 1um).

To the other difficulty this is the clearest response. «Although relation does not add above the essence some thing but only an aspect, nevertheless relation is some thing, just as goodness also is some thing in God, although it does not differ from the essence except by reason, and so likewise is it with wisdom. And therefore, just as those things which pertain to goodness or wisdom really belong to God, such as understanding and other things of this kind; so also that which is of a real relation, namely to be opposed and to be distinguished, is really found in divine things» (ib. ad 2um et 3um). Further he says: «In no way is it to be conceded that the being of relation in divine things is one thing and the being of the essence another. But reason does not signify being, but being-what, i.e. what something is. Whence two aspects of one thing do not demonstrate a double being of it, but demonstrate that it can be said in two ways what it is, just as of a point it can be said what it is, as principle and as end, on account of the diverse aspect of principle and end» (ib. ad 1um). You have this doctrine of St. Thomas also declared in Card. Pallavicino (Curs. theolog. l. VIII. c. 52), from whom I shall cite a few things for the sake of a specimen. «If that predicate which is the principle of distinction between the producing and the produced (paternity, filiation, etc.) is added to the infinite being, it adds nothing of entity to it; for infinite being has by itself every entity and every perfection (i.e. the infinite essence includes every reality, even that which can be conceived under the formal aspect of relation). Therefore, as St. Thomas most acutely saw, 1, q. 28, a. 2, it superadds nothing pertaining to the complement of it and to being-in, but adds a pure being-to, i.e. a respect to another. Which respect, according to itself and above being-in, expresses no entity; for a being is either something absolute, i.e. substance, or something inhering in the absolute itself, i.e. accident; but that which is neither substance nor inheres in substance but is a mere respect to something else does not have the notion of being... But the respect which is given in God of the producing to the produced or of the produced to the producing cannot really and identically not be a being, because ... this respect constitutes and formally distinguishes the one from the other; therefore it is a real being. Yet this respect is not really distinguished from the divine essence itself (because, as we have declared, the essence itself, besides the aspect of the absolute, has the aspect of the relative)... Since no relative can be only relative but must either be received in some absolute or be identified with it, and since the received relation is accidental, the divine relation, as substantial and not accidental, must therefore not be received but identified with the absolute essence» Pallavicin. l. c. n. 385. 386.