Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

« One supreme reality which is God has at once both the aspect of the absolute, in that it is one divine essence, and the aspect of things relative to one another, which are really distinguished among themselves; for the internal divine relations, both all together and each singly, are by the doctrine of faith really the very infinite essence of God. Nevertheless the revealed truth of the mystery requires that the divine essence and relation, as they can be conceived by us only inadequately, be understood as distinct by reason with a foundation in the reality, and virtually. »

For explaining the concept of distinct persons in one essence, the first foundation from which we proceed is the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council, cap. Damnamus. « There is one supreme reality, incomprehensible indeed and ineffable, which is truly the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, three persons together and each one of them singly; and therefore in God there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity, because each of the three persons is that reality, namely the substance, essence, or divine nature, which alone is the principle of all things... And that reality is not begetting, nor begotten, nor proceeding, but it is the Father who begets, and the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds; so that the distinctions are in the persons and the unity in the nature ».

According to this definition, therefore, a) the divine essence itself is really the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, three persons together and each one of them, or the divine essence is identified with the three persons distinct among themselves and with each single one of them. b) Insofar as that supreme reality is formally the essence or divine nature, it is altogether one and not multipliable, although it is identified with the three mutually distinct persons, or (as is usually said) is common to three persons mutually distinct. Therefore by this very fact, because it is one and not multipliable, under this formal aspect of common nature it neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds. But c) the same supreme reality is the Father, and under this formal aspect, as Father, it begets the Son; the same is the Son, and under this formal aspect, as Son, it is begotten by the Father; the same is the Holy Spirit, and under this formal aspect, as Holy Spirit, it proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore d) evidently the same one supreme reality has the formal aspect of the absolute (as absolute is said in opposition to relative)¹, because under the formal aspect of essence it neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds, and therefore has no distinction, and by this very fact no (real) relation ad intra; but at the same time the same one supreme reality has the formal aspect of the relative, or better, of the relatives (for a relative cannot really be or be conceived without a real distinction and multiplication of relatives), and under this aspect it is itself the Father begetting and the Son begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeding; and so the supreme reality, which under the formal aspect of the absolute is one, one essence, one God, the same under the formal aspect of the relatives is three, which three are distinguished among themselves solely under this formal aspect of the relatives. But these distinguishing relations, by force of the real immanent processions, are relations of origin expressed in revelation by the name and reality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The same doctrine is contained in Scripture, in the creeds, in the definitions of the Councils, in the declarations of the Fathers, and in the whole ecclesiastical preaching, from which we have demonstrated the revealed doctrine: that one God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; that the essence, one in number, is not multiplied, but is common to three things distinct and relative to one another; that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not one thing and another, but one and the same altogether, although there is one person and another and so not one but three; and therefore in this sense the three persons are most perfectly consubstantial. « Nor is the Son the Father, for the Father is one; but he is what the Father is; nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because he is from God; for he is the one only-begotten; but he is what the Son is. These three are one in deity, and this one is three in properties » ἓν τὰ τρία θεότητι, καὶ τὸ ἓν τρία ταῖς ἰδιότησι Gregor. Naz. or. 31 (al. 37) n. 9. In properties they are three, namely under the formal aspect of the Father begetting, of the Son begotten, of the Holy Spirit proceeding, which aspects are relative to one another, as Gregory had said a little before: « the difference of the mutual relation made their appellation different ». In the baptismal formula the Savior « shows that it is enough, if we remain in the appellation of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, for the perception of that which is essentially; which indeed is one and not one. For by reason of essence it is one; therefore the Lord established by his law that we look to one name (baptizing in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit); but by the notional properties of the hypostases the faith in Father and Son and Holy Spirit is discerned, indivisibly distinguished and unconfusedly united »² Gregor. Nyss. contr. Eunom. l. I. T. II. p. 3. But the doctrine belonging to this matter, both of the Fathers and of Scripture, is to be recalled from the foregoing; here we are concerned only with deriving from it and declaring the concept.

As is evident, this whole doctrine and especially the Lateran definition can be reduced to a twofold dogma. One, which is presupposed as a foundation and is known both by the light of reason and by revelation, namely the dogma of the unity and simplicity of God: that the infinite divine essence is necessarily one, both with the unity which is opposed to multiplication, and with the unity which is opposed to any composition — not only physical composition from real parts, but also metaphysical composition, such as would arise from diverse grades of entity distinct from one another by objective precision. The other dogma, knowable directly from revelation alone, is directly enunciated: that one God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, three persons really distinct among themselves.

The simplicity of the divine Being in the Lateran definition is presupposed as a foundation for declaring that the divine essence itself is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that therefore it is not the absolute essence that is distinguished from the persons relative to one another, but only the persons are really distinguished among themselves. Because of this identity of the one essence with the three persons, the Council teaches that there is not a quaternity (as Joachim, Abbot of Flora, had objected to Lombard), but only a Trinity of persons. From the same infinite simplicity, as it has been proposed anew in the whole doctrine of Scripture and of the Fathers and by the Council, it further follows that we cannot by consideration of the mind distinguish any perfection or formal aspect of God without the same, objectively and as it is in itself, including — or rather being itself — really the infinite divine Being and the fullness of absolute entity.

Therefore it must be held that in God essence and relation are not one reality and another reality, but altogether the same reality; nevertheless the formal aspect of essence is one thing and that of relation another, and this distinction is with a foundation in the reality. This distinction of reason — first, what it is and what its truth is, and then its necessity — requires declaration.

I°. Because we, by our imperfect mode of knowing, cannot embrace the whole fullness of being in one concept except altogether confusedly, therefore, in order to form a somewhat more distinct understanding of God, we try to attain the one most simple infinite Being itself as it were by parts, under diverse inadequate concepts of essence, intellect, will, wisdom, goodness, and the other perfections, to all of which concepts there corresponds one infinite Being; for really it is essence and intellect and will and every perfection. But it is all these not by distinct realities in God himself; rather it is one infinite entity equivalent to all these perfections according to diverse functions, as it were. What we conceive under the idea, e. g., of infinite wisdom is truly in God and is God himself; or the same objective reality corresponding to this concept of wisdom is also the divine essence, goodness, omnipotence, justice, etc., because that reality is the very fullness of absolute being. Now what we explicitly conceive under the ideas of wisdom, goodness, omnipotence, and the other attributes, that we call objective formal aspects; but the operation of our mind in this distinction we call a distinction of (subjective) reason. Those formal aspects, as is now evident, are not really distinct in God, but are one most simple entity apprehended by us through distinct and inadequate concepts of the perfections. Nevertheless the very infinity of divine perfection, equivalent and supereminent in its one most simple Being to all these perfections, as they are distinguished by us by consideration or reason (ἔννοια), provides the foundation why from the truth of the matter we can conceive the divine Being under diverse formal aspects; and this is what is called the distinction of reason with a foundation in the reality. Cf. S. Th. I. dist. 33. qu. 1. a. 1. ad 3. (Recall these things, which we disputed in the Tract. de Deo th. XII. XII. XXVI. XXVI.)

But now from the same principle of infinity and the consequent simplicity of the divine Being it is understood in exactly the same way as was said of the absolute attributes, that there is no real distinction between the same Being under the formal aspect of the absolute and under the formal aspect of the relative. For the same entity is both absolute and relative; but we can apprehend these diverse formal aspects only by distinct concepts, and this distinction of ours is surely with a foundation in the reality, because objectively and really one infinite entity is at once both absolute and relative, and has the functions both of the absolute and of the relative. In one word it can be said: the distinction of the many aspects, and so also of the absolute and of the relative, is not real; but that which corresponds to those many aspects, the absolute and the relative themselves, is a reality in God, but one reality most simple in itself.

This whole explanation of the Lateran definition which we have given is that of the Angelic Doctor. « The aspect of substance and of relation is one thing, and to each (to our subjective aspect or concept) there responds something (an objective aspect) in the reality which is God, yet not some diverse reality but one and the same... Although relation adds to essence not some reality but only an aspect (i. e., the same reality truly is under one aspect essence and under another aspect relation, and hence is conceived under a twofold aspect with a foundation in the reality), nevertheless relation is some reality, just as goodness also is some reality in God, although it does not differ from essence except by reason, and so likewise is it with wisdom. And therefore just as those things which pertain to goodness or wisdom truly belong to God, such as understanding and other things of this kind: so also that which is proper to real relation, namely to be opposed and to distinguish (i. e., that the relatives be really referred to one another, and by this very fact under the formal aspect of the relatives be distinct among themselves), is really found in divine things » S. Thom. de Potent. q. 8. a. 2. ad 2. 3. et I. q. 28. a. 2.

Cardinal Cajetan expressed this same thing most lucidly, as far as the depth of the mystery permits, in I. q. 39. a. 1. « In God, he says, according to reality or in the real order there is one reality (as all Catholics must confess), not purely absolute nor purely respective, nor mixed or composed or resulting from both, but most eminently and formally having what is of the respective — indeed of many respective realities (of three really relative to one another and by this very fact really distinct among themselves) — and what is of the absolute. So in the formal order, or of the formal aspects in themselves (as it is in God), not speaking as regards us (who conceive that one thing by many distinct inadequate notions), there is in God a single formal aspect, not purely absolute nor purely respective, not purely communicable nor purely incommunicable, but most eminently and formally containing both whatever there is of absolute perfection and whatever the respective (relative) Trinity requires....³. The Father does not understand essence and paternity as two formal objects in themselves, but as one formally and many virtually — not in such a way that in that supreme reality and formal aspect paternity and essence are (only) virtually, but in such a way that they are formally and really (i. e., that one reality and one formal aspect is in fact both the absolute essence and the relative paternity toward the Son as toward a term); but their distinction is virtual, because they are so there as if they were distinct, and again because in this way (one reality and formal aspect) it exercises the function of both, as if they were distinct ». These things there.

In few but clear words Suarez says this very thing. « There is there one reality truly absolute and truly relative without distinction between them, because as such (as absolute and at the same time relative) they do not involve opposition nor repugnance; because it is not of the essence of an absolute thing that under no aspect can it have a respect, but only that, insofar as it is absolute, it does not express it » Suarez de Trin. l. IV. c. 3. n. 19. Cf. Didacus Ruiz disp. XI; Molina in I. q. 28. disp. III.

2°. It is easily apparent that the foundation is different and the necessity far greater of the distinction between the formal aspect of the absolute and of the relative, than between the formal aspects of the absolute attributes. For this latter distinction is neither founded in any real distinction, nor does a real distinction follow from it; but it is only necessary, so that by our inadequate notions we may conceive the one absolute divine Being a little more distinctly (Tract. de Deo). But the matter is not so in the distinction of the absolute and the relative. It is indeed most true that one supreme reality, without any actual distinction in the thing itself, is no less the absolute essence and the relative (the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit), than one reality is essence and absolute wisdom and goodness; but the absolutes are distinguished by us either solely or certainly chiefly according to diverse relations of reason and functions of the infinite Being ad extra, without any real distinction following therefrom; on the contrary, the distinction between the absolute and the relative is according to a diverse function ad intra in such a way that under the formal aspect of the absolute there remains one undivided, but under the formal aspect of the relative there are three really distinct among themselves. Thus, therefore, one supreme reality contains in itself both the aspect of the absolute and of the relative, and really has the functions of both, as if those two aspects were distinct realities. For this reason this distinction between the absolute and the relative, just as also between intellect and will in relation to the diverse processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is called virtual more properly than the other distinction between the absolute attributes, i. e., with a foundation according to the diverse functions of one and the same infinite reality, no otherwise than if they were two distinct realities, as we saw a little before declared by Cajetan. In this sense also must those theologians be understood who say that the distinction between essence and person is greater than between essence and attributes (cf. Petav. de Deo l. I. c. 10. n. 10.).

The simplicity and unity of God being thus presupposed, just as the real distinction of the persons among themselves evidently shows that the one most simple supreme reality is at once absolute and relative not only in our concept but in itself; so the same real distinction not only provides the foundation but renders altogether necessary that we conceive the same supreme reality under the distinct notions of the absolute and of the relative.

This necessity is so great that, once the distinction of both formal aspects is removed, the very dogma of the Trinity of persons in one most simple and non-multipliable essence is subverted. For the dogma consists in this very fact: that God, according to the aspect of absolute Being and of every absolute perfection which we can distinguish by consideration of the mind, is one most simple infinite Being; but according to the aspect of things relative to one another through the relations of origin or procession of one from another, that same one Being is the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, who are really distinct among themselves. Hence the heretics — both those who in the unity of the essence admitted only one truly divine person (as the Arians), and the Tritheists who introduced three divine essences in the three persons (as also Abbot Joachim) — in order to impugn the Catholic doctrine assumed the negation of the diverse aspect and the affirmation of an exaggerated identity between the absolute essence and the relative properties; and therefore the holy Fathers in turn placed no small part of the Catholic defense in demonstrating the diverse formal aspect of the absolute essence and of the person and relative property, so that, in accordance with the most explicit revelation, the unity and real communion according to the formal aspect of essence, and the real distinction and incommunicability according to the formal aspect of the relatives or persons, might be kept safe and sound. Long disputes about the distinction according to the twofold aspect of essence and of the relative properties are found in St. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa his brother in the books against Eunomius, in Greg. Nazianz. or. 29. al. 35, in Epiphanius haeres. 76, in Cyril in the Thesaurus, in Augustine especially l. V. de Trin., and in others, where they respond to the perpetual cavil of the Arians, which Gregory Nazianzen calls (or. 31. l. 23) « the citadel and wall of the heretics », and Augustine (Trin. V. c. 3.) « a most cunning device » — namely, that the unbegotten and the begotten are diverse, and therefore the essence of the Father and of the Son is diverse; for whatever is said of God, they maintained to be said according to essence, having rejected the virtual distinction between essence and hypostasis. Whence, together with others, Greg. Naz. responds to the Arian objection in or. 29. n. 16: « Father is not a name of essence, o most acute men, nor of action, but it indicates that relation which the Father has to the Son or the Son to the Father. For as among us (in human things) these names signify a kindred bond (τὸ γνώρισμα καὶ οἰκεῖον), so there too they indicate the relation of the begotten to the begetter in the communion of nature » (τὴν συγγένειαν). Likewise Augustine in Trin. l. V. poses that Arian difficulty: « whatever is said of God or understood is said not according to accident but according to substance; wherefore for the Father to be unbegotten is according to substance, and for the Son to be begotten is according to substance. But to be unbegotten and to be begotten are diverse: therefore the substance of the Father and of the Son is diverse ». The sum of Augustine’s rather long response is contained in this conclusion: « although to be the Father and to be the Son is diverse, the substance (absolute essence) is nevertheless not diverse, because these are said not according to substance but according to the relative, which relative is nevertheless not an accident, because it is not changeable ». Declaring the same, he proceeds concerning the unbegotten and the begotten: « just as begotten is not said with reference to itself, but that it is from a begetter; so when unbegotten is said, it is not said with reference to itself, but it is shown that it is not from a begetter. In the same predicament, however, which is called relative, both significations (of the begotten just as of the unbegotten) are turned; but what is pronounced relatively does not indicate substance: so although begotten and unbegotten are diverse, it does not indicate diverse substance » Aug. ib. c. 3-7. See Petav. de Deo l. I. c. 7-11; Trin. l. V. c. 1-3.