Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

« Although both the truth of existence (that it is) and the truth of essence (what it is) in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity must, from what has been said, be judged to be above human reason: nevertheless 1° from presupposed faith there can be sought some understanding and a more distinct analogical concept of the essence of the mystery, what it is; and likewise 2° from the root of the revealed and believed truth one can arrive at some understanding of the existence of the mystery, why it is so. Hence this understanding and theological demonstration proceeds from principles that are believed by faith and is wholly grounded upon them, not, however, a philosophical one, from principles perceived by the light of reason ».

1°. In order that we may be able to believe with explicit faith the things that God reveals to us, a proper notion of the things to be believed, as they are in themselves, is not indeed required; nevertheless it is altogether necessary, or rather it is contained in the very act of explicitly believing, that we conceive at least some analogical notion of the thing believed. But this (setting aside the manifestation of the thing through immediate intuition and in itself, where there would no longer be faith but vision) is accomplished in three ways: either, namely, by supernatural intellectual light alone, through infused ideas and intellections; or by prophetic vision, by exhibiting signs of things (whether real, whether verbal, whether to be perceived extrinsically even by the senses or only intrinsically by the imagination), from which the intellect, under divine illumination, may be led to conceive the notions of the things signified, and to form a judgment about the truth; or finally by God the Word incarnate Himself, who, subsisting in the bosom¹

of the Father, testifies what He has seen (Io. 1. 18; III. 11.); or at least through men, God's legates (with the necessary and opportune manifestation of mission and authority), the things and truths to be believed are set forth extrinsically by word and doctrine, and intrinsically grace illuminates, excites, and elevates to the conceiving of supernatural faith (cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 173. and 174.; de Veritate q. 12. a. 7. sq.).

Although, as far as concerns the present matter, what we are about to say of the third mode holds with proportion almost the same for the first and second modes of revelation, which are prophetic modes; nevertheless now we treat only of this third mode of revelation, which in the present providence of God is the ordinary one. We shall consider therefore, first, how the understanding to be sought relates to revelation and to faith; then, with the holy Doctors leading the way, we shall illustrate this very thing with several examples.

1°. In the mode of revelation of which we have spoken, the internal light of grace does not of itself pertain to infusing the concepts themselves into the mind, but presupposes an external proposition of the things to be believed, suited to the character of the human mind; « faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ » Rom. X. 14. sqq. But the word is not heard by us, or the doctrine is not intelligible to us, nor could we conceive any ideas of the things proposed from it, and hence also give no explicit assent to the proposed truth, unless revelation were in some way connected with the notions of our mind already pre-held and with truths previously known. Here too that holds which Augustine says (ep. 120. n. 3.): « we could not even believe, unless we had rational souls ». With regard, therefore, to this connection of ideas, so that from things known one may arrive at things unknown, our mind, in the conception of ideas about revealed super-rational things, conducts itself in a manner similar to the attainment of the knowledge of God through the light of reason.

Namely, we first form the notions of perfections, wisdom, goodness, etc. from creatures, and thence, concluding from effects to cause, we know the perfections of God by the way of negation and supereminence (τῆς ὑπεροχῆς), removing the imperfection by which perfections are limited in creatures; nor except by this way of conclusion, and thus through likeness (ἀναλόγως Sap. XIII. 5.), as in a mirror and in an enigma, can we attain by the light of reason the idea and knowledge of the divine perfections. By this very fact we indeed evidently know God, if it is asked whether He is; but only with ideas derived from elsewhere and by comparison, and hence with analogical notions — not, however, with ideas formed from the intuition of the object in itself, and hence not with proper notions — do we conceive what God is (Tract. de Deo sect. II. c. 1.). So also when it is no longer the invisible things of God, understood through the visible works of God, that are to be contemplated, but the words of God are proposed to be believed, these words of God must be signs of ideas, of which we have already preconceived in the mind some analogical notions primarily derived from creatures; otherwise the words would not be signs for us to conceive the ideas signified by them, but a mere sound of words. In the present matter, while it is taught that the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are one God, one Godhead, and three distinct among themselves, who both individually and three together are one God; there are presupposed in our mind many at least confused notions of perfections, without which God cannot be conceived; then the notions of essence, person, generation or origin of one from another, identity, distinction, etc., without which the mind will not be able, and with which pre-held it will be able, to form at least some confused concept of the thing proposed for belief, removing (as has been said of rational concepts) by the way of negation and supereminence the imperfections which adhere in creatures to these very things, whether absolute perfections or relations.

The distinction, therefore, between rational and super-rational concepts about God, as I have already indicated above (th. XVII.), is not in this, that we conceive the super-rational truths in no way, or that we conceive the rational ones by proper ideas and the super-rational ones by analogical ones; for on both sides the concepts are analogical, formed from perfections previously understood, as they are in creatures; but the distinction is another and a twofold one. For a) in the rational truths about God, as regards the concepts themselves, we proceed by the way of causality, by which we understand of God that He is; then by the way of negation and supereminence, by which we conceive somewhat more distinctly what He is, although only analogically and not properly, as God is in Himself. But in the super-rational truths there is no place for a conclusion from effects to cause, and therefore in place of the way of causality there is necessary there a positive revelation through the word of God, without which we would never arrive at those concepts. But because revelation does not change the mode of knowing connatural to us, it itself exhibits the super-rational perfections and internal relations of God according to the analogy and from the analogy of the rational notions which we have preconceived from creatures ². Wherefore, with revelation presupposed (just as in rational matters the way of causality is presupposed), we can already use, and necessarily do use, the way of negation and supereminence for a more distinct analogical concept of the super-rational truth or revealed object, what it is.

b) As is already evident from what has been said, the distinction is with regard to the judgment of assent (that it is). For this judgment, in so far as God is understood by reason, arises from the perceived connection of effects with their supreme cause; but in the revealed super-rational truths it rests solely on the authority of God revealing. Nevertheless, just as in the rational notions about God the mode of conceiving analogically what He is is referred to the perfections, not by abstracting from their existence but formally as understood in necessary existence; so in the super-rational objects of faith themselves the mode of conceiving is engaged with them in so far as their existence is most certainly established by faith. Hence the movement and striving to conceive things more distinctly from the analogies tends not to the understanding of things as possible but as existing, and therefore also to the understanding, in some measure, of the intimate reason of necessary existence.

In one word we can say: what is known of God (the rational truth Rom. I. 19.) can be understood by reason from the created perfections — that He is, and analogically, what He is; the deep things of God (the super-rational truths 1. Cor. II. 10.) are revealed by the Spirit of God — that they are, and in this very revelation there is exhibited to our spirit the analogy from the created perfections, so that we may apprehend analogically what they are, and by what intrinsically necessary reason they are.

Thus, therefore, in these truths the principle of the holy Fathers is altogether most certain: « unless you believe, you will not understand » (from Is. VII. 9. according to the LXX.) For although faith itself (explicit) could not exist, unless some understanding preceded — not only of the motives of credibility, about which we now ask nothing, but of the very thing to be believed ³ — nevertheless the object of this preceding understanding is exhibited by revelation itself, and (in super-rational matters) only it can exhibit it. Moreover, faith being now presupposed, faith itself, in so far as there is included in it the highest religious veneration and intimate love of the thing believed, seeks a further understanding, as it were a middle between faith and vision ⁴, whose root and seeds are already contained in the very mode of revelation and in faith itself.

Consentius had asked of St. Augustine that « discussing the question of the Trinity, i.e. of the unity of the divinity and the distinction of the persons, cautiously and prudently, he would so wipe away the cloud of his mind that what he previously could not think, being declared by the light of understanding, he could in some way see with his eyes ». On the other hand, the same Consentius had maintained: « reason is not so much to be sought as the authority of the saints is to be followed; for if the faith of the holy Church were grasped by the reason of disputation and not by the piety of believing, no one besides philosophers and orators would possess beatitude ». Now Augustine in his response showed that these two things posited by Consentius, if taken absolutely, mutually exclude one another. Wherefore, he says, since both are most true — both that faith is to be followed on authority, and that nevertheless understanding of the things believed is to be sought — those two are to be taken in such a way that faith precedes and that from faith one strives to some understanding of the thing believed, which however will not be perfect until we arrive at vision face to face. « If you not unreasonably demand of me or of any teacher reason, that you may understand what you believe, correct your definition, not so that you reject faith but so that you may see by the light of reason also those things which you already hold with the firmness of faith. For far be it that God should hate in us that by which He created us more excellent than the other living beings. Far be it, I say, that we should believe in such a way as not to receive or seek reason, since we could not even believe, unless we had rational souls. Therefore, that in certain things pertaining to salutary doctrine, which we are not yet able to perceive by reason but will one day be able, faith should precede reason, by which the heart is cleansed, so that it may take up and bear the light of great reason — this is certainly of reason. And therefore it was said reasonably through the prophet: unless you believe, you will not understand. Where without doubt He distinguished these two, and gave counsel that we believe first, so that we may be able to understand what we believe. Accordingly, that faith should precede reason, seemed reasonable... If a believer already demands reason, that he may understand what he believes, his capacity is to be regarded, so that, reason being rendered according to it, he may take as much understanding of his faith as he can — more, if he takes more; less, if less — provided, however, that until he arrives at the fullness and perfection of knowledge, he does not depart from the way of faith... Now therefore if we are faithful, we have arrived at the way of faith; which if we do not abandon, not only to as much understanding of incorporeal and immutable things as can be taken in this life, not by all, but even to the summit of contemplation, which the Apostle calls face to face, we shall without doubt arrive » Aug. ad Consent. ep. 120. n. 2-4.

The same principles, both elsewhere often in Augustine and in the other Fathers, are enunciated theoretically and brought into practical use. Indeed, on these principles all genuine theology, in so far as it is speculative, and its elaboration rest. Wherefore just as with the Fathers — Gregory Naz. and Nyssenus, Basil, Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, etc. — so with Anselm, the Victorines, Peter Lombard, Alexander, Albert, Thomas, Bonaventure, and all the other masters of the school, both the treatment of the other dogmas and specifically the doctrine of the Trinity (with which we are now concerned) is constituted in no small part in the inquiry of understanding from faith. Thus Anselm: the mystery of the Trinity

must not be proved to the Christian by reason, he says, but believed by faith; but from faith and in faith, as far as can be done, one must advance to understanding. « I hear that the cleric Roscelinus ⁵ says that in God the three persons are three things separated from one another, as there are three angels, yet in such a way that there is one will and power... Whoever asserts as truth the blasphemy which I have set down above that I heard said by Roscelinus, whether man or angel, is anathema... for he is altogether not a Christian. But if he is baptized and has been nourished among Christians, he is in no way to be heard; nor is any reason either to be demanded from him for his error or to be exhibited to him of our truth (because namely the proposition of faith is most clear)... For it is most foolish and insipid, on account of anyone not understanding, to call into the doubtfulness of wavering questions what is founded most solidly upon the firm rock... For a Christian ought to advance through faith to understanding, not come to faith through understanding, or, if he cannot understand, depart from faith. But when he is able to attain to understanding, he delights; when truly he cannot, he venerates what he cannot grasp » Anselm. l. II. ep. 41. ad Fulconem Episc. Belovac. « I do not attempt, Lord, to penetrate Your height, because I in no way compare my understanding to it, but I desire in some measure to understand Your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand. For I believe this too, that unless I believe, I will not understand » Id. Proslog. c. 1.

2°. The analogies under which the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is exhibited to us to be conceived, in the Scriptures themselves and thenceforth in the whole ecclesiastical preaching, are chiefly three. When a) it is taught: God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, proceeding from the Father and (because all things that are the Father's are also the Son's) receiving from the Son; here there is included the fundamental analogy ⁶, without which we could form no concept, and under which, according to the notions pre-held from creatures, we conceive three distinct persons and the unity of nature.

Then we conceive the origin of the second person from the first, indeed also the mode of origin, through generation, i.e. a procession in the likeness of nature, i.e. from an internal vital principle the communication of the divine nature, in such a way that the second person, existing thence by the force of the mode of procession, is the substantial image of the first person; for this is what we understand to be expressed by the names Father, Son, generation, image, figure or character of the substance of the Father, under which the mystery is revealed.

Likewise we conceive the procession of the third distinct person from the first and the second, in so far as they have all things in common, i.e. in so far as they are one principle; and at least negatively we understand the mode of procession to be diverse from generation, because the third person is not the Son.

Moreover, we learn to correct the notion of the unity of nature and of the distinction of persons, as we have preconceived it from creatures, by the other dogma, that the three are one God, not three distinct Gods. For thence we understand that the unity of nature and of the whole absolute perfection is not specific, as in creatures, but numerical; and that the distinction of the persons is not according to absolute substance, but according to formal relative reasons, which are expressed by the names Father, Son, and Spirated. God is spirit; therefore all the imperfections which adhere in creatures to the notions of father, son, generation are to be denied.

« Neither son nor generation is a property proper to the deity, but is taken from human likeness; likewise the appellation spirit. Sacred Scripture, therefore, used this appellation of the divine Spirit, showing that He is from God in another way (than the Son); since, as was said before, it was not fitting that He also be signified through the same likeness. But you (heretic) ... holding in contempt (καταφρονῶν or περιφρονῶν) the human examples (παραδείγματα), you subvert the divine dogmas which are understood from them.... God begets not as a man; yet He begets truly, and brings forth a progeny from His very self, the Word (ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει, Λόγον), not a human one; but He brings forth the Word truly from His very self. And He emits the Spirit through the mouth (ἐκπέμπει), not as it were in human fashion, since neither is the mouth of God corporeal; but from Him Himself is the Spirit, and from no other source » Basil, cont. Eunom., l. V, p. 306.

The manner, therefore, of positively conceiving these things is exhibited in the second analogy, taken from the spiritual and intellectual order.

For b) the same one who is the Son is the Word, God, ὁ Λόγος. When this analogy is joined with the former, they perfect one another, as it were, and what is lacking in the one is supplied from the other. In the former, both the substantially and the real distinction of the persons from one another are exhibited more distinctly; in the latter, both the mode of the intellectual, immanent, necessary, and eternal generation and the unity of essence and the mutual immanence of the persons, that is, the περιχώρησις, are conceived more clearly.

« John himself, when he was about to teach that this Word is the only-begotten Son of God, lest anyone suspect a passible generation, by prefixing the appellation of Word takes away every unjust suspicion, declaring that the Son is from Him (the Father) and is so impassibly... But if neither do these adumbrations (παραδείγματα) suffice to set forth the whole matter, do not wonder; for the discourse is about God, whom we can neither utter nor think according to His dignity » Chrysost., in Io., hom. II, n. 4.

Thus also do the other Fathers speak with common consent. « When he spoke of the Only-begotten, he said the Word itself... Why Word? That it may be clear that He proceeded from the mind. Why Word? Because He was begotten without passion. Why Word? Because He is the image of the Begetter, showing the whole Begetter in Himself, separating nothing from Him, and existing perfect through Himself; just as our word also bears the image of our whole thought... He said Word, therefore, to show you that the Father's generation is not subject to passion, and to teach you the perfect existence (subsistence) of the Son, who is of course God, and to show you through these things the eternal conjunction of the Son with the Father. For our word too, the offspring of the mind, is begotten without passion; for it is neither cut nor divided nor flows away, but the whole mind, remaining in its own substance, produces the whole and perfect word; and the word proceeding embraces in itself all the power of the begetting mind. After, therefore, you shall have derived from the name of the Word as much for the theology of the Only-begotten as is pious, then whatever you find to be alien and dissonant, avoid it and pass it by with all diligence » Basil, hom. in illud: « in principio erat » etc., n. 3, T. II, p. 136.

From this concept of the origin and relation between the first and second person according to the analogy of the mind and of the proceeding word, it is easy to advance to the notion of the third person as the term, that is, of the love produced through dilection, insofar as the one dilection is common to the Father and the Son. c) The third analogy can be said to be in some way intermediate between each of the preceding ones, taken of course from the material procession of splendor from light, that is, of light from light, which nevertheless is itself a sensible image of the intellectual procession.

It is set forth in the Scriptures: Heb. I. 3 (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης); Sap. VII. 25 (ἀτμὶς γὰρ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής). It is cultivated in many ways by the holy Fathers. See Athanasius, de decretis Nic., n. 23, and in the same place n. 25, the doctrine of Theognostus; Gregory of Nazianzus, ep. 143 ad Evagr. (or or. 45), T. II, p. 199; Basil, contr. Eunom., l. II, n. 16; l. IV, n. 1; Cyril, thesaur., T. V, P. I, p. 47; Dialog. II, ibid., p. 453; Damascene, Fid. orth., l. I, c. 8, pp. 134. 136.

He who considers both the matter itself and the testimonies of the Fathers will easily see the great difference of this analogy from the preceding ones.

Just as in man, and especially in the spirit, there is the image of God, while in material things there is only a more remote adumbration and vestige of God (S. Th. I. q. 93.), so Father, Son, Word, Holy Spirit — names which have an analogy in man and in the understanding and willing spirit — are and are said properly in divine things, if the perfection signified is considered in itself; on the contrary, light, splendor, etc., which are drawn from material things, can never be said of divine things properly but only metaphorically. Hence in this last analogy nothing else is set forth than a comparison and metaphor to aid our intellect by some sensible thing, under which metaphor is supposed the image of the Most Holy Trinity, the supreme Spirit, drawn from the created spirit, as in itself nearer and far more expressive (because spiritual), so that from it we may ascend to some more distinct concept of the ineffable mystery ⁷. Cf. S. Th. contr. gent., l. IV, c. 12.

Thus the speculative theology of the Trinity rests almost entirely — both of the other Fathers and above all of St. Augustine, and from Augustine of the subsequent theologians, St. Anselm, the Victorines, Lombard, Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the rest — upon the revealed intellectual procession of the Word and of love, insofar as this concept of the depths of God, proposed by the Holy Spirit revealing, can be apprehended by us from the analogy of the created spirit. For according to this same analogy, and within the limits of analogical cognition, keeping the revealed principles before the eyes, the understanding of the internal relations, distinctions, and unity has progressed and progresses, as much as God deigns to illumine the holy Doctors of the Church, and through their doctrine each one of us, with external and internal light.

II. Now it is also evident in what sense there are, and in what sense there are not, « necessary reasons » for proving the truth of the existence of the mystery. For St. Anselm and Richard the Victorine seem to appeal to « necessary » reasons by name no less in proving the Most Holy Trinity than in demonstrating the rational truth of the existence of God and of the absolute attributes.

Those at whose request St. Anselm wrote the Monologium «prescribed this form, that in that meditation nothing at all should be persuaded by the authority of Scripture; but whatever the end should assert through the individual investigations (that is, whatever it was proposed to demonstrate and was contained in the conclusion), that it is so — the necessity of reason should briefly compel, and the clarity of truth should openly show» Praefat. ad Monolog.

Richard, however, in his books on the Trinity professes these things. « It will be our intention in this work to adduce for those things which we believe, insofar as the Lord shall have given, not only probable but even necessary reasons, and to season the documents of our faith with the unravelling and explanation of truth. For I believe without doubt that for the explanation of whatever things must be, not only probable but even necessary arguments are not lacking, although in the meantime it may happen that they escape our industry » De Trin., l. I, c. 4. And indeed both of them, Anselm no less than Richard, seem to pursue consistently, in the matter itself and in the manner of treatment, a purely rational demonstration. Nor does the interpretation of St. Thomas seem sufficient for the true sense of Richard, who says: « the meaning of that expression (about necessary arguments for demonstrating all necessary truths) appears from this, which follows (in Richard): although it may happen that they escape our industry » S. Th., in Boet. Trin., Prooem., q. 1, a. 4, ad 7. For although necessary arguments may escape some, and at times, Richard nevertheless does not think that they cannot be found by human reason, or that they are lacking to himself in the mystery of the Trinity; nay, he says that it is his intention « to adduce necessary reasons » for those things which we believe about the Most Holy Trinity. Hence theologians are also wont to cite Richard (and they could have said the same of Anselm with equal right) for the opinion of those who have said that the truth of the mystery, with revelation presupposed, can be demonstrated by necessary reasons. See Suarez, Trin., l. I, c. 12, n. 8. 9; Ruiz, disp. 41, sect. 2.

What, then, does it mean, that with faith alone presupposed, but not apart from revelation, « necessary reasons can be adduced », and a « compelling necessity of reason » can be shown? Necessary reasons can be taken here in two ways: first, so that only the historical knowledge of the Trinity is presupposed, but otherwise the Trinity of distinct persons is demonstrated uniquely from rational principles, without any principle of demonstration known from revelation alone being necessarily presupposed — namely, from the pre-known image, say, of the created spirit and of its immanent acts, concluding to God, the uncreated Spirit, and to the immanent processions of the divine persons. This was the error of the Güntherians, of Frohschammer, and of others (S. P. Pius IX, ep. ad Archiep. Monac., II. Dec. 1862); but St. Anselm and Richard exclude this sense no less expressly than do all the other preceding Fathers and subsequent theologians. For they most expressly require a preceding faith, that some understanding may be reached of the things we believe ⁸. Necessary reasons, therefore, are to be understood in another sense according to these Doctors.

If, namely, the revealed truth is presupposed as a principle — that just as our mind produces an immanent intellectual word and an immanent volition, so in the infinite Spirit there is a true immanent production, and hence a real procession both under the aspect of intellection and under the aspect of volition; this revealed principle, I say, being presupposed, certainly not only probable but necessary reasons, intelligible even to us, demonstrate that those processions are immanent, not from free production but from the necessary intimate perfection of the intellect and will in God, and therefore that they are eternal; moreover, that the begotten Word in God is not an accident but a substantial being (what is said of the Word holds equally of the proceeding love); likewise, that there is a distinction between the principle from which the Word is generated and the begotten Word, and therefore also that there are distinct persons, and the rest that pertains to the unity and distinction of the persons. But this is not a demonstration of the Trinity from the sole light of reason; rather, it is a theological deduction from the revealed truth, and a somewhat more distinct analogical understanding of the same truth from the analogy of the created spirit.

Thus St. Thomas explains more fully the sense in which the « necessary arguments » of Richard the Victorine for demonstrating the Trinity are to be understood. « Reason is brought to bear on something in two ways: in one way, to prove the root sufficiently.... in another way, reason is brought to bear not as one that sufficiently proves the root, but as one that shows the consequent effects to agree with the root already posited... In the first way, therefore, reason can be brought to bear to prove that God is one, and similar things; but in the second way stands the reason which is brought to bear for the manifestation of the Trinity, because, namely, once the Trinity is posited, such reasons agree, yet not so that through these reasons the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved.... And hence it is, that.... through faith one comes to knowledge, and not conversely » I. q. 32, a. 1, ad 2.