Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

« Although both the truth of existence (that it is) and the truth of essence (what it is) in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity must, from what has been said, be judged to be above human reason: nevertheless 1° from presupposed faith there can be sought some understanding and a more distinct analogical concept of the essence of the mystery, what it is; and likewise 2° from the root of the revealed and believed truth one can arrive at some understanding of the existence of the mystery, why it is so. Hence this understanding and theological demonstration proceeds from principles that are believed by faith and is wholly grounded upon them, not, however, a philosophical one, from principles perceived by the light of reason ».

1°. In order that we may be able to believe with explicit faith the things that God reveals to us, a proper notion of the things to be believed, as they are in themselves, is not indeed required; nevertheless it is altogether necessary, or rather it is contained in the very act of explicitly believing, that we conceive at least some analogical notion of the thing believed. But this (setting aside the manifestation of the thing through immediate intuition and in itself, where there would no longer be faith but vision) is accomplished in three ways: either, namely, by supernatural intellectual light alone, through infused ideas and intellections; or by prophetic vision, by exhibiting signs of things (whether real, whether verbal, whether to be perceived extrinsically even by the senses or only intrinsically by the imagination), from which the intellect, under divine illumination, may be led to conceive the notions of the things signified, and to form a judgment about the truth; or finally by God the Word incarnate Himself, who, subsisting in the bosom¹

of the Father, testifies what He has seen (Io. 1. 18; III. 11.); or at least through men, God's legates (with the necessary and opportune manifestation of mission and authority), the things and truths to be believed are set forth extrinsically by word and doctrine, and intrinsically grace illuminates, excites, and elevates to the conceiving of supernatural faith (cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 173. and 174.; de Veritate q. 12. a. 7. sq.).

Although, as far as concerns the present matter, what we are about to say of the third mode holds with proportion almost the same for the first and second modes of revelation, which are prophetic modes; nevertheless now we treat only of this third mode of revelation, which in the present providence of God is the ordinary one. We shall consider therefore, first, how the understanding to be sought relates to revelation and to faith; then, with the holy Doctors leading the way, we shall illustrate this very thing with several examples.

1°. In the mode of revelation of which we have spoken, the internal light of grace does not of itself pertain to infusing the concepts themselves into the mind, but presupposes an external proposition of the things to be believed, suited to the character of the human mind; « faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ » Rom. X. 14. sqq. But the word is not heard by us, or the doctrine is not intelligible to us, nor could we conceive any ideas of the things proposed from it, and hence also give no explicit assent to the proposed truth, unless revelation were in some way connected with the notions of our mind already pre-held and with truths previously known. Here too that holds which Augustine says (ep. 120. n. 3.): « we could not even believe, unless we had rational souls ». With regard, therefore, to this connection of ideas, so that from things known one may arrive at things unknown, our mind, in the conception of ideas about revealed super-rational things, conducts itself in a manner similar to the attainment of the knowledge of God through the light of reason.

Namely, we first form the notions of perfections, wisdom, goodness, etc. from creatures, and thence, concluding from effects to cause, we know the perfections of God by the way of negation and supereminence (τῆς ὑπεροχῆς), removing the imperfection by which perfections are limited in creatures; nor except by this way of conclusion, and thus through likeness (ἀναλόγως Sap. XIII. 5.), as in a mirror and in an enigma, can we attain by the light of reason the idea and knowledge of the divine perfections. By this very fact we indeed evidently know God, if it is asked whether He is; but only with ideas derived from elsewhere and by comparison, and hence with analogical notions — not, however, with ideas formed from the intuition of the object in itself, and hence not with proper notions — do we conceive what God is (Tract. de Deo sect. II. c. 1.). So also when it is no longer the invisible things of God, understood through the visible works of God, that are to be contemplated, but the words of God are proposed to be believed, these words of God must be signs of ideas, of which we have already preconceived in the mind some analogical notions primarily derived from creatures; otherwise the words would not be signs for us to conceive the ideas signified by them, but a mere sound of words. In the present matter, while it is taught that the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are one God, one Godhead, and three distinct among themselves, who both individually and three together are one God; there are presupposed in our mind many at least confused notions of perfections, without which God cannot be conceived; then the notions of essence, person, generation or origin of one from another, identity, distinction, etc., without which the mind will not be able, and with which pre-held it will be able, to form at least some confused concept of the thing proposed for belief, removing (as has been said of rational concepts) by the way of negation and supereminence the imperfections which adhere in creatures to these very things, whether absolute perfections or relations.

The distinction, therefore, between rational and super-rational concepts about God, as I have already indicated above (th. XVII.), is not in this, that we conceive the super-rational truths in no way, or that we conceive the rational ones by proper ideas and the super-rational ones by analogical ones; for on both sides the concepts are analogical, formed from perfections previously understood, as they are in creatures; but the distinction is another and a twofold one. For a) in the rational truths about God, as regards the concepts themselves, we proceed by the way of causality, by which we understand of God that He is; then by the way of negation and supereminence, by which we conceive somewhat more distinctly what He is, although only analogically and not properly, as God is in Himself. But in the super-rational truths there is no place for a conclusion from effects to cause, and therefore in place of the way of causality there is necessary there a positive revelation through the word of God, without which we would never arrive at those concepts. But because revelation does not change the mode of knowing connatural to us, it itself exhibits the super-rational perfections and internal relations of God according to the analogy and from the analogy of the rational notions which we have preconceived from creatures ². Wherefore, with revelation presupposed (just as in rational matters the way of causality is presupposed), we can already use, and necessarily do use, the way of negation and supereminence for a more distinct analogical concept of the super-rational truth or revealed object, what it is.

b) As is already evident from what has been said, the distinction is with regard to the judgment of assent (that it is). For this judgment, in so far as God is understood by reason, arises from the perceived connection of effects with their supreme cause; but in the revealed super-rational truths it rests solely on the authority of God revealing. Nevertheless, just as in the rational notions about God the mode of conceiving analogically what He is is referred to the perfections, not by abstracting from their existence but formally as understood in necessary existence; so in the super-rational objects of faith themselves the mode of conceiving is engaged with them in so far as their existence is most certainly established by faith. Hence the movement and striving to conceive things more distinctly from the analogies tends not to the understanding of things as possible but as existing, and therefore also to the understanding, in some measure, of the intimate reason of necessary existence.

In one word we can say: what is known of God (the rational truth Rom. I. 19.) can be understood by reason from the created perfections — that He is, and analogically, what He is; the deep things of God (the super-rational truths 1. Cor. II. 10.) are revealed by the Spirit of God — that they are, and in this very revelation there is exhibited to our spirit the analogy from the created perfections, so that we may apprehend analogically what they are, and by what intrinsically necessary reason they are.

Thus, therefore, in these truths the principle of the holy Fathers is altogether most certain: « unless you believe, you will not understand » (from Is. VII. 9. according to the LXX.) For although faith itself (explicit) could not exist, unless some understanding preceded — not only of the motives of credibility, about which we now ask nothing, but of the very thing to be believed ³ — nevertheless the object of this preceding understanding is exhibited by revelation itself, and (in super-rational matters) only it can exhibit it. Moreover, faith being now presupposed, faith itself, in so far as there is included in it the highest religious veneration and intimate love of the thing believed, seeks a further understanding, as it were a middle between faith and vision ⁴, whose root and seeds are already contained in the very mode of revelation and in faith itself.

Consentius had asked of St. Augustine that « discussing the question of the Trinity, i.e. of the unity of the divinity and the distinction of the persons, cautiously and prudently, he would so wipe away the cloud of his mind that what he previously could not think, being declared by the light of understanding, he could in some way see with his eyes ». On the other hand, the same Consentius had maintained: « reason is not so much to be sought as the authority of the saints is to be followed; for if the faith of the holy Church were grasped by the reason of disputation and not by the piety of believing, no one besides philosophers and orators would possess beatitude ». Now Augustine in his response showed that these two things posited by Consentius, if taken absolutely, mutually exclude one another. Wherefore, he says, since both are most true — both that faith is to be followed on authority, and that nevertheless understanding of the things believed is to be sought — those two are to be taken in such a way that faith precedes and that from faith one strives to some understanding of the thing believed, which however will not be perfect until we arrive at vision face to face. « If you not unreasonably demand of me or of any teacher reason, that you may understand what you believe, correct your definition, not so that you reject faith but so that you may see by the light of reason also those things which you already hold with the firmness of faith. For far be it that God should hate in us that by which He created us more excellent than the other living beings. Far be it, I say, that we should believe in such a way as not to receive or seek reason, since we could not even believe, unless we had rational souls. Therefore, that in certain things pertaining to salutary doctrine, which we are not yet able to perceive by reason but will one day be able, faith should precede reason, by which the heart is cleansed, so that it may take up and bear the light of great reason — this is certainly of reason. And therefore it was said reasonably through the prophet: unless you believe, you will not understand. Where without doubt He distinguished these two, and gave counsel that we believe first, so that we may be able to understand what we believe. Accordingly, that faith should precede reason, seemed reasonable... If a believer already demands reason, that he may understand what he believes, his capacity is to be regarded, so that, reason being rendered according to it, he may take as much understanding of his faith as he can — more, if he takes more; less, if less — provided, however, that until he arrives at the fullness and perfection of knowledge, he does not depart from the way of faith... Now therefore if we are faithful, we have arrived at the way of faith; which if we do not abandon, not only to as much understanding of incorporeal and immutable things as can be taken in this life, not by all, but even to the summit of contemplation, which the Apostle calls face to face, we shall without doubt arrive » Aug. ad Consent. ep. 120. n. 2-4.

The same principles, both elsewhere often in Augustine and in the other Fathers, are enunciated theoretically and brought into practical use. Indeed, on these principles all genuine theology, in so far as it is speculative, and its elaboration rest. Wherefore just as with the Fathers — Gregory Naz. and Nyssenus, Basil, Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, etc. — so with Anselm, the Victorines, Peter Lombard, Alexander, Albert, Thomas, Bonaventure, and all the other masters of the school, both the treatment of the other dogmas and specifically the doctrine of the Trinity (with which we are now concerned) is constituted in no small part in the inquiry of understanding from faith. Thus Anselm: the mystery of the Trinity

must not be proved to the Christian by reason, he says, but believed by faith; but from faith and in faith, as far as can be done, one must advance to understanding. « I hear that the cleric Roscelinus ⁵ says that in God the three persons are three things separated from one another, as there are three angels, yet in such a way that there is one will and power... Whoever asserts as truth the blasphemy which I have set down above that I heard said by Roscelinus, whether man or angel, is anathema... for he is altogether not a Christian. But if he is baptized and has been nourished among Christians, he is in no way to be heard; nor is any reason either to be demanded from him for his error or to be exhibited to him of our truth (because namely the proposition of faith is most clear)... For it is most foolish and insipid, on account of anyone not understanding, to call into the doubtfulness of wavering questions what is founded most solidly upon the firm rock... For a Christian ought to advance through faith to understanding, not come to faith through understanding, or, if he cannot understand, depart from faith. But when he is able to attain to understanding, he delights; when truly he cannot, he venerates what he cannot grasp » Anselm. l. II. ep. 41. ad Fulconem Episc. Belovac. « I do not attempt, Lord, to penetrate Your height, because I in no way compare my understanding to it, but I desire in some measure to understand Your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand. For I believe this too, that unless I believe, I will not understand » Id. Proslog. c. 1.

2°. The analogies under which the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is exhibited to us to be conceived, in the Scriptures themselves and thenceforth in the whole ecclesiastical preaching, are chiefly three. When a) it is taught: God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, proceeding from the Father and (because all things that are the Father's are also the Son's) receiving from the Son; here there is included the fundamental analogy ⁶, without which we could form no concept, and under which, according to the notions pre-held from creatures, we conceive three distinct persons and the unity of nature.

Then we conceive the origin of the second person from the first, indeed also the mode of origin, through generation, i.e. a procession in the likeness of nature, i.e. from an internal vital principle the communication of the divine nature, in such a way that the second person, existing thence by the force of the mode of procession, is the substantial image of the first person; for this is what we understand to be expressed by the names Father, Son, generation, image, figure or character of the substance of the Father, under which the mystery is revealed.

Likewise we conceive the procession of the third distinct person from the first and the second, in so far as they have all things in common, i.e. in so far as they are one principle; and at least negatively we understand the mode of procession to be diverse from generation, because the third person is not the Son.

Moreover, we learn to correct the notion of the unity of nature and of the distinction of persons, as we have preconceived it from creatures, by the other dogma, that the three are one God, not three distinct Gods. For thence we understand that the unity of nature and of the whole absolute perfection is not specific, as in creatures, but numerical; and that the distinction of the persons is not according to absolute substance, but according to formal relative reasons, which are expressed by the names Father, Son, and Spirated. God is spirit; therefore all the imperfections which adhere in creatures to the notions of father, son, generation are to be denied.

« Neither son nor generation is a property proper to the deity, but is taken from human likeness; likewise the appellation spirit. Sacred Scripture, therefore, used this appellation of the divine Spirit, showing that He is from God in another way (than the Son); since, as was said before, it was not fitting that He also be signified through the same likeness. But you (heretic) ... holding in contempt (καταφρονῶν or περιφρονῶν) the human examples (παραδείγματα), you subvert the divine dogmas which are understood from them.... God begets not as a man; yet He begets truly, and brings forth a progeny from His very self, the Word (ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει, Λόγον), not a human one; but He brings forth the Word truly from His very self. And He emits the Spirit through the mouth (ἐκπέμπει), not as it were in human fashion, since neither is the mouth of God corporeal; but from Him Himself is the Spirit, and from no other source » Basil, cont. Eunom., l. V, p. 306.

The manner, therefore, of positively conceiving these things is exhibited in the second analogy, taken from the spiritual and intellectual order.

For b) the same one who is the Son is the Word, God, ὁ Λόγος. When this analogy is joined with the former, they perfect one another, as it were, and what is lacking in the one is supplied from the other. In the former, both the substantially and the real distinction of the persons from one another are exhibited more distinctly; in the latter, both the mode of the intellectual, immanent, necessary, and eternal generation and the unity of essence and the mutual immanence of the persons, that is, the περιχώρησις, are conceived more clearly.

« John himself, when he was about to teach that this Word is the only-begotten Son of God, lest anyone suspect a passible generation, by prefixing the appellation of Word takes away every unjust suspicion, declaring that the Son is from Him (the Father) and is so impassibly... But if neither do these adumbrations (παραδείγματα) suffice to set forth the whole matter, do not wonder; for the discourse is about God, whom we can neither utter nor think according to His dignity » Chrysost., in Io., hom. II, n. 4.

Thus also do the other Fathers speak with common consent. « When he spoke of the Only-begotten, he said the Word itself... Why Word? That it may be clear that He proceeded from the mind. Why Word? Because He was begotten without passion. Why Word? Because He is the image of the Begetter, showing the whole Begetter in Himself, separating nothing from Him, and existing perfect through Himself; just as our word also bears the image of our whole thought... He said Word, therefore, to show you that the Father's generation is not subject to passion, and to teach you the perfect existence (subsistence) of the Son, who is of course God, and to show you through these things the eternal conjunction of the Son with the Father. For our word too, the offspring of the mind, is begotten without passion; for it is neither cut nor divided nor flows away, but the whole mind, remaining in its own substance, produces the whole and perfect word; and the word proceeding embraces in itself all the power of the begetting mind. After, therefore, you shall have derived from the name of the Word as much for the theology of the Only-begotten as is pious, then whatever you find to be alien and dissonant, avoid it and pass it by with all diligence » Basil, hom. in illud: « in principio erat » etc., n. 3, T. II, p. 136.

From this concept of the origin and relation between the first and second person according to the analogy of the mind and of the proceeding word, it is easy to advance to the notion of the third person as the term, that is, of the love produced through dilection, insofar as the one dilection is common to the Father and the Son. c) The third analogy can be said to be in some way intermediate between each of the preceding ones, taken of course from the material procession of splendor from light, that is, of light from light, which nevertheless is itself a sensible image of the intellectual procession.

It is set forth in the Scriptures: Heb. I. 3 (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης); Sap. VII. 25 (ἀτμὶς γὰρ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής). It is cultivated in many ways by the holy Fathers. See Athanasius, de decretis Nic., n. 23, and in the same place n. 25, the doctrine of Theognostus; Gregory of Nazianzus, ep. 143 ad Evagr. (or or. 45), T. II, p. 199; Basil, contr. Eunom., l. II, n. 16; l. IV, n. 1; Cyril, thesaur., T. V, P. I, p. 47; Dialog. II, ibid., p. 453; Damascene, Fid. orth., l. I, c. 8, pp. 134. 136.

He who considers both the matter itself and the testimonies of the Fathers will easily see the great difference of this analogy from the preceding ones.

Just as in man, and especially in the spirit, there is the image of God, while in material things there is only a more remote adumbration and vestige of God (S. Th. I. q. 93.), so Father, Son, Word, Holy Spirit — names which have an analogy in man and in the understanding and willing spirit — are and are said properly in divine things, if the perfection signified is considered in itself; on the contrary, light, splendor, etc., which are drawn from material things, can never be said of divine things properly but only metaphorically. Hence in this last analogy nothing else is set forth than a comparison and metaphor to aid our intellect by some sensible thing, under which metaphor is supposed the image of the Most Holy Trinity, the supreme Spirit, drawn from the created spirit, as in itself nearer and far more expressive (because spiritual), so that from it we may ascend to some more distinct concept of the ineffable mystery ⁷. Cf. S. Th. contr. gent., l. IV, c. 12.

Thus the speculative theology of the Trinity rests almost entirely — both of the other Fathers and above all of St. Augustine, and from Augustine of the subsequent theologians, St. Anselm, the Victorines, Lombard, Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the rest — upon the revealed intellectual procession of the Word and of love, insofar as this concept of the depths of God, proposed by the Holy Spirit revealing, can be apprehended by us from the analogy of the created spirit. For according to this same analogy, and within the limits of analogical cognition, keeping the revealed principles before the eyes, the understanding of the internal relations, distinctions, and unity has progressed and progresses, as much as God deigns to illumine the holy Doctors of the Church, and through their doctrine each one of us, with external and internal light.

II. Now it is also evident in what sense there are, and in what sense there are not, « necessary reasons » for proving the truth of the existence of the mystery. For St. Anselm and Richard the Victorine seem to appeal to « necessary » reasons by name no less in proving the Most Holy Trinity than in demonstrating the rational truth of the existence of God and of the absolute attributes.

Those at whose request St. Anselm wrote the Monologium «prescribed this form, that in that meditation nothing at all should be persuaded by the authority of Scripture; but whatever the end should assert through the individual investigations (that is, whatever it was proposed to demonstrate and was contained in the conclusion), that it is so — the necessity of reason should briefly compel, and the clarity of truth should openly show» Praefat. ad Monolog.

Richard, however, in his books on the Trinity professes these things. « It will be our intention in this work to adduce for those things which we believe, insofar as the Lord shall have given, not only probable but even necessary reasons, and to season the documents of our faith with the unravelling and explanation of truth. For I believe without doubt that for the explanation of whatever things must be, not only probable but even necessary arguments are not lacking, although in the meantime it may happen that they escape our industry » De Trin., l. I, c. 4. And indeed both of them, Anselm no less than Richard, seem to pursue consistently, in the matter itself and in the manner of treatment, a purely rational demonstration. Nor does the interpretation of St. Thomas seem sufficient for the true sense of Richard, who says: « the meaning of that expression (about necessary arguments for demonstrating all necessary truths) appears from this, which follows (in Richard): although it may happen that they escape our industry » S. Th., in Boet. Trin., Prooem., q. 1, a. 4, ad 7. For although necessary arguments may escape some, and at times, Richard nevertheless does not think that they cannot be found by human reason, or that they are lacking to himself in the mystery of the Trinity; nay, he says that it is his intention « to adduce necessary reasons » for those things which we believe about the Most Holy Trinity. Hence theologians are also wont to cite Richard (and they could have said the same of Anselm with equal right) for the opinion of those who have said that the truth of the mystery, with revelation presupposed, can be demonstrated by necessary reasons. See Suarez, Trin., l. I, c. 12, n. 8. 9; Ruiz, disp. 41, sect. 2.

What, then, does it mean, that with faith alone presupposed, but not apart from revelation, « necessary reasons can be adduced », and a « compelling necessity of reason » can be shown? Necessary reasons can be taken here in two ways: first, so that only the historical knowledge of the Trinity is presupposed, but otherwise the Trinity of distinct persons is demonstrated uniquely from rational principles, without any principle of demonstration known from revelation alone being necessarily presupposed — namely, from the pre-known image, say, of the created spirit and of its immanent acts, concluding to God, the uncreated Spirit, and to the immanent processions of the divine persons. This was the error of the Güntherians, of Frohschammer, and of others (S. P. Pius IX, ep. ad Archiep. Monac., II. Dec. 1862); but St. Anselm and Richard exclude this sense no less expressly than do all the other preceding Fathers and subsequent theologians. For they most expressly require a preceding faith, that some understanding may be reached of the things we believe ⁸. Necessary reasons, therefore, are to be understood in another sense according to these Doctors.

If, namely, the revealed truth is presupposed as a principle — that just as our mind produces an immanent intellectual word and an immanent volition, so in the infinite Spirit there is a true immanent production, and hence a real procession both under the aspect of intellection and under the aspect of volition; this revealed principle, I say, being presupposed, certainly not only probable but necessary reasons, intelligible even to us, demonstrate that those processions are immanent, not from free production but from the necessary intimate perfection of the intellect and will in God, and therefore that they are eternal; moreover, that the begotten Word in God is not an accident but a substantial being (what is said of the Word holds equally of the proceeding love); likewise, that there is a distinction between the principle from which the Word is generated and the begotten Word, and therefore also that there are distinct persons, and the rest that pertains to the unity and distinction of the persons. But this is not a demonstration of the Trinity from the sole light of reason; rather, it is a theological deduction from the revealed truth, and a somewhat more distinct analogical understanding of the same truth from the analogy of the created spirit.

Thus St. Thomas explains more fully the sense in which the « necessary arguments » of Richard the Victorine for demonstrating the Trinity are to be understood. « Reason is brought to bear on something in two ways: in one way, to prove the root sufficiently.... in another way, reason is brought to bear not as one that sufficiently proves the root, but as one that shows the consequent effects to agree with the root already posited... In the first way, therefore, reason can be brought to bear to prove that God is one, and similar things; but in the second way stands the reason which is brought to bear for the manifestation of the Trinity, because, namely, once the Trinity is posited, such reasons agree, yet not so that through these reasons the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved.... And hence it is, that.... through faith one comes to knowledge, and not conversely » I. q. 32, a. 1, ad 2.

« That the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, although it is above reason and the human power of understanding, is nevertheless not against reason, is assuredly evident, granted divine revelation. Against those, however, who deny revelation, it can be shown in a twofold way that there is no evident repugnance against reason: 1° namely, indirectly, from the very fact that the intimate ground of the divine essence and of the divine person (as it is in itself) surpasses our power of understanding; 2° directly, by showing that there is no evident truth which is understood to be evidently repugnant to this dogma, in the sense in which it has been revealed and is proposed as to be believed by faith. »

When it must be shown that the revealed doctrine does not repugn to reason — namely, that the one God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three really distinct from one another — this can be understood in a threefold way. For either a) it is demanded that the very truth of the matter be perceived by reason and be able to be demonstrated, namely that the divine nature, from its own infinite perfection, necessarily subsists in three distinct persons, as the Güntherians said, that non-repugnance is congruity with reason; and therefore that the former cannot be shown without the latter being demonstrated at the same time, and that in such a way that the very internal truth of the matter is perceived ¹. That in this way a rational demonstration of the mystery cannot be made, and that in this sense the truth is above reason, has been proved by us above (th. XVII.). Or b) a demonstration of non-repugnance is demanded, such that reason positively perceives and evidently understands the internal possibility of the matter. But that one most simple, undivided essence can at the same time be three relative subsistents really distinct from one another cannot be demonstrated by comparison with the ideas and rational truths pre-understood from creatures; and so such a possibility could only be understood by immediately knowing that essence and those hypostases in themselves, as they are in themselves. But then not only the bare possibility, but the very truth and necessary existence would be understood. Therefore c) it is one thing to demonstrate non-repugnance positively from internal grounds, and another that we understand even negatively, by reason, that a repugnance cannot be demonstrated. For that former there would be required to have seen into the truth intrinsically, which cannot be done in superrational mysteries; for the latter it suffices to have shown that the arguments which are opposed as demonstrating repugnance are either not evident truths, or do not evidently repugn to the true sense of the mystery.

This last point can always be shown. For indeed a rational truth cannot, objectively and in itself, repugn to a revealed truth; otherwise the same thing would at once be true and false. Hence it is impossible that reason understand anything as an evident truth evidently opposed to revelation understood in its genuine sense; otherwise reason would understand as an evident truth that which is false; and so the very light of reason, made for truth, would by its own nature incline toward it, and consequently God Himself, the author of reason, would lead us to judge as true that which is false. But these are evidently contradictory. Therefore by the very fact that the truth of the mystery is certain to us by infallible faith, it is no less certain that what is said to repugn to it is either not a truth, or does not truly repugn, or repugns only to a sense of the dogma foreign to it, in which sense the mystery is neither revealed nor true.

« The gifts of grace are added to nature in this way, that they do not take it away but rather perfect it. Hence the light of faith, which is infused into us gratis, does not destroy the light of natural cognition naturally implanted in us. Although, however, the natural light of the human mind is insufficient for the manifestation of those things which are manifested through faith, nevertheless it is impossible that those things which are divinely handed on to us through faith be contrary to those which are implanted in us through nature; for then one of the two would have to be false; and since both are for us from God, God would be for us the author of falsehood, which is impossible.... Just as, however, sacred doctrine is founded upon the light of faith, so philosophy is founded upon the natural light of reason. Hence it is impossible that those things which are of philosophy be contrary to those things which are of faith; but they fall short of them. They contain, nevertheless, certain likenesses of them and certain preambles to them, just as nature is a preamble to grace. But if anything is found in the sayings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this is not philosophy, but rather an abuse of philosophy and a defect of reason. And therefore it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind, either by showing it to be altogether impossible, or by showing it not to be necessary. For just as those things which are of faith cannot be demonstratively proved, so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be false, but it can be shown that they are not necessary. Thus, therefore, in sacred doctrine we can use philosophy in a threefold way: first, to demonstrate those things which are the preambles of faith... second, to make known through certain likenesses those things which are of faith... third, to resist those things which are said against the faith, either by showing them to be false, or by showing them not to be necessary » S. Th. in Boet. Trin. Prooem. q. 2. a. 3. cf. I. q. 1. a. 8.

I. Now, in order that it be shown that the opposing arguments are false or not necessary, speaking per se and absolutely, there is no need to compare those arguments one by one with the revealed dogma; but a certain general comparison of the divine eminence and infinite perfection with the imperfection and limitation of our intellect suffices. This general solution of the difficulties, indeed, will be only indirect; yet it is not therefore less valid in itself. For from this very general comparison it is altogether evident that there can be many things in the infinite essence which cannot be understood by the light of finite reason, restricted within certain limits of truths. We understand many things in God by the very light of reason, because they are; yet we do not understand how they are and how they do not repugn to one another; for example, that the essence itself is one immutable volition and yet free in its operations ad extra, and many other things. If, therefore, on account of the infinity of the essence, predicates of this kind do not repugn — which would involve an evident contradiction in finite natures — then without absurdity it cannot be asserted that such a communication of the infinite nature, that there be several really distinct from one another of one numerically single essence, evidently repugns, because such distinction and unity would repugn in finite natures and hypostases. For although someone might assert that the intimate ground of a finite essence and hypostasis is so fully seen by him that he evidently understands the metaphysical repugnance of the unity of nature in distinct persons, no one can claim for himself, without enormous arrogance and ignorance, such an evident understanding of the divine essence and hypostasis. Because, namely, the divine essence stands above the whole order of created and finite being, and we do not understand it as it is in itself, it cannot be evident to the light of reason whether there is or is not one formal ground of that infinite spiritual nature and another of the divine hypostasis, such that the nature, remaining one, requires its communication through internal vital acts, and therefore under the formal ground of nature there is unity, while under the formal ground of hypostasis there is plurality.

In this sense can be understood what Suarez says, l. I. c. 12. n. 20: « that principle, things which are the same as one and the same third are the same as each other, although it is universally true in finite things, in an infinite reality cannot be demonstrated by natural reason; and therefore in the way in which it is evident, it is not contrary to this mystery ».

Namely, in finite things there are never two who are really distinct from each other under some ground and really and numerically one under another ground, but they are only one in species. But the truth has been revealed that the infinite essence is so identified with one relative that, from its infinite eminence and communicability, it is at the same time identified with the other relative, and therefore there are two really distinct under the ground of the relatives, and the same are one under the ground of the absolute essence (all of which, as is plain, holds equally of the third person as well).

But in such communicability of the infinite essence, whose intimate ground, as it is in itself, we do not understand, to assert an evident repugnance is evidently absurd. « If, because he does not see this in other things, he is unable to understand it in God either, let him bear for a little while that there is in God something which his intellect cannot penetrate » s. Anselm. de fide Trin. c. 7. Moreover, that principle, « things which are the same as one and the same third, etc., » has metaphysical truth, and so holds in any order of infinite things no less than of finite ones, provided it be understood in its true sense, about which we shall speak shortly.

This somewhat indirect solution of the difficulties by which the adversaries of the faith wish to demonstrate a contradiction is not an appeal to the superrationality of the mystery, so as to evade demonstrations of an evident contradiction, as Bayle said with cunning but quite clear words in his Dictionary², and after him other unbelievers said; but it is a demonstration deduced from the very natures of the things themselves of the impossibility of demonstrating an evident contradiction between the Trinity of relative hypostases and the unity of the essence or absolute perfection, when the proper internal ground both of the hypostasis and of the divine essence stands above our intelligence, and cannot be understood by us as it is in itself. For if the contradiction between the Trinity of hypostases and the unity of essence were evident, as the hypostases and the essence are conceived by you, by that very fact it will not be, and cannot be, evident that that concept of yours is genuine and proposed in revelation; indeed for Christians it will be evident, if not immediately, at least mediately from the revealed truth, that such a concept of yours, whether the one or the other or both, is foreign to revelation and is false. Conversely, if the concept is genuine as it is contained in revelation, it is at least mediately evident from infallible faith that a proof by which the showing of a contradiction would be pretended is necessarily fallacious, and therefore can also be shown by the light of reason to be either false or not evident, and by this very fact altogether empty for the purpose for which it is brought forward. « Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and it is impossible that the contrary be demonstrated of the true, it is manifest that the proofs which are brought against it are not demonstrations but soluble arguments » S. Th. I. q. 1. a. 8.

Indirect solutions of this kind show indeed sufficiently that the objections are not valid, but they do not show from an intrinsic ground why they are not valid. They occur, however, frequently among the Fathers, because they are most suitable both in themselves and for preparing minds for the direct solutions, and because most are not suited for grasping these latter. « Sometimes we bring them a reason, not the one they seek when they ask about God, because neither can they take it in, nor perhaps can we either apprehend or utter it; but one by which it is shown to them how unfit and utterly unsuited they are for perceiving what they demand » s. Aug. Trin. I. n. 3.

II. Yet in theology, where faith seeks understanding, what Augustine pursues in that same place must be attempted, « that as much as we can, we render a reason that the Trinity is the one and only true God ». But this very reason rendered, as Augustine speaks — namely, a more distinct concept, although only analogical, of the Most Holy Trinity deduced from revelation — supplies the direct solution of all the difficulties by which the adversaries would wish to demonstrate a contradiction in the concept of the mystery. A fuller direct solution of objections of this kind will therefore spontaneously follow below from the very explanation of the genuine concept. Here only some general consideration will suffice.

1°. It cannot be demonstrated that there is an evident repugnance in the fact that in God, an infinite spirit, the immanent Word really proceeds through intellection, or is eternally truly produced. For a repugnance of this kind is not evident from the very nature of intellection considered universally; indeed, we conceive intellection in act without an immanent word with more difficulty than intellection with a word as immanent term. The repugnance is not evident in intellection insofar as it is divine and infinite; for from that alone it is evident that the Word cannot be an accident; but if it is something, it is necessarily substantial, because divine intellection is a substance. Finally, that repugnance is not evident by reason of the non-multipliable unity of the divine essence; for from that alone it is evident that the principle producing the Word by intellection and the Word as the immanent term of this intellection are one absolute essence. To be sure, the production of the divine essence repugns; for that would be both a multiplication of the essence and its production out of nothing; but it cannot be shown to be an evident repugnance that from the inborn perfection of the divine intellect there is required the eternal necessary procession of the immanent Word, which is distinguished under the formal ground of the Word, namely of the relative, from the producing principle likewise viewed under the formal ground of the producer and of the relative, but in such a way that the formal ground of the Godhead and of the absolute essence is one, common in the begetter of His Word and in the Word of His begetter.

The truth, therefore, of the production of the divine Word is indeed above reason, because by reason it cannot be understood and demonstrated that in the divine intellect there is, as immanent term, and necessarily is, a produced Word (th. XVII.); but it is not a doctrine against reason, because there is no notion of reason, nor can there be, evidently true and evidently repugnant to this doctrine. When, however, the Spirit of God, who searches the depths of God, has revealed to us, and the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, has Himself declared this mystery: « in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word »; when, I say, it is established by divine revelation concerning the procession of the immanent Word, from this posited principle and from this « root of truth » (S. Th. I. q. 32. a. 1.), as was said in the preceding thesis, we understand the remaining consequences through « necessary reasons »; namely, that the begotten Word is distinct from the begetter, that it is substantial, and therefore (according to the analogy of a person in created things compared with the common nature) that it is a subsistent person distinct from the Father, but that the distinction is not according to essence but according to the formal ground of the relative. For all these things (supposing the real procession of the Word) are necessarily connected with the infinity, unity, and simplicity of God, which attributes are understood even by the light of reason. Moreover, these same things hold of the real production of an immanent term through an act of willing or of loving, and therefore of the third person, whose notion is shown in the same way to be above reason, but not against reason.

2°. Let judgment now be passed on the Socinian hay, which the Rationalists of our age continue to chew over again (Christianus Baur, Fridericus Strauss, Fridericus Schleiermacher and others, in D.num Ioan. Kuhn de Trinit. p. 522. seqq.). One, they say, is not equal to three; we evidently understand that 1=3 repugns. The mathematical axiom is evident: things which are not distinguished from one and the same third are not distinguished from one another; A=B; B=C; therefore A=C. The divine persons, according to Christian dogma, are not distinguished from the essence; therefore they are not distinguished from one another.

We answer: these mathematical axioms are evident, and their altogether necessary truth so little contradicts the revealed mystery of God one in nature and three in persons, that unless the truth of these axioms were absolutely certain to us, we could neither understand the revelation of the mystery itself nor know what is to be believed. « For unless we had rational souls, we could not believe at all » (Aug.). Indeed revelation itself presupposes, and we presuppose in believing revelation, as evidently true that one is not three; otherwise revelation and faith in the Trinity, proposing one essence and three persons, would not render us certain that there are not three essences and one person. In general, just as we could be certain of no truth, so neither could we be certain of a revealed truth, because we would not have rational souls.

Likewise, revelation and faith in God one in nature and three in persons presupposes as evidently true the other axiom: wherever two things are said not to be distinct from one third, there under that formal aspect under which they are not distinct from that said third, they are really neither two nor a third, but altogether one undivided thing. Without this evident principle we would not understand the one undivided Godhead, while it is revealed and believed that the Father is God and the Son is God and yet there is one God. For while it is revealed that the Father is God and the Son is the same God, the two under the formal aspect of deity are said to be one, i.e., not distinct from one third (as is objected), namely from the deity; and therefore from that evident principle we understand that the two are not distinguished from one another but are altogether one in deity, although at the same time they are revealed as distinct from one another under another formal aspect (namely under the formal aspect of relatives, i.e., of Father and Son): « I and the Father are one; there are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one ».

The evident truth enunciated in both of those mathematical principles therefore in no way opposes the mystery of the Catholic faith, but rather is presupposed in it; those axioms indeed contradict only a heresy — such as has never existed nor can be conceived by the mind — if it were said that the one God is three Gods, and that the three persons, who under the aspect of deity are one and undivided, are nevertheless, under the same aspect, the deity I mean, really distinguished among themselves³ Let the Rationalists, therefore, who continue to swear by the most foolish words of the Socinians, hold fast the simplest answer: the one, under that aspect under which it is one, is evidently not three, and therefore one divine essence, one God, is not three essences and not three Gods; and conversely, three persons are not one person, one Father is not three Fathers, one Son is not three Sons, etc. Likewise, things that are really one under some aspect are evidently not many under that aspect, or, as it is said in the objection in less fitting words: things that are under some aspect the same as one third are under that aspect the same among themselves. For this reason the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, because they are one under the aspect of deity, i.e., inasmuch as they are God, are not three Gods but one God; or, because they are the same as the deity and are one deity, therefore under the aspect of deity they are not distinguished among themselves.

A far different opinion would contradict the mystery of faith — one that is in no way evident, cannot be demonstrated true, indeed, enunciated in general terms, is evidently false. For one would have to say: things that are several really distinct from one another under one aspect cannot be one under another aspect; and things that are one under some aspect (or, less properly speaking, things that are the same as one third under some aspect) are the same among themselves under every aspect, i.e., are distinguished among themselves under no aspect. But who does not see that, where in one thing there are several different aspects and functions, it is absurd to say that what is verified in it according to one aspect must necessarily also be true according to another, different aspect? In man life is rational and animal and vegetative; does he therefore, according to the same aspect according to which he digests food and vegetates, also think, and will and choose with free will? On the matter at hand St. Thomas answers thus: « That argument holds — that whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another — in those things which are the same in reality and in notion, like a tunic and a garment, but not in those which differ in notion... Although paternity is the same in reality as the divine essence, and filiation likewise, nevertheless these two import opposite respects; whence they are distinguished from one another » S. Th. I. q. 28. a. 3. ad 1. That is to say, they are not really distinguished among themselves because they are distinguished from the essence according to reason; for in that way even the absolute attributes are distinguished both from the essence and from one another only by reason. But that the infinite divine nature has diverse aspects of the absolute and the relative, i.e., that nature and hypostasis in God are distinguished by reason and virtually — this is the condition without which there could be no real distinction of the hypostases among themselves. But the formal reason of this distinction actually existing is that the divine hypostases are relative through relations of origin, and therefore are opposed to one another as principle and as really proceeding from the principle.

Mathematical formulas do not pertain to this; for there the terms cannot be the same as a third under one aspect and not the same among themselves under another aspect, because abstract quantities have only one aspect, not one and another. In the physical and metaphysical order of finite substances there is a distinction under the aspect of hypostasis (another and another), and some unity under the aspect of nature (not another and another), although only a specific unity. Peter, formally as this one individual, is other than Paul; if the nature contained in the definition is regarded formally, Peter has a greater unity with Paul than with animal (in general), and with animal greater than with substance in general (e.g., with a stone); but the greatest, indeed numerical, unity would be according to the notion of man, if — as some philosophers and even Catholic theologians thought — humanity, i.e., the formal notion of nature, on the side of the thing really and numerically one, constituted Peter and Paul one man (see above the Scholion to th. IX.).

Now if the divine intellect really produces the immanent Word, evidently the essence or nature, one in number, is that of the producer and of the Word (and the same holds for the immanent term of volition or love). Then indeed, under the formal aspect of the producer of the Word and of the Word produced, they are two relatives really distinct from one another; but under the formal aspect of nature or deity there is one in number, and therefore one God. Both this unity under the aspect of the absolute and this distinction under the other aspect of relatives evidently follow from the supposed production of the Word. Ridiculous sophisms drawn from the mathematical axiom are therefore to be dismissed, if the Rationalists do not wish to contradict evident reason; and so there will remain for them only this: to test the strength of their unbelief solely in demonstrating an evident repugnance in the fact that infinite intellection produces the Word as the immanent term of intellection. All attempts of this kind will necessarily come to nothing, because, as we have said, neither from intellection in itself, nor from intellection inasmuch as it is substantial and infinite, nor from the divine nature is there available any evident principle evidently repugnant to this revealed truth. Nor can such a repugnance be deduced from anywhere else; indeed, it is evident by the light of reason from the very infinity of the divine intellection, and most certain by revealed faith, that there can be no such evident principle repugnant to it.

3°. From these things an answer has now also been given to the remaining difficulties, which the same Rationalists — Schleiermacher, Strauss, and the rest of suchlike traffickers walking in darkness (see Fol. trimest. Theolog. Tubing. 1843. fasc. 1.) — repeat from the ancient heretics in order to demonstrate a contradiction in the concept of three persons who are one God. They say, namely: three persons would necessarily be three essences, because a person is not distinguished from the singular intellectual substance (from the first substance). Moreover, if the persons are really distinguished, necessarily there is some perfection in one that is not in another, and accordingly the three persons would also be something more perfect than each one singly. Finally, if one person is the principle of another, this latter depends on the first, and by that very fact is inferior and less perfect.

In the reheating of such difficulties, which are exhibited by those pettifoggers as though new lights had arisen in their own philosophy, one thing is perfectly clear: that either their own notable ignorance or the presumption of ignorance in their readers renders men foolishly overconfident. For these objections — proposed since the third century by the ancient heretics in almost the same words, refuted by the holy Fathers, crushed by all the Scholastic theologians — could neither prevent the ruin of the Sabellian, Arian, and Tritheist heresies, nor of Roscelin, Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, Abbot Joachim, and the Socinians, nor in the least weaken the universal faith of the whole Church in the one and triune God or the theological illustration of the dogma promoted by the Catholic doctors; indeed, they were the external occasion for a more ample and at the same time more subtle Catholic explanation. « The Catholic truth was asserted from the heretics ... when the heretics had been cut off, they agitated the Church of God with questions; what lay hidden was laid open, and the will of God was understood... For was the Trinity treated of perfectly before the Arians barked? » Aug. in Ps. 54. n. 22.

a) We concede that even in created and finite beings the connatural hypostasis does not differ from the singular and complete substance by some superadded reality; but we say that it is distinguished by reason with a foundation in the thing, i.e., that the same thing under one aspect is a singular and complete substance (first substance), inasmuch as it is this such οὐσία or entity, and under another aspect is a hypostasis, inasmuch as it is wholly in itself and not, whether after the manner of a part, the nature of another, or a nature common to several. Because of this diverse aspect of one and the same thing, a created nature, without ceasing to be a singular and complete substance, can not be in itself a hypostasis — and this by the sole union after the manner of a part with a superior hypostasis, of which it becomes the proper nature, and so not by detraction but by superaddition of reality — which has been demonstrated at length in its place concerning the human nature of the God-man (in the treatise on the Incarnation, th. XXXI.). Much more do we not only concede but hold by faith that the divine essence or substance itself is really a hypostasis: « a certain supreme thing, which is really the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, the Holy Spirit who proceeds ». But the same thing under one aspect is the absolute, and so an essence one in number, not multipliable; and under another aspect it is relative, and so there are three hypostases. For since a relation is of one to another, inasmuch as one proceeds from another by an immanent act, by which the Word is expressed as the immanent term of substantial intellection, and the Holy Spirit proceeds as the immanent term of substantial love, under this formal aspect of relatives to one another, i.e., of the producer and of the one proceeding by way of intellection and love, there are three relatives really distinct among themselves, but the absolute entity, i.e., the divinity of the three, is one in number.

Now, according to the analogy derived from creatures, we call the one common absolute reality the essence, nature, or substance; the three distinct subjects of one intellectual nature we call persons (intellectual hypostases). None of us affirms that this distinction of the three can be demonstrated by reason alone; but rather, just as we believe it by faith, because God Himself revealed it, so also we believe that it cannot be demonstrated by the light of reason (th. XVII.). But if it is already established that by intellection and love the immanent terms, the Word and the Holy Spirit, are really produced, the rest concerning unity and distinction is demonstrated from this very dogma of the processions « by necessary reasons ». Therefore we again recall the adversaries to that one point, that they evidently demonstrate a repugnance in this, that the infinite intellect produces the Word, and the infinite will produces love as an immanent term; which repugnance we not only deny can be demonstrated, but we demonstrate that it cannot be demonstrated.

b) Those who imagine the immanent relations and relatives in God after the likeness of three men — as absolutes and persons mutually separated, each of which has its own numerically distinct nature — will surely find an evident contradiction in the notion of the one and triune God; but no less than reason itself, revelation contradicts such a concept. And yet from that utterly false concept proceeds the objection mentioned in the second place. For if one infinite essence simultaneously has the aspect of the absolute and of the relative, and if the same infinite essence is identified with the three relatives, it is repugnant that more perfection be understood under the aspect of either one or several relatives than under the aspect of the infinite absolute essence. Of this matter we have said enough in th. XV.

c) In what they also object concerning dependence, from which the inequality of the persons is supposed to follow, there is presupposed the production of a nature, and hence distinction, and by that very fact a diversity of natures, and from these further a production through action, which, producing another nature, is a most true production ad extra. In one word, the Arian opinion about the production of the Son is presupposed, in which indeed the dependence, and the inequality of the Son included in it, is evident. But the revealed doctrine is altogether different. The infinite act of divine intellection, from the intimate perfection and exigency of its nature, by understanding itself produces the Word of itself as the immanent term of intellection, so that in the Word there is communicated the whole same absolute perfection, one in number, which is in the producer. « It is necessary, therefore, that God be in Himself as the intellect is in the one understanding; but the thing understood in the one understanding is the understood intention (concept) and the word. Therefore in God understanding Himself there is the Word of God, as it were God understood » S. Th. contr. gent. IV. c. 11. But from the same exigency of necessary perfection by which God is, in understanding, expressing the Word, the Word also exists as God understood.

If, therefore, dependence is said improperly, namely that one cannot be without another from the inborn exigency of perfection, in this sense the dependence is mutual, because the paternal intellection cannot be without the immanent Word produced, and the Word cannot be without the producing intellection. But this is not dependence properly so called including imperfection; rather, it is an internal necessary perfection, so that the one God is — just as He is the necessarily existing infinite intellection of Himself expressing the Word, so the Word of infinite intellection necessarily existing; « in the beginning was the Word with God, and God was the Word ».

Dependence properly so called is the negation of necessary Being and of necessary perfection, and the affirmation of some Being and some perfection through the influx of another as cause (in some genus of causality: material, formal, final, efficient). This dependence is neediness and denies necessary Being, and consequently denies divine Being⁴ The procession of the Word, therefore, necessary from the necessary perfection of the divine nature, is not a dependence of neediness and imperfection; rather, it is the inborn exigency of perfection in the infinite spirit, so that one and the same spirit in one essence that is not multipliable but nevertheless communicable is both the producer of the Word and the Word. All of which, as is evident, applies equally to the procession of love, i.e., to the necessary immanent term of the infinite love of the Father and of the Son. This necessary procession according to the natural exigency of perfection is to be understood when the Fathers say that the Son depends on the Father, the Holy Spirit on the Father and the Son. See Didac. Ruiz disp. X. sect. 1. 2. 3; Suarez l. II. c. 2.