Tractatus de Deo Trino secundum personas

« God, revealing Himself as triune in persons, has also explicitly revealed that, besides the known of God, which is to be contemplated by the intellect through the things that have been made, there are depths of God which, since they are above the power of human understanding, the Spirit of God alone searches, and has revealed to us. That the internal processions and the Trinity of persons belong above all to these depths of God is demonstrated both from the written word of God and from the perpetual profession and catholic understanding; and it follows also from the very proper character of this dogma in comparison with our manner of understanding. The Most Holy Trinity is therefore a mystery in the proper sense, whose truth can neither be known by the light of human reason apart from revelation, nor, granted revelation, be demonstrated from merely rational principles. »

In order rightly to understand the sense of the proposition, one must have before one the notion of a mystery in the proper sense taken universally. 1°. It does not suffice to say that the notion of person, and consequently of the Trinity of persons in God, transcends our concept, so that whether before or after having received revelation we are able to apprehend it not by a proper but only by an analogical notion. For although this is indeed most true, yet it is common to the essence and to all the divine attributes; nor are the existence, omnipotence, wisdom of God, etc. for that reason simply superrational mysteries. For a mystery in the strict sense, in the truths of faith, includes two things: that neither is the existence of the truth (whether it is) understood by the light of reason alone, nor can its internal reason (what it is) be apprehended by us with a proper concept (as proper is distinguished from analogous) even granted faith. We shall say most briefly: in mysteries both the knowledge of apprehension and the cognition of assent — that is, both the idea of the quiddity and the judgment of truth — are above the powers of reason. In this matter the Güntherians deceived themselves not a little, who, claiming for the Most Holy Trinity an understanding acquired by the light of reason alone, that it is and what it is (as they said), nevertheless affirmed that the character of the superrational mystery was sufficiently preserved by confessing that we do not know God as He is, and as God Himself knows Himself. But if we only do not know properly how He is, the Trinity is no more above reason than the existence of the one God; and this very thing subverts the character of the mystery, such as we shall see it asserted in Scripture and by the Fathers. But that we do not know God as He Himself knows Himself — that pertains nothing to the notion of mystery; for such a manner of knowing is comprehension, which altogether repugnates to a creature even in any supernatural elevation to the beatific vision.

2°. Yet the mystery is not such that, granted revelation, we understand nothing about what it is. Indeed, unless we apprehended in some way, at least by analogical notions, what that is which is revealed and proposed for belief, explicit faith in such a truth could have no place; for not the words but the things or truths signified by the words are the (material) object of faith. With regard to the idea of the quiddity, therefore, that is, what we have called the knowledge of apprehension, the mystery seems to be on the same footing as the knowledge even of the absolute attributes of God. But although the difference lies chiefly in the judgment of truth, which with regard to the Most Holy Trinity is altogether superrational, but with regard to the existence of God and the absolute attributes is not so; nevertheless there still remains a great difference in the very knowledge of apprehension. For we attain to the analogical concept of the attributes of God from the adumbrations in creatures by the light of reason, through the way of affirmation, negation, and transcendence (τῆς ὑπεροχῆς), and so we ascend from the lower analogue to the concept of the archetype or (as they say) of the first analogue, in which operation of the mind one arrives not only at the analogical notion of the quiddity, but at the same time at the judgment of truth (Tract. de Deo th. XII.). On the contrary, the very notion of the persons, which are constituted by relations and which under the formal reason of persons, really distinct from one another, are at the same time one essence in number, we would never apprehend unless positive doctrine and revelation preceded. Finally, once revelation is proposed, we seek analogies in created things in order to form some concept; and so, although reason here does something by its own light, that is, from rational ideas, it nevertheless always leans on positive revelation, and thus from the object proposed by revelation reason as it were descends to investigate the adumbrations in creatures — not that the judgment of truth (whether it is) may be demonstrated, for this stands by faith alone; but that some concept analogous to the thing to be believed may be formed.

The root and foundation of this difference is that God, the creator and first cause operating ad extra by understanding and willing, and universally according to the absolute attributes, exhibits these very attributes, « everlasting power and divinity », « to be contemplated by the intellect through the things that have been made » (Rom. I. 19. seqq. see Tract. de Deo Sect. I.); on the contrary, the relative persons, mutually and among themselves really distinct, are immanent relations, nor are generation and procession referred ad extra; and so the persons operate inasmuch as they are one God, not inasmuch as they are referred to one another and distinguished by relations. Thus, then, God according to the absolutes is knowable from His works as cause from effect, that He is, and analogically what He is; but under the formal reason of the relations ad intra He is not the cause of the works ad extra, and therefore He is not knowable as cause from effect, whether He is and what He is.

After those internal processions and distinct persons have been revealed, we can indeed find in creatures, especially in the created spirit, analogies for forming some concept of the processions and divine persons, what they are. And this comes from the fact that the created spirit, as the image of God, exhibits immediately the analogy of divine intellection and volition (love); whence, after we have learned from revelation the processions in God according to intellection and love, we are able to arrive mediately, through the concept of intellection and love, at forming a concept of the processions. Properly, therefore, it should be said: from creatures we immediately apprehend analogically the absolute attributes, and (granted the revelation of the relative things) from the absolute attributes (and so from creatures mediately) we apprehend analogically the processions and internal relations (cf. S. Th. I. q. 32. a. 1. ad 1.). If therefore at times the Fathers, as Athanasius orat. I. contra Arian. n. 11. 12., seem to interpret of the distinct persons that saying of the Apostle Rom. I. 20.: « His invisible things, from the creation of the world, through the things that have been made, are seen understood, His everlasting power also and divinity »; this accommodation of the Fathers must be understood of the immediate knowledge of the absolute attributes from creatures, and of the concept of the persons mediately deduced, granted revelation. Thus St. Cyril, after he had indicated that the everlasting power in that text of Paul can be understood of the Son, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God, immediately subjoins this commentary. « It is written: no one knows the Father but the Son, and him to whom the Son has willed to reveal Him. If, however, the Father is known to the Son alone, and through Him alone is revealed to others, then the Father is not contemplated through a creature nor from the understanding of the things that have been made; but the creature indeed proclaims its creator, God the Word (not as distinct from the Father but as creator); the Word, however (already known through revelation as a distinct person), shows the Father in Himself. Therefore to Philip saying: show us the Father, He does not bid him to understand Him by concluding from the beauty of creatures ¹, but He shows Himself, saying: he who has seen Me, has seen the Father also » Cyrill. Thesaur. T. V. P. I. p. 20. 21.

These things being premised, for the demonstration of the thesis we ask what revelation itself and the catholic understanding of revelation directly teach us about the superrationality of the mystery; then what is to be concluded about the same superrationality, when the dogma itself as revealed is examined, and a comparison is made with our rational manner of knowing.

I. We consider first the doctrine of Scripture on the superrational eminence of the mystery.

1°. That in general there are some supernatural truths, the knowledge of which is necessary to men and which nevertheless exceed reason, nor can they be known except through faith in the present life and through supernatural vision in the future life, is most fully attested in revelation itself. Paul declares this matter in the whole of I. Cor. II., deliberately.

The Apostle distinguishes a twofold objective wisdom, that is, a twofold series of things and truths to be known. The first is « the wisdom which the Apostles speak among the perfect », « the wisdom which none of the princes of this world knew », « the wisdom of God hidden in mystery »; to this there is then opposed « the wisdom of this world », « the wisdom which the Greeks seek » (ib.

I. 22.). To each objective wisdom there corresponds, of course, a twofold and most diverse formal or subjective wisdom: one is « the mind of Christ », through it men are « spiritual » (πνευματικοί); through the other a man is « wise (σοφός); but wise according to the flesh, a scribe (γραμματεύς, a man of letters, as Tertullian renders it, contra idololatr. c. 8), a disputer of this world » ² (ib. I. 20. 26.); by virtue of this wisdom a man still remains « animal » (ψυχικός) ³.

Hence, further, the efficient principle or immediate source of each wisdom differs. Of the wisdom which the Greeks seek, the proximate principle is, of course, human reason, or better, the principle is God through the light of reason and through the works of creation (Rom. I. 19. sqq.). But the principle of the other, higher wisdom is the Holy Spirit in a far different way; and that in two ways. For a) He internally affects the rational soul and renders men « spiritual ». This indeed can happen and does happen even with regard to truths knowable by the light of reason, so that the manner of cognition is not animal or natural but spiritual or supernatural. But b) here the Apostle treats of truths which are altogether unknowable by the light of reason. With regard to these truths he teaches that a twofold operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary, or rather an operation of the Holy Spirit for a twofold effect: first, that the mystery, in itself altogether hidden from and inaccessible to natural human reason, be rendered knowable, which is done by internal or external revelation; secondly, that it be known as it ought to be, which is done by internal grace, rendering men « spiritual ».

We are now concerned with that former way, because in it is contained the superrational eminence of the truths about which we are inquiring.

Thus the Apostle says: the wisdom which we speak among the perfect, that is, objective wisdom, the truth, the doctrine, that thing which is the object of subjective wisdom, is wisdom in mystery. This epithet, in mystery, he declares through another: it is hidden wisdom, and that from eternity; for from eternity God predestined that thing to be brought about (inasmuch as it is contingent, and comes to be in time; for Paul has before his eyes the Incarnation and the whole economy of redemption) and to be supernaturally revealed, ib. II. 6. 7. Whence none of the princes of this world knew this wisdom. The princes of this world are without doubt those who excel among men by the prerogatives of this world or natural gifts, and who, with respect to the subject matter, excel in the wisdom which he called in v. 6. « the wisdom of the princes of this world », who are « the wise γραμματεῖς, the inquirers of this world » (ib. I. 20. 26.) ⁴. This universality of the negative proposition « none of the princes of this world knew » is not restricted by what is added: « for if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory »; but it is only shown that Pilate also, and Gentiles like him, and no less the wise Jews and scribes who rejected the revelation of Christ, are included among all those who did not know the hidden wisdom. Further, how that wisdom is in mystery, hidden, known to none of the princes of this world, Paul still declares in the words of Scripture (Is. LXIV. 4.): « but as it is written: what eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what God has prepared (cf. v. 7. which God predestined) for those who love Him » v. 9. What God has prepared, from the context (with Chrysostom l. c. n. 3 and Theodoret on this passage also admonishing) are of course the same as what he earlier called the wisdom which God predestined before the ages for our glory; they are, namely, the mysteries of redemption, and of these above all the foundation, the Lord of glory, Christ, the incarnate Word; nor yet for that reason can or ought the goods of heavenly beatitude included in these be less rightly understood as the end and complement of redemption. The phrase, ascended into the heart of man, is most well known in the biblical manner of speaking, signifying the same as to come into the mind, into the thought, into the intellect. When therefore it is said: « it has not ascended into the heart of man », the universal expression designates that wisdom to be above the intellect of human nature. « He speaks of the whole of human nature... Whence it is manifest that, before they were heard, they had not ascended even into the heart of man; for after the Spirit had been given, the heart of the prophets was not the heart of man (by natural human powers), but a spiritual heart, just as he himself says: we have the mind (νοῦν) of Christ » Chrys. ibid. « Since he said that the mystery of the economy (of the Incarnation) was hidden, he necessarily added: which no one ever heard nor saw, nor did the most insatiable mind think » οὔτε ὁ ἀπληστότατος ἐνενοήθη νοῦς Theodoret. ibid.

In what has been said so far — wisdom in mystery, hidden, no one knew, nor did it ascend into the heart of man — there is indeed enunciated the fact of ignorance, but a fact which is from the very nature of the thing, from the nature, I say, of the mystery to be known and of the mind knowing. If you still doubt this, proceed to what follows.

The principle of the knowledge of the mystery is solely the revelation of God through the Holy Spirit: « but God has revealed to us through His Spirit ». Whence the animal man, because the principle of knowledge, namely the supernatural principle, is lacking to him, « does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God, for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand, because it is spiritually examined » ⁵. Therefore such an entire ignorance is not only a fact as it were per accidens, but from the nature of the thing, from the disproportion of the natural intellect and from the supereminent order of these truths. For the truths pertain to the depths of God, the knowledge of which is natural to God alone. For just as elsewhere creation (see Tract. de Incarn. th. IV.), so here the knowledge of these depths of God is exhibited as an attribute and mark of divinity. « For the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. For who of men knows the things that are of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him? so also the things that are of God no one has known except the Spirit of God » v. 10. 11. This is the apostolic commentary on the passage of Isaiah which he cites. What the Apostle says: « no one has known except

the Spirit of God », the same the prophet says in other words: « from of old they have not heard, nor have they perceived with ears, eye has not seen, O God, besides You » ⁶; that is, no one has known except God. In almost the same way the same prophet speaks of creation and of the supreme governance proper to God alone: « I am the Lord making all things, stretching out the heavens, etc., and there is no one with Me ». Is. XLIV. 24. XXXVII. 16. XLV. 5. sqq.

Wherefore the mysteries are said to be not only above human reason, but simply above the natural knowledge of any created intellect. « What he (the Apostle) says is of this sort: before we enjoyed the Spirit and learned the ineffable things, neither from ourselves nor from the prophets did anyone think them. For how, when not even the angels knew them? For what, he says, is to be said of the princes of this world, when no man, nor the supernal powers, knew them:... Wherefore we had need of that teacher, who knew these things clearly. For the Spirit, he says, searches all things, even the depths of God ». Chrysost. l. c. n. 3. 4.

It is established, therefore, that there are not only infinitely many truths above the finite intellect, and expressly above the human intellect considered in its whole natural perfection; but that there are some superrational truths of this sort revealed by the Holy Spirit, who alone knows them naturally.

2°. These things and truths, which are called by the Apostle « the depths of God », τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ, in opposition to « the known of God », τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ (Rom. I. 19.), are in the context directly and explicitly called the mysteries of redemption; among these, however, in the first place Christ Himself, « the power of God and the wisdom of God » (ib. I. 24), as we have already sufficiently declared. Therefore the depths of God which the Spirit alone searches are not only the free counsels and works of sanctification ad extra; but in the inmost root of these sanctifying counsels, the depths of God which « have not ascended into the heart of man », which « from of old they have not heard nor perceived, O God, besides You », which « no one has known, except the Spirit of God », are also and indeed in the first place the internal relations themselves, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

This so explicit doctrine of the Apostle on the disproportion of the created intellect to the mysteries must be kept before the eyes, so that the superrational order may be better understood in those places where there is direct speech about the divine relations and persons:

Matth. XI. 25-27. cf. Luc. X. 21-22.

« I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent (ἀπὸ σοφῶν καὶ συνετῶν) (I. Cor. I. 19. 22. 26; II. 8. 14.), and have revealed them to little ones. Yes, Father, since such was your good pleasure before you (οὕτως εὐδοκία ἐγένετο ἔμπροσθέν σου) (I. Cor. I. 18. 24. 27. 30; II. 4. 5.). All things have been delivered to me by my Father. And no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and him to whom the Son shall will to reveal him (I. Cor. II. 9. 11.). »

In the same sense St. John I. 18. concludes his doctrine concerning God the Word: « No one has ever seen God (I. Cor. II. 9. 11); the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him » ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο (I. Cor. II. 10). It is clear that, through the clause « no one knows, except him to whom the Son shall will to reveal », just as with Paul through the other parallel « no one has known except the Spirit of God; but God has revealed to us through his Spirit », knowability through the powers of human reason is indeed excluded from the immediate scope; yet from the indication of a natural knowledge which belongs to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit alone, and from the universality of the negation and of the opposition of the divine persons to the whole of creation, the natural knowledge of any created intellect is manifestly excluded. That in the phrase « no one except the Father », « no one except the Son », « no one except the Spirit of God » God is opposed to creatures, not the persons to one another, is evident of itself from the unity of the divine essence in the persons. « If he had said simply "no one," many of the hearers would have thought that this was said only of our nature; but now, since after having said "no one" he adds "except the Son," by this addition of the Only-begotten he excluded every creature... That "no one" is always set for the separation of creatures only; nor, if it is said of the Father, does it remove the Son, nor, if of the Son, does it exclude the Holy Spirit » Chrysost. hom. V. n. 1 de Incomprehens. T. I. p. 481.

II. « That the profound reality of God and the revealed truth of the distinct persons who are one God is above the natural faculty of any created intellect, and specifically above natural human reason, the holy Fathers in every age either presupposed or expressly vindicated as most certain.

1°. The holy Doctors, defenders of the truth against the heretics, and all the heretics themselves agreed that the doctrine of the Trinity, as the catholic Church proposes it, cannot be understood by human reason. But just as the Fathers insisted on revelation, and said that it must be learned from God alone speaking of himself, and that the mystery which is above our reason must be believed by faith, so conversely the heretics denounced what could not be understood by reason as contrary to reason, and for that reason accommodated the sense of revelation to the norm of merely rational notions. The Fathers agreed that human reason and philosophy must be subjected to revelation confirmed, handed on, and declared by authority, according to the doctrine of the Apostle: « destroying reasonings (λογισμούς) and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and leading captive every understanding into the obedience of Christ » (αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα εἰς ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ) II. Cor. X. 5. The heretics, if not in words certainly in deeds, contended with inverted order that revelation and faith must be subjected to reason and to philosophy as the supreme norm of interpretation, not only in the negative sense of a demanded non-repugnance, but also in the positive sense of a perceived congruence.

Already in the II. and III. century the cause of the Monarchians for denying three distinct persons was none other than that the unity of God together with the Trinity of persons cannot be understood by reason. But the Fathers demonstrated — not by reason, but solely by appealing to revelation manifest in Scripture, in the creed handed down by the Apostles, in the profession and consensus of the whole Church — that both truths are equally to be believed, because both are equally revealed by God. They conceded, however, that this truth is known to us only with God teaching, and that, even with revelation supposed, it cannot be understood in itself. Thus e. g. the Fathers of the synod of Antioch taught against Paul of Samosata. « We have decreed to set forth in writing the faith which we received from the beginning and have handed down and kept in the catholic holy Church up to the present day according to the succession from the Apostles... Since God is unbegotten, one... whom no man has seen nor can see; whose glory or greatness, as it is, to think or to narrate worthily of the truth is impossible for human nature (ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀνέφικτον); but it must suffice for us to have some notion of him, however mediocre, with the Son revealing, as he himself says: no one knows the Father except the Son, and him to whom the Son shall have revealed. But this Son, begotten... God not by foreknowledge but by essence and hypostasis, since we have known him in the Old and New Testament, we confess and proclaim. But whoever contradicts, saying that he does not believe and confess that the Son of God is God before the constitution of the world, and says that two Gods are proclaimed if the Son of God is proclaimed God, him we judge alien from the ecclesiastical rule » ep. ad Paul. Samos. (Opp. Dionysii Alex. pag. 281).

But especially in the long war of the whole Church against the Arians and specifically against the Eunomians, the super-rationality of the mystery was handed down and vindicated by the holy Fathers as the foundation for the defense and the genuine explanation of the revealed doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity. We have seen in the Tractatus de Deo (th. X.) how sharply the Eunomians claimed for themselves a full knowledge and comprehension of the divine essence, and how carefully all the Fathers demonstrated against this error, from the very nature of the thing, that what God is can be conceived by us only to some extent through analogical notions. It could seem that this dispute pertains in nothing to what we now treat. But in truth the direct aim of the heretics was the exclusion of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity. The heretics themselves, no less than the catholic Fathers, perceived that the divine essence cannot be understood by us in such a way that we understand by reason the three persons together, distinct from one another and identified with the same most simple essence. Hence, if we perfectly understood by reason the divine essence as it is in itself, as they asserted, by that very fact nothing else would belong to the divine essence except what we understood in it. But since we in no way understand by reason the one most simple essence in three persons really distinct from one another, the consequence was that not only was the Trinity denied, but the heretics also, from that same principle of the perfect comprehension of the divine nature, drew their arguments to demonstrate that the Trinity of persons such as the catholic Church professes neither is nor can be.

Hence all the Fathers — St. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa in the books against Eunomius, Gregory of Nazianzus in the orations on Theology (specifically in the 1st theological, which is or. 28. al. 34.), Cyril of Jerusalem in Catechesis VI., Epiphanius in haer. LXXVI., Chrysostom in the five homilies on the incomprehensible nature of God, Cyril of Alexandria in the Thesaurus — convince that that assertion about the comprehension of the divine nature is absurd both from the documents of Christian doctrine and from reason itself, in order to smooth the way for the explanation of the revealed doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity. For the Fathers agree, as we have said, with the heretics to this extent, that they confess and indeed earnestly contend that the Trinity of persons of one essence cannot be understood by the light of reason. Just as therefore the heretics, from their perfect intellection of the divine essence according to the whole ratio of the divine Being, denied the truth of the Trinity as not comprehended in that rational intellection, and reduced the whole disputation no longer to the doctrine contained in the Scriptures and unfolded in the perpetual tradition and profession of the Church but, as the Fathers complain, « to syllogisms » and to philosophy; so the holy Doctors, with that foundation overthrown, and with the imperfection of our knowledge relative to the divine nature and essence itself demonstrated, brought it about that the super-rationality of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity could no longer be adduced as a cause of denial, nor could the heretics any longer conclude from that which is above intellection that it is against reason. Thus the demonstration that the divine essence is not intelligible to us as it is in itself was at the same time a demonstration that, not from philosophy and merely rational notions with the heretics, but solely from the revelation of God himself, with the Church and from the Church, must be learned what concerning the divine persons is to be believed by faith rather than understood by reason. For the Fathers, therefore, the super-rationality of the mystery is not only certain, but they hold it as a necessary presupposition, without which the integrity of the faith and the sincere explanation of the dogma cannot stand.

2°. For abundance I set down a few special testimonies, so that the opinion of the Fathers, already most certain from what has been said, may appear more distinctly. « Because no one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and him to whom the Son shall have revealed, therefore the Saints, to whom the Son revealed, handed down to us a certain image from visible things, when they say: the splendor of glory and the figure of his substance; and again: with you is the fountain of life, in your light we shall see light.... But these examples, although they be slight and quite obscure for expressing what we desire, yet from them something can be known that is above human nature, and that the generation of the Son is not like ours.... Since Scripture has these images, it is absurd and very impious to wish to seek from other things knowledge of the Lord, which are neither written nor have any order to piety » Athan. de decret. Nic. n. 12. « This truth is the sacrament of God, this is the name of the inscrutable nature in the Father. God invisible, ineffable, infinite, at whose uttering speech is silent, at whose investigating the mind grows dull, and at whose comprehending the understanding is constrained... Known to the Son alone, because no one knows the Father except the Son... And because no one knows the Father except the Son, let us think about the Father together with the revealing Son, who alone is a faithful witness » Hilar. de Trin. l. II. n. 6. cf. l. 9. 10. « God unbegotten, and from him the begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeding.... He has nothing in common with all things, nor does anyone communicate with him in dignity; for all things fly past and yield (if reason wishes to gather intellection from them), and instead of reasonings they leave the whole cause to the doctrinal word in the divine Scripture, by which it is said: no one knows the Son except the Father, nor the Father except the Son, and him to whom he shall have revealed. But he reveals through the Holy Spirit not to those who wish to understand him by syllogisms, but to those who believe in him sincerely and perfectly » ⁷ Epiphan. haeres. LXXVI. ad cap. VII. Aëtii (T. I. p. 943.). « As often as the infirmity of the human condition, about to know itself forthwith, attempts to exceed somewhat the limits of its smallness, and, pregnant with the concept of heavenly illumination (i. e. with revelation and grace supposed), begins to give birth to the inquiry of its creator and redeemer, that immutable sempiternity of the Trinity alone (not of course alone simply, but in comparison with God considered absolutely), as I think, will be found worthy of the miracle of incomprehensibility, which so exceeds everything that we can think or know, as it surpasses everything that we are » Fulgent. ad Trasimund. l. II. c. 1. « But the Trinity alone can reveal itself, because the Trinity alone can fully know itself, and as much as it gives itself to be known, so much it bestows itself to be revealed » ib. c. 10. In sum, if the question is about proper understanding, the sense of the Fathers comes back to this: « concerning the mystery of the Trinity the right confession is the ignorance of knowledge » s. Hieronym. Prooem. ad l. XVIII. in Is.

Cf. Athanas. on that text: all things have been delivered to me n. 5.6. (T. I. p. 107.); Basil. contr. Eunom. l. I. n. 14.; Gregor. Naz. or. 20. (al. 29.) n. 10-12.; or. 29. (al. 35.) n. 8.; or. 31. (al. 37.) n. 33.; Cyrill. Hier. Catech. VI. n. 6.; Chrysost. de Incompreh. hom. V. n. 1.

Moreover, lest we twist the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers into another sense, there comes the consensus of the older theologians, who all, with the Master I. dist. 3.; and S. Th. I. q. 32. a. 1., defend the eminence of this mystery above reason — not by opining, but as a certain and constant principle. See on this matter Suarez l. I. c. 11. 12; Vasquez in 1. P. disp. 133. and the theologians cited there.

III. With the theological foundation laid beforehand, we can now show the super-rationality of the mystery from the very mode of our cognition and from the nature of the thing to be known.

We cannot know the divine perfections, or what God is, by the light of reason, except either by concluding a posteriori from the imperfections and perfections of creatures previously known (both material and spiritual) to God as from effect to cause, or in a certain way a priori ⁸ i. e. by proceeding from the absolute perfection of God previously known in a confused way to the perfections to be known explicitly and distinctly, or (which comes back to almost the same) by proceeding from one previously known perfection to the knowing of another (distinct in our reason or cognition): « whatever natural reason shows about God is had either from the ratio of principle (i. e. insofar as he is the supreme cause), or from the ratio of supreme perfection » (i. e. from the supreme perfection of God pre-understood in a confused way, proceeding to the understanding of the individual perfections) Pallavic. Curs. theol. de Deo c. 1. n. 3. This principle is altogether evident for any mediate cognition of God to be acquired by the light of reason, and hence it holds with regard to the rational cognition of the Trinity in every opinion, whichever you follow concerning the natural cognition of God, unless perhaps the immediate intuition of God, as he is trine in persons, were absurdly said to be natural to our intellect. For, this being set aside, even those who have persuaded themselves of an idea of God innate to our intellect, or of an immediate intuition of the divine Being ⁹ must all confess that by one or the other of the two indicated ways — from creatures previously known, I say, or from the previously known absolute perfections of God — one must arrive at the cognition of the Trinity of persons, if it can be arrived at by the light of reason alone. Indeed the same principle is universal, and is equally evident not only before the human intellect but before any intellect, to which an immediate intuition of the internal relations of God is not natural. But since such an intuition is natural to the divine intellect alone, while it does not belong by its nature to a created intellect — at least to every intellect now existing (angelic and human), as is theologically certain — indeed it seems to be above the nature of any possible creature, as can be deduced from certain principles (Tract. de Deo th. XIV. cf. s. Th. I. q. 12. a. 4.; verit. q. 8. a. 4.; contr. gent. III. c. 52.); it follows that universally, by the natural light of a created intellect, the cognition of the Trinity of the divine persons is to be attained either in no way, or in one or the other of the indicated ways.

But 1°. the internal processions in God and the three distinct persons cannot be known and demonstrated by the light of reason from creatures previously known, or by concluding a posteriori from effect to cause. From the previously known contingent existence of creatures, from their perfections and their order and direction to an end, reason understands the existence of a being necessary in its existence, intelligent and wise, willing and good, omnipotent, etc., because the existence of contingent creatures without such a necessary being existing is understood to be repugnant. Hence, to understand God — one in nature and trine in persons — in this way from the consideration of creatures, it would be necessary to perceive in creatures, whether spiritual or material, whether considered singly one by one or all together, something which would be understood to be repugnant unless three persons are one God. But it is evident that nothing of this kind is or can be in creatures. For creatures exist in act in whatever way and manner omnipotent God, infinitely wise, infinitely good, wills them to exist; nor can anything beyond the absolute attributes be understood by the light of reason as necessary in God, so that he be the cause of creatures. But the absolute attributes are of God insofar as he is one, equally full whether one person is considered, or whether three distinct persons are supposed and considered. In other words the same can be said: God operates ad extra insofar as he is one in essence, not however as ad intra there are processions and mutual relations of the begetter, the begotten, and the one proceeding. But by this very fact it is repugnant to understand from creatures as from an effect that the cause is three persons distinct from one another and not one, just as the essence is one. « Everything that has causality in the divine realities belongs to the essence, since God is the cause of things through his essence. But the proper things of the persons are the relations, by which the persons are referred not to creatures but to one another. Hence by natural cognition we cannot arrive at what is proper to the persons » S. Th. de verit. q. 10. a. 13.; 1. q. 32. a. 1.; 1. dist. 3. q. 1. a. 4.; in Boet. Trin. Prooem. q. 1. a. 4.

2°. It would therefore remain that, from the consideration of the absolute attributes, which « are perceived as understood through the things that have been made », and hence in a certain way a priori, reason would arrive at the intellection and demonstration of the Trinity of persons. In this way the necessary being is for reason the foundation of understanding and demonstrating the fullness of absolute perfection, and thence further is inferred the unity of God and the repugnance of the multiplication of the divine nature, and so on other attributes can be deduced from others pre-understood and be distinctly understood. But as long as we understand the divine essence only by analogical notions derived from the previously known perfections of creatures, i. e. by abstractive cognition, and not as it is in itself, it is repugnant that from the one most simple essence of God and from the absolute attributes, which are that same essence apprehended under one and another of our analogical concepts, one should arrive at knowing and demonstrating three really distinct persons of one essence. Hence it is, as we said above, that the holy Fathers judged that by the same argument by which, against the Eunomians, the divine essence is shown to be not intelligible by the light of reason as it is in itself, the super-rationality of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is at the same time demonstrated. For these two things are mutually inferred: the divine essence is known immediately in itself, and therefore as it is in itself; therefore the Trinity of the persons is known, who really are the divine essence itself. Conversely: the divine essence is not known as it is in itself, but by analogical notions derived from pre-understood created perfections; therefore by the light of reason it is neither understood nor can it be understood that one absolute essence is at the same time three relative persons really distinct among themselves.

Certainly, for the intellection of the three distinct persons, the principle and foundation of cognition would have to be the divine essence previously known either under the formal ratio of the infinite, or under the formal ratio of one or several attributes (say wisdom, goodness, etc.), or under the formal ratio of the acts of the internal life (intellection and dilection), or (lest a defect of full induction be able to be alleged) under any formality whatsoever intelligible by the light of reason. But it is repugnant that the essence under some or under all of these ratios be the principle of cognition demonstrating the distinct persons, as long as the essence is known not as it is in itself, but from the analogy of creatures.

For we understand the infinite Being and whatever absolute attributes, or the formal ratios under which that same Being can be conceived by the light of reason, as one not multiplicable, most simple, and indistinct; but that that same Being, from its internal ratio, requires a trine and indeed relative subsistence, i. e. that the same infinite essence be the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, distinct among themselves by relations alone, and three relative subsistents — this can in no way be deduced from infinity or from any absolute perfection, insofar as it is knowable by the light of reason from creatures. The cause is that there is given, or can be understood by us, no created or creatable perfection exhibiting an analogy of the absolute perfection, which, being one in itself, requires a relative subsistence and a multiplication of subsistents.

What we say about the infinity of the essence and about the attributes holds equally also for the acts, or rather for the act of intellection and dilection, which indeed is a divine attribute and consequently, as we have said, is nothing other than the divine substance itself, or the absolute essence apprehended by us under the formal concept of intellect or will. In created things actual intellection and volition is indeed necessarily something produced by the very spirit that understands and wills; yet from this, by the light of reason alone, we could in no way conjecture, let alone demonstrate, in God the Word and the love produced with a real distinction of three, who are one God. For that intellection and volition in created things is produced by the spirit follows from the limitation of perfection, because the substance of the spirit is not the very understanding and the very loving; but the spirit is in potency to act, and the act is not the substance of the spirit itself, but a perfecting modification of the substance. But where the infinite essence, altogether simple by force of infinity, is the very intellection and volition without any real distinction of act and essence, there indeed we cannot understand by the light of reason that the Word and love are both one supreme absolute thing, i. e. really the essence itself, and under the formal ratio, insofar as they are terms of intellection and dilection, the begotten Word and the love proceeding with a real procession, so that the distinction of the begetter, the begotten, and the one proceeding is real.

3°. Indeed, precisely because the whole created order, from which we ascend to the analogical understanding of the divine perfections, offers no foundation, no analogy (with revelation not supposed) for forming the concept of one absolute substance subsisting in three relations in such a way that there are three distinct ones of one numerically single essence; for this reason, I say, not only is the existence of the thing and its objective truth indemonstrable by natural reason, but we could not even form the concept of the thing as possible.

Hence follows a great difference in the way in which we conceive the absolute attributes and in the way in which, even with revelation supposed, we conceive the persons of one essence, relative to one another and distinct among themselves. God as wise, good, etc. we can conceive by analogical notions from the previously known perfections of creatures, and therefore in the mode of our concept there is indeed an imperfection and as it were a certain composition of the divine essence and of the attribute affecting it; but this imperfection adhering to the concept we easily correct by a judgment from certain principles known also by the light of reason. But when we wish to conceive the divine person by the light of reason alone from previously known created perfections, the concept will always be as of an absolute person, and therefore as of one no less than the essence is one, nor does any merely rational principle present itself by which this mode of conceiving might be corrected by a judgment from the light of reason.

But when from revelation we know that there are three really distinct persons of one absolute essence, and therefore that the persons are relative, distinct of course by relation alone and not by something absolute, we conceive the relative person never under a single but necessarily under a double notion, both of the absolute and of the relative. Hence this imperfect mode of conceiving indeed needs correction by a judgment, by which we judge that the absolute itself is at the same time relative, i. e. that the essence itself is really the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. But just as we have the notion of the relative person from revelation alone, so also this judgment is not from merely rational principles, but is a judgment of faith from those things which become known to us by revelation alone.

From all these things it sufficiently appears that the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity, as it has been revealed by God, is above reason both with regard to the truth of existence (that it is), and with regard to the very analogical concept (what it is). But both of these remain true not only before revelation, but also with the revelation of the mystery supposed, as it is conceded in the present life. « Since the ray of divine revelation reaches us according to our mode, hence although through revelation we are elevated to know something which otherwise would be unknown to us, not however to this, that we know in another way except through sensible things » (or more generally, according to our mode). S. Th. in Boet. lect. II. q. 2. a. 3.