Disputationes metaphysicae
Francisco Suárez (1548–1617)
Disputationes metaphysicae, in quibus universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, et quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur
First published 1597
Francisco Suárez's fifty-four metaphysical disputations, the systematic metaphysics of the late scholastic tradition, first published at Salamanca in 1597. This edition gives the Latin of the prooemium and all fifty-four disputations — the first part on being and its passions (I–XI), the second on its causes (XII–XXVII), and the third on the division of being into infinite and finite, substance and the nine kinds of accident, and beings of reason (XXVIII–LIV) — with the transcription's apparatus of variant readings from the 1597, 1600, 1605, 1614, 1751 and 1861 editions, and the facsimile of the 1597 print.
Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON THE NATURE OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY OR METAPHYSICS
Sectio I: WHAT THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IS
Sectio II: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS CONCERNED WITH ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPER NOTIONS
Sectio III: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS ONLY ONE SCIENCE
Sectio IV: HOW MANY ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THIS SCIENCE, WHAT ITS END, AND WHAT ITS USEFULNESS
Sectio V: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS THE MOST PERFECT SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, AND TRUE WISDOM
Sectio VI: WHETHER AMONG ALL THE SCIENCES METAPHYSICS IS MOST OF ALL DESIRED BY MAN WITH NATURAL APPETITE
Disputatio II: ON THE ESSENTIAL NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING
Sectio I: WHETHER BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING HAS IN OUR MIND ONE FORMAL CONCEPT COMMON TO ALL BEINGS
Sectio II: WHETHER BEING HAS ONE CONCEPT OR OBJECTIVE FORMAL NOTION
Sectio III: WHETHER THE NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING IS IN REALITY AND BEFORE THE INTELLECT IN SOME WAY PRESCINDED FROM ITS INFERIORS
Sectio IV: IN WHAT THE NOTION OF BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING CONSISTS, AND HOW IT BELONGS TO THE INFERIOR BEINGS
Sectio V: WHETHER THE NOTION OF BEING TRANSCENDS ALL THE NOTIONS AND DIFFERENCES OF THE INFERIOR BEINGS, SO THAT IT IS INTIMATELY AND ESSENTIALLY INCLUDED IN THEM
Sectio VI: HOW BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING IS CONTRACTED OR DETERMINED TO ITS INFERIORS
Disputatio III: ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING IN COMMON AND ITS PRINCIPLES
Sectio I: WHETHER BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING HAS SOME ATTRIBUTES, AND OF WHAT KIND THEY ARE
Sectio II: HOW MANY ARE THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING, AND WHAT ORDER THEY KEEP AMONG THEMSELVES
Sectio III: BY WHAT PRINCIPLES THE ATTRIBUTES CAN BE DEMONSTRATED OF BEING, AND WHETHER AMONG THEM THIS IS THE FIRST: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING AT THE SAME TIME TO BE AND NOT TO BE
Disputatio IV: ON TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IN COMMON
Sectio I: WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY ADDS TO BEING SOME POSITIVE NOTION, OR ONLY A PRIVATIVE ONE
Sectio II: WHETHER ONE FORMALLY EXPRESSES ONLY THE NEGATION WHICH IT ADDS OVER BEING, OR SOMETHING ELSE
Sectio III: HOW MANIFOLD UNITY IS IN THINGS
Sectio IV: WHETHER UNITY IS AN ADEQUATE ATTRIBUTE OF BEING, AND ON THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY
Sectio V: WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS ANALOGOUS
Sectio VI: HOW ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED
Sectio VII: WHETHER ONE IS PRIOR TO MANY, AND INDIVISION TO DIVISION
Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS THE FIRST OF ALL
Sectio IX: WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IS NUMERICAL UNITY, OR WHAT IT IS
Disputatio V: ON INDIVIDUAL UNITY AND ITS PRINCIPLE
Sectio I: WHETHER ALL THINGS WHICH EXIST OR CAN EXIST ARE SINGULAR AND INDIVIDUAL
Sectio II: WHETHER IN ALL NATURES THE INDIVIDUAL AND SINGULAR THING, AS SUCH, ADDS SOMETHING OVER THE COMMON OR SPECIFIC NATURE
Sectio III: WHETHER SIGNATE MATTER IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES
Sectio IV: WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES
Sectio V: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE SINGULAR THING
Sectio VI: WHAT, FINALLY, THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS IN ALL CREATED SUBSTANCES
Sectio VII: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS IS TO BE TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT
Sectio VIII: WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT THAT TWO ACCIDENTS DIVERSE ONLY IN NUMBER BE AT THE SAME TIME IN THE SAME SUBJECT ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR INDIVIDUATION
Sectio IX: WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS THAT SEVERAL DIFFERING ONLY IN NUMBER BE SUCCESSIVELY IN THE SAME SUBJECT
Disputatio VI: ON FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY
Sectio I: WHETHER THERE IS IN THINGS SOME FORMAL UNITY DISTINCT FROM NUMERICAL UNITY AND LESS THAN IT
Sectio II: WHETHER THE UNIVERSAL UNITY OF THE NATURE, DISTINCT FROM FORMAL UNITY, IS IN THINGS BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND
Sectio III: WHETHER THE COMMON NATURE OF ITSELF HAS SOME UNITY OF PRESCISSION OUTSIDE THE INDIVIDUALS, AND BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND
Sectio IV: WHAT THE APTITUDE TO BE IN MANY IS IN THE UNIVERSAL NATURE
Sectio V: WHETHER UNIVERSAL UNITY ARISES FROM THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT, AND HOW THE DIFFICULTIES POSITED TO THE CONTRARY ARE TO BE SATISFIED
Sectio VI: BY WHAT OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT THINGS BECOME UNIVERSAL
Sectio VII: WHETHER UNIVERSALS ARE REAL BEINGS, CORPOREAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR ACCIDENTAL, AND WHAT CAUSES THEY HAVE
Sectio VIII: HOW MANIFOLD THE UNIVERSAL, OR ITS UNITY, IS
Sectio IX: HOW THE UNITY OF GENUS AND DIFFERENCE ARE DISTINGUISHED IN THE THING, BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND FROM SPECIFIC UNITY
Sectio X: WHETHER THE METAPHYSICAL ABSTRACTS OF GENERA, SPECIES AND DIFFERENCES CAN TRULY BE PREDICATED OF ONE ANOTHER
Sectio XI: WHAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY IS IN THINGS
Disputatio VII: ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF DISTINCTIONS
Sectio I: WHETHER BESIDES THE REAL DISTINCTION AND THE DISTINCTION OF REASON THERE IS SOME OTHER DISTINCTION IN THINGS
Sectio II: BY WHAT SIGNS OR MODES THE VARIOUS GRADES OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS CAN BE DISCERNED
Sectio III: HOW SAME AND DIVERSE ARE COMPARED BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO BEING
Disputatio VIII: ON TRUTH, OR THE TRUE, WHICH IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF BEING
Sectio I: WHETHER FORMAL TRUTH IS IN THE COMPOSITION AND DIVISION OF THE INTELLECT
Sectio II: WHAT THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS
Sectio III: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION, OR ALSO IN SIMPLE CONCEPTS
Sectio IV: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE OR OF THE INTELLECT IS NOT IN IT UNTIL IT JUDGES
Sectio V: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY IN THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT OR ALSO IN THE PRACTICAL
Sectio VI: WHETHER TRUTH IS IN DIVISION EQUALLY AS IN COMPOSITION
Sectio VII: WHETHER THERE IS SOME TRUTH IN THINGS WHICH IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF BEING
Sectio VIII: WHETHER TRUTH IS SAID FIRST OF THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE RATHER THAN OF THE TRUTH OF THE THING, AND IN WHAT WAY
Disputatio IX: ON FALSITY OR THE FALSE
Sectio I: WHAT AND WHERE FALSITY IS, AND WHETHER IT IS A PROPERTY OF BEING
Sectio II: WHAT THE ORIGIN OF FALSITY IS
Sectio III: WHENCE THE DIFFICULTY OF ATTAINING TRUTH ARISES
Disputatio X: ON THE GOOD, OR TRANSCENDENTAL GOODNESS
Sectio I: WHAT THE GOOD OR GOODNESS IS
Sectio II: HOW MANIFOLD THE GOOD IS
Sectio III: WHICH GOOD IT IS THAT IS CONVERTIBLE WITH BEING AS ITS ATTRIBUTE
Disputatio XI: ON EVIL
Sectio I: WHETHER EVIL IS SOMETHING IN THINGS, AND HOW MANIFOLD IT IS
Sectio II: HOW MANIFOLD EVIL IS
Sectio III: WHERE AND WHENCE EVIL IS, OR WHAT CAUSES IT HAS
Sectio IV: WHY EVIL IS NOT NUMBERED AMONG THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING
Disputatio XII: ON THE CAUSES OF BEING IN GENERAL
Sectio I: WHETHER CAUSE AND PRINCIPLE ARE ALTOGETHER THE SAME
Sectio II: WHETHER THERE IS SOME COMMON NOTION OF CAUSE, AND WHAT AND OF WHAT KIND
Sectio III: HOW MANIFOLD CAUSE IS
Disputatio XIII: ON THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF SUBSTANCE
Sectio I: WHETHER IT IS EVIDENT BY NATURAL REASON THAT THERE IS IN BEINGS A MATERIAL CAUSE OF SUBSTANCES, WHICH WE NAME PRIME MATTER
Sectio II: WHETHER THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF GENERABLE AND CORRUPTIBLE SUBSTANCES IS ONE OR MANIFOLD
Sectio III: WHETHER THE FIRST AND ONLY MATERIAL CAUSE OF GENERABLE SUBSTANCES IS SOME SIMPLE BODY OR INTEGRAL SUBSTANCE
Sectio IV: WHETHER PRIME MATTER HAS SOME ACTUAL ENTITY, INGENERABLE AND INCORRUPTIBLE
Sectio V: WHETHER MATTER IS PURE POTENCY, AND IN WHAT SENSE THIS IS TO BE TAKEN
Sectio VI: HOW MATTER CAN BE KNOWN
Sectio VII: WHAT MATTER CAUSES
Sectio VIII: THROUGH WHAT MATTER CAUSES
Sectio IX: WHAT THE CAUSALITY OF MATTER IS
Sectio X: WHETHER A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CAUSE IS FOUND IN INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES
Sectio XI: WHETHER THE MATTER OF INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES IS OF THE SAME NOTION AS THAT OF THE ELEMENTS
Sectio XII: WHICH MATTER IS MORE PERFECT, THE HEAVENLY OR THE ELEMENTAL
Sectio XIII: OF WHAT KIND IS THE CAUSALITY OF THE MATTER OF INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES
Sectio XIV: WHETHER IN INCORPOREAL THINGS THERE CAN BE A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CAUSE, AND HOW QUANTITY IS COMPARED TO THIS MATERIAL CAUSE
Disputatio XIV: ON THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS
Sectio I: WHETHER THERE IS A TRUE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS
Sectio II: WHETHER SUBSTANCE AS SUCH CAN BE THE IMMEDIATE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS
Sectio III: WHICH SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS
Sectio IV: WHETHER ONE ACCIDENT CAN BE THE PROXIMATE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ANOTHER
Disputatio XV: ON THE SUBSTANTIAL FORMAL CAUSE
Sectio I: WHETHER THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL FORMS IN MATERIAL THINGS
Sectio II: HOW THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM CAN COME ABOUT IN MATTER AND FROM MATTER
Sectio III: WHETHER IN THE EDUCTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM MATTER MUST PRECEDE IN TIME
Sectio IV: WHETHER THE FORM, WHILE IT IS EDUCED FROM MATTER, COMES ABOUT PER SE
Sectio V: WHAT IS THE PROPER NOTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM AND ITS PROPER CAUSALITY IN ITS GENUS
Sectio VI: WHAT IS THE NOTION OF CAUSING OF THE FORM
Sectio VII: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE FORMAL CAUSE
Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS A TRUE CAUSE OF MATTER, AND MATTER ITS EFFECT
Sectio IX: WHETHER THE DEPENDENCE OF MATTER ON FORM IS SO GREAT THAT IT CANNOT BE PRESERVED WITHOUT IT EVEN BY DIVINE POWER, AND CONVERSELY
Sectio X: WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE FORMAL CAUSE OF ONE SUBSTANCE
Sectio XI: WHAT METAPHYSICAL FORM IS, AND WHAT MATTER CORRESPONDS TO IT, AND WHAT CAUSALITY IT HAS
Disputatio XVI: ON THE ACCIDENTAL FORMAL CAUSE
Sectio I: WHETHER ALL ACCIDENTS EXERCISE TRUE FORMAL CAUSALITY, AND ABOUT WHAT EFFECT
Sectio II: WHETHER EVERY ACCIDENTAL FORM IS EDUCED FROM THE POTENCY OF THE SUBJECT
Disputatio XVII: ON THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IN GENERAL
Sectio I: WHAT THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS
Sectio II: IN HOW MANY WAYS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS SPOKEN OF
Disputatio XVIII: ON THE PROXIMATE EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS CAUSALITY, AND ALL THAT IT REQUIRES IN ORDER TO CAUSE
Sectio I: WHETHER CREATED THINGS TRULY EFFECT ANYTHING
Sectio II: WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH A CREATED SUBSTANCE EFFECTS ANOTHER
Sectio III: WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH CREATED SUBSTANCES EFFECT ACCIDENTS
Sectio IV: WHAT ACCIDENTS CAN BE PRINCIPLES OF ACTING
Sectio V: WHETHER ACCIDENTS ALONE, WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, EFFECT OTHER ACCIDENTS
Sectio VI: WHETHER AN ACCIDENT IS ONLY AN INSTRUMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF ANOTHER ACCIDENT
Sectio VII: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE MUST BE REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE RECIPIENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ACT
Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE MUST BE CONJOINED WITH, OR NEAR TO, THE PATIENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ACT
Sectio IX: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, IN ORDER TO ACT, REQUIRES A PATIENT UNLIKE ITSELF, AND IN WHAT PROPORTION
Sectio X: WHETHER ACTION IS THE PROPER NOTION OF CAUSING OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, OR ITS CAUSALITY
Sectio XI: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, BY EFFECTING SOMETHING, CORRUPTS OR DESTROYS, AND HOW
Disputatio XIX: ON CAUSES ACTING NECESSARILY AND FREELY OR CONTINGENTLY; WHERE ALSO ON FATE, FORTUNE AND CHANCE
Sectio I: WHETHER AMONG CREATED EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE ARE SOME ACTING NECESSARILY, AND WHAT THAT NECESSITY IS
Sectio II: WHETHER AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE ARE SOME OPERATING WITHOUT NECESSITY AND WITH FREEDOM
Sectio III: WHETHER AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE CAN BE ANY ACTING FREELY IF THE FIRST CAUSE OPERATES FROM NECESSITY; AND IN GENERAL WHETHER FREEDOM OF ACTION REQUIRES FREEDOM IN ALL THE CAUSES INFLOWING INTO IT, OR WHETHER IT SUFFICES IN ONE
Sectio IV: HOW FREEDOM OR CONTINGENCY STANDS IN THE ACTION OF THE SECONDARY CAUSE NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FIRST, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN WHAT SENSE IT IS TRUE THAT A FREE CAUSE IS ONE WHICH, ALL THE REQUISITES FOR ACTING BEING POSITED, CAN ACT AND NOT ACT
Sectio V: WHAT IS THE FACULTY IN WHICH THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATED CAUSE FORMALLY RESIDES
Sectio VI: HOW THE FREE CAUSE IS DETERMINED BY THE JUDGEMENT OF REASON
Sectio VII: WHAT IS THE ROOT AND ORIGIN OF THE DEFECT OF THE FREE CAUSE
Sectio VIII: TO WHAT ACTS THERE IS INDIFFERENCE IN THE FREE CAUSE
Sectio IX: WHETHER THE FREEDOM OF THE CAUSE IS PRESENT WHILE IT ACTUALLY OPERATES
Sectio X: WHETHER CONTINGENCY IN THE EFFECTS OF THE UNIVERSE ARISES FROM THE FREEDOM OF EFFICIENT CAUSES, OR CAN EXIST WITHOUT IT
Sectio XI: WHETHER FATE CAN WITH ANY TRUE REASON BE NUMBERED AMONG THE EFFICIENT CAUSES OF THE UNIVERSE
Sectio XII: WHETHER CHANCE AND FORTUNE SHOULD BE NUMBERED AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES
Disputatio XX: ON THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS FIRST ACTION, WHICH IS CREATION
Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON THAT THE CREATION OF SOME BEINGS IS POSSIBLE, OR EVEN NECESSARY; OR, WHAT IS THE SAME, WHETHER ONE BEING INASMUCH AS IT IS BEING CAN DEPEND ESSENTIALLY AND EFFECTIVELY ON ANOTHER BEING
Sectio II: WHETHER INFINITE POWER OF ACTING IS REQUIRED FOR CREATING, AND THEREFORE WHETHER IT IS SO PROPER TO GOD THAT IT CANNOT BE COMMUNICATED TO A CREATURE
Sectio III: WHETHER THERE CAN BE AN INSTRUMENT OF CREATION
Sectio IV: WHETHER CREATION IS SOMETHING IN THE CREATURE DISTINCT FROM IT BY THE NATURE OF THE THING
Sectio V: WHETHER NEWNESS OF BEING IS OF THE NOTION OF CREATION
Disputatio XXI: ON THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS SECOND ACTION, WHICH IS CONSERVATION
Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY NATURAL REASON THAT CREATED BEINGS ALWAYS DEPEND IN THEIR BEING ON THE ACTUAL INFLUX OF THE FIRST CAUSE
Sectio II: WHAT ACTION CONSERVATION IS, AND IN WHAT WAY IT DIFFERS FROM CREATION
Sectio III: WHETHER ALL THINGS DEPEND ON GOD ALONE IN BEING CONSERVED
Disputatio XXII: ON THE FIRST CAUSE AND ITS OTHER ACTION, WHICH IS COOPERATION, OR CONCURRENCE WITH SECONDARY CAUSES
Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY PROVED BY NATURAL REASON THAT GOD OPERATES PER SE AND IMMEDIATELY IN THE ACTIONS OF ALL CREATURES
Sectio II: WHETHER THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FIRST CAUSE WITH THE SECOND IS SOMETHING BY WAY OF PRINCIPLE OR OF ACTION
Sectio III: HOW THE CONCURRENCE OF GOD IS COMPARED TO THE ACTION OF THE SECONDARY CAUSE AND TO ITS SUBJECT
Sectio IV: HOW GOD GIVES HIS CONCURRENCE TO SECONDARY CAUSES
Sectio V: WHETHER SECONDARY CAUSES DEPEND ESSENTIALLY IN OPERATING ON THE FIRST CAUSE ALONE, OR ALSO ON OTHERS
Disputatio XXIII: ON THE FINAL CAUSE IN GENERAL
Sectio I: WHETHER THE END IS A TRUE REAL CAUSE
Sectio II: HOW MANIFOLD THE END IS
Sectio III: WHAT EFFECTS THE FINAL CAUSE HAS
Sectio IV: WHAT THE NOTION OF CAUSING OR THE CAUSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE IS, OR IN WHAT IT CONSISTS
Sectio V: WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE NOTION OF CAUSING FINALLY IN THE END
Sectio VI: WHAT THINGS CAN EXERCISE FINAL CAUSALITY
Sectio VII: WHETHER TO BE KNOWN IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE END IN ORDER THAT IT CAN CAUSE FINALLY
Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE END MOVES ACCORDING TO ITS REAL BEING, OR ACCORDING TO ITS KNOWN BEING
Sectio IX: WHETHER THE CAUSALITY OF THE END HAS PLACE IN THE DIVINE ACTIONS AND EFFECTS
Sectio X: WHETHER IN THE ACTIONS OF NATURAL AND IRRATIONAL AGENTS TRUE FINAL CAUSALITY INTERVENES
Disputatio XXIV: ON THE ULTIMATE FINAL CAUSE, OR ULTIMATE END
Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY PROVED BY NATURAL REASON THAT THERE IS SOME ULTIMATE END, AND THAT THERE IS NO PROCESS TO INFINITY IN FINAL CAUSES
Sectio II: WHETHER THE ULTIMATE END PER SE AND PROPERLY CONCURS WITH ALL PROXIMATE ENDS FOR CAUSING FINALLY, AND CONSEQUENTLY WHETHER ALL AGENTS IN ALL THEIR ACTIONS INTEND THE ULTIMATE END
Disputatio XXV: ON THE EXEMPLARY CAUSE
Sectio I: WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR EXISTS, WHAT IT IS, AND WHERE IT IS
Sectio II: WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR CONSTITUTES A PROPER NOTION OF CAUSE, OR IS BROUGHT BACK TO ONE OF THE OTHERS
Disputatio XXVI: ON THE COMPARISON OF CAUSES TO THEIR EFFECTS
Sectio I: WHETHER EVERY CAUSE IS NOBLER THAN ITS EFFECT
Sectio II: WHETHER EVERY CAUSE IS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECT
Sectio III: WHETHER THERE CAN OR MUST BE SEVERAL CAUSES OF THE SAME EFFECT
Sectio IV: WHETHER THE SAME EFFECT CAN BE AT ONCE FROM SEVERAL TOTAL CAUSES OF THE SAME GENUS AND SPECIES
Sectio V: WHETHER THE SAME EFFECT CAN DIVIDEDLY BE NATURALLY FROM SEVERAL TOTAL CAUSES
Sectio VI: WHETHER THE SAME THING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF SEVERAL EFFECTS, ESPECIALLY OF CONTRARY ONES
Disputatio XXVII: ON THE COMPARISON OF CAUSES AMONG THEMSELVES
Sectio I: WHICH OF THE FOUR CAUSES IS MORE PERFECT
Sectio II: WHETHER CAUSES CAN BE CAUSES OF EACH OTHER
Disputatio XXVIII: De Prima Divisione Entis in Infinitum Simpliciter et Finitum et Aliis Divisionibus Quae Huic Aequivalent
Sectio I: Utrum Recte Dividatur Ens in Infinitum et Finitum, et Quaenam Divisiones Huic Aequivaleant
Sectio II: Utrum Sufficienter et Adaequate Dividatur Ens per Finitum et Infinitum et Alia Aequipollentia Membra
Sectio III: Utrum Praedicta Divisio Univoca Sit vel Analoga
Disputatio XXIX: De Deo Primo Ente et Substantia Increata, Quatenus Ipsum Esse Ratione Naturali Cognosci Potest
Sectio I: Utrum Esse Quoddam Ens Increatum Ratione Physica vel Metaphysica Demonstrari Possit
Sectio II: Utrum a Posteriori Demonstrari Possit Deum Esse, Ostendendo Unum Tantum Esse Increatum Ens
Sectio III: Utrum Aliquo Modo Possit a Priori Demonstrari Deum Esse
Disputatio XXX: De Primo Ente, Quatenus Ratione Naturali Cognosci Potest Quid et Quale Sit
Sectio I: Utrum de Essentia Dei Sit Esse Ens Omnino Perfectum
Sectio II: Utrum Demonstrari Possit Deum Esse Infinitum
Sectio III: An Demonstrari Possit Deum Esse Actum Purum et Ens Omnino Simplex
Sectio IV: Qua Ratione Demonstretur non Esse in Deo Compositionem Substantialem
Sectio V: Qua Ratione Demonstrari Possit non Esse in Deo Compositionem Accidentalem
Sectio VI: An Attributa Divina Sint Proprietates Dei, vel de Eius Essentia
Sectio VII: An Deum Esse Immensum Demonstrari Possit
Sectio VIII: An Demonstrari Possit Deum Esse Immutabilem et Aeternum
Sectio IX: Quomodo cum Divina Libertate Stet Immutabilitas
Sectio X: An Tantum Unum Deum Esse Demonstrari Possit
Sectio XI: An Deum Esse Invisibilem Demonstrari Possit
Sectio XII: An Demonstrari Valeat Deum nec Comprehendi, nec Quidditative Cognosci Posse
Sectio XIII: Possitne Demonstrari Deum Esse Ineffabilem
Sectio XIV: An Deum Esse Substantiam Viventem, Intellectualem per Essentiam Sibique Sufficientem Demonstrari Possit
Sectio XV: Quid Possit de Divina Scientia Ratione Naturali Cognosci
Sectio XVI: Quid Possit Ratione Naturali Demonstrari de Divina Voluntate
Sectio XVII: Quid Possit de Divina Potentia et Actione Cognosci Naturali Ratione
Disputatio XXXI: De Essentia Entis Finiti ut Tale Est et de Illius Esse Eorumque Distinctione
Sectio I: An Esse et Essentia Entis Creati Distinguantur in Re
Sectio II: Quid Sit Essentia Creaturae, Priusquam a Deo Producatur
Sectio III: Quomodo et in quo Differant in Creaturis Ens in Potentia et in Actu, seu Essentia in Potentia et in Actu
Sectio IV: An Essentia Creaturae Constituatur in Actualitate Essentiae per Aliquod Esse Reale, Indistinctum ab Ipsa, quod Nomen Habeat et Rationem Existentiae
Sectio V: Utrum Praeter Esse Reale Actualis Essentiae Sit Aliud Esse Necessarium, quo Res Formaliter et Actualiter Existat
Sectio VI: Quae Distinctio Possit Inter Essentiam et Existentiam Creatam Intervenire Aut Intelligi
Sectio VII: Quidnam Existentia Creaturae Sit
Sectio VIII: Quas Causas, Praesertim Intrinsecas, Habeat Creata Existentia
Sectio IX: Quae Sit Proxima Efficiens Causa Existentiae Creatae
Sectio X: Quos Effectus Habeat Existentia, et in quo Differat in Hoc ab Essentia
Sectio XI: Quarum Rerum Sit Existentia, et an Simplex vel Composita Sit
Sectio XII: Utrum Essentia Creata Sit Separabilis a Sua Existentia
Sectio XIII: Qualis Sit Compositio ex Esse et Essentia, Qualisve Compositio Sit de Ratione Entis Creati
Sectio XIV: An de Ratione Entis Creati Sit Actualis Dependentia et Subordinatio Ac Subiectio ad Primum et Increatum Ens
Disputatio XXXII: De Divisione Entis Creati in Substantiam et Accidens
Sectio I: Utrum Ens Proxime et Sufficienter Dividatur in Substantiam et Accidens
Sectio II: Utrum Ens Analogice Dividatur in Substantiam et Accidens
Disputatio XXXIII: De Substantia Creata in Communi
Sectio I: Quidnam Substantia Significet, et quo Modo in Incompletam et Completam Dividatur
Sectio II: Utrum Recte Dividatur Substantia in Primam et Secundam
Disputatio XXXIV: De Prima Substantia seu Supposito Eiusque a Natura Distinctione
Sectio I: Utrum Prima Substantia Sit Idem quod Suppositum Aut Persona vel Hypostasis
Sectio II: An in Creaturis Suppositum Addat Naturae Aliquid Positivum Reale et ex Natura Rei Distinctum ab Illa
Sectio III: An Distinctio Suppositi a Natura Fiat per Accidentia vel Principia Individuantia, et Ideo Locum non Habeat in Substantiis Spiritualibus
Sectio IV: Quid Sit Subsistentia Creata, et Quomodo ad Naturam et Suppositum Comparetur
Sectio V: Utrum Omnis Subsistentia Creata Indivisibilis Sit et Omnino Incommunicabilis
Sectio VI: Quam Causam Efficientem et Materialem Habeat Subsistentia
Sectio VII: Utrum Subsistentia Habeat Aliquam Causalitatem, et Quomodo Actiones Dicantur Esse Suppositorum
Sectio VIII: Utrum in Secundis Substantiis Concreta ab Abstractis Distinguantur, et quo Modo in Eis Suprema Ratio Substantiae et Coordinatio Praedicamentalis Constituenda Sit
Disputatio XXXV: De Immateriali Substantia Creata
Sectio I: Utrum Possit Ratione Naturali Probari Esse in Universo Aliquas Substantias Spirituales Extra Deum
Sectio II: Quid Possit Ratione Naturali Cognosci de Quidditate et Essentia Intelligentiarum Creatarum
Sectio III: Quae Attributa Cognosci Possint de Essentiis Intelligentiarum Creatarum
Sectio IV: Quid Possit Ratione Naturali de Intellectu et Scientia Intelligentiarum Cognosci
Sectio V: Quid Possit de Voluntate Intelligentiarum Ratione Naturali Cognosci
Sectio VI: Quid Possit Ratione Naturali Cognosci de Vi Agendi et Efficacitate Intelligentiarum
Disputatio XXXVI: De Substantia Materiali in Communi
Sectio I: Quae Sit Essentialis Ratio Substantiae Materialis, et an Eadem Omnino Sit cum Ratione Substantiae Corporeae
Sectio II: Utrum Essentia Substantiae Materialis Consistat in Sola Forma Substantiali, vel Etiam in Materia
Sectio III: Utrum Substantia Materialis Sit Aliquid Distinctum a Materia et Forma Simul Sumptis, et Unione Earum
Disputatio XXXVII: De Ratione Essentiali Accidentis in Communi
Sectio I: Utrum Accidens in Communi Dicat Unum Conceptum seu Rationem Obiectivam
Sectio II: Utrum Communis Ratio Accidentis in Inhaerentia Consistat
Disputatio XXXVIII: De Comparatione Accidentis ad Substantiam
Sectio I: An Substantia Sit Prior Tempore Accidente
Sectio II: Utrum Substantia Sit Prior Cognitione Accidente
Disputatio XXXIX: De Divisione Accidentis in Novem Summa Genera
Sectio I: Utrum Accidens in Communi Immediate Dividatur in Quantitatem, Qualitatem et Alia Summa Genera Accidentium
Sectio II: Utrum Divisio Accidentis in Novem Genera Sit Sufficiens
Sectio III: Utrum Praedicta Divisio Sit Univoca vel Analoga
Disputatio XL: De Quantitate Continua
Sectio I: Quid Sit Quantitas, Praesertim Continua
Sectio II: Utrum Quantitas Molis Sit Res Distincta a Substantia Materiali et Qualitatibus
Sectio III: An Essentia Quantitatis Consistat in Ratione Mensurae
Sectio IV: Utrum Ratio et Effectus Formalis Quantitatis Continuae Sit Divisibilitas, vel Distinctio, Aut Extensio Partium Substantiae
Sectio V: Utrum in Quantitate Continua Sint Puncta, Lineae et Superficies Quae Sint Verae Res, Inter se et a Corpore Quanto Realiter Distinctae
Sectio VI: An Linea et Superficies Sint Propriae Species Quantitatis Continuae Inter se et a Corpore Distinctae
Sectio VII: Utrum Locus Sit Vera Species Quantitatis Continuae ab Aliis Distincta
Sectio VIII: Utrum Motus Aut Extensio Eius Proprii Eius Speciem Quantitatis Continuae Constituat
Sectio IX: Utrum Tempus Sit per se Quantitas Peculiarem Speciem a Reliquis Distinctam Constituens
Disputatio XLI: De Quantitate Discreta et Coordinatione Praedicamenti Quantitatis et Proprietatibus Eius
Sectio I: Utrum Quantitas Discreta Sit Propria Species Quantitatis
Sectio II: Utrum Quantitas Discreta in Rebus Spiritualibus Inveniatur
Sectio III: Utrum Oratio Sit Vera Species Quantitatis Resolutio
Sectio IV: Qualis Sit Coordinatio Generum et Specierum Quantitatis
Sectio V: Quae Proprietates Quantitati Attribuantur
Disputatio XLII: De Qualitate et Speciebus Eius in Communi
Sectio I: Quae Sit Communis Ratio, seu Essentialis Modus Qualitatis
Sectio II: Utrum Qualitas in Quatuor Species Convenienter et Sufficienter Divisa Sit
Sectio III: Utrum Omnes Dictae Species Veras et Solas Qualitates sub se Comprehendant
Sectio IV: An Quatuor Qualitatis Species Sint Inter se Omnino Distinctae
Sectio V: Utrum Divisio Qualitatis in Quatuor Species Sufficiens Sit
Sectio VI: An Duplicatae Voces quibus Dictae Species Proponuntur Significent Essentiales vel Accidentales Differentias Earum
Sectio VII: Quae Proprietates Qualitati Conveniant
Disputatio XLIII: De Potentia et Actu
Sectio I: Utrum Potentia Recte et Sufficienter Dividatur in Activam et Passivam et Quid Utraque Sit
Sectio II: An Potentia Activa et Passiva Semper Re, vel Interdum Tantum Ratione Differant
Sectio III: Quodnam Sit Divisum Illius Partitionis, Quaeve Definitio Illius
Sectio IV: Utrum Omnis Potentia Sit Naturalis, et Naturaliter Indita
Sectio V: Utrum Unicuique Potentiae Proprius Actus Respondeat et Quomodo
Sectio VI: Utrum Actus Sit Prior Potentia Duratione, Perfectione, Definitione et Cognitione
Disputatio XLIV: De Habitibus
Sectio I: An Sint, et Quid Sint, et in quo Subiecto Sint Habitus
Sectio II: An in Potentia Secundum Locum Motiva Acquiratur Habitus
Sectio III: An in Brutis Sint Habitus
Sectio IV: An in Intellectu Sint Proprii Habitus
Sectio V: Utrum Habitus Sit Propter Efficiendum Actum
Sectio VI: Quid Efficiat Habitus in Actu
No English text for this section yet.
Become a contributor to add one.