Disputationes metaphysicae

1. These causes can be compared either in the notion and perfection of being, or in the notion of causing and the perfection which they have in it; and this latter comparison is formal (so to speak), and pertains per se to the present matter; yet, because causality follows upon the notion of being and is its property or attribute, therefore greater perfection in causing is wont to follow from greater perfection in being; and therefore we cannot so make the latter comparison as to omit the former wholly.

The intrinsic causes are compared to the extrinsic

2. First, then, it is certain that, comparing matter and form to the efficient and the end, they are causes less perfect of their genus, both in being and in causality. It is proved, because, when a comparison is made between genera, that one is to be preferred to the other in which the form and most perfect species exceeds the most perfect of the other genus, as is gathered from the doctrine of Aristotle, bk. I De Caelo, c. 11, texts 115 and 116, where he teaches that the perfections of powers are to be measured from that which is greatest in each; but the supreme efficient and the supreme end surpass any matter or form, as is known per se; therefore. Likewise, in the genus of being, matter and form are incomplete beings and in some way imperfect, and this they include intrinsically by virtue of their notions and in their whole latitude; but the efficient and the end not at all, but the more complete, actual and perfect a being is, the more apt, per se speaking, will it be to exercise the perfect notion of efficient or end. Likewise matter and form include imperfection in the very mode of causing, because they do not cause except by composing; but the efficient and the end, which are extrinsic causes, per se speaking involve no imperfection in their causality.

Form and matter are compared among themselves

3. Secondly, comparing matter to form, it must be said that form excels matter both in the notion of being and in the notion of cause. This assertion chiefly has place in substantial matter and form; of which enough was treated above when we were dealing with these causes, where we showed each part from the fact that form has more actuality than matter; hence it is it which completes the essence of the thing and which is the principle of all the operations and perfections of the composite. From which it is understood that this comparison in the notion of cause must be understood with respect to the composite, namely, inasmuch as these two are its causes; for if the comparison is made between matter and form, especially material form, mutually, in this way the causality of matter upon form seems more proper than that of form upon matter, because the dependence of such form on matter is more a priori, as on its proper sustainer; but the dependence of matter on form is more a posteriori, as on a condition or actuality required for the connatural and due state of matter, as was said in the foregoing. Nor does this stand in the way of matter being simply less perfect in the genus of being, although in a qualified sense, in some condition, it exceeds.

4. Whether the accidental form is more perfect than its subject, or less perfect.—Wherefore, if this comparison is extended to the accidental form and its subject, it is to be understood proportionally with respect to the concrete, as formally constituted in such notion; for so it is more perfectly caused by the accidental form than by the subject, and under the same consideration the accidental form exceeds the subject, inasmuch as it is compared to it as act to potency; yet that excess is only in a qualified sense, for absolutely in the perfection of being the primary subject of the accident is substance, which is simply more perfect. And in the notion of causing too, the subject is more the cause of the accident than conversely, because the subject simply sustains the accident in its being, but the accident as such only accidentally perfects the subject, and at most is sometimes a condition or disposition necessary for the conservation of its subject. And from these two comparisons it may be gathered that, speaking absolutely of the genera of causes, matter is in the first and lowest grade, form in the second; it remains, then, only that we compare the end and the efficient among themselves.

The end and the efficient are compared among themselves

5. The end and the efficient do not necessarily exceed each other in entitative perfection.—I say thirdly: if the end and the efficient are compared in entitative perfection, neither is more perfect than the other, but they are of the same perfection, although in the notion of end that perfection is expressed more formally than in the notion of efficient. The prior part is proved, because the end and the efficient, taken in their whole latitude, are not necessarily distinguished in the notion of being; for they often coincide in the same thing, which most of all happens in the most perfect efficient and the most perfect end; for these two notions are conjoined in one and the same thing, namely in God; therefore, comparing these two causes in their genus and in the highest of each, neither exceeds the other. And the proper reason seems to be that each of these causes of its genus says perfection without imperfection, and each, in order to have the highest perfection possible in its genus, requires infinite perfection simply in the genus of being, and therefore neither of its genus necessarily exceeds the other.

6. But the latter part is declared, for in the end the proper and formal notion of causing is its goodness and perfection, as was said above, but the efficient causes through its form or nature as such; and therefore the final cause is said to express perfection and goodness more formally than the efficient cause, which pertains more to the distinction from our concepts than from the thing itself. But hence it is proportionally understood that in other agents and ends too these two causes are often of the same perfection, inasmuch as any agent in some way operates for its own sake, or inasmuch as it operates for the sake of a univocal end or one like or equal to itself; but sometimes the efficient cause surpasses the final in perfection, when the end is proximate and not ultimate; but more often and more connaturally the end exceeds the acting cause in perfection, for when the acting cause is not supremely perfect, in order that it may operate in the best way, it operates for the sake of some more excellent good.

7. I say fourthly: if the end and the efficient are compared in the notion of causing, in many things they also have equality, but in others they mutually exceed each other according to their proper and precise formal notions; but simply the final cause is reckoned first and chief in causing. That we may proceed more briefly, let us declare this whole conclusion in God, who is the supreme final and efficient cause. For although all things which are in God, as they are in Him, are equally perfect, or rather one perfection, yet as the various attributes are conceived by us according to their proper and precise notions, we understand one of its genus to be more eminent than another, or the office or work of one than the office of another, in which way the theologians say that mercy is the greatest virtue in God. So, then, comparing the notion of efficient and final cause, they will be found equal, first, in effects, because the most perfect efficient cause cannot have more or nobler effects than the final cause too, supremely perfect, can, and conversely; for no effect is from God as efficient which is not for His sake as ultimate end, and conversely. Indeed it can further be added that there is equality in this too, that, just as all the effects of all efficient causes are from the first efficient, so all the effects of all final causes are from the supreme end; and, the proportion being changed, just as all the effects of all final causes are in their genus from the first efficient, so all the effects of all efficient causes are in their genus from the supreme end. Thirdly there is also a certain equality in this, that each of these causes of its genus says perfection simply, hence neither includes imperfection, as limitation or dependence, or anything similar, and, as one is connected (so to speak) with the other in causing, so too in turn the other with it; yet neither can properly be called dependent on the other, but the effects themselves are necessarily dependent on both, or on God under both notions. And so the first part of the assertion is evident.

8. In what the efficient exceeds the end.—The second is declared, because the notion of efficient cause seems to exceed much in this, that its influx is most proper and real through the essential dependence and emanation of the effect from it, whence the efficient is most properly said to give being to the effect, and Aristotle defined it to be the principle whence motion begins, or the production or making of the thing. And hence too it originated that the effect, since it is the adequate correlative of the cause, is named by antonomasia from effecting, on account of which the Stoics thought the efficient cause alone worthy of the name of cause, as is evident from Seneca, epist. 66, and Laertius, in the life of Zeno. But the end exceeds, first, in this, that it is as it were the last terminus into which every action of the efficient is directed, so that, if it is lawful so to speak, we can say that the efficient serves the end, and that God Himself in a certain way ministers to Himself, while whatever He does He operates for His own sake. And for this reason, although the effect is in some way for the sake of its cause (for the particle for the sake of can generally indicate causality), yet by antonomasia of the end alone is it said to be that for the sake of which the thing is made, and hence too Socrates called the final cause alone a cause, in Plato in the Phaedo. Next, and chiefly, the end seems to excel in this, that it itself is the first beginning and principle of every action; because it arouses and allures the efficient itself to effecting; which, although in the first efficient it is found without causality of the end upon the efficient itself, but only upon its external action, nevertheless according to that notion we understand that the first mover or (so to speak) the first procurer of all causality is the end. Which therefore is wont to be called first and cause of causes, as Albert noted, bk. II Phys., tract. 2, c. 5, where he considers certain other orders among these causes; but those which we have explained seem to be the chief.

9. Cause is said analogically of the four genera.—But it can finally be asked here, what we referred hither above, whether this inequality of the causes is so great as to constitute analogy among them in the notion of cause. To which it must briefly be said, with the common opinion, that the notion of cause is not univocal, but analogous, first indeed on account of the reason treated above, that the cause of accidents and of substances is not univocally a cause. Secondly, because the notion of cause said of God and of matter and form cannot be univocal, for the same reason on account of which neither the notion of being nor of any other real predicate common to God and creatures can be univocal. Which two reasons prove not only that the notion of cause in common, but also that the notion of efficient cause (and the same holds of the end), is not univocal, whether as it is common to the efficient cause of accidents and of substance, or as it is common to the first cause and the secondary ones, on account of the essential dependence of the secondary on the first. Which is most of all true if they are compared in the power of causing, for if they are compared in the action itself, the analogy is not so proper, because both the action itself is something created, and often one and the same action is from both causes, which was touched upon in the foregoing.

10. Moreover, comparing matter and form among themselves, no analogy appears between them in the notion of cause; yet, if they are compared with the end, another notion of analogy truly seems to intervene here. For the efficient most properly inflows being; but matter and form do not so properly inflow being as compose it through themselves, and therefore according to this notion the name of cause seems to have been said first of the efficient, but to have been transferred to matter or form through a certain proportionality. Hence, although those two causes are properly essential parts and intrinsic principles of the natural thing, they seem to have been called causes through the said analogy, although now according to common usage the name of cause is simply to be attributed to them.

11. But comparing among themselves the efficient and the final cause, it seems to me indeed that, if we attend to the imposition and force of the name, it was said first and most of all of the efficient cause, whose influx is both better known and most real and most properly attains the very being which it communicates to the effect. But as to the thing signified, it has already been said that it belongs properly and in some way primarily to the final cause. But I do not see what necessity there is of constituting proper analogy between these two causes in the mode proposed by us, namely the end and the efficient, if they are compared per se, and other things being equal on the part of the effect, and according to the whole perfection which each can have in its order, which is to compare the notion of end and of efficient as they are in God. For to each belongs properly and intrinsically the notion of cause, and in it they can be conceived as having some true and proper agreement, and they do not have essential dependence among themselves in that notion, although they have connection, as we have declared; there is, then, no reason of analogy between them; under that notion, then, the name will be univocal. For it is not repugnant that a name otherwise analogous to several should belong univocally to some, as we shall say below in treating of the analogy of being and accident. And let these things suffice about this comparison.