Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The title of the question is expounded.—Under this title many things are comprehended which it is necessary to distinguish and briefly dispatch. For the discourse can be either of causes of diverse genera, or of causes of diverse order or species in the same genus, or of causes of the same notion and species in the same genus. Again, the question can be of causes total in their order, or of partial ones; but that cause is total which supplies the whole concurrence necessary for the effect in that order; but that is called partial, on the contrary, which by itself alone does not confer the sufficient and whole necessary concurrence. Moreover, it is one thing to ask whether several causes are necessary for the effect, in which is inquired at the same time both the connection of the effect with the causes and the connection of the causes themselves among themselves in order to causing the effect; another to ask whether several causes can come together for causing the same effect, granted that it is not necessary. Finally this is to be considered, that when the influx of several causes into one and the same effect is inquired, the unity of the effect is not inquired as to the relation of the effect, that is, whether such effect is referred by one and the same respect to several causes; for this question is of small moment and has its proper place in the predicament of relation. Nor yet is the unity or identity of the causality of several causes into the same effect inquired, but it is inquired of the being itself or absolute entity of the effect, whether several causes can or must inflow into it, whether each inflows by a distinct influx or not; for that will have to be judged from the mode of the causes and from the principles posited above about the causalities of the single causes, as will also easily be established from what is to be said.

The question is dispatched in causes diverse in genus

2. In the first place, then, of causes of diverse genera, it is certain that there are some effects to which causes of all genera must necessarily concur, if they are properly and per se effects. Of this kind are first of all all natural substances, of whose notion it is that they be composed of form and matter, and so already two causes concur there; but matter cannot be per se unless it is made by something; nor yet does it have form unless some agent induces it; but the agent does not induce it unless it intends some end, and so it is necessary that the other two causes too concur. From which it comes about that the same concurrence of causes is necessary both for the matter and for the material form or form informing matter, yet not in the same way, both because neither does matter cause itself, nor yet the form; and also because matter concurs otherwise to the form than to the composite, and conversely, and so of the others, as is sufficiently established from the foregoing. The same concurrence of causes is proportionally necessary in order that any accident be per se caused in a connatural way, because it is not made except from a subject, by some efficient, for the sake of an end. But I said if it is properly and per se an effect, because in a contingent and per accidens effect, as such, there is neither a final cause nor properly and per se an efficient; yet that, as such, is neither a per se effect nor properly one effect, but an aggregation of several, in each of which the said causes are found. But in simple or immaterial substances alone only two causes concur, namely the efficient and the final, because they do not have a material cause, nor can they have a formal one, unless perhaps someone calls the metaphysical form a cause; but that this is not properly and physically a cause we showed above.

3. No effect depends on a single cause.—From these it is understood, first, that there is no effect in the nature of things which has only a single cause, formally speaking. For in the first place it is necessary that whatever is caused have an efficient cause, as is evident both from the induction made and also because what is caused does not have being from itself; it must, therefore, have it given by another extrinsic cause; but the cause which really inflows being, as extrinsic cause, is the efficient. Next, because everything caused has a final cause; for this is the first of the causes; but whatever has a final cause also has an efficient, as Averroes taught, book On the Substance of the Orb, c. 2, because the final cause is that for the sake of which the agent operates. Hence above we showed that the causality of the end is first and per se exercised about some action of the agent. And conversely the efficient cause too per se operates nothing except with the end concurring for the sake of which it operates; these two causes, then, are at least necessary and have necessary connection between themselves, in the way in which we declared above how every agent operates for the sake of an end. But I said formally speaking, because where it happens that the efficient and the end coincide in wholly the same thing, the effect will indeed be able to be really from one cause only, yet as exercising a twofold notion of causing, according to which they are formally named two causes. And in the same proportion those who number the exemplar as a distinct cause will say that it has connection with the efficient and the end, at least by reason of the first agent, according to what was declared above.

4. You will say that some thing can be understood to be of itself for the sake of another end, even if it is not from another efficient, so that the adequate notion of end is not to be that for the sake of which something is made, but for the sake of which it is either made or is. And Gregory and others think that Aristotle so thought of some things, that they have a final cause and not an efficient, of which matter we have partly spoken above and shall partly speak below. Now, as regards the present matter, it is impossible in the first place that a thing which is of itself be for the sake of something other than itself; for what is from itself is also for its own sake, because such a being is wholly perfect, nor is there reason why it should have being ordered to another, if it has it from itself. Next, even if such an order were feigned, it would not be through the proper causality of the end with respect to the very being of such a being, because such being would be of itself simply necessary, since it is supposed not to need an efficient cause; therefore it does not depend on another even as on a final cause, because otherwise, that being taken away, it would lose its being, which is repugnant to a simply necessary being. Hence neither could it depend on another as on an end in operating, because such as being is, such is operating. These two causes, then, are at least required for any effect.

5. It follows secondly from what has been said that no effect has an intrinsic material cause which does not have all the others, nor yet has an intrinsic formal cause which does not have the rest, and finally that the intrinsic material and formal cause have necessary connection, not only between themselves, but also with the efficient and the end. All these are clear and certain from what has been said, because matter and form under the said notion have between them a mutual relation or transcendental habitude, because neither does matter cause intrinsically except through the complex of the form, nor the form except through the information of matter, and so one cannot cause intrinsically without the other. But I say intrinsically, because inasmuch as matter causes the form itself, it does not cause so intrinsically, and therefore as such it does not require the form as concausing itself, but only as caused, and consequently as concausing the composite. But each of these causes, and both together too, have connection with the efficient, and consequently also with the final, because both matter and form and also the composite of them is a being so imperfect that it cannot have being from itself, and therefore, just as neither of these causes is without an efficient, so neither does it cause without an efficient; but the efficient, as has often been said, per se does not effect without the concurrence of the end.

6. Why the material and the single other causes are called total.—Finally it is understood from what has been said how these causes are called total, while yet none of them by itself alone suffices for the effect. For they are total in their genera, because each in its genus suffices and applies the whole causality necessary in that order, and because each has its causality of a diverse notion from the other and they do not compose one integral cause, therefore each absolutely exists a total cause. You will say: at least it follows that any of these causes is imperfect in the absolute and common notion of cause, granted that each is called perfect in its genus. The sequel is evident, because any of them is absolutely insufficient for constituting the effect in the nature of things without the partnership of the others. But the consequent is false, otherwise God too in the notion of cause would be something imperfect. It is answered, first, by absolutely denying the sequel on account of the instance of the divine causality. Secondly it is added: the consequent is true in every other cause besides God; and I declare the reason of each saying thus. For in the first place the material and formal causes are simply imperfect, both because they do not cause except by composing, which mode is of its genus imperfect; and also because, since each causes as it were by giving its own entity to constituting the entity of the effect, neither by itself alone is sufficient for this, because each has an imperfect and incomplete entity, so that from the conjunction of both the complete entity of the whole effect arises. Finally each gives something proper which the other can in no way confer. By these reasons, then, each is simply imperfect.

7. The final and efficient cause of their genus purely perfect.—But the final and efficient cause, as such, say no imperfection either in the mode of causing or from the fact that other causes sometimes concur with them. But in creatures they always have some imperfections mixed in, as to the mode indeed, because either they operate with change or mutability, or for their own advantage, or something of this kind. But as to the need of other causes (which pertains to the present matter), because every created efficient cause needs a material cause in order to be able to effect, which is of imperfection, both on account of the limited mode of acting and also because the matter itself which they suppose is in no way from them. Again, they need some final cause outside themselves; for, although they operate for their own sake, yet it is necessary that they also operate for the sake of another, at least as ultimate end. And moreover they need the concurrence of a superior cause in the notion of efficient of a superior notion. And in similar proportion every created end has imperfection in causing, on account of which and on account of its limitation it needs the concurrence both of some distinct efficient and of some matter or subject in order that it can have some effect.

8. But in God alone is there causality without imperfection; for in the first place He absolutely does not need the concurrence of matter or form for effecting. Next, when these causes are necessary in some effect, even if it is made by God, none of them concurs as simply supposed to the causality of God, but as made and conserved by Him Himself. And moreover the necessity of such causes is not from the defect of the power of God, otherwise God would not give being even to the causes themselves, but is from the intrinsic need of the effect, whose nature it is to consist of such causes. From which it also comes about that such causes, inasmuch as they concur to the effect of God, concur rather as His effects than as concauses with Him, so much so that the very causalities of such causes cannot be exercised unless God effects them. Again, God, in order to cause effectively, so needs the concomitance of the final cause that He does not need an end distinct from Himself, because He Himself is the ultimate end of all His actions. But if sometimes He wills to order His action to another proximate end, that too is not from need, but from His perfection and will, and moreover such proximate end could not be an end unless it received from God the perfection and goodness by which it could undertake that office. And similarly, conversely, in order that God cause after the manner of end, He does not need the partnership of another agent but of His own power, to omit that in those very genera of end and efficient God has the highest independence. So, then, it comes about that the concurrence of several causes to one effect does not diminish the perfection of God in the absolute notion of causing, even though in inferior causes it is an indication of imperfect power.

The question is treated in causes of the same genus diverse in species

9. There cannot be several matters of the same effect.—In the second place one must speak of several causes of the same genus, yet of diverse notion or order in such genus. And this can be dispatched briefly, because the matter is very easy. For it must be said that in the material and formal cause several causes cannot concur in this way to the same effect; but in the efficient and final they can. The first part, about matter, is proved because matter does not concur except by receiving the form; but two matters of diverse notion, either in being or in causing, cannot concur to receiving the same form, because neither can the same form be received in several matters; but if several matters receive several forms, they no longer concur to one effect, but to several.

10. You will say that, although the reason made concludes with respect to substantial forms which depend on matter, yet not with respect to the rational soul, because several matters concur with the same soul to compose the same man, either together by reason of diverse parts, or successively on account of the continual change of matter. It is answered that on account of the diversity of parts there are not properly several matters, but one adequate one, consisting of several parts, especially since neither can those parts be informed by the same soul unless they are in some way united and conjoined among themselves to compose one adequate receptive subject. I add moreover that, inasmuch as those several partial matters concur to one effect, to that extent the effect itself is manifold and various according to parts. Hence to the other part, about the successive change of matter, it is answered that that effect is indeed one by reason of the soul, yet on that side on which the matter is varied, the effect too is in some way varied, as was treated above, disp. V.

11. You will say again that, although this is true in a substantial effect, yet not in an accidental one. And the reason of the difference is that the proximate material cause of the substantial form does not have another in which it is founded, because it is itself the first subject, and therefore there can be only a single material cause of one form and one composite; but the accidental form can immediately have some material cause which needs another matter in which it is sustained, because, as we said above, an accident can immediately inhere in an accident. Thus, then, the same accident will be able to have two material causes, one proximate and another remote, as the same intellection, for example, is caused materially by the subject in which it is received and by the substance of the soul. It is answered, first, that that remote subject does not properly concur per se to the last act, but only by sustaining that accident in which another inheres, and so the assertion posited above is to be declared or limited of the immediate and per se material cause. But if someone wishes to defend that the same accident, for example the same vital act, immediately affects each subject, both the proximate and the radical, he must say that those two then concur by way of one adequate receptive subject, and each concurs only partially, but that the conclusion is to be understood of total causes.

12. Several forms of the same effect cannot be even supernaturally.—Now of the formal cause the assertion posited is more evident, because several forms cannot come together to constitute the same effect. For as regards substantial forms, it was shown above that several cannot be at once in the same matter; but although they are successively, they do not compose with it the same effect, but diverse ones, because they formally give diverse being. Hence, although by absolute power several forms were at once in the same matter, they would not concur to one effect, but each would constitute its own species and its own effect. But as regards accidental forms, although several can be at once in the same subject, they do not concur to the same effect, but each has its own proper and distinct effect. Nor does it matter that sometimes the composite of such forms is denominated in some way one, as one artificer, even if he has several arts distinct in species, for that singular denomination is taken from the unity of the subject subsisting in those forms; hence formally it does not fall upon the effect of such forms, for that in truth is not one, but falls upon the supposit itself, inasmuch as one and the same underlies all those forms or accidents. Finally, if sometimes perhaps several forms, either accidental or even substantial, are said to concur to constitute one thing, they do this not as total forms, but as partial, as the form of blood, flesh and bone to constitute the animal, and colour, figure, etc., to constitute a beautiful thing, or if there is anything else similar. Always, therefore, such forms concur as composing one, nor is there greater unity in the effect than there is proportionally in the form; never, then, do several formal causes concur to the same effect.

13. But in efficients and ends, if they are of diverse notions and subordinated among themselves, the matter is manifest from what we discussed about these causes. For several causes of this kind can concur to the same effect; and when the effect is from a created cause, this is always necessary on account of the dependence of the particular cause.