Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting.—The reason for doubting is that Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 2, asserted without any distinction that the cause in act is together with the effect in act; therefore it is not prior to it. But if you say that the cause in potency is prior to the effect in act, this is surely nothing, both because this does not come from the notion of cause, but from the notion of potency and corresponding act; for so being in potency can also be called prior to being in act. And also because the comparison is not rightly made; otherwise it could also be said that the effect in potency is prior to the cause in act; it must therefore be made proportionately; and in this way, just as the cause in act is not prior to its effect in act, but together with it, so neither is the cause in potency prior to the effect in potency. But if you say further that Aristotle spoke only of simultaneity of time or duration, against this is, first, that he himself distinguished nothing. Secondly, because in c. 11 of the same bk. V Metaph., enumerating various modes of prior and posterior according to nature, he makes no mention of that which is between cause and effect. Thirdly, because cause and effect are said relatively; but relatives are not only together in time, but also together in nature. On the contrary is that every cause is a principle; but every principle, especially in created things, is in some way prior to that of which it is the principle, as was seen above. Hence Aristotle too, in the Postpredicaments, ch. on the Modes of Prior, said that every cause is prior in nature to its effect.

2. This question, as has been touched upon, can be understood of a twofold priority, namely of time and of nature; and because the reason of them is diverse, one must speak of them singly, running briefly through the single causes, since one general answer about all cannot be handed down. But it must be considered that it is one thing to inquire what belongs per se to the cause, namely, whether per se and necessarily it is together with or prior to the effect, another what can belong to it, even if it is not necessary. Finally, we can speak of the thing which is the cause, either as it can be, or inasmuch as it is actually a cause.

The question is dispatched as to the final cause

3. The final cause does not necessarily exist before the effect.—Beginning, then, from the final cause, it is established from the foregoing that it does not always require real existence in order to cause, but that sometimes it can have it, namely, when the end moves not in order that it be made, but in order that it be acquired, or be accidentally perfected. Hence, then, it comes about that some end, as to the thing itself which is the end, can be prior in real existence to its effect, yet that this is not necessary, indeed not even that the end actually causing exist together in time with its first effect, but only with its last; because that which is first in intention is last in execution. But if you object Aristotle saying generally that the cause in act is together with the effect in act, it must be answered that that is to be understood with proportion, of the cause in act according to that being which is necessary for causing, and that in the final cause it suffices that the end actually causing be together with its effect in apprehended being, because it cannot actually move the agent unless it is apprehended.

4. Yet it has priority of nature to the effect, as depending on it.—But of priority of nature the final cause has nothing peculiar besides that which is common to every cause, namely, that, inasmuch as the effect depends on it and it does not depend on the effect, it is prior in nature to it; of which priority of nature, what it is and how it is to be understood, we shall speak more at length below. And this priority of nature alone belongs per se to the final cause. But the other modes of priority of nature, which are either priority of perfection, or in the consequence of subsisting, are not required per se in the final cause; but how they can belong to it is sufficiently established from what has been said, both in the preceding section about the perfection of the end, and in this assertion too about its real existence.

The question is resolved as to the material cause

5. Secondly, the matter can also easily be dispatched in the material cause; for as to priority of existence, it belongs per se to this cause that it not be posterior in time to that effect which it causes. And as to this that pronouncement holds true in it: The cause in act is together with the effect in act. And the reason is that it cannot actually cause unless it actually and really exists, as was proved above, and therefore it cannot happen that it be posterior in time to its effect. But it is not of the notion of this cause that the thing itself which causes be so together in time with its effect that it did not also exist before; for it can have existed before such effect in time, not indeed actually causing it, but as to the absolute entity itself of such cause. And in this sense another pronouncement of Aristotle can hold true in this cause: The cause in potency is not necessarily together with the effect, but can be prior; for the comparison is made between the things themselves of cause and effect in order to actual existence; for that is not called a cause which can be, but which can cause. And in this way it is said of it that it is not always together in real existence with the effect, but can be prior, which is manifest in this cause; for the matter of wood, from which fire can be generated, is the cause in potency of the fire not yet generated, and is prior in time to it.

6. Matter cannot precede all its effects in duration.—But it must be added that it is peculiar to this cause that, although it can be prior in time to any designated effect of its own, yet it cannot be prior in time to all its effects, understanding this collectively, which is most of all true in the material cause of substance; yet, proportion being kept, it will also be found true in the material cause of accidents. And the reason is that this cause is of such a nature that it cannot actually exist at any moment without also actually causing, because neither can matter naturally be without form, nor can a substance capable of accidents be without every accident; and so there is always some effect of this cause equal to it in duration; therefore with respect to such effect it is not prior in time. But that this is with respect to this determinate effect is accidental; for such matter could have been made under another prior form, and so have preceded in time. I omit the matter of the heaven, to which it is connatural to be always under such determinate form; for that comes from a peculiar reason and connection; but now we are speaking from the general reason.

7. In how many ways matter is prior in nature to its effect.—And hence it is easily understood by what reason prime matter is prior in nature to its effect. For it can be called prior in nature in two ways: either from the intrinsic notion of causing, by reason of which the effect depends on it, but it itself depends on the effect. Which will be easier to understand if matter does not depend on the form as on a prior and as on a proper cause, as was touched upon above and will again have to be touched upon in the following disputation. Secondly, it can be called prior in nature on account of the consequence of subsisting, which is to be expounded according to what was just said about priority in existing. But if prior in nature is taken by reason of perfection, in this way this cause is not simply prior in nature, but rather posterior, because it is less perfect than its effect. And this is the common opinion, which is most clear if the comparison is made with respect to the whole composite, which is also the effect of the material cause. But if the comparison is made with respect to the form, I so interpret it that in substances matter is understood to be simply posterior in perfection; but excellent in a qualified sense, namely in the notion of subsisting or mode of being per se; for in this matter exceeds the material form, which is its effect, because it sustains it. Hence such form in a certain way inheres in the matter itself; but matter, because it is the first subject, can inhere in nothing, but must be per se, and in this we say this cause exceeds this effect of its own, which will be more established from what is to be said below about created subsistence. But in accidents the converse happens; for the material cause is simply more perfect than the effect, which is the accidental form, since the cause itself is a substance; yet in a qualified sense it is less perfect, inasmuch as it is compared as passive potency to its act.

What is to be said of the form in the present question

8. The form is always together in time with its effect.—Thirdly it must be said of the form that per se and from its nature it is never prior in time to its effect, nor yet posterior, but together. Hence in this cause there is no place for the cause in potency being prior to the effect, because this cause is not prior in time actually a being and a cause in potency than it is also actually a cause, because it does not exist or have real power of causing prior in time to its actually causing, as Aristotle rightly taught, XII Metaph., c. 3. And the reason is manifest, most of all in those formal causes which depend in their being on matter, as are all except the rational soul; for forms of this kind cannot naturally exist outside their subjects; therefore neither outside their composites; therefore neither can they exist without their effect. But in the rational soul, although there is not this necessity of dependence, there is yet a connatural property of such thing; for since its being is for composing the composite, by its nature it demands not to be made except when there is actually the composite to be composed of it, and so it is never naturally prior in duration to its effect, although it can afterwards endure when the effect ceases; in which it has a certain genus of priority as to the consequence of subsisting, as I shall now say.

9. What notions of priority of nature the form obtains with respect to its effect.—But of priority of nature, if it is taken as to perfection, the comparison between the form and the composite has already been made above, and we said that the form is simply less perfect, in which sense it can be called posterior in nature to its effect; but with respect to matter it will be prior in nature, if indeed matter is to be called the effect of the form. But if priority of nature is taken in the consequence of subsisting, in this way it is not necessary that the form be prior or posterior in nature to its effect, but they are together, because neither can the composite be without the form, nor the form, at least naturally, without the composite. I except only the rational soul, which, although by some reason it is together, inasmuch as it cannot be unless at some time there is also a man, yet simply does not convert, because sometimes the soul can exist even if the man is not; and according to that notion it can be called prior as to the consequence of subsisting.

10. Whether the form is prior to its effect in causality.—But of the priority of nature which per se follows the notion of cause, it is difficult to explain how it belongs to this cause from its proper notion, the peculiar condition of the rational soul being omitted. And the reason of the difficulty is that it seems impossible that the form be prior in nature to its informing; therefore it cannot be prior in nature to its effect. The antecedent is evident, because it is not prior in nature in itself than in a subject; for this is proper to a subsisting form; therefore it is not prior in nature to its informing, and consequently neither is it prior in nature to the composite, because as soon as the form informs the matter the composite arises. Some answer that the form informs prior in nature, yet is not prior in nature to the composite, for being belongs first to the composite, and through it to the form, who a fortiori will say the same of matter. But this answer neither removes the difficulty nor contains true doctrine. First, because Aristotle said not only that the cause causes prior in nature, but also that it is prior in nature to its effect. Next, if the form informs prior in nature, in this very thing it is included that it be prior in nature, both because being is a transcendental predicate included in any real predicate; but to inform is a real predicate; and also because to inform is nothing else than by actuating to give proper being; therefore to inform intrinsically includes being. Finally, if the form informs prior in nature to the composite's being, this is because the being of the composite arises from the information of the form; but the entity of the composite too arises from the entity of the form; therefore the entity of the form is prior in nature to the entity of the composite; therefore the form, as it informs prior in nature, so is prior in nature.

11. It can be answered otherwise that three things intervene here, namely, the form's being, the form's informing, and the composite's being or (what is the same) being formed or constituted, which three are distinguished not only in reason, but also in some way from the nature of the thing, as can be established from what was treated in the foregoing. The form's being and informing, then, are prior in nature to the composite, because they are compared in a certain way as way and terminus, and as becoming and having been made. And so in this genus of cause too the general pronouncement of Aristotle holds true: The cause is prior in nature to its effect. Which is true not only of the thing which is the cause in potency or in first act, but also of the cause causing in second act; because as such it exercises the action of the cause and the effect depends on it, as we shall also explain in the acting cause. But the form is actually causing inasmuch as it actually informs; therefore as such it is prior in nature to the composite, which is its effect. Nor does the difficulty touched upon proceed against this, because rather from the fact that the composite results from the information of the form it follows that the information itself and the form as informing are prior in nature to the composite. But comparing the other two among themselves, namely being and informing, it can be granted that neither is prior in nature to the other in those forms which are made dependently on a subject; for the difficulty touched upon seems to intend and sufficiently prove this, which being granted it is satisfied. Nor does that principle stand in the way, that the cause is prior in nature; for Aristotle did not say that every cause is prior in nature to its causing, but said that the cause is prior in nature to its effect; but this latter can be true even if the former is not, for the causing itself is prior in nature to the effect, as I said. But it does not seem necessary that the causing be posterior in nature to the being of the cause where the causing itself is not properly the effect of the being itself of the cause, but is the very being communicated or united to the subject, which union is the effect of the agent, as is the very being of the form, and is made together with the existence of the form.

12. This answer, as to the former part about priority of nature with respect to the composite, is true and satisfies excellently. But as to the other part, although it is probable, yet it does not wholly satisfy me, because it seems it cannot be denied that the very causality of the form is in some way from it, as the causality of the agent is from the agent; hence, just as the agent is not only prior in nature to its effect, but also to its action, yet in a diverse way—for inasmuch as it is actually acting, it is prior in nature to the effect, not however to the action, because through it it is formally constituted actually acting, yet inasmuch as it is actually a being, it is at least prior in nature to its action—so it seems the form is prior in nature to its actual causality, since this too is caused by it; therefore it is prior in nature to its informing. Hence this causal proposition is true: Because the form is, therefore it informs or causes the composite, and this very thing was said by us in the foregoing. Let us grant, then, that the form is prior in nature to its informing.

13. But to the difficulty posited above it must be said that, although the form, which by its nature depends on matter, is prior in nature to its informing, yet it is not prior in nature in itself or per se than in matter, but only precisively (so to speak) it is prior in nature to its being in such a way, namely, by informing the matter. But if it is asked in that prior of nature in what way it is in itself or in another, it is answered, first, that the question is not rightly asked about that prior of nature as if it were some instant in which the form is and does not inform; for this priority of causality is not to be explained by a prior in which, but from which. For the form is not said by any other reason to be prior in nature to its informing except because informing in some way flows from being, although in reality, in no sign even of reason, is the form understood simply to be before it informs the matter. But the priority being so understood, to the question asked it must be said that in that prior the form is neither in itself nor in another, but only is through such being as intrinsically demands to be in another, which matter we shall explain more at length in the following disputation, treating how causes are causes to each other.

The question is treated in the efficient cause

14. Fourthly it must be said that the efficient cause of itself can be prior in time to its effect as to its absolute entity or power of acting, which Aristotle called the cause in potency or in first act, yet that this is not always necessary; for the effect of this cause can sometimes be equal in duration; but if such cause is taken in second act, it is necessarily together in time with its effect, although it is simply and most properly prior in nature. The first part is proved, first, by induction, for God, who is the first efficient cause of things, by eternity existed before He effected anything, and in the heavens and other secondary causes the matter is manifest. But the reason is that this cause, per se speaking, does not need its effect in order to be, nor from elsewhere has necessary connection with its action. Hence, if sometimes there is some efficient cause which does not precede its effect in time, this is not from the precise notion of such cause, but from some peculiar condition.

15. But this can happen in three ways (by which we prove the second part of the conclusion): first, if the efficiency is less proper, through natural resultance alone, in which way the essence does not precede in time the passions flowing from it. Secondly, if the cause is naturally acting and from the first instant of its being has all the requisites for acting without any impediment, in which way light produced by the sun can be coeval; thirdly, if the cause is free, and as soon as it is wills to act, in which way the angels in the first instant in which they were created could do something; and God could have created something from eternity, if He had willed. But in all these modes it must be supposed that the effect must be such that it can be made through indivisible action; for if it is to be effected successively, it cannot be wholly together with its cause, unless otherwise the cause itself too is supposed to begin and be successively or after the manner of successive things. Otherwise the successive effect necessarily begins after some instant in which the cause is already supposed existing, either of itself, as God, or through creation or generation, at least from the nature of the thing and miracles being excluded. For which reason the motion of the heaven could not be together in time with its mover, but this had to precede by at least an instant. But I say miracles being excluded, because, if it is true that God could have created an angel through a last non-being, it will also be true that such an angel could at the same time be and move the heaven; but of this elsewhere.

16. The third part of the conclusion, besides the authority of Aristotle, is per se evident, because the cause is in act through action; but action is not without a terminus; but the terminus of the action is the effect of the acting cause; therefore from first to last the acting cause in act is not without its effect in act. But in this two things are included: one is that the effect cannot actually flow from the cause unless the cause itself exists at the same time, which was proved above against some who said that the effect can actually flow from a thing no longer existing, either in itself or in some power of its own, which is plainly impossible and against this dogma of Aristotle, that the cause in act and the effect in act must be together. But that is called the effect in act, not that which is actually a being through its actual existence, but that which is actually an effect, that is, which actually flows from the cause; for that thing can actually be and not actually emanate, but have emanated, and then it is established that it can be without the cause existing then, although it supposes that it was and caused. Secondly, it is included in that pronouncement that the cause cannot be actually a cause prior in time to the effect's actually being, because it is actually a cause inasmuch as it actually inflows; but it cannot actually inflow unless there already is something into which it inflows. But it must be observed that the effect is so together with the cause in act as it flows from it; for if it flows whole at once through momentary action, it will be simply and according to its whole being together in time with its cause in act, because in an effect of this kind (as they say) becoming and having been made are together, and consequently the cause's acting and the effect's being are also together. But if the effect is made successively, the cause too will be in act successively, and then the effect will be together with the cause in act only in becoming or according to something of itself.

17. Someone can only object that God from eternity was a cause in act, not only in the first but also in the second way, and yet no effect was from eternity. But this objection has place only in the opinion of those who posit that the whole action by which God acts ad extra is immanent in God and eternal. According to which it will have to be answered that this is peculiar in the action of the divine will, which is powerful not only to inflow being into the effect, but also to inflow for that time which it itself prescribes and not before, although it itself is before. But those who think so will speak better if they say that that immanent act or volition of God does not constitute Him actually acting ad extra except as it actually inflows, and as such connotes the coexistence of the effect. But to us the answer is easier; for we deny that God is a cause actually acting ad extra through an act remaining in Himself alone, but through action passing outside, which is not prior in time to the effect.

18. Finally, the last part about priority of nature is established, first, from the general opinion of Aristotle that the cause is prior in nature to its effect, which priority is nothing else than the dependence of the effect on the cause and the independence of the cause from the effect; but this dependence on the part of the effect and independence on the part of the cause is most of all discerned in the efficient cause, as we shall declare more at length in the following disputation. And therefore I said that the efficient cause is not only prior in nature, but also that this belongs to it most properly; because the efficient cause most of all requires existence for causing and according to it is wholly independent of its effect. But about this priority of nature it must be considered that the discourse can be of the efficient cause either as it is actually efficient, or according to itself, or as it is in first act proximately disposed for acting. Again, it can be compared either to its proper effect, or to its action or causality. In comparison with the effect, then, the cause in act is simply prior in nature, even as actually acting, because the action itself is prior in nature to its terminus. But in comparison with the action itself the cause in second act cannot be prior in nature, as Soncinas well noted, V Metaph., q. 7, because by the action itself it is formally constituted acting in second act; therefore it cannot be prior in nature to the same action. With respect to the action, then, the cause can be said to be prior in nature only inasmuch as it is considered in first act.

19. You will say: in this way it is not only prior in nature, but also in time. It is answered that, if we speak of the cause in first act sufficient and not impeded and with all the requisites for acting, it is not so, except perhaps in a free power, in which this is special. Next it is said that, even if priority of time has preceded, priority of nature can also intervene for that very instant in which the action and the acting cause are already together in duration; and so the free cause too is not only prior to its action in that time in which it does not operate, but also for that instant in which it operates it is also prior, at least in nature; and therefore it can be free for that very instant, as we said above. And the reason is that the action itself flows from first act, yet does not flow by means of an action, but by itself; and therefore it is posterior in nature to the cause in first act, not however to the cause in second act.

The arguments posited at the beginning are satisfied

20. The Aristotelian axiom is explained.—From what has been said the reason for doubting posited at the beginning has been solved, and the proposition of Aristotle has been explained, the cause in act and the effect in act are together. For he speaks openly of the cause actually causing, and of the effect in act in the notion of effect, as we have explained, and of simultaneity of time, not of nature, as is openly established from the context. Hence it matters nothing that he does not distinguish there in express words, both because the thing itself is sufficiently perspicuous, and also because in the context itself, as I said, it is sufficiently declared; most of all since the Philosopher himself, in the Postpredicaments, says that those things are said simply to be together which are together in time. And in the same way is to be taken what Aristotle says there, that the cause in potency is not together, namely in time, with its effect; for he calls the cause in potency, as I said, not the thing itself which is the cause, as existing in potency, but the thing actually existing and in potency to causing; and of this he denies that it is together in time with the effect, not because it cannot be, but because this is not necessary.

21. To the other arguments against priority of nature it is answered. To the first it is said, in the first place, that it is enough that Aristotle in the Predicaments posited this mode of priority of nature; for in V Metaph. he does not seem to have repeated all the modes of prior posited elsewhere. Or it can be said that this priority of nature was comprehended under that which is in the consequence of subsisting; for the cause is said to be prior in nature to its effect by reason of causality inasmuch as that which depends, as such, cannot be without that on which it depends, in which it has the notion of posterior; but conversely that on which another depends, as such, is independent of it, and by virtue of this independence can be without it; but if perhaps it depends from elsewhere, it is per accidens on account of another causality. And so causality is said to be priority of nature inasmuch as it virtually includes priority in the consequence of subsisting, either absolutely, or at least so far as concerns that head.

22. To the last, about relation, I have often already said in this treatise on causes that we are not concerned with the predicamental relations consequent upon causality; for, whether they are of the thing or of reason, they are posterior to causality and have their proper consideration and place in the predicament relation. Cause and effect, then, are not taken here as they can formally say predicamental relations, in which sense it is true that they are together not only in time but also in nature, if they are taken as relation and its actual terminus; but the discourse is of cause and effect as to the act of the causing and of the caused; and so they are not together in nature, even if they include a transcendental relation, because this does not require simultaneity of nature between the extremes, as in many other things is per se known.