Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The effect can be compared in perfection either to its single causes or to all taken together, and this either to all¹ simply, or to all of the same genus or notion.

2. First, then, it is certain that the effect cannot exceed in perfection all its causes taken together. It is proved, because there is nothing of perfection in the effect which it does not have from its causes; therefore the effect can have nothing of perfection which does not pre-exist in some one of its causes, either formally or eminently, because causes cannot give what they in no way contain in themselves.

Comparison of the effect to its intrinsic causes

3. Secondly it must be said that, if the effect is compared only to those causes of which it intrinsically consists, it cannot exceed in perfection all of them taken together as actually causing. Which is to say that a composite substance, for example, which is the intrinsic effect of matter and form, cannot exceed in perfection the matter and form themselves taken together and united; for I added actually causing in order to comprehend their union. And so the assertion is easily proved, first, because that effect is not distinguished in reality from such causes taken together and actually causing, as I shall show below in treating of material substance; therefore there cannot be inequality of perfection between them.² Secondly, because the effect does not have perfection formally or entitatively from elsewhere than from those causes of which it intrinsically consists; therefore it cannot exceed in perfection all of them with their causalities, because there is no source from which it has that excess of perfection. You will say that many things belong to the composite which pertain to perfection and cannot be attributed to its intrinsic causes, such as to be per se, to operate per se, as in living things to live belongs to the composite, which belongs neither to the matter nor to the form. It is answered that these perfections do not belong to the single intrinsic causes taken by themselves, but belong to them as together and actually causing; hence it is only concluded that from the union or causality of these causes there arises something more perfect than is the aggregate (so to speak) of these causes without their union and causality among themselves.

4. But hence it is inferred and said thirdly that, comparing the effect wholly and simply to the single intrinsic causes, the effect is more perfect than any one of them. It is openly proved, because it includes the whole perfection of any one of them, and moreover includes the perfection of the other, and moreover the perfection of their union among themselves. Likewise, if such effect is a composite substance, it is established that it is more perfect than matter; above too it was shown to be more perfect than the form. Nor can this seem wonderful, because such effect does not have its whole perfection intrinsically from either of such causes taken by itself, and therefore it can exceed either of them taken by itself by reason of the other. But I said, if the whole effect is compared simply according to the whole perfection which it has; for if the comparison is made only in a qualified sense, in that precisely which the effect has from such cause, it cannot exceed in that notion the perfection of the cause, since from it it can have nothing more than it contains in itself. Indeed, under that consideration the cause in a certain way exceeds, inasmuch as it is that which communicates its perfection to the other, and inasmuch as the effect depends on it under that notion. You will say: when this effect is some accidental composite, it is not always more perfect than the other cause taken by itself, namely the material, which is the substance itself. It is answered that even this composite surpasses the substance itself at least in the perfection of the accidental form and its information;³ for this is some perfection. But if it happens that this whole perfection is contained eminently in the substance alone, that will not be by reason of material causality, but by another superior reason. Hence that is per accidens to the comparison of the material cause as such to its effect, which we are now making. But here a further comparison could be made between the material and formal causes themselves, inasmuch as one can be the effect of the other; but we shall touch on this comparison better in the following section.

Comparison of the effect to the efficient causes

5. Fourthly it must be said that the effect can never exceed in perfection all the efficient causes which concur to it, taken together; indeed not even any one of them which concurs to it as principal and total cause in some genus; but conversely the principal efficient cause often exceeds its effect in perfection. This assertion is easy as to all its parts from what we disputed most broadly about the efficient cause. And the first part is proved, because the whole perfection of the effect flows from the efficient causes; therefore it cannot happen that there be some perfection in the effect which is not in an equal or nobler way in some one of the efficient causes; therefore the effect cannot exceed in perfection all its efficient causes taken together. You will say: besides the efficient causes the effect has other causes intrinsic to it; therefore by reason of them it can exceed the efficient causes in perfection. It is answered that the intrinsic causes themselves composing the effect necessarily flow from some extrinsic efficient cause; and therefore it cannot happen that the effect, compared to the efficient cause adequate to it, have some perfection from its intrinsic causes which is not in an equal or nobler way in the extrinsic or efficient cause.

6. But the other part, in which the effect is compared to the single efficient causes, is easily declared from the distinction of principal and instrumental cause. For the instrumental can be less noble than the effect, as was said above and as St. Thomas noted, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaestiunc. 1, ad 3, because the effect does not proceed principally from its power. But the principal cause can never be less noble, especially if it is integral and total in its genus; for of the partial the matter is more doubtful. Although, speaking properly of intensive perfection, it is more probable that even the partial principal cause is never intensively less perfect than its effect, because in this it most differs from the instrumental cause, and because such cause, although on the part of the action it is partial, yet on the part of the effect acts upon the whole of it; and therefore it cannot exceed the grade of its perfection, as was touched upon in the foregoing. And hence a fortiori it is established that, when the cause is total principal, it cannot be inferior in perfection to its effect, because it could not give it perfection which it did not have in itself. But among principal causes some are univocal, others equivocal, as we said above; of which the latter are necessarily nobler than their effects, because, since they are of a diverse species from the effects, they necessarily do not contain their perfection formally and according to the same notion; therefore they must have it in a more eminent way, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; and it is frequent among all philosophers. But the univocal cause, although it cannot be inferior to its effect, yet need not exceed it; for it communicates its whole perfection, which it produces in the same species; and therefore between them equality is found. But if you object Augustine, bk. LXXXIII Questions, q. 2, saying: Everything which is made cannot be equal to that by which it is made, I answer, first, that it can be understood that the effect is never equal to the cause in all things; for at least in the relation of dependence it is inferior; yet not in absolute and intrinsic perfection. Or secondly, and perhaps more to the mind of Augustine, I answer that it is to be understood of that which is made by another as by a necessary principle on which it essentially depends; but the effect never has such dependence on a univocal cause, but on some superior one; and therefore of such effect it is true that it can never come to equality with the cause.

7. From another side someone can object that, when several principal causes per se subordinated concur to the same effect, even if each in its genus and grade is total, nothing prevents the effect from exceeding the inferior or proximate cause, provided it does not exceed all the superior ones, because it is enough that the whole perfection of the effect be in the whole series of causes, although it is not in each. And so it happens that a less perfect brute generates another of a more perfect species; and more frequently it happens that one man generates another of better wit, and therefore more perfect in the individual. To the argument it is answered from what was said above that no causes are per se and essentially subordinated in acting except the second and the first; for secondary causes among themselves do not have that so intrinsic subordination, although among secondary causes there are some universal and superior ones which in their way help the inferior ones to their effects. The first cause, then, when it acts with the second operating principally in its order, accommodates its action to the perfection and nature of such cause, and therefore the effect can never exceed the perfection of the secondary cause, nor can some perfection flow from the first cause into the effect except through the second; otherwise in communicating that perfection the first cause would no longer act as concurring with the second, but by itself, as supposing some defect of the secondary cause. And in a similar way, if sometimes the effect from the influence of the heavens has some greater perfection than the particular univocal cause, as to that perfection it does not proceed from the particular cause, at least as from the principal, but from the heaven or another universal cause which in that effect holds the place of proximate principal cause.

8. Hence to the examples about animals, which seem to be generated in a more perfect species by others less perfect, either the assumption is to be denied, because always at least one of the generators is equally perfect or more perfect in species; or certainly it must be said that such generators do not concur to that effect as principal causes, but as instrumental, disposing the matter; but that the generation is perfected by the power of some superior cause, as happens also in the effecting of a mixed body which is generated from the mutual action and mixture of the elements. But of individual inequality, if we hold that individuals of the same species are not unequal except in accidental dispositions, as is the opinion of many, the answer is easy; for the perfection of such disposition or complexion does not always come from the proximate and univocal causes, but from other surrounding ones and especially from heavenly influence, as is the concordant opinion of all philosophers. But if perhaps in the individuals themselves there is inequality of perfection, and a more perfect individual is generated by a more imperfect one, it must necessarily be said that that excess of perfection too comes from the concomitance and concurrence of other causes, which, just as they help to dispose the matter more perfectly, so also to introduce an individually more perfect form. Which matter is properly wont to be disputed in the books On the Soul, and well by Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 28, q. 16.

Comparison of the effect to the final cause

9. Finally it must be said that the final cause is not always more perfect than its effect; although, if the end is ultimate and the order to the end is right and according to the institution of nature, it is always more perfect than its effect or the thing ordered to the end. The former part is established, first, by induction; for often someone exercises most noble actions for the sake of money, or the esteem of men, which are more imperfect ends. And the reason is that the end only moves the agent metaphorically to operate, and therefore it is not necessary that it contain the effect either formally or eminently, but it is enough that it have some notion of good under which it can move the will. The latter part too is established by induction, for inasmuch as God operates for the sake of an end, it is clear that the ultimate end which He intends is nobler than the other things procreated for the sake of such end. Again natural agents, since they do not operate except for the sake of the ultimate end intended by God, also act for the sake of a nobler end. But if they are considered precisely inasmuch as they act from the natural impetus of nature, they operate in one of three ways. The first is for the sake of the perfection or fitting state of the individual, as when a stone is moved to rest at the centre, or a brute to conserve its life; and in this mode of operating the agent itself is the end of that action, and in some way ultimate, namely in that series; and so it is established that an end of this kind is more perfect than such action or its formal terminus. The second mode is when these agents act for the sake of the conservation of their species, as when fire generates fire, etc.; and then the end is in a certain way equally perfect, inasmuch as the form itself of the thing generated is called by Aristotle the end of generation; or, inasmuch as the generator⁴ itself is the end of its action, it is in a certain way a more perfect end, inasmuch as the common good of the whole species and its perpetuity is a more excellent good than one or another individual. The third mode is when these causes operate for the sake of communicating in some way the being which they have, as when the sun illuminates, and the same holds of all the influences of the heavens; for they do not act in order to conserve themselves, since they are incorruptible; they act, then, only in order to communicate themselves, or (what is the same) in order to conserve or perfect others. In which action, if the proximate end of the action itself is considered, it is indeed less perfect than is the agent itself, yet that is not the end of the agent itself, but of the action alone; but if the ultimate end is considered, for the sake of which agents of this kind can be said to act, that according to a certain notion or series is the good of the whole universe; but simply it is God Himself, whom these agents imitate while they communicate themselves; and in both ways the end is something more excellent than that which is ordered to the end.

10. Finally, created intellectual agents, if they operate rightly and in an orderly way for the sake of an end, tend through their operations to the true ultimate end, which is God, either expressly, or at least implicitly, inasmuch as they operate for the sake of virtue and honesty. In which too they in some way operate for their own sake, inasmuch as they operate for the sake of their own perfection, not indeed resting in themselves as in the ultimate end for the sake of which they operate, but as in the end to which they procure that perfection. And so the end which they ultimately intend is absolutely more perfect than all that which they order to the end; for of God it is established; but of the agents themselves, inasmuch as they order something to themselves and are compared to it as ultimate end in some series, it is also necessary that under that notion they be more perfect, for these agents are more perfect than their operations. But if they are said to be for the sake of their operations, they do not so rest in them as not to order them to themselves, so that they completely intend themselves in the perfect state; which can be called the intrinsic ultimate end of such action, yet not simply ultimate, since that whole action either is referred or of itself tends to a further extrinsic ultimate end, which is God.

11. But sometimes these agents can order other things more perfect than themselves, even God Himself, to themselves as to the ultimate end simply; yet that is a perverse order and foreign both to right reason and to that which the natures of things demand; and therefore I said in the conclusion if the order to the end is right from the very institution of nature. And in this way is to be understood what Aristotle said, that the end is the best of each thing; for he speaks of the ultimate end respectively, so to speak, that is, either simply or in a qualified sense, in order to that of which it is the ultimate end. And the reason is that the ultimate end is desired for its own sake, and other things for its sake; and therefore it is also loved more than the rest, according to that: That on account of which each thing is such is itself more such; and therefore, if it is loved rightly and consonantly with the natures of things, it must itself be more lovable, and consequently a greater and more excellent good.

12. But it is otherwise of the end not ultimate; for rightly and in a most fitting order a more perfect thing can be ordered to a less perfect as to a proximate end, provided that the whole series is referred to another ultimate and more perfect end, because then the proximate end is not so much attended to as it is per se lovable from its own goodness and perfection as it is lovable from relation to the more perfect end.