Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The title of the question is explained.—This question is to be understood of the end ultimate simply or universal; for of that which is only ultimate in some series we have already shown above that it is that which immediately inflows finally into all the effects or actions per se pertaining to that series. Indeed we said that an end of this kind is the whole notion of causing, so that the means or intermediate ends have no proper final causality except inasmuch as they underlie, or are as it were informed by, this end. But of the end ultimate simply there is a special question, whether it inflows with all particular ends into their causalities per se and immediately, after the manner of a universal cause in that genus, in the way in which the first efficient cause in the genus of efficient cause concurs per se and immediately with all particular efficient causes.

Arguments for the affirmative part

2. And it seems indeed that it must wholly be so said: first, because the notion of final cause belongs to God in its genus as perfectly and universally as the notion of efficient in its own; therefore, just as the notion of first efficient so belongs to God that all things depend on Him per se and immediately in causing efficiently, so the notion of first or ultimate end belongs to God with this perfection and universality, that all particular ends depend on Him per se and immediately in causing. Nor is it enough if someone says that the causalities of particular ends depend indeed immediately on God, yet not in the genus of end, but in the genus of efficient, as we said above of the material and formal cause; it is not (I say) enough, because material and formal causality include imperfection, on account of which they cannot be exercised by God in their genus, and therefore the concurrence of God to those causalities is through efficiency; but final causality as such formally involves no imperfection, and therefore can belong to God as immediately and per se about every action and causality as effective causality; therefore it belongs to Him equally, for whatever of perfection simply can be understood in God is in Him. Hence it is confirmed, for just as there is a per se order between the proximate and the first efficient cause, so between the proximate and the ultimate end; for, just as the proximate efficient cause has entity and power of effecting participated from the first, and therefore dependent on it, so the proximate end has goodness, through which it causes finally, participated from the supreme goodness of the ultimate end; therefore it depends on it equally as to causality in its genus.

Arguments for the negative part

3. On the contrary, however, is that neither in proper agents for the sake of an end, such as intellectual ones are, nor yet in lower ones, does such an influx of the ultimate end per se and immediately seem to intervene in every final causality. The prior part is proved, because in agents through intellect the end has no causality unless it is known by him who operates for the sake of the end; but these agents operate for the sake of a particular end when they think nothing at all of the universal ultimate end; therefore then the particular end causes finally without the actual influx per se and immediate of the ultimate end itself in that genus of cause. And it is confirmed and declared further: for causality in the genus of end is through metaphorical motion; therefore, in order that God concur immediately after the manner of ultimate end and in the genus of final cause, it is necessary that He metaphorically move at the same time, or that the metaphorical motion which is from the particular end be also immediately from Him, as such; but this cannot be unless He Himself is known, as is established from what was said above about metaphorical motion; therefore. And certainly experience itself seems sufficiently to persuade this; for when a man is moved by health to seek it, he is in no way moved immediately by the divine goodness, of which he thinks nothing, but by the fittingness of health.

4. Nor does it matter if someone says that health does not move except inasmuch as it has goodness participated from the divine goodness; for this is the same as if it were said that that motion comes remotely from the goodness by essence, inasmuch as from it some goodness has been derived into health, not however that the goodness by essence itself concurs immediately and per se also. Just as heat too does not heat except through power of acting participated from the effective power by essence which is in God; yet by virtue of this participation or of the emanation of that effect from such participated power, it is not immediately from God, but remotely, and therefore it is necessary that through the uncreated power itself God inflow immediately, so that He have the proper influx of the first efficient cause; but this mode of influx He does not have in the genus of end, as the reason made seems to prove.

5. And hence a fortiori the other part about lower agents is proved; for brutes, in the way in which they are metaphorically moved through cognition, can in no way be said to be moved immediately by the goodness itself of the ultimate end, which much less can they know. But lower natural agents are only said to operate for the sake of an end inasmuch as they tend or are directed to their ends; but they do not tend immediately to the goodness of the ultimate end, but only to such form or terminus of their action. But what is commonly said, that these agents intend to be assimilated to the ultimate end in communicating their perfection, seems said metaphorically rather than properly; and so it serves nothing for explaining the immediate causality of the ultimate end about these actions. The assumption is evident, both because these agents per se do not intend likeness as referred to the goodness of God, but only intend the foundation of that likeness, which is not something besides that created good which is in their actions; and also because in their communication, regularly speaking, they do not intend to communicate themselves for the sake of communication alone (so to speak), but for the sake of some advantage or their own perfection, namely, to conserve their species, or to perfect themselves; it is a sign, therefore, that in their communication they do not properly and formally intend assimilation to the communication of God.

Various opinions

6. In this matter I find it frequently said by the theologians that God is the ultimate end of all creatures, so that all in their actions intend to attain Him, each according to its capacity. So St. Thomas teaches at length, III Cont. Gent., cc. 18, 19, 20 and 21, and I-II, q. 1, aa. 6, 7 and 8; and in that doctrine all the rest agree. None, however, so far as I have seen, sufficiently declares the proper dependence of proximate ends on the ultimate in causing within the proper genus, nor the mode of influx which the ultimate end has together with the proximate or particular ones. Indeed rather, they finally so declare that notion of ultimate end that they seem to attribute to it only a remote concurrence to the motions of the proximate ends. For of the agent from purpose, man for example, they say only that he operates for the sake of the ultimate end in all his actions because he operates for the sake of some good, which does not have the power of moving finally except inasmuch as it is a certain participation of the supreme good; but of the lower agents they say only that they intend the ultimate end inasmuch as they intend some representation or participation of its goodness; by all which nothing is declared except the remote causality of the ultimate end, as seems proved in objecting. But Fonseca, bk. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 12, since he thinks that God concurs per se and immediately with all causes to their causalities, and with each by a proper concurrence pertaining to its genus, tries specially to prove this opinion of his there only of the material and formal; for of the final he supposes it is as certain and received a dogma as of the efficient, about which he had already disputed. But, the material and formal cause being omitted, of which it was spoken above and which do not pertain to the present matter, of the final he expressly teaches there, sect. 5, that it concurs immediately with proximate ends to their causalities, from that general reason that they are causes essentially subordinated in the same genus; but the mode of that immediate concurrence he does not declare but only affirms.

Resolution of the question

7. But to me this matter seems to be so explained that we declare the causalities of ends by proportion to agents; for, as has often been said, the causality of the end is best understood through relation to the agent as it is agent, or to the action of the agent. It is to be considered, then, what we handed down above, that all the actions of secondary agents are also actions of God; for chiefly on this ground God is said to concur to all of them per se and immediately as the first efficient cause. From which it is inferred that those actions are for the sake of an end, and therefore are caused by some end, not only as they are from the proximate agents, but also, and much more, as they are from the first agent. Because the first agent, just as in every action of His operates through intellect and will, so in every action of His operates for the sake of an end in a far more excellent way than any other agent; and so every action, inasmuch as outside God it is transient and flows immediately from God, is caused by some end, intended by God Himself too.

8. God as ultimate end concurs finally to all the actions of creatures for the sake of an end.—I say now, first: God as ultimate end inflows immediately and per se into every action of the creature inasmuch as it is from God Himself, and in this way at least concurs immediately and per se in causing finally with every proximate end. The first part is proved, for every action of a created agent is immediately from God operating for the sake of an end; therefore it is from God as from the ultimate end; therefore God as ultimate end causes in His genus immediately that action. The antecedent has been proved. But the first consequence is proved, because God does not act for the sake of an end except by acting for His own sake as for the sake of the ultimate end, because, as was proved above, He cannot per se primo be moved or inclined to act by some extrinsic goodness, but by His own.

9. You will say: can God not be moved by some created goodness to confer or effect another? For so on account of the goodness of merit He is moved to give reward, and because He promised, He is moved to fulfil the promise, and in this way God exercises an act of fidelity, or of justice, or of mercy, etc., on account of the honesty of each; therefore God also operates for the sake of some proximate created end; therefore the said inference is not certain and formal.

10. Some do not dare to grant that antecedent, because it seems to be beside the divine perfection to will something for the sake of a created end. Yet, since for God to act for the sake of an end is not to act for the sake of His own end, but for the sake of the end to which He orders that thing which He effects, it is not unfitting that He proximately effect something for the sake of some created end, because this is nothing else than to order one creature to another as to a proximate end, which is most ordered and without any imperfection. And in this way God ordered single things to the beauty of the universe, and founded herbs and animals for the sake of man, etc. And by the same reason, because creatures are not good formally by the divine goodness, but by their own, as was said above, so God wills creatures for the sake of His own goodness that yet He wills to each the goodness or perfection proper to it, and in this way God wills grace to man, as it is the perfection of man himself; hence proximately He wills it for the advantage or utility of man himself. And in this way, although in comparison with His goodness He wills all creatures as means to the manifestation and communication of Himself, yet comparing one creature to another He wills one as the proximate end of the other.

11. Nevertheless it is necessary that in every action and operation for the sake of an end God operate for His own sake, as for the sake of the ultimate end. Both because He always operates for the sake of an end in the most perfect way, and therefore by a most simple and most eminent act leads all things up to the supreme cause and refers them into Himself as into the ultimate end, and also because the divine goodness is so to God the universal reason of willing every other goodness or created end, that without relation or habitude to it nothing outside God Himself is lovable to God. For if through created goodnesses the divine goodness were not communicated, represented or shown, there would be no reason why they should be loved by God Himself. Yet, because that by which the creature represents and participates the divine goodness is something lovable according to itself and for its own sake with respect to created appetite, therefore it is not repugnant that God at the same time will one creature as the end of another and as something ordered to Himself as to the ultimate end. This respect, then, is not separable from the volition of God as it is terminated to the creature, and therefore it is excellently inferred that, if God operates something for the sake of an end, He also operates it for His own sake, as for the sake of the ultimate end actually and most perfectly intended.

12. Now the other consecution is easy to prove, namely, that the ultimate end inflows immediately and per se with any proximate end into every action of the creature, because the end inflows immediately in its way into that action which is done for its sake from the formal and direct intention of the agent; for final causality, especially about transient actions, consists only in this dependence which the action has on the agent so ordering it to the end; but it has been shown that every action of the creature, at least inasmuch as it is from the first agent, is done necessarily with this actual relation or ordination to the ultimate end; therefore every such action is caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end in its genus.

13. Whether God with dishonest ends concurs to finally causing depraved actions.—You will say that this cannot be universally true; for, although in merely natural actions and in honest free ones it seems possible and without drawback, yet in free and sinful actions this seems both unbecoming and impossible; the first is evident because it is unbecoming that God will these actions; much more, then, that He will them for His own sake. The second is evident, because those actions are intrinsically repugnant to the supreme goodness of God; how, then, can they be referred to the supreme good as to the ultimate end? It is answered, in the first place, that the whole argument can and must be granted of sinful actions as they are sinful; for strictly the objection proceeds of them only as such; for as such they are repugnant to the divine goodness, and of them as such we confess that they are not from God as from the ultimate end, nor is that a drawback, because as such too they are not from God as from the first agent, because as such they are not actions, but defects of action. Hence it is further added that these actions, however sinful with respect to the secondary cause, as they are actions are also actions of God Himself, and as such are per se and immediately from the ultimate end, and for the sake of the ultimate end; for as such they include no defect or malice by reason of which they would be repugnant to the supreme goodness of the ultimate end. And although God does not efficaciously and absolutely will them on account of the relation which, absolutely taken, they have to the secondary cause, with which and from which they have concomitant malice, yet He wills to concur to them and so wills them inasmuch as they are His actions, and in this way orders them to Himself as to the ultimate end, because in them, considered under this notion, the goodness of God shines forth most, which diffuses itself to all things inasmuch as they have something of good, and is able so to inflow into goodness that, although malice is conjoined to it, it does not attain it, nor is it to be imputed to it by any reason. In which He also manifests His omnipotence and wisdom, indeed in a certain way His justice too, either because He uses His right in offering His concurrence even to those who will abuse it, or because to each principle He gives the concurrence naturally due to it, and lets each act according to its mode. Thus, then, there is no action of a creature caused by a proximate end which is not at the same time caused per se and immediately by the ultimate end, at least with respect to the first agent. Read St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., especially reason 6, for there he virtually contains the whole doctrine of this assertion.

14. Creatures in their ends do not always intend the ultimate end formally.—I say secondly: the action of the creature, as it is from the creature itself for the sake of an end, is not always caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end formally and according to its proper goodness, but at most virtually or implicitly; and in this sense it can with due proportion be said that the ultimate end does not always concur to these actions as such immediately by immediacy of supposit, but only of power. The reasons posited above in the latter place, I think, sufficiently prove this conclusion, together with those which we adduced in reporting the common doctrine of St. Thomas and others. And indeed of natural or irrational agents there can be no reason for doubting, because these do not operate for the sake of an end to which they themselves direct their actions; much less, then, can they operate for the sake of the ultimate end. Next, in the way in which they are said metaphorically to intend an end, inasmuch as through natural inclination or appetite they tend to something certain and determinate, in truth they do not tend properly and formally to God, but to something created fitting or proportioned to themselves, and so they tend to God only virtually and as it were interpretatively. Finally, if they are considered inasmuch as by extrinsic denomination they are said to be directed to the end by their author and cooperator God, so indeed they can be said to tend to the ultimate end itself formally intended; yet that direction and ordination to the end is now from the first agent itself, by whom alone that end is intended.

15. But of agents from purpose, it is not necessary that their actions never be per se and immediately from the ultimate end, even inasmuch as they are for the sake of an end from the direction and intention of such agents. For they can often be so, namely, when these agents consider the ultimate end itself in itself and refer to it all their actions and private intentions, which they can do because through intellect and will they can objectively attain the ultimate end in itself, which the lower agents cannot. But we said that the actions of these agents, inasmuch as they are from them for the sake of an end, are not always caused finally per se and immediately by the ultimate end by immediacy of supposit, that is, by itself and by its goodness finally inflowing into such action, and in this sense the assertion is sufficiently proved by that reason posited above, because the ultimate end thought of in itself does not always move these agents when they operate for the sake of some particular end. But virtually the ultimate end can be said always to move agents of this kind, because they are always moved by some good or under the notion of some good, which, inasmuch as it is a certain participation of the supreme good, is reckoned to move in its power; and conversely, he who tends to that good is reckoned virtually to tend to the ultimate end, because by desiring (so to speak) a part of the good, he is reckoned virtually to love more the complement of the whole good, which sense St. Thomas declared, In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 4, and in the same way he speaks in I, q. 60, a. 2, and I-II, q. 1, a. 6, where in the solution ad 3 he says that the power of the first intention with respect to the ultimate end moves in any appetite of any thing whatever, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought of. Read Aristotle, I Ethic., cc. 4 and 7, and I Rhetoric., c. 5; Augustine, X Confess., cc. 20 and 21, and bk. XI De Trinit., c. 6.

Brief resolution of an incidental question

16. But here at once the question insinuated itself whether in these agents it is always necessary that a proper and elicited intention of the ultimate end, terminated at the ultimate end itself proposed in itself under the notion of supreme or complete or common good, must necessarily precede the intentions of particular ends. For some theologians seem to think it necessary that such an as it were universal intention precede at least sometimes, or once in life, in order that the other intentions of particular ends can be had in its power. But this question is proper to the theologians, and is commonly treated in the cited places of St. Thomas. And to me that opinion seems certain which denies that such intention is necessary, because neither on the part of the intellect is there anything which necessitates to think first of that object, nor on the part of the will is that intention necessary in order that it can will the particular goods proposed to it as per se lovable, since in those objects there is sufficient reason for tending to them for the sake of their goodness. Indeed even if that universal intention precedes, yet if afterwards it does not remain either in memory or in some affection or habit, it can serve nothing for the subsequent acts. See Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, and In IV, dist. 49, q. 3; and there Paludanus, Major, Capreolus and others.

The reasons for doubting posited at the beginning are satisfied

17. The arguments posited in the prior place at the beginning confirm our prior conclusion; they do not, however, stand against the latter, because it is not of the notion of the first cause that it inflow into the action of the secondary cause except with due proportion; nor yet is it necessary that the causality of the first and of the second cause, formally and precisely taken, say the same relation, although in reality, as they are in the effect, they are not distinguished. Thus, then, for the subordination of the proximate and ultimate end it is enough that the former depend on the latter in causing in its genus, and that the former cannot cause except the latter causing; yet it is not necessary that each end cause with respect to the same agent, but only with respect to the same effect or action. Indeed rather the proximate end causes with respect to the proximate agent and the action which is in it or from it; but the ultimate end does not cause with respect to the first agent itself, but with respect to the effect or action as it flows from it. But the arguments posited in the latter place to the contrary stand nothing against the prior conclusion, as is sufficiently established per se; but they confirm the latter, as has been declared.