Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The twofold mode of ultimate end.—In two ways, as we said in the foregoing, some end can be understood to be ultimate, namely, either only in a qualified sense, or in some series of means, or with respect to some intention and the elections which proceed from it, or simply and with respect to all things which can be ordered to an end; here we treat chiefly of the ultimate end in this latter way, because in it the chief difficulty of this matter is placed; yet, in order that we may proceed from clearer things, we shall premise some things about the former mode of ultimate end.

Resolution about the end ultimate only in a qualified sense

2. I say, then, first: in every series or intention and action for the sake of an end, some ultimate end must necessarily be given, either negatively, that is, one which is not ordered to another end in that series or by virtue of that intention, or also positively in a qualified sense, or in that series, because, namely, all things which pertain to it are referred to such end and stop there. And in this sense it is impossible that there be a process to infinity in these ends. Aristotle chiefly intends this conclusion, bk. II Metaph., and from the last part the rest are necessarily inferred. For if, proceeding from the election of the first means towards the end, there is no process to infinity, one must necessarily stop in something beyond which intention does not tend; that, therefore, will be the ultimate end in that series, both negatively, because such end is not ordered to another, otherwise one would not stop in it; and positively, because to it are referred all things which pertain to that series, since all are desired for its sake; for if something were not desired for its sake, it would not pertain to that series, but would be joined as it were per accidens. As, for example, with respect to the physician and in the series of curing, the health of the man is the ultimate end negatively, because it is per se intended and the intention of the physician does not proceed beyond it, and therefore, it being attained, action ceases; it is also the ultimate end positively, because to it are referred all things which are of that art, as instruments for preparing medicines, medicines for tempering or evacuating the humour, and this finally to health itself. But if someone perhaps takes a medicine also either for the sake of delight or for the sake of nourishment, that end no longer pertains to the series of curing, but to another intention joined per accidens with the other.

3. It remains that we prove the last part of the conclusion, which Aristotle demonstrates at length in the cited place; but the demonstration can easily be formed in this way. For in the first place, descending from the intention of the end to the election or execution of means, it is necessary that election stop at last in some means which is first in execution and last in the order of intention, because otherwise action could never be begun and so every election would be frustrated, because one would always proceed from one election to another, and never come to use, and so all action would be taken away. Hence, as much as it is evident by experience that inquiries of ends through means are begun by us, so much is it evident that in the progress from end to means one stops in the last, or first, means. Again, that from this first means tending towards the end one cannot proceed to infinity is proved, first, because it is impossible that all things which are desired in that series be desired for the sake of another; therefore one must stop in something which is desired for its own sake; that, therefore, will be the ultimate end in that series, for in that particle, for its own sake, is included the negation of for the sake of another, which negation is also supposed in the antecedent, while we assume that not all objects, or all ends contained in one series, can be desired for the sake of another or ordered to another.

4. But this antecedent is proved, for I take the whole collection of ends and means (for whether it is finite or infinite, it can be conceived as a whole at once); of it, then, I ask whether it is desired for its own sake, or for the sake of another; this latter cannot be said, otherwise outside the whole collection there would be something, which involves contradiction; therefore the first must be given; therefore necessarily within that collection one must stop in something which is desired for its own sake. For since, beginning from the first means, it is chosen for the sake of the second, and the second for the sake of the third, and so on, unless one stops in some end intended for its own sake, the whole collection cannot be desired for its own sake, because neither by reason of all or of the single things which are in it, since many and almost all are desired for the sake of another; nor by reason of some one, unless something intended for its own sake is admitted; this, therefore, must necessarily be admitted.

5. An objection is satisfied.—It will perhaps be said that that collection is neither desired for its own sake nor for the sake of another, because it is not intended as a whole by way of one, but by parts (so to speak), that is, by loving the single things contained in that collection; and so it is said to be desired only by loving one thing for the sake of another. Hence it will also be granted that, although the collection of the things which are loved one for the sake of another is always finite, because proceeding from one to another one cannot pass through to infinity, nevertheless the desirable ends in that series are not finite, but proceed to infinity, and so it does not stop in some ultimate and desirable for its own sake.

6. But against this the reasons of Aristotle evidently proceed. The first, because in this way intention could never be begun, for it must be begun from something which is first in intention; but this can be none, if one proceeds to infinity in that way. For either that which is first in intention is loved for its own sake, and so the process ceases; or it is loved for the sake of another, and so it cannot be that first in intention, but that other for the sake of which it is loved; therefore, if one always proceeds from one thing loved for the sake of another to that other for the sake of which it is loved, there can never be a first in intention; therefore neither will there be a first intention; therefore intention can never be begun, because it is not begun except from some first.

7. The second reason (and it comes back almost to the same), because in this way final causality is taken away. The sequel is evident, for the intermediate end does not cause except in the power of the prior and dependently on it, as was declared and proved in the preceding disputation; therefore, if one proceeds to infinity from one to another prior, and never comes to the end first in intention, all the intermediates will not be able to cause anything, since all depend on that first and it never causes, or is not; necessarily, therefore, one must come to some one which is first in causing in this order, which we now call last in execution, because in the progress of means inquiry stops there. And this reason is declared, lest anyone think that in it the question is begged by supposing that there is a first end; for it is not supposed, but proved to be necessary, if there is to be final causality. But it is declared almost by the argument made at the beginning; for I take the whole series of ends collectively: either it is dependent in causing finally on another end, and this is impossible, otherwise the whole collection would not be taken; and moreover because then that whole could not cause except relying on another on which it is said to depend; about which the same question returns, for if that end is said to be independent, that is the ultimate which we are seeking; but it cannot be posited dependent, otherwise it would have been comprehended in the prior collection. But if the whole collection is independent in causing finally, it is necessary that within it there be some end independent of another prior in causing finally; for it is impossible that all things contained in the collection be dependent and the whole collection be independent, and by the same reason it is impossible that causality be begun unless in the collection of subordinated causes some one is independent. Which discourse we shall pursue more at length below in efficient causes, demonstrating that God exists.

8. The third reason of Aristotle, and the best, is that, while it is said that every means is desired for the sake of another and one never comes to something lovable for its own sake, the notion of good is destroyed, which per se is established to be most absurd. The sequel is evident, because the good useful for another is only good in a qualified sense and becomes desirable only by reason of another to which it is useful; but that which is such simply being taken away, it is necessary that that be taken away which is such only in a qualified sense, especially since it is such only through relation to others. The end desirable for its own sake being taken away, then, the good simply, which is per se good, is taken away, and consequently the good in a qualified sense is also taken away, because it no longer has whence it is good, nor whence it is rendered desirable. Hence it is an open repugnance to say that one thing is desirable for the sake of another, and this in turn for the sake of another, nothing existing desirable for its own sake. Aristotle has other reasons, both in the cited place and in I Ethic., c. 2; but these suffice, for the matter too is sufficiently clear.

Resolution about the ultimate end simply

9. I say secondly: there is also some end ultimate simply with respect to all things and particular ends and their co-ordinations, which is God Himself. This assertion is certain in the doctrine of faith, which St. Thomas hands down, I, q. 44, a. 4, and q. 103, a. 2; and with him the other theologians from that of Prov. 16: The Lord hath made all things for Himself; and Apoc. 21 and 22: I am Alpha and Omega. And the holy Fathers handed down the same, especially Dionysius, c. 10 De Divin. nom.; and St. Augustine, bk. I De Doctr. Christ., c. 23, and bk. XIX De Civit., from the beginning; and among the philosophers Aristotle touched upon it, XII Metaph., c. 10, and in the book On the World to Alexander, and Plato in the Timaeus, and bk. IV of the Laws, and Trismegistus in the Pimander.

10. But the difficulty is whether it can be demonstrated by evident reason that this ultimate end is one with respect to all things. For from those demonstrations by which it is proved that there is no process to infinity in ends, it cannot be sufficiently concluded that there is in this way some universal or common ultimate end to which all things are referred, and it to no other; for each thing can tend ultimately to its own proper end, and so in no series will there be a process to infinity in ends, even if there is no ultimate end common to all.

11. It is answered that it is one thing to ask whether there is some common ultimate end to which all things are ordered, another whether all and each thing intend and seek that end. Of this latter point we shall speak in the following section; now we treat only of the former sense. And in it we say that it is evident by natural reason that there is one ultimate end of all things, and that this is gathered from that principle that there is no progress to infinity in ends, two others being added which were also demonstrated above, namely, that there is one first effective principle of all things and that it operates for the sake of an end. From which the reason is concluded thus. The first efficient principle of all things produced, conserves and rules them for the sake of some end, and in its intention there is no process to infinity; therefore it operates all these things for the sake of some ultimate end; that ultimate end, therefore, which the first agent intends, is one, and consequently is the ultimate end simply of all things. This last consequence is proved, for the rest are clear. Because God cannot intend several ultimate ends, adequate to His intention, in His works; for even man cannot intend several ultimate ends in this way, as is demonstrated in I-II, q. 1, a. 5; much less, then, God, because to intend several ends pertains not to perfection, but rather to imperfection.

12. You will say that the reason is far diverse of man and of God; for man intends the ultimate end as his own end, in which he places his happiness and the sufficiency of all goods, and therefore it cannot happen that man at the same time intend two complete ultimate ends; for if he thinks that neither suffices for him without the other, neither is a complete ultimate end; but if he loves one of them as sufficient, the other cannot have the notion of ultimate end. But God, while He operates for the sake of the ultimate end, does not operate for the sake of His own ultimate end, but of those things which He creates; for in the foregoing it was shown that there is a difference between the created and the divine will, in that in the created will the act itself of the will is ordered, as to an end, to the object which it loves; but in the divine will by no means, but one thing willed is ordered to another as to an end. Thus, then, it will not be repugnant that God intend several ultimate ends of those things which He wills and operates outside Himself, because with respect to diverse things nothing is repugnant in there being diverse goods in which their ultimate perfection and as it were happiness consists. Just as several men can intend several ultimate ends, although one cannot. For so God behaves in intending for several things their ends. Hence it is confirmed; for the things of which God intends the ends are of diverse notions and natures; therefore they can also have various ultimate ends proportioned to themselves; therefore God too can intend those ends, as they are several, for various things.

13. Someone will say that God does not intend the variety and distinction of things except in order to something one, for example, the completion of the universe or something similar, and therefore it is necessary that in the procreation of things however distinct He intend one ultimate end. But this does not satisfy. First, because it is not so evident that God intends all created things for the composition or completion of one thing; for, although in corporeal things it so appears, of spiritual things it cannot be so proved by reason, most of all if spiritual things are compared with corporeal ones, and especially if God had produced several worlds, as He could have. Secondly, that is not enough for all things to be said to have one end ultimate simply, both because the very unity and constitution of the universe is something very imperfect for all things to be said to be ordered to it as to an ultimate end, and also because the very order of the things of the universe is ordered to the conservation of single things or species, and all corporeal things are ordered in some way to man, as Aristotle too acknowledged, I Polit., c. 5.

14. Wherefore this whole demonstration cannot be concluded otherwise than by demonstrating the last part of the conclusion, namely, that this ultimate end which the first efficient intends in its actions cannot be something other than itself; for hence it evidently follows that all things procreated, however diverse among themselves, just as they are united in one first principle, so are also united in one ultimate end, even if we feign some of them to be so constituted that among themselves one is ordered to another, or several to some one outside God. But the first proposition assumed is proved, because that which is to each agent the chief end of its actions is to it the best and greatest good, especially if the intention is ordered and right, as Aristotle taught, I Ethic., c. 7; but to the first agent nothing is the best and greatest good except its intrinsic goodness; therefore with respect to it nothing can be the ultimate end of its actions and effects except itself by reason of its goodness; for the ultimate end is chief in every intention and action. Moreover, because the notion of final cause is perfect and of itself pertains to perfection simply; therefore it belongs to God in the highest grade of perfection, both because every perfection simply is in God in the highest grade, and also because, since goodness is the notion of causing finally and God is the supreme good, it is necessary that He have the notion and perfection of final cause in the highest degree. But just as the highest perfection in the order of efficients is that it be first and most universal, so in the order of ends, that it be ultimate and most universal; therefore such perfection must necessarily be attributed to God. Moreover, every agent, inasmuch as it is agent, operates in some way for its own sake, and so is the end of its actions; therefore the first agent too operates all things for its own sake; therefore it is the end of all, since all things are from its action and effecting; but it is not a non-ultimate end, for such is always imperfect in its order; therefore it is the ultimate end. Finally, that axiom tends to this, that the order of ends is according to the order of agents; for the more perfect or universal an agent is, the more perfect or universal the end it intends; but God is the most perfect and most universal agent; therefore He intends the most perfect and most universal end. Read St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., cc. 17 and 18.

15. To the objection made above, then, it is answered that, although God does not act for His own sake as for the sake of His own end, but of His effects or actions, nevertheless He cannot have but one ultimate end of all of them, not because He seeks that end in order to be satiated and to have in it the sufficiency of all goods, but rather because He is supposed to have in Himself the sufficiency of all goods and supreme goodness and perfection, by which alone He could first be moved or invited to do good to others for His own sake. Hence, although it is true that of the very things which He creates He orders some to others as to ends, or rather connects all so among themselves that some serve others in turn, and in this way under God Himself other common or universal ends can be assigned to which single creatures, besides their private ends, are ordered by the Creator Himself, and especially to the order or beauty of the universe, yet simply nothing outside God can be said to be the ultimate end to which the divine intention or action tends. So much so that St. Thomas said, q. 3 De Potent., a. 15, ad 14, that even the very communication of the divine goodness is not the ultimate end, but the divine goodness itself, because the communication of the divine goodness is something created, whence it too is referred to the uncreated goodness, from love of which God willed to communicate Himself, not because it is advantageous or useful to Him, but because it befits Him and is consonant with His goodness. But St. Thomas adds there that God does not act from appetite of the ultimate end, but from love of Himself, because He does not act in order to obtain the ultimate end, but in order to communicate its goodness. Which indeed is true with respect to God Himself, because, as we have often said, He does not act for His own sake as for the sake of His own end; yet with respect to creatures it can also be said that God operates from appetite of the end, that is, desiring that creatures attain Himself as end.

16. God the ultimate objective end of creatures, not the formal.—From which it is also understood, since in the preceding disputation we distinguished a twofold end, objective and formal, that God is not called the ultimate formal end, but the objective end of creatures, either properly or broadly speaking of object, according to what we shall say in the following section. And the reason is that the formal end is not ultimate simply, since it is ordered to the objective, as was shown above. Likewise, because, although God is the supreme good, yet creatures do not attain it except inasmuch as they in some way participate it; hence the attainment of that supreme good, which is called the formal end, is always something created. Hence by the way a certain objection made above is solved, namely, how so great a variety of things and natures can be ordered to the same ultimate end; for the reason is that that is not the end as attainment, but as the good attained; but diverse things have diversity in the mode of attaining that end although they agree in the same ultimate end, just as they agree in the same first principle, yet differ in the mode or grade of emanation from it.

17. The end to which of the actions of God is God Himself.—Finally it is understood from what has been said that, although with respect to creatures God is the ultimate objective end, for the sake of which they either were created or themselves operate, yet with respect to the action of God Himself He is the ultimate end to which; for to Him all things are created or done, or rather He creates and effects all things for Himself. For every agent has the notion of end to which with respect to its action, whether through it it seeks its own advantage, as created agents commonly act, or only the communication and manifestation of its goodness, as God.