Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This question seems to coincide with that which is commonly treated about the object of the will, whether the will can be borne to the unknown; in truth, however, they are not wholly the same, although they are very connected; for, even if the will were borne to the unknown, the final cause would not on that account cause unknown, but rather it would then have to be said that the will elicits its act without the proper causality of the end about it, because then in truth the will would be moved not drawn nor moved by the object, but tending to the object from its sole efficacy. And so the present question does not wholly depend on that other, although conversely, if the will cannot be borne to the unknown, it is rightly inferred that neither can the end cause unless it is foreknown.

The end does not cause unless known

2. I say, then, first: in order that the end cause, it is wholly necessary that it be foreknown. This is the received opinion of all philosophers, whom we shall review below, and especially in the following section. And it is proved, first, a priori from the mode of causing of this cause, which is by metaphorically moving and alluring the appetite. For this metaphorical motion, as was explained above, is founded on the natural consensus and sympathy of intellect and will, which cannot be understood except by means of the acts of such powers; for while they do not operate, they neither move nor are moved, nor have any vital consensus. But in this consensus it is necessary that the act of the intellect precede, because it, through its act or object, behaves as mover and the will as moved; therefore for this metaphorical motion which the final cause exercises about the will, its previous cognition is necessary.

3. Secondly, because, in order that a real cause cause, it needs some being; but the final cause does not necessarily demand being of real existence proper and in itself; therefore at least it requires being in cognition, and so it comes about that the end often causes when it does not exist, as was seen above; but never if it is not known. So much so that, although sometimes it really exists, if it is not apprehended, it moves the affection not at all. So that for this cause, among others, it was deservedly said: Hidden treasure and unseen wisdom, what profit is there in either? And from the same root it comes about that the end, even if in reality it is good, yet if it is not known as such, but falsely apprehended as evil, does not allure but rather draws back the will.

4. The Aristotelian pronouncement.—Thirdly, this is confirmed a posteriori from the fact that the will can be borne only to the known good. Which truth is as it were a first principle and axiom of all philosophers and theologians. For Aristotle, III De Anim., c. 10, says that the appetible does not move unless perceived by mind or imagination; with whom all the interpreters there agree, and excellently St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 4, and I-II, q. 3, a. 4, ad 4, and q. 9, a. 1. And it is the express opinion of St. Augustine, bk. X De Trin., cc. 1 and 2: No one (he says) can love at all a thing wholly unknown; the same, bk. XV, c. 26, where he says that love arises in us from the knowledge of the mind; the same, bk. VIII, c. 4, and bk. III De Liber. arb., c. 25, and often elsewhere; and St. Gregory, bk. V Moral., c. 23, and bk. XXIII, c. 12, and bk. XXXI, c. 12; and excellently Bernard, book On the Interior House, cc. 18 and 19, and book On Grace and Free Choice, not far from the beginning, and sermons 7, 8 and 52 on the Canticle; and Anselm, in the Monologion, c. 48: No thing is loved without memory or understanding of itself.

5. But the a priori reason of this truth is to be taken from the principle posited by us in the assertion, namely, that the final cause cannot cause unless known; another being added, namely, that the will cannot move itself unless in some way finally moved, and therefore cannot be borne except with previous cognition. The minor or second proposition is established by experience; for vital appetite cannot begin its vital appetition from itself alone, unless in some way it is allured and moved by the appetible. But the reason can be given either from the general condition of a vital power, especially of one which acts by immanent action, which cannot act unless in some way moved or determined by its object; but this motion with respect to appetite is metaphorical. Or the reason can be given from the condition of appetite; for every appetite follows some being and some form or nature; but elicited appetition does not follow immediately from natural being itself or natural form, as is established, and therefore it is necessary that it follow the apprehended form and the known being which comes from it; hence, just as without natural being natural appetite does not follow, so neither without cognition does elicited appetite follow. But there is the difference that natural appetite, because in reality it is not distinct from the nature itself or the natural faculty, accompanies it as it were formally or as it were by natural sequel, in our way of conceiving; but elicited appetite is of a far other notion, and is an act distinct from the apprehended form or from the concept, both formal and objective; and therefore it is not caused by it formally, but finally by the good object applied through cognition.

Whether God can bring it about that the will loves the unknown

6. And from these reasons the theologians more frequently infer that not only according to the order of nature is it necessary that cognition precede elicited appetition, but also that by absolute power it is impossible that it happen otherwise, or that the will be borne to the unknown. Which opinion St. Thomas intimates in the places cited, and Henry teaches it more openly, Quodl. I, q. 15; and Gabriel, In II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 3; Denis the Carthusian, book On the Praises of the Solitary Life, aa. 36 and 37. And this opinion seems true to me and sufficiently proved by the reasons made above. But it is excellently declared from those two principles, namely, that the will in its act depends essentially on final causality, because it cannot desire unless metaphorically moved or aroused by the good which it is going to love; and that the final cause wholly necessarily and essentially requires to be known in order to cause, because metaphorical motion cannot be understood except by means of cognition, as has been sufficiently declared.

7. There were not lacking, however, theologians who said that God can bring it about that the will loves without previous cognition. So thinks Paludanus, In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2, n. 29; it is also commonly attributed to Gregory there, and to Ockham, q. 25, ad 7 and 15. Some mystical theologians too¹ asserted that in the highest contemplation one sometimes arrives at that state in which the will loves without previous cognition. These authors do not explain, however, whether then too the final cause causes without cognition, or whether the will then loves without the proper concurrence of the final cause; and indeed they would say this latter more consistently; for then the object would be only the terminus of the act of the will, but not the principle, and consequently not the cause. But if it were true that the will could love by receiving an act which it did not itself effect, that opinion would be more intelligible; for then it would be enough that that action, inasmuch as it is from an extrinsic cause, had also a final cause. Yet, since the will cannot love except by vitally eliciting love and moving and inclining itself through it in a vital mode, it cannot be understood that it begin in itself a motion of this kind unless aroused and allured by the object through final causality, which cannot be without cognition.

What kind of cognition is necessary for the causality of the end

8. But at once various questions occur here, which, because they are the same as are treated about the object of the will, I shall only indicate and refer to their proper place. One is, what kind this cognition is which is required for causing finally, namely whether intellective is necessary, or sensitive suffices. In which two can be included; one is whether sensitive cognition suffices to move the will, and this part does not pertain to the present; we suppose, however, that cognition of the intellect is necessary in order that the will be moved, because only the intellective power is proportioned to the will for moving it; of which matter it is discussed in I, q. 9, aa. 1 and 2, and it is touched upon by Cajetan, q. 10, a. 3, on account of certain words of St. Thomas there, ad 3, saying that the will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended through the intellect, but also by the particular good apprehended through sense, which are not to be so understood that the apprehension of sense is thought sufficient for such motion, but so that these material goods which sense apprehends can move the will too inasmuch as by means of sense they reach reason. The other part included in the said question could be hypothetical, whether, if the will were moved by an object apprehended only through sense, that motion would suffice for final causality, or (what is the same) whether that motion would be final causality, about which question the reason is the same as about the similar absolute question, whether the motion of the sensitive appetite by a good known through sense is final causality, which we shall explain in the last section of this disputation.

9. Another question, consequent upon the preceding, is what intellective cognition is necessary, namely whether apprehensive suffices, as Scotus, In II, dist. 6, q. 1, seems to opine, or judicative is necessary. Of which matter it is treated in I-II, q. 9, a. 1. And it can scarcely fall into doubt that judicative cognition is necessary about the object under the notion of the fitting and about its fittingness. Which is the open opinion of the Philosopher, II De Anim., c. 3, who in this sense says that bare phantasy does not move the appetite, but opinion; and in c. 7 he denies that the appetite is moved until a judgement of good or evil is present; and bk. IV Metaph., c. 4, text 18, is an excellent testimony. For he thinks it so ascertained that for a determinate motion of the will a determinate judgement about the fittingness of the thing to which the will is moved is necessary, that by this experiment he refutes the philosophers denying the first principle and shows that no thing at once is and is not, but only one of these determinately. The same is the opinion of St. Damascene, bk. II De Fide, c. 22; and of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, and I, q. 53, a. 3, and often elsewhere. And the reason is clear, because until the intellect judges the object to be fitting, it does not yet know its fittingness, for pure apprehension prescinded from every judgement is indifferent to that which is apprehended being reckoned so to be or not to be; and therefore he who only apprehends and does not judge that the stars are even does not know that they are even, but remains doubtful and ignorant; apprehension of this kind, then, about the fittingness of a thing cannot be enough to move the will, as experience itself also sufficiently teaches; therefore neither for causing finally; judgement, therefore, is required.

10. You will say: the sensitive appetite is moved without judgement from the apprehension of the object; therefore the will too can be so moved. It is answered that the antecedent is false; for, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 59, a. 3: The sheep flees the wolf from² a certain judgement, by which it reckons it harmful to itself. But such judgement in the brute is not through reasoning, nor through composition, nor through formal cognition of that notion on account of which the thing is fitting, but is through a simple and natural estimation of the fittingness of such thing. But the human intellect attains perfect judgement about fittingness and about the formal notion of such fittingness, both by composing and also by reasoning; but the superior intelligences judge in a superior way through simple acts. But whether sometimes in man, in order that the will be moved, cognition of the object through a simple act suffices, which, although it does not say that it is or is not so through formal composition and division, yet is not pure apprehension but includes virtual judgement and cognition that such object is fitting, is disputed by the theologians; and it is probable that such a mode of cognition can suffice for some simple affection of the will; and perhaps in this sense Scotus spoke above, and more at length Marsilius, In II, q. 16, a. 1; Major too and Gabriel, In II, dist. 6. Yet for the proper and formal motion for the sake of the end, of which we now treat, a more perfect judgement is necessary, which is not had without reasoning or composition or division, because it is necessary to know either the proper and formal fittingness which is in the end, or the proportion of the means to the end, which cognition is not had except through the comparison of one to another, which does not take place without composition and reasoning and the perfect judgement which is thence procured. And therefore the indeliberate operations of the will are not thought to be properly for the sake of the end, as St. Thomas noted, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, because, although they do not take place without some cognition of the intellect, yet it is imperfect, and in mode is like imaginary estimation. But here at once a doubt arose about the will of the insane, whether in it the proper causality of the end has place, of which I shall speak at once.

11. Again, it is commonly doubted whether this judgement must be practical or whether speculative suffices, of which matter too many things are disputed by the theologians in the cited places. But from what was said above by us about the use of human freedom, and about the mode in which the will can be determined by the judgement of the intellect, a sufficient resolution of the said doubt can be taken, so far as is necessary for the present. And because it depends much on the use of words, it is necessary to distinguish them. If, then, by practical judgement we understand some act of the intellect so judging of the end that per se and by its force it is able efficaciously to determine the will, so it must be said that such practical judgement is not required for final causality, because the motion of the end, or the judgement through which the end is applied, does not impede the use of freedom; for such practical motion would be wholly contrary to the will, as we showed above. But if by practical judgement is understood a judgement about the fittingness of the end, not only according to itself but also with respect to the man judging, not only in common and abstractly but also in particular here and now, and consequently judging not only about the object itself or end, but also about the act itself or tendency to the end, that is, so that not only the object is judged to be fitting, but also that here and now it is fitting to will it—if such a judgement (I say) is signified by the name of practical judgement, it is true that judgement practical in this way is required for final causality; and in the same sense, speculative judgement co-distinguished from this practical judgement does not suffice.

12. In which sense I understand the saying of Aristotle, III De Anim., c. 9, text 42: The contemplative intellect says nothing at all as to whether something is to be fled or pursued; but motion is always of one fleeing or pursuing something. For that he speaks there of practical judgement or command in this latter way and not in the former is evident from text 47, in which he adds: The intellect sometimes commands, and reason says to flee one thing or pursue another, but the man does not obey and is not moved, but acts by desire, as is wont to happen in the incontinent. But the reason why such judgement is required is clear, because, as was also said above, while the will is moved, it wills not only the object, but also in its way wills here and now its proper act and motion; therefore it is necessary that judgement be passed about this whole and about such fittingness. But that such judgement suffices is evident, because it sufficiently applies both the fittingness of the object and of the practical motion towards it; but whatever else is demanded can be founded neither in the notion of the final cause nor in the mode of operating of the will; indeed rather on that side on which it is free it is repugnant to it; therefore.

13. Whether the insane will something for the sake of an end.—But at once a difficulty occurs, because neither does such practical judgement seem necessary, otherwise the causality of the end will not have place in the insane or in children before the perfect use of reason, which seems to be against experience, because by words they show that they know the notion of good by which they are moved and the utility of the means to the end. It is answered by absolutely denying the sequel; for, although these men cannot exercise practical judgements in order to honest or depraved morals, because the cognition of honesty requires perfect use of reason and integral judgement, yet they can have practical judgement about the thing as here and now operable and fitting under some lower notion, as is the notion of the delightful or the notion of fitting or unfitting to animal nature, which is found in health, for example, and the utility which is in the means with respect to such end. For, although these are insane, they are not deprived of all discourse and reasoning, through which the final cause may be sufficiently applied so as to be able to have some causality of its own, although not the most perfect.

14. Whether cognition is a per se cause of finalizing.—Lastly, it can be inquired about this cognition, which we say is necessary for causing finally, whether it is required only as a condition necessary for this causality, or also as a principle or per se cause. Which doubt can have a twofold sense. One is whether the cognition of the end, besides that necessity which is taken on the part of the final cause, has another per se causality about the act of the will, on account of which too it is necessary. In which sense this question is not to be treated at present; for it coincides with that one, whether cognition concurs effectively to the act of the will as a proper principle per se inflowing into it, which matters nothing to the present question about the final cause. For it is certain, as I said above, that the final cause, which is applied through cognition, does not inflow effectively into the act of the will; but whether the very act of cognition by which such cause is applied has from elsewhere power for sufficiently causing the act of the will is irrelevant to final causality, although it is more probable that cognition does not have that power of effecting the act of the will, as was touched upon in the foregoing and is to be disputed more at length in the science of the soul. The other sense of that doubt is whether the being known which the final cause has through cognition is to it the notion of causing finally, and therefore cognition is not only a necessary condition but also a per se principle of this causality; and this doubt is commonly reckoned grave, which demands the following section.