Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The difficulty of this question can arise from a twofold head. The first is about means, whether they can exercise the causality of the end; for it seems manifest from the very terms that means cannot have the causality of the end; for only the thing which is the end can exercise the causality of the end; but the means is a thing distinct from the end; therefore it cannot exercise the causality of the end. On the contrary, however, is that the means as means allures the will to love it; therefore in this it exercises the causality of the end. And most of all because to one means another too can be ordered; then, therefore, that means which is prior in the order of intention exercises the causality of the end about the other which is ordered to it.

2. The second difficulty is about privations or negations, whether under this proper notion they can exercise the causality of the end, that is, judged and reckoned without error to be privations or negations, and not true beings. And the same of relations, especially of reason. And the reason of the difficulty is that these, as they do not have true entity, so neither goodness, and especially goodness lovable per se; therefore they do not have the power and proximate notion for causing finally. On the contrary, however, is that we often per se intend privations of this kind, and for their sake choose means, as someone's death, or something similar. Similarly we sometimes intend a relation of reason, as human dignities, or esteem among others, which consist in a relation of reason alone.

Whether means can exercise the causality of the end

3. About the former difficulty there are various ways of speaking. The first is that means too as means can exercise the causality of the end; in which this opinion openly contradicts the last part of the third assertion proposed in the preceding section. Gabriel, however, holds it, In I, dist. 38, a. 1, where, from the opinion of Gregory there, a. 1, he distinguishes that one end is most proper, another proper, another common or most common, and in this last way he says means have the notion of end and exercise its causality. Hence he says that even that means which is last in intention and first in execution, for the sake of which no other is chosen, participates the causality of the end. The foundation seems to be that every object of the will has the notion and causality of end; but the means as means, or that which is nothing but means, is an object of the will; therefore it participates the causality of the end. The minor is established, because the will truly and properly is concerned with the end by loving it; but that is the proper object of a power about which it is concerned. But the major is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, where he says that the end is the object of the will; but he speaks of the adequate object, both because he says that the end is related to the will as colour to sight; but colour is the adequate object of sight; and also because thence he infers that the will loves all things under the notion of end, because it loves all things under the notion of its object; which consecution would not be good unless the end were the adequate object. Aristotle also favours it, II Phys., c. 3, saying that end and good are the same; but the good is the adequate object of the will; therefore also the end.

4. The second way of speaking is that the thing which is a means, even if it is not loved for its own sake nor is lovable, can exercise the causality of the end, not however inasmuch as it is a means, but inasmuch as another means can be desired for its sake. Thus that means which is not first in execution, but intervenes between the end and the first means, is said to participate the causality of the end, not inasmuch as it is loved for the sake of the end, but inasmuch as another means is loved for its sake,¹ because under that notion it is that for the sake of which, and consequently has the notion of proximate end, and not of means. But that which is the first means, for the sake of which no other is loved, does not participate the causality of the end. Giles holds this opinion, In II, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2; Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, a. 1, and Ockham, In II, q. 3; and St. Thomas seems to favour it, III Cont. Gent., c. 2, where in the fourth reason he says: All intermediates between the agent and the ultimate end are ends with respect to the prior, and active principles with respect to the following; and in II Phys., lect. 5, he says that it is not of the notion of end that it be ultimate simply, but only with respect to the preceding. Aristotle thinks the same, I Ethic., c. 7, where he much favours this opinion, for he says that not all ends are perfect and desirable for their own sake; and in V Metaph. and II Phys. he numbers among ends instruments of art and riches, because they are made or acquired through other means, although they themselves too are means to further ends. But the reason has already been touched upon, because in them there is sufficient notion for moving the will to will something for their sake, and this is enough for exercising some office of final cause, even if they do not exercise all.

A principle necessary for the resolution of the question is established

5. Nevertheless I think it must be said that no thing can properly and (so to speak) by intrinsic denomination exercise the causality of the end except one which is per se good and desirable. Why I add those particles, properly and by intrinsic denomination, I shall declare below. I take this assertion, then, from Aristotle, II Metaph., c. 2, where he says that it is of the notion of end that other things be desired for its sake, but it itself not for the sake of others; where by this latter negation he circumlocutes that notion which we explain positively by saying that the end must be per se desirable through the proper goodness which it has in itself. For it is not of the notion of end, generally speaking, that it be not desired for the sake of another, but this is proper to the wholly ultimate end. Hence in I Ethic., c. 7, he says that in each series that is the end which is desired as ultimate, that is, in which the intention of all the means which are desired for the sake of the end rests. So too in II Phys., c. 3, he says that all means which are subordinated among themselves are for the sake of one end. Finally, in bk. I Magn. Moral., c. 2, he distinguishes: Of goods some are ends, others not; as health indeed is an end, but the cause of health is by no means an end, where he calls the cause of health a means to health. And it is proved by reason, for in each genus of cause that thing can cause in such genus which has the power or formal principle constituting in first act the cause of such genus; but goodness is the formal notion of the final cause, constituting it in first act sufficient for causing; therefore only that thing which has goodness can be a final cause by intrinsic power or denomination; but every thing, and that alone, which has in itself goodness and fittingness with respect to the appetent is per se good and desirable; therefore only a thing which is per se good and desirable can exercise the causality of the end.

6. You will say: the useful thing too, as such, has goodness in itself, since it has in itself utility, for utility is a certain species of goodness. But against this is what we said above in treating of goodness, disp. X, that the useful good, as such, is not something wholly intrinsic to the thing which is reckoned useful; for although utility, as it says only some power or efficacy, is something in the thing which is denominated useful, yet that whole utility is not good nor desirable as useful except on account of the goodness of the intended end, and as it underlies it. On account of which St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, deservedly said that useful things are not lovable for their own sake, but only by reason of the end. And therefore too the useful good as such is not reckoned good simply, nor by intrinsic denomination, because it is not per se fitting, but only as it underlies such end and from it receives fittingness as it were formally.

7. Secondly, then, I argue in this way; for that thing which is not per se good cannot move the will to love itself for its own sake; therefore neither can it move the will to love other things for its sake; therefore it can exercise no causality of the end. This second consequence is evident from what has been said, because the whole causality of the end is contained in those two heads. But the first antecedent too seems known per se from the terms, because, since only the good draws the appetite to love of itself, only that thing can draw the appetite to love itself for its own sake which according to itself and without order to another end is good. Hence it was not rightly assumed in the reason for doubting posited at the beginning that the means as means draws the will to love of itself; and further² it would be said that the end itself draws the will to love the means, for in truth to will the means for the sake of the end is nothing else than that the whole reason of willing it be the end itself; but the reason of willing is that which moves and attracts the will, and therefore it is also commonly called the motive of the will; but the means is as the material object, which is loved by reason of the end. And hence the prior consequence is easily proved, because what does not suffice to draw the will to love itself can much less draw the will to love another for its sake; but that thing which is not per se good cannot draw the will to love itself, as we have shown; therefore it can less draw the will to love another for its sake. The major is evident, both from that principle, that on account of which each thing is such is itself more such; and so, if the means is loved for the sake of the end, the end is loved more; therefore the thing which makes another be loved for its sake must make itself be loved more; therefore, conversely, that which cannot draw to love of itself will much less be able to draw to love of another for its sake. And also because the love of the means for the sake of the end proceeds from the love of the end; therefore, if the love of some thing as end cannot be caused by it, neither can the love of another thing for the sake of such end be finally caused by that end; which is to say that it cannot be an end, if by the name of end a true final cause is signified, as we are now speaking of it in order to the created will.

General reply to the proposed question

8. From this principle is gathered, first, the general reply to the question proposed in the title of the section, namely, that that thing can properly exercise final causality which has in itself goodness on account of which it is loved (either truly or in estimation, which is to be understood added in all similar expressions, lest it be necessary to repeat the same). This conclusion is evident from the preceding principle and its proofs. Wherefore we cannot descend in particular to designate the things which can cause finally, namely, whether God, or angel, or man, or substance, or accident, or riches, or honour, or other things of this kind, can cause finally; but in each and all it must be considered what goodness or fittingness they have per se, and, if they have any, according to it they will be able to be final cause, but if they have none, they will not be able. But only a twofold good is per se and according to itself good, namely the delightful and the honest, comprehending under the honest whatever is per se fitting to nature, and therefore whatever is such will be able under that notion to exercise the causality of the end; but what is not such never exercises the causality of the end except because it is reckoned such, and in this way riches or honours are often desired as end, although those things, if right judgement is passed on them, are not per se lovable or fitting, but only for the sake of another.

9. You will say: by the same reason the delightful good will not truly be sufficient for causing finally, because, if right judgement is passed on it, it is not lovable for its own sake, but for the sake of another. Indeed neither will knowledge, health and similar things be able to exercise final causality, because they are not lovable for their own sake, but for the sake of man. To the prior part it is answered by denying the sequel; for the reason is far diverse, because the delightful good, prescinded from every other extrinsic end, truly has in itself whence it is loved, and therefore is of itself able and sufficient for exercising the causality of the end; although, if it is to be desired by man with right, that is, honest, reason, one must not rest in it as in an end, but order it to some superior end, which is to be understood not only of the delightful good, but also of the good fitting to nature, or natural, as it is co-distinguished from the moral honest good. Hence for the sake of clarity it could be said that the delightful good according to true speculative or physical judgement is per se lovable, which is enough for it per se to suffice for exercising the causality of the end, and not only from the false estimation of the operator, but also from the proper force which it has in itself; although according to true practical and moral judgement, which is attended to through conformity to right and honest appetite, it is not to be desired as end by a man operating honestly. But it is otherwise of other things which lack all goodness of this kind; for these can be final causes neither according to practical judgement nor even according to true speculative judgement, but only from false estimation.

10. To the latter part it is answered by denying the sequel; for those things are truly lovable for their own sake, for they are per se fitting to nature. Nor does it matter that they are lovable only for man; for from this it only comes about that they are not lovable with the love of friendship, but of concupiscence, which does not prevent true and proper final causality, whatever Gabriel in the place cited above signifies. And it is evident, because such things, through the goodness which they truly have in themselves, allure and draw the will to themselves, according to their mode and capacity. For because they are such that by their nature they are adapted to man and are his perfections, therefore, although they are loved for their own sake, yet they are loved for man; and these two relations are not repugnant among themselves, nor are they compared as means to end, but as end of which and end to which, which integrate one complete end, as we saw above.

Resolution about the causality of means

11. Secondly, and chiefly, from the said principle is gathered the resolution of the prior difficulty about the causality of means. For the thing which is a means to another end can under some other notion be per se desirable, by reason of some goodness which it truly has in itself even prescinded from relation to that end, and under that notion there is no doubt that the thing which is a means can have final causality, because it does not have it as means. Indeed with respect to that it is something material and per accidens that such thing be a means or be loved for the sake of another end; nor is there any controversy about this. In another way, then, the thing which is a means can behave so that it has no notion of per se good, or at least does not cause through it nor is loved for its sake, but only inasmuch as it is useful; and under this consideration it must simply be denied that that thing as such is sufficient for exercising final causality. And indeed, if that thing is such that it is loved only for the sake of the end, the matter seems most evident, because then it is loved as pure means, which all philosophers distinguish from the end as end, and think rather pertains to the effect of the end than has the notion of cause. And all that we adduced in the proof of the first assertion confirms this too. But when this thing which is a means puts on the relation of terminus with respect to another means which is loved for its sake, it now seems in some way to participate the notion of end.

12. And therefore for the sake of greater clarity, and to declare the expressions of some grave authors, we can accommodate here the distinction which Gabriel adduces in the place cited; for it is one thing to speak of the end as it puts on the pure notion of terminus, another as it has the proper notion of final cause; for here we speak of it under this latter notion. And in this way we deny that such a means, even if another is ordered to it, exercises true final causality properly speaking and by intrinsic denomination, so to speak. And all that was adduced in the prior assertion proves this, because the means, even considered under this notion, does not have in itself whence it draws the will to love itself for its own sake, but the end itself, to which all the means are ordered, moves the will to love all the means and their subordination among themselves, or, what is the same, the same end moves the will to love some means immediately for its own sake, but some immediately for the sake of another means, but mediately or ultimately for its own sake. The very goodness of the end, then, is that which proximately and finally moves, although it does not always proximately and immediately terminate the relation or habitude of the means to the end; but final causality consists in metaphorical motion; this, therefore, is not in the means, even inasmuch as another is ordered to it, but is only in the end. And it is confirmed from the specification of the acts of the will, or of all the elections of means tending to the same end; for all those receive their species and honesty or malice from the end itself, as the theologians hand down more at length, in I-II, q. 18; therefore it is a sign that, although one means is ordered to another, yet, if all are desired only as means, only the end for the sake of which all are desired is that which through its goodness finally causes all those elections.

13. But if we speak of the end only as it is the terminus of the ordination or relation of another to it, so one means is called the end of another which is ordered to it, because it is the terminus to which it is proximately referred. For the remote means, as such, has no fittingness and proportion with the end except with the proximate means intervening; and therefore it is proximately ordered to it; therefore under this notion such a means participates the notion of proximate end. And the testimonies of Aristotle and St. Thomas adduced in favour of the second opinion confirm this; the common mode of speaking too favours it; for it is absolutely said that one means is loved for the sake of another; from which kind of expression Aristotle everywhere gathers the notion of end. You will say: if the means participates the office and notion of end under the notion of terminus to which another means is ordered, why will it not also participate the causality of the end, which consists in metaphorical motion? For the reason seems equal. Most of all because, just as, for example, the love of health moves to procuring evacuation or digestion, or something similar, so the desire of evacuation moves to taking a potion, or to walking, or another similar means.

14. It is answered, first, that the difference is that the proximate ordination of one means to another is attended according to that which is material in them, namely, inasmuch as one means can be the effective cause of that effect, and so one means can very well be ordered to another, and conversely one can be the proximate terminus of the ordination of the other according to that which truly and really is in it; and so it can participate the notion of end as terminus. But final causality formally comes from the end inasmuch as it is good, and because the goodness of the end is not intrinsically participated by the nearer means, even if another is ordered to it, therefore the causality of the end is not so participated by it as the notion or habitude of terminus. But the motion or natural resultance which is between the acts of the will themselves (inasmuch as from one the will is aroused to another) is not to be confused with final causality; for that causality between acts is rather effective than final, whether it is through proper physical efficiency or through natural sympathy and consent, of which elsewhere, for at present it does not matter. But the final notion is from the object itself; and therefore, although the desire of one means causes or arouses the desire of another, nevertheless in the genus of final cause that whole motion comes from the same end.

15. Unless someone finally wishes to say that, just as the means from conjunction with the end becomes lovable and desirable, so it becomes able to cause finally, at least the election of another means for its sake, and so participates final causality. Which indeed in reality is not diverse from what we have said; for at most this can be attributed to the means through a certain extrinsic denomination. For just as the means does not receive from the end some intrinsic goodness by which it becomes desirable, but only through extrinsic denomination and as it were information receives from it fittingness and objective desirability, so at most through a similar extrinsic denomination it can participate final causality; in very truth, however, that whole causality comes from the end itself and its goodness; and therefore I often said in the foregoing that properly and by intrinsic denomination only the end exercises final causality.

16. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: then, in the way in which the notion of end is attributed to means to which others are ordered, so it can be attributed to the means which is first in execution and last in the way of intention; for, although no other extrinsic means is ordered to it, yet the very act of the will which is terminated at it is ordered to it; hence too it can be said to be for its sake, according to the doctrine handed down above, sect. 3. Again, although that means through intrinsic goodness does not draw the will, yet as conjoined to the end, just as it is rendered desirable and fitting by it through extrinsic denomination, so through the same it can be said to cause finally, not through itself, but through the end as through its extrinsic form. It is answered, first, that it is no great drawback to grant this whole, which pertains more to the mode of speaking than to the thing. And if someone wishes to sustain the opinion of Gabriel in this way, he easily can; for St. Thomas too, I, q. 5, a. 6, calls the useful good as such the proximate terminus of the motion of the will. Nevertheless that mode of speaking, especially as to the participation of causality through extrinsic denomination, seems to me very improper; for strictly it is not the means which moves, but the end to the means, as I said above. Yet as to the habitude of terminus it can be said to be participated by the first means, inasmuch as it is the material object with which the act of the will is concerned, which alone St. Thomas in the cited place intends. Indeed under that notion under which the act is said to be for its sake, it no longer has the notion of first means; for the act itself in a certain way takes on the notion of the prior means, as I declared in sect. III.

The foundations of the other opinions are satisfied

17. What the adequate object of the will is.—The foundations of the other opinions almost do not need new solution, because in declaring the true opinion they have been partly solved, partly accommodated to confirming what we have said. Only to that which we objected in favour of the prior opinion about the adequate object of the will, it must be said that the object of a power is twofold, material and formal; the end, then, cannot be called the adequate material object of the will, because means too are the matter about which the will is concerned, as has been said; but the end can be called the adequate formal object, because whatever the will loves is either end or for the sake of the end; and St. Thomas intends this in the cited place. When, therefore, it is said that every object of the will has final causality, it is to be understood of the formal object, not of the material. And in the same way is to be understood what Aristotle says, that end and good are the same; for he understands it of the good simply, which is good in itself and per se; in which sense he also said, I Ethic., c. 7, that the good of each thing is that for the sake of which it operates. And what others say comes back to the same, that the end is the adequate motive object of the will, but not the terminative, and that final causality properly belongs to the motive object, but not to the purely terminative. Conrad, however, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, says that the end is the adequate per se object of the will, but the means is the per accidens object; which comes back to the same, provided that per accidens is not so understood that the will is thought not to attain the means itself in itself; for so it would be false that means are objects per accidens, for they are properly and in themselves loved; but per accidens is to be understood as through another, namely, through the end, and in this way only the per se object of the will can have final causality.

18. Whether there is some act of the will not caused by the end.—You will say: then there is no act of the will which is not from the final cause, because there is none which is not from its adequate formal object; but this seems false, both because there is some act in the will which is concerned neither with the end nor with means, as Scotus and some other theologians contend, In I, dist. 1; and also because simple complacency, or ineffective desire of an impossible thing, is not caused by the end, since it in no way moves to the attainment of the end. This objection demanded a long disputation, whether there is in the will a neutral act which is not caused by the end; but because this is not of our purpose, it is briefly answered to the argument by granting the sequel, namely, that there is no act in the will operating with reason and some deliberation which is not an effect of the end, as the reason made rightly proves and can be confirmed from all that was said in sect. 3. But to the prior part of the objection, we deny that there is an act in the will which is not in some way either about the end or about a means for the sake of the end, which Gregory proves at length, In I, dist. 1, q. 1, especially from Augustine, I De Doctrina christiana, c. 8, where he brings back all lovable goods to the goods which are to be enjoyed or used, that is, which are ends or means. Which Aristotle also thinks, III Eth., cc. 3 and 4, and it is also taken from St. Thomas, I Cont. Gent., c. 86. And the reason is that between the good lovable for its own sake and the good lovable only for the sake of another no middle can be found. For what Scotus thought, that the good in common or abstractly taken can be a middle, is not true, because the good in common is not abstracted except as per se lovable, because the other, which is loved only for the sake of an extrinsic end, is not good simply, but analogically and through extrinsic denomination, in which no common abstract concept is given, as is established from the foregoing. To the other part of the objection it is answered that in that simple or ineffective act about an impossible object, the impossible object itself is not loved by way of an end to be sought or attained, but either the delight itself which is taken from that act is loved by way of end, or some notion of good is loved which is represented in that impossible object either absolutely or under condition. For that is what moves the will to that simple affection, and that too is what participates the causality of the end, not indeed as to intention or election, but only as to the simple affection; for this too is concerned with the end.

How privations participate final causality

19. Finally, from what has been said above the resolution of the second difficulty posited at the beginning, about negative or privative objects, is plainly easy. To which some answer that the good which can cause finally is not to be taken so strictly as to be convertible with true real being, but more broadly inasmuch as it is convertible with being, as it analogically comprehends also privations or negations, according to what was said above, disp. XI, sect. 3, n. 3. For, as Aristotle said, V Ethic., c. 1, the lesser evil is in a certain way good; privations, then, and negations, although in truth they do not bring goodness, yet inasmuch as they remove some disadvantage, are reckoned to have some fittingness, by reason of which they can cause finally, which opinion is true in substance; but we can add that the lack of evil does not have the power of causing finally except in virtue of some positive good; and it can deservedly be said that a privation is loved more as a means to obtaining a good or to fully enjoying it than properly as an end, and therefore that that causality of the end which is in the effect of some privation is rather to be attributed to the good by reason of which that privation is loved than to the privation itself. For someone loves to lack pain for the sake of the delight opposed to it, or certainly for the sake of the love of his nature and the state fitting to it, such as is freedom from pain, even if another positive will is lacking. This only seems to stand against this doctrine, that sometimes someone can love not to be simply, which love cannot be caused from the love of some positive good, because not to be simply and absolutely leaves no foundation of positive good. But it must be said that even not to be itself cannot be loved, nor have the power of moving the affection, except from the love of the advantage of being itself; for no one loves not to be except to avoid some grave disadvantage of being itself, which is apprehended as greater with respect to his own nature, which he loves for its own sake, than wholly to lack being. And so it comes about (which is wonderful) that from excessive love of his own being someone can desire not to be. Read St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 2; Hervaeus, Quodl. VIII, q. 8; Durandus, In IV, dist. 50, q. 2; Ferrariensis, III Cont. Gent., c. 19; Soncinas, IX Metaph., q. 16.

How relation participates the causality of the end

20. To the other about relations, some contend that not only real relations but also those of reason can exercise the causality of the end. Others deny that power even to real relations, as Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 1, and quite consistently, if he holds that real relation has no perfection. And certainly I think that no relation either of reason, or of those real ones which are called predicamental and are thought to be only through resultance from foundation and terminus—none (I say) of these relations is lovable for its own sake, but only by reason of its foundation or on account of the concomitance of its terminus; for he who loves fame does not love the resulting relation, but the real esteem of himself, which he thinks very fitting to himself, and so of others. Wherefore, if false estimation does not intervene, these can never exercise final causality. But it is otherwise of transcendental relations, which per se have their entities or are included in the concepts of some absolute things; for therefore they can be per se good and fitting, as is evident of the habitude of knowledge, of sight, and similar things, and so they can exercise this causality. I omit also the divine relations, which by another superior reason can obtain this causality, most of all since they essentially include the whole goodness and perfection of the essence.