Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The sense of the present question is established from the preceding; for we are not inquiring into the notion of causing inasmuch as it says causation in second act, but inasmuch as it says the as it were formal first act constituting the final cause proximately apt and sufficient for causing. For just as in the efficient cause we distinguish the thing which causes from the proximate notion of causing, so in the final it seems necessary, because wholly the same thing can be both efficient principle and final and formal cause; it is necessary, therefore, that it exercise these offices under diverse notions; therefore that notion under which it exercises the office of final cause will be that which proximately constitutes the final cause as it were in first act.

Resolution of the question

2. About this matter, then, the common consent of all the Doctors seems to be that goodness is the proximate notion under which the end moves; and so that it is that which constitutes the final cause, giving (so to speak) power for causing. So St. Thomas thinks, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, and more at length III Cont. Gent., cc. 2 and 3, where he shows that to operate for the sake of the end is the same as to operate for the sake of the good; and I, q. 5, a. 4, he proves that the good has the notion of end; and there, in the solution ad 2, he declares of this causality that saying of Dionysius, c. 4 De Divin. nom., The good is diffusive of itself, namely, by finally attracting and alluring the will. Alexander of Hales has the same doctrine, I p., q. 17, memb. 3, and q. 34, memb. 1; and it is taken from Aristotle, II Phys., c. 3, text 31, where he says that end and good are the same, which he also repeats in V Metaph., c. 2; and in bk. I Ethic., c. 7, he says that that is to each the good for the sake of which he operates the other things; the same in bk. I Eudemian Ethics, towards the end. The reason, however, is that the causality of the end consists in the metaphorical motion of the will, by which it allures it to itself; but nothing allures the will to itself except inasmuch as it is good; therefore goodness is the notion of moving the will; therefore it is also the notion or principle of causing finally. I suppose the minor as certain, from the common consent of theologians and philosophers, saying that the will cannot be borne to anything except under the notion of good, according to that saying, the good is that which all things desire.

Whether evil as evil can be a final cause

3. But at once a controversy occurs with Ockham and other nominalists, saying that the will can be borne to evil under the notion of evil. So Ockham, In III, q. 13, dub. 3. Scotus also inclines to it, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, towards the end, and In II, dist. 43, q. 2. From whose assertion it plainly follows that evil as evil can also metaphorically move the will and consequently have the causality of the end, for if evil can be loved for its own sake, other things too will be able to be loved for its sake, if they are necessary and useful for obtaining it. And so it will come about that goodness is not the adequate notion and power of the end for causing finally, but it will be entity or something of this kind, as Ockham signifies.

4. Nevertheless this opinion is antiquated and deservedly rejected by the schools, as repugnant to the consent of Aristotle, Dionysius, Augustine, St. Thomas and all who think rightly, as is evident from Aristotle, bk. I Ethic., c. 1; Dionysius, c. 4 De Divin. Nom.; Augustine, II Confess., cc. 6 and 8; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8, a. 1, and the other theologians, In II, dist. 43; Henry, Quodl. I, q. 17. See also Gregory of Nyssa, book On the Making of Man, c. 20; and Damascene, bk. II De Fide, c. 22. For the common axiom of all these is that no one operates intending evil. And this is most evident by experience. And the reason is that the faculty of the will would be most disorderly instituted if it could be borne to evil inasmuch as it is evil. For what can be more disordered than to will evil because it is evil? But the will can will nothing by elicited appetite except what is consonant with some natural inclination of the will itself, because from such inclination every elicited appetition is born, at least natural, because every appetition of this kind is referred to the object adequate and proportioned to the will or some part of it; but the natural inclination of the will is to that whole object; if, then, the will could be moved by its proper act to evil as evil, its natural inclination too would be to evil as evil; the natural inclination itself, therefore, would be disordered. But this is wholly repugnant, both because it was most wisely instituted by the best author, and also because it would be repugnant to itself. For the end or institution of the will is that through it man seek things fitting to himself and flee things unfitting; if, then, it had received an inclination to tend to the unfitting inasmuch as it is unfitting, it would formally and directly be repugnant to itself and to its end; and therefore Damascene rightly said, bk. II, c. 22: The will is borne to acting in those things which are consonant with nature. As Seneca said, bk. IV De Benefic., c. 17: Nor has anyone so departed from the natural law and put off the man as to be evil for the mind's sake.

5. And it is confirmed, for it is impossible that the intellect give assent to the false inasmuch as it is false; therefore also that the will pursue evil inasmuch as it is evil. The consequence is evident, because as the intellect is compared to the true, so the will to the good; and so great is the repugnance from the very terms between pursuit and evil as between assent and the false. Also, because if the intellect cannot judge by assenting to the false, then it cannot judge that evil as evil has whence it may be loved, for that is evidently and from the very terms false and repugnant to every intellect. Of which there is an open sign (that we may by the way solve all the arguments which are commonly made to the contrary), because we never judge that something is to be loved or pursued which otherwise we know to be evil, except because we judge it advantageous either for delight, or for taking vengeance, or for another similar utility. Therefore neither can the will be borne to evil as such, or what is known only to be evil. The consequence is evident, because, as will be said below, the will cannot be moved except by means of a judgement of reason by which something is sufficiently proposed as either to be desired or desirable.

6. And hence finally a reason is taken which pertains to the matter of which we are treating, because in evil as such, inasmuch as it is evil, there is nothing which can be apprehended or reckoned as a sufficient reason on account of which the will is moved. For either in evil the malice is considered, or the entity which underlies the malice. Malice per se and formally taken has nothing by which to allure or attract the will, because it itself is nothing, as we said in the foregoing. But the entity which can underlie malice has something of goodness; hence, if it moves the appetite, this is by reason of goodness. And it is confirmed, for in the election of means it is impossible that the will choose something as a means to the end because it is unfitting, or impedes the attainment of the end, which would be to choose the evil opposed to the useful good under the notion of evil; therefore in the intention or love of the end it is impossible that it be borne to something as to an end because it is per se unfitting, which is to will under the notion of evil opposed to the good desirable for its own sake. The antecedent seems known per se from the terms; for how can it be understood that someone from the intention of the end chooses what is repugnant to the end, inasmuch as it is such? For this would be a contradiction in the will itself. Indeed rather all who think rightly teach that, when there is a single useful means to the end, it cannot happen that the will does not choose it, if it truly and efficaciously intends the end; much more impossible, then, is it that it choose a useless means, as such. But the first consequence is proved, because evil as in itself evil is as repugnant to intention as the useless as useless to election; for just as the election of the useless, as useless, is repugnant to the intention of the end, so the intention of evil as per se evil is repugnant to the natural and adequate propension of the will.

Whether the indifferent as such can be a final cause

7. You will say that these arguments sufficiently prove both that evil as evil cannot cause finally and that good as good can, yet do not prove that only the good can have causality of this kind, or that goodness is the adequate notion of finalizing. Because between good and evil there can be an indifferent, either in reality, or at least by precision of the mind, inasmuch as the notion of being or of true can be considered prescinded from the notion of good; therefore this can be a sufficient reason for moving the appetite, and consequently for causing finally. I answer that in reality there can indeed be a being indifferent according to some notion of good, but not according to every one, because being cannot not be good, and so, when a being indifferent under some notion moves the will, it does not move it inasmuch as it is indifferent, but inasmuch as it has some notion of good. But if it happens that some being is indifferent under every notion of good with respect to the appetent, that is, that it is neither honest nor base, nor pleasant nor troublesome, nor fitting to nature nor unfitting (which perhaps cannot be found), yet, that being posited, such being could not have final causality in the will; because it would have no fittingness or conformity with it; but the will, since it is essentially appetite, is inclined only to the fitting as such; hence, since the notion of being of itself is indifferent to the notion of fitting and unfitting to the appetent, it is not of itself sufficient to move the appetite. But if sometimes some being seems to move the will only because it is not reckoned unfitting, this is because in every being something of goodness and perfection is apprehended to be in it, which, if from elsewhere it has no unfittingness, by that very fact is reckoned fitting by reason of its perfection.

8. Indeed, because that which is good in itself can be either fitting or unfitting to man, therefore not any goodness whatever, but goodness according to some fittingness to the appetent, is the sufficient notion of finalizing. On account of which Aristotle said, VIII Ethic., c. 5: The good indeed is lovable, but to each his own. How this is to be understood requires a long and theological disputation, both on account of the love of friendship and most of all on account of the love of God above all things. Now let it only be briefly noted that the proper good must not be understood only as that which turns to one's own advantage, but simply as that which per se befits or is consonant with the nature of the appetent. In which sense every end is comprehended, even if it pertains to the most perfect love of friendship.

9. Again someone will say: the will is not always moved by the end to obtain something, but often also to avoid something; but to this it is moved by the end by reason of malice; therefore not only the good but also evil as evil can have some final causality in the will. It is answered that, when a mobile withdraws from one terminus so as to approach another, the terminus a quo is not the end of that motion, nor does it arouse the mobile (we speak metaphorically) to withdraw from it, but the end is the terminus itself to which the mobile is borne, and if it could be finally aroused, it would be drawn only by it and consequently by reason of it would withdraw from the other terminus. So, then, the will is properly moved only by the good as by the end by which it is drawn to approach it through love, intention, etc.; but thence follows withdrawal from evil, which is not so much motion towards the end as something consequent upon the tendency to the end and as it were a certain means to obtaining the end. Hence to that very act which is hatred of evil, evil does not move except in the power of the good, because evil is not held in hatred except by reason of the good loved, and so in that act too goodness can be said to be the notion moving to pursue with hatred the opposite evil. For to hate evil under the notion of evil is nothing else than to hate it because it deprives of good, and so goodness is for those things the notion principally moving, as we shall say in a like case a little below about the election of means.

10. Finally someone will say: sometimes lesser goodness moves the will more to love than greater malice to withdraw, and conversely lesser malice sometimes moves more to flight than great goodness to pursue the end; therefore by the same reason it can happen that the will withdraws from the good inasmuch as it is good, or even if it is not evil, and conversely that it is borne to evil even if it is not good, because, as the dialecticians say, as simply to simply, so more to more, and conversely. It is answered: just as only the good can move the will, so too only the greater good, so far as concerns itself, moves more, provided it is sufficiently proposed. But that the will sometimes is not so moved comes from the freedom of the will itself. But this does not suffice for it to be borne to evil under the notion of evil, both because freedom cannot be exercised outside the object of the will, and also because, by the very fact that the will is borne to evil to experience its freedom, it is no longer borne under the notion of evil, but under some notion of the useful. Although this experiment of freedom always supposes in the object a sufficient notion of good or evil which on its part can found such use of freedom. But for this use, if it is only as to exercise, it suffices either that the goodness of the object, or the act itself or the love of it, be not reckoned necessary, as was handed down in the foregoing when we treated of free causes.

11. Hence, although the good, so far as concerns itself, is more efficacious in its genus for causing finally, yet, because it cannot actually cause unless the will itself lets itself be moved, or cooperates in its genus with its motion, which by its freedom it can not do, therefore from this head it can happen that a lesser good actually causes finally, a greater good being passed over. Which yet it could not do if it had no goodness, because then the notion of causing would be wholly lacking, without which the freedom of the will does not suffice for it to be moved, although, in order that it be not moved, the lack or negation of a necessary good suffices (as I said), even if it is not evil. But it will be otherwise if the use of freedom is not only as to exercise but also as to specification through a contrary act of hatred or similar, for then it is necessary that some notion of evil appear in the object, for hatred properly taken can be concerned only with the notion of evil.

12. I say secondly: not only the true good which is or can be in reality, but also the apparent good or that which is only reckoned, can be sufficient for exercising its final causality. So St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 8, a. 1. And it is sufficiently established by experience, for a man is often moved to seek some things which appear good, or delightful, which in truth are not such. Which is also manifest in the election of means; for we often choose what we reckon to be useful for the end, which afterwards we experience to be useless, or even impeding. The reason, however, is that the final cause does not cause except as known, as we shall say below; but, as regards cognition, the thing which is reckoned good behaves in the same way as if it were good in reality itself, because the same judgement is passed about it and it is reckoned equally true, and finally it is represented or proposed to the will in the same way.

13. This, however, commonly seems difficult in this conclusion: since final causality is true and real, how can a notion only feigned or reckoned suffice for this causality? For real causality cannot arise except from a real principle; but that goodness only apparent is nothing real, but rather feigned; therefore neither can it cause really. Indeed such goodness, since it is not in things but only in reason, does not seem able to be sufficient for moving the will metaphorically, for the will is borne only to things themselves inasmuch as they are good.

14. It is answered, first, that this final causality is real in such a way that it takes place in a certain moral and intellectual mode through the natural sympathy which is between the will and the intellect, and therefore for it no other real being is required in the cause except that which suffices for the motion between these powers through their natural consensus, and, because for that real being as represented in the intellect suffices, even if in reality it is not true, therefore apparent goodness too can suffice for final causality, although it is not true. And this is almost what St. Thomas says in the cited place, that elicited appetite follows the apprehended form and therefore for its motion apprehended or reckoned goodness suffices, even if it is not true.

15. But it can be added further that it is one thing to speak of goodness, another of the good thing, for the will is sometimes moved by a thing which is not truly good; in which sense the conclusion posited proceeds, namely, that sometimes a good only apparent causes finally. Nevertheless it can be said that the will is never moved except by true goodness; for it is never moved except either by delight, or by honesty, or by the advantage of nature, all which are true goodnesses (I omit the appetite of good in common, in which there is no deception). Hence in the proper formal notion which moves there is never deception, but this intervenes in the application of this formal notion to this or that thing, and for this reason indeed the thing which appears good moves; but the moving notion is not apparent but true goodness, although it is falsely attributed to such thing. As, for example, if someone loves theft in order to give alms from it, he is indeed moved by a reckoned good, yet by true goodness and honesty, namely by the honesty of mercy which he reckons to be in such act. And the same holds when a man seeks some object which he thinks delightful, but which in reality is not delightful, for he seeks true delight and is moved by it alone, but errs in applying it to a thing in which it truly is not. In this sense, then, it can be said that the notion of causing finally is always some true goodness, although it is not always some true good, because such goodness is not always apprehended or judged of the thing in which it truly exists.

16. I say thirdly: only that good which is good in itself or per se is sufficient for exercising final causality. It is declared, for the good, as we treated above, is only either honest, or delightful, or useful; of which the first two are good in themselves and per se, but the third only through relation to them, all which were explained there. The first two goods, then, suffice for exercising final causality, which can easily be proved. For the causality of the end consists in two things, or in one of them, namely, that it move the will to love the end for its own sake and other things for its sake, or to execute them; but each of those goods can achieve each of these. For the honest good is most desirable for its own sake as per se becoming, or per se fitting to nature; indeed this is the very notion of the honest good, as we noted in the said place with St. Thomas, I, q. 6, a. 6. But of the delightful good the same St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, from Aristotle, X Ethic., c. 2, that it is foolish to ask why it is desired, for delight itself per se has whence it is desirable. These two goods, then, are sufficient for causing the first motion towards the end for its own sake.

17. But from this motion is born another, which is to the means for the sake of the end; for that same good which is loved for its own sake moves to love other things for its sake, if they are necessary or useful for obtaining the good loved for its own sake. Each of these goods, then, is per se sufficient by reason of its goodness for exercising final causality as to each of its parts. In which office they behave mutually as exceeding and exceeded, for the delightful good both as regards us is wont to move more and to draw the appetite to itself, and delight is in a certain way the last perfection of operation lovable for its own sake; but the honest good, the greater and per se nobler it is, the more powerful it is of itself and by its nature for exercising this causality, and it can also cause nobler effects in this genus. Indeed rather, if we look to the institution of nature, only the honest good should have the proper notion of end, for delight from the intention of nature is not for its own sake, but for the sake of the operation to which it is joined, and therefore must be loved for its sake, of which more at length elsewhere.

18. But of the useful good, since it is not per se good, it appears sufficiently manifest that it is not sufficient for exercising final causality, because the useful good as such is not per se lovable; therefore it is not sufficient for exercising the first motion of the end. Again, inasmuch as it is useful, it is not that for the sake of which another is loved, for rather it itself is loved for the sake of another; therefore neither can it exercise the second motion or causality of the end. Indeed rather under that notion it is the effect of the end, because it is that which is made or loved for the sake of another; therefore the useful good as such cannot exercise final causality. Only honest goodness, then, whether moral or natural, and delightful goodness, can be the proper notion of causing finally. But here at once the difficulty about means occurred, whether they can exercise final causality, which we shall treat better in the following section.