Disputationes metaphysicae

1. We are not now inquiring into the notion of causing in first act, so to speak, or that which in the final cause is the proximate notion by which it is able so to cause, for of this we shall speak in the following section; but we are inquiring into the causation itself in second act, namely what it is, and where or in what subject or effect it is; for this, although in the other causes it is difficult to explain, in this one is in truth most difficult, because it does not appear what thing or what real mode this causality can be; but if it is none of these, neither will it be able to be real causality.

The first opinion is weighed

2. Some, then, easily extricate themselves from this difficulty, saying that this causality is nothing else than that the action or effect is made for the sake of the end, or on the end's account. For Aristotle did not explain this causality of the end otherwise than by saying that it is that for the sake of which something is made. Hence Cajetan, II-II, q. 17, a. 5, excellently teaches that, just as in the agent there is the notion of acting which is in it, and the effect, and the causality, which is as it were a middle between the notion of acting and the effect, so in the end there are those three: the notion of finalizing, finalization, and the effect. But he says that finalization is something unnamed, and is signified only by these words, to be that for the sake of which, or to be made for the sake of another, and that this causality cannot be explained further, nor can it be understood what else it is, nor yet where it is. For if it is said to be in the will, against this is, first, that this cannot be saved in the will of God, nor in natural agents, which also operate for the sake of an end. And next it must be inquired in our will what it is, for either it is something antecedent to the act elicited by the will itself, and this not, according to the true and sound doctrine, because in the will nothing is received before the act elicited by it, as was sufficiently proved above in treating of the concurrence of the first cause. I omit supernatural habits, which are sometimes infused before every act, because they hold the place of the power, or complete it, and so do not come into the present consideration. Likewise, because if anything were received in the will, it would have to have some efficient principle outside it, which is none besides the final cause itself; but this as such is not active, otherwise the causalities would be confused. Besides which the end would have efficiency without real being. And therefore Aristotle deservedly said, I De Gener., text 55: The cause for the sake of which the others are made is not active, and health itself is not active except by transference. Nor yet can it be said that that principle is the intellect or its act, because it is improbable that the intellect by itself alone can impress something on the will, and next it cannot be explained what that is. And moreover this is little consonant with the freedom of the will. Or else that which is said to be the causality of the end in the will is the very act of the will, and this not, because this is the effect; but causation must be in some way distinct from the effect. Add moreover that in commanded acts it will not be possible to explain what this causality is, because in acts of this kind the end itself inflows nothing immediately; and much less will it be possible to explain it in the effects of God and of natural agents.

3. This opinion has great difficulty in this, that it does not declare the matter, for by those words, that for the sake of which, there is declared not so much the causality of the end as a certain denomination resulting in the end itself from the fact that something else is ordered to it; which denomination cannot be causality, both because it is not something real in the effect, but something of reason in the cause or an extrinsic denomination, which is the same; for that God is that for the sake of which a thing is made is not something intrinsic in things, nor in God Himself, but is an extrinsic denomination of God taken from the things themselves; and also because in those words the end is not signified as principle, but rather as terminus, and therefore there is not signified some emanation or influx of the final cause into the effect, which seems to be of the notion of every causality. And it is confirmed, first, because otherwise in every motion with respect to its terminus there would be most proper causality of the end, and in every act with respect to its object; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is evident, because the terminus is that for the sake of which the motion is, and the object that for the sake of which the act is. But the minor is evident, because otherwise the causality of the end would no more belong to the object of the will than of the other powers; nor would it be more in rational motion than in natural. Hence it is confirmed, secondly, because otherwise, as long as a thing is for the sake of some end, so long would it be actually caused by such end, as the visual power, which is for the sake of the act of seeing, or for the sake of the visible object, would always be actually caused by that end, because that denomination always lasts, that this power is for the sake of its act or object; which denomination can flow either from a past action, or from the natural propension of the power to its act or object. But the consequent is false, because the actual causality of the end is not without the actual causality of the agent, as I shall say at once; by that denomination, therefore, the causality of the end is not sufficiently declared. Especially because all place this causality in metaphorical motion, which is not sufficiently declared by those words alone, unless the matter is expounded more fully.

The second opinion is weighed

4. The second mode of explaining this causality can be that it is a certain metaphorical motion; which in common is so taken from Aristotle, I De Gener., c. 7, and St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, and other places which I shall report at once. Yet in the mode of explaining this motion this opinion is singular; for it says that this motion is such that of itself it precedes the act elicited by the will, not only in nature but also in time, because this motion results by a certain natural necessity from the final cause sufficiently proposed; but the act of the will remains in its freedom. Hence, although this motion with respect to the final cause itself is as it were second act, yet with respect to the will it behaves as first act. Which is explained and proved in this way, for by the very fact that the goodness of the end is sufficiently known and proposed to the will, it arouses it, and, so far as concerns itself, draws it to the love of itself; but the will, because it is free, can suspend its own act; therefore this motion of the end is distinct from the act itself of the will and precedes it; therefore in this motion the proper causality of the end consists. The antecedent seems to be established by experience, and its foundation seems to be placed in a certain natural sympathy which is between intellect and will, inasmuch as they are rooted in the same essence of the soul. But the first consequence is known per se; the second is evident, because by no other reason does it seem that this causality can be understood, both because what proximately follows after this motion in the will is some act of it, which, as I said above, is not causality, but the effect of the final cause; and also because, this motion being set aside, in the rest the end does not behave as a cause, but rather as a specifying terminus, which rather participates the causality of form, which all objects have which specify the acts of any powers whatever.

5. This opinion, however, is first of all foreign to the mind of St. Thomas, wherever he places the causality of the end in this metaphorical motion, for in q. 22 De Verit., a. 2, explaining this motion, he says: As the inflowing of the efficient cause is to act, so the inflowing of the final cause is to be desired or longed for; where he clearly thinks that the influence of the final cause is not in act until the will is moved by desiring or longing. He thinks the same in q. 5 De Potent., a. 1. And it is proved by reason, because it is an open repugnance that the end be causing in second act and that nothing be actually caused; but before the will elicits an act, nothing is caused in it; therefore neither can the causality of the end be in second act. The major is evident, both because to cause and to be caused are correlatives, and also because real causality must be terminated at something real and must in itself be something real, otherwise it would be nothing; if, then, in the will there is no new thing, or operation or effecting,¹ neither can the actual causality of the end be in it; nor yet is it in the intellect, as is established per se; therefore such causality of the end cannot be understood before every act of the will. And it is confirmed, first, because the end does not cause in act unless the agent also actually effects, for, as Aristotle said, III Metaph., c. 2, text 3, the end and that for the sake of which is the end of some action; and therefore the same Aristotle said, I De Gener., c. 7, that, the action ceasing, the final cause too stops; therefore in the same way, prior in time to the action of the agent being begun, the causality of the final cause cannot be in second act; but before the will elicits an act, no efficient cause moved by the end actually acts anything, and conversely nothing is actually made for the sake of the end; therefore neither does the end itself actually cause anything in the will. It is confirmed, lastly, by declaring the thing itself; for before the will is moved by eliciting its proper act, there is only the good object or end represented through the cognition or judgement of the intellect; but in the will there is nothing which was not before; therefore in all that time there is no arousing distinct from the judgement; but the judgement itself is not causality, but the sufficient approximation of the end so that it can cause; therefore the causality of the end posited in act before the act of the will cannot be understood. Most of all since neither can that causality be concerned with the power itself, since it does not yet behave otherwise but remains unchanged, nor with the act of the will itself, since that does not yet exist.

6. Someone will perhaps say that these reasons conclude that this causality of the end is not something new in the will itself which is its proper elicited act or free consent; but that nevertheless it can be some new mode of behaving, or, to speak more clearly, some simple affection through which it is actually and vitally inclined to the end, so as to love or intend it. But this is not said consistently in that opinion, for such affection, in whatever way it is feigned in the will, cannot be not elicited by it, otherwise it cannot be a vital motion or affection, but will be some quality by way of habit or first act, which can be feigned or thought of by no reason, as the reasons made so far sufficiently prove. But if that motion is elicited by the will, it is a certain act of the will; there is not, therefore, causality of the end before the act of the will.

7. But if it is said that that act is imperfect and by way of velleity, as they call it, but that the opinion which we are examining is to be understood of the perfect act and consent, against this stands, first, that that act, whatever it may be, is a certain effect of the end itself; therefore it is not the causality of the end; or if in it causality can be distinguished from effect, the same can be said of the first perfect and consummated act, nor will it be necessary to have recourse to such imperfect act. It stands against it, secondly, because the causality which the end exercises about such act has in it its proper effect, and therefore that is not the proper causality necessary for another consummated and perfect act, which we are inquiring into, but will only be an occasion and a certain disposition for that further effect. Finally, it stands against it because either that simple act is necessary or free; if it is free, then neither does it always result from sufficient proposal of the end, as that opinion said; nor yet is it necessary that it always precede the effecting of the consummated act of love, or intention of the end; it is not, therefore, per se necessary for the causality of the end, nor can such causality consist in it. But if that act is made naturally and without freedom, much less can it be per se required for the causality of the end about the free and perfect act; for imperfect acts or motions of this kind rise in us from the conjunction of appetite, or from some superior cause preventing our deliberation, and therefore these acts are only useful or necessary, some imperfection of ours being supposed, by way of disposition or arousing; but not because they are per se required for the causality of the end. Hence in the angels, in the soul of Christ, in the Blessed Virgin, and others, there was a perfect mode of operating from the causality of the end without acts of this kind.

The third opinion is proposed and persuaded

8. There is, then, a third opinion, which also constitutes this causality of the end in metaphorical motion. But it adds that motion of this kind is not posited in second act except when the will is moved in second act, and when it is so posited in reality it is not something distinct from the very act of the will. But, just as we said above that one and the same action, as it flows from the agent, is its causality, but as it is in the matter is also its causality about the form, so they say that one and the same action of the will is caused by the end and by the will itself, and as it is from the will is effective causality, but as it is from the end is final causality, and in the former notion is real and proper motion, because such action flows from the power as from its proper physical principle, but in the latter notion is metaphorical motion, because it flows from the object alluring and drawing the will to itself. This opinion is taken from St. Thomas, in the places cited, and I-II, q. 9, a. 1, where he says that the end moves the will metaphorically, thinking that in this its causality consists, although he does not declare it so expressly. Yet from bk. I Cont. Gent., c. 75, reason 5, it can be taken more clearly; for St. Thomas says that the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are desired for its sake. From which words I gather that the desire itself by which something is desired for the sake of the end, inasmuch as it is from the end, is called by St. Thomas the causality of the end. Again, that the causality of the end consists in this metaphorical motion is the common mode of speaking among authors, as is evident from Avicenna, bk. VI of his Metaph., tract. V, c. 5; Albert, V Metaph., tract. I, c. 3; and Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 1, and more clearly q. 8, part Ad rationes; Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 2. It is also taken from Alexander of Hales, I, q. 17, memb. 3. No one, however, so clearly and expressly declared the aforesaid opinion as Ockham, In II, q. 3, a. 2, where he says that the causation of the end is to move the efficient to acting; but that that moving is nothing else than the end itself being loved by the agent, or something for its sake. Hence below, answering a certain doubt, he says that the causation of the end is not prior in time to the motion of the agent, at least through love or volition by which it wills the effect to be executed for the sake of the end, or the end itself for its own sake.

9. By reason this opinion seems to be sufficiently proved by the attacks on the others and from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, because nothing else can be thought of which is the causality of the end; nor yet is anything else necessary in order that the will be understood to be moved by the end towards the end, and in order that its act have dependence on the end as end; therefore in that alone which this opinion affirms does this causality consist. It is confirmed and declared by a likeness, for the act of a cognitive power depends both on the object and on the power; hence the causality both of the object and of the power is nothing else than the action itself, inasmuch as it flows from the object and from the power, for as it is from the object it is called its causality, but as it is from the power it is the causality of that; so, then, the action of the will, as soon as it is made, necessarily depends on the will and on the end; that same action, therefore, inasmuch as it is from the will, is active dependence on it, but inasmuch as it is from the end, is final dependence. For as to this there is diversity between the end and the object of a cognitive power, for the object of a cognitive power concurs efficiently to its act, by means of some real form by which it is conjoined, or through its own entity, if it can be united to it through that; but the good proposed to the will concurs to its act only finally, because it moves only metaphorically, attracting the one proposed through cognition, even if otherwise it does not exist in reality.

The fourth opinion is rejected

10. There are, however, those who say that this causality of the end is not the action of the will as depending on the end, but conversely is the end itself objectively proposed through the intellect, as inflowing in its genus or concurring to the act of the will². But if you ask what that concurrence is, or what it adds over the end itself, they answer that it adds nothing intrinsic to it, but connotes the actual dependence of the effect on such cause. But, although this mode of speaking agrees with the preceding in this, that it says no other thing intervenes in this causality besides the end itself objected to the will by means of the intellect, and the act or effect thence resulting in the will, and the denominations thence arising by which both the end is said to cause the act and the act to depend on the end, nevertheless it displeases in this, that it says the end itself is its causality or its concurrence to the act, because concurrence never signifies the cause itself, but something which proximately flows from the cause in its genus, by which it causes the effect, whether that is distinguished in some way in reality itself from the effect, or only in reason, inasmuch as it is conceived as by which and which. Of which we spoke above, in treating of the causality of the efficient cause; but the proportional reason is the same. Indeed in this there is in a certain way greater reason, because the end sometimes causes not actually existing, but only objectively in the intellect.

11. But they say also that it is not necessary that the concurrence of the final cause exist really when it actually causes, but that it is enough if it exists objectively. This, however, is not rightly said, because to be only objectively is to be known; but in order that the final cause actually cause, it is not necessary that its concurrence be actually thought or known, but it suffices to think of the goodness of such cause, and conversely, although that concurrence is in objective being through formal and express thought about it and its fittingness, that is not enough for the effect to be posited in the will, as is established per se, because, all that thought standing, the will can not be moved. Therefore, although the final cause according to its being or its goodness is only objectively in the intellect, yet in order that it actually cause, it is necessary that its actual concurrence be posited in reality itself, because this concurrence in reality is nothing else than the dependence of the effect on its cause; but in order that the cause actually cause, it is necessary that the effect be actually caused in reality itself; therefore also that it depend really on the cause; therefore also that the actual concurrence, or what is the same, the actual dependence, exist in reality itself, and not only in the intellect, indeed this latter is irrelevant. But because this dependence of this effect of the final cause on it consists only in a certain intrinsic relation to such cause, which relation can exist in reality itself and be terminated at the cause as existing only objectively in the intellect, thence it is that the final cause can actually cause existing only objectively, but cannot actually cause unless its causality exists really, through relation to the cause itself existing objectively.

The third opinion is chosen and the question resolved

12. Hence from the attack on this last opinion the third remains more explained and confirmed, which is without doubt true and excellently satisfies as regards this effect which the end has within the created will, and as regards its causality. Nor does the objection made above stand against it, that the act of the will is rather the effect than the causality of the end. For in the first place in the very act of the will we can distinguish the action from the act, and we shall say that the act is the effect, but the action, inasmuch as in its genus it is from the end, is its causality, as must be said proportionally of effective causality. Next, even if in that act those two notions are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but it is imagined to be pure action, nevertheless it is not repugnant that the same thing which is the effect of the cause, in that genus in which it is effect, be also the causality, when that effect is the action itself, and a distinction of reason suffices for them to be distinguished by way of causality or by way of effect, as is manifestly established in active causality.

13. It can seem more difficult to someone that wholly the same thing, or real mode, without any distinction in reality, be the causality of the end and of the efficient, since yet these causes are of diverse notions. But if what was said above about the causalities of the other causes is considered, wonder will cease. For the same union too, under diverse respects, is the causality of matter and of form, although those causes are of diverse notions; indeed the same change, as it is action, is the causality of the agent, but as it is passion, is the causality of matter, although action and passion are not distinguished in reality; and similarly the same action under diverse respects is the causality of the first cause and of the second. And the reason is that one and the same action through itself can be immediately caused by many causes, by each in its genus; and so by means of it the effect is caused by the same causes, and therefore by comparison to each of them it is the causality of each, and conversely is the proper dependence of such effect on such cause.

14. Another difficulty remains to be explained, because, although this mode of explaining final causality satisfies as regards the acts elicited by the created will, yet it does not satisfy as regards commanded actions and exterior or transient effects (to omit for the meantime the divine will and the actions of natural agents, of which we are to speak below); it seems, then, that the above opinion and doctrine cannot be applied to the aforesaid actions and effects, because the final cause does not move metaphorically the powers subject to the will, but only the will itself, which afterwards not finally but effectively moves or applies the lower powers to their actions; therefore the end as such has no proper causality in these actions, or that does not consist in such metaphorical motion.

15. In this matter it is first of all to be established that the exterior effects which are produced through these actions can be effects of the final cause inasmuch as the actions through which they are made are caused in some way in their genus by the final cause and depend on it; because, as we said above with Aristotle, the final cause does not actually cause except when the agent acts something³ for the sake of the end. Hence, just as the effect made by the agent, if it does not depend on it in being conserved, but only in becoming, is, when the action ceases, no longer being caused, but has been caused, so the same effect, as it is caused by the end for the sake of which it was made, when the action of the agent for the sake of the end wholly ceases, is no longer being caused by the end, but has been caused, and remains ordered to the end, either through intrinsic relation or propension, or through extrinsic denomination or relation from the past action.

16. The whole difficulty, then, remains about commanded actions, for in the way in which those have been caused by the end, they will be causalities of the same end with respect to effects or termini, for through them effects of this kind will depend on the final cause and only by reason of them will they be said to be made for the sake of such end. Of the commanded actions themselves, then, it can be said that, although physically and according to entity the external action is distinct from the interior act of the will, yet in the notion of action and in order to the causality of the end it has the notion of one, and arises from the same causality or metaphorical motion, because for the end, for example, to move metaphorically to willing to write and to writing itself are not two, but one and the same, because those two are so connected that they cannot be separated; for I speak of the volition which is by way of use and proximately commands the external action of writing. Hence it can further be said that the final causality which we said is in the interior act and identified with the elicited action itself is at the same time the causality of the interior act itself and of the exterior, which is necessarily conjoined with it, although in a diverse way, for with respect to the interior it behaves proximately and intrinsically, but with respect to the exterior more extrinsically and remotely. Nor for this reason will the end be called a cause per accidens of the external action, since it follows wholly necessarily and per se from its causality, and it so moves the will as at the same time and by way of one to move it to the execution of the action to be commanded by the will. Nor yet does it stand in the way that causality of this kind adds nothing to the exterior action except an extrinsic denomination, because such action is not called the effect of the end only because that extrinsic denomination is from the end, but because the action itself, as it is made here and now, truly proceeds from the motion of the end in its genus, even if that exterior action, taken physically and entitatively, could be made without that metaphorical motion and proper causality of the end, because it proceeds from such cause only by means of the internal action. Most of all because this causality is in a certain way moral and as it were artificial and intellectual, and therefore is not in all things to be equated with efficient causality, which is more physical and real. And so at the same time the difficulty touched upon at the end of the preceding section and referred to this place has been answered.

17. Lastly it can be added that the commanded action itself, in the way in which here and now it proceeds from such agent, is both the effect of the final cause by way of action and its causality with respect to the thing made for the sake of that end through the same action, for by means of it that effect depends on such end, and to be causality is nothing else than to be as it were the way by which the effect depends on the cause in such genus of cause. But in this dependence the effect is not to be considered as it were materially, as it is such a thing; for so it will not always require that dependence through such causality as per se necessary for its being, but it is to be considered formally inasmuch as it is the effect made here and now in such a way, in which way it necessarily includes order to such action and to the mode of acting of such cause. And so this reply almost coincides with the preceding, and we shall explain both better below in declaring final causality in the effects of God.