Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Before we proceed further to explain the other things which we proposed pertaining to the causality of the end, it is necessary to explain the various divisions, or rather significations of the name, so that it may be distinctly understood of what the disputation is.

The first division of the end into end of which and end to which

2. There is, then, a first and celebrated division of the end into the end of which (cuius) and the end to which (cui), which is taken from Aristotle, II De Anima, c. 4, where Argyropoulos translates end by which and to which; but the former words are more conformed to the Greek and declare the intention better; for the end of which is called that for the sake of attaining which a man is moved or operates, as health is in healing; the end to which is called that to which the other end is procured, as man is in the intention of health; for, although a man is healed for the sake of health, yet he seeks health itself for himself and for his own advantage.

3. But it can be asked which of these has the proper notion of end. For some attribute it only to the end to which, which Gabriel thinks, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, following Ockham, In II, q. 3, a. 1; and Henry thinks the same, Quodl. II, q. 1. And it is proved: for that is properly the end in which the intention of the agent rests; for the others seem rather to have the notion of means; but intention rests only in the end to which the others are procured; for to it all are ordered; hence, just as the means is loved only inasmuch as it is proportioned to the end, so the end of which is loved only inasmuch as it is proportioned and fitting to the end to which; therefore. And it is confirmed: for the end must be loved by the love of friendship, or at least of benevolence, because it must be loved for its own sake; but only the end to which is so loved; for the end of which is loved for another, which is called the end to which; and so the love of the end of which is of concupiscence, but that of the other is of friendship or benevolence, and therefore the end to which is loved simply, but the end of which only in a qualified sense, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26, a. 4, saying that that is loved simply to which good is loved; but this good, which is loved for another, is loved only in a qualified sense.

4. But from elsewhere it appears that only the end of which properly has the notion of final cause; for Aristotle, wherever he defines this cause, explains its notion by this, that it is that for the sake of which something is made, as is evident in II Phys., cc. 3 and 7, and V Metaph., c. 2; and for this reason he says that the end is first in intention and last in execution, and similarly says that the form is the end of generation, not the generator itself. And it is declared by reason, because this to which the other end is acquired or sought is only the subject which is perfected or actuated by the other thing which is intended as end; as man is the subject of health or of the blessed vision, which is the end of our operations; this relation, therefore, is not properly of end, but of another notion; for no one would properly say that man is the end of the blessed vision, but rather that the vision is the end of man; for a thing is for the sake of its operation as for the sake of its end. And it is confirmed: for in the end of which is comprehended, as I shall say below, the object of the operation, as God is with respect to the blessed vision; hence man not only loves for himself the vision of God, but also God Himself, by love of concupiscence pertaining to hope, as the theologians teach; but it cannot be said that man is the end of God because he is that to which God is loved; therefore through that particle to which the proper notion of end is not explained.

5. It is dissolved.—Nevertheless it must be said that in each of these the proper notion of end can be saved, but sometimes they are so conjoined that from both there coalesces one integral end. This is consonant with Aristotle in the cited place De Anima. And it is proved by reason, for each of these ends can per se arouse the will and be loved or intended by it on account of its goodness; for so, when a man seeks health, he loves himself, to whom he wills health for his own advantage and perfection, which he desires per se on account of the supreme conjunction or rather identity which he has with himself. Similarly he loves and intends health on account of the perfection of health itself, in which there is a great difference between the means and the end of which; for the means, for example the potion, is lovable only inasmuch as it is useful for health; but health itself is loved for its own sake, because it per se perfects the man to whom it is loved. Hence it comes about that this whole, the healthy man, is the integral and adequate end of that action, in which the said two ends are included, as it were composing one integral end. So too the power is said to be for the sake of the operation as for the end for the sake of which it is made, although the operation too is truly for the sake of the power itself, namely to perfect it and constitute it in last act; so that it can deservedly be said that the integral end is the power as perfectly actuated, which others say: the power is not so much for the sake of the operation as for the sake of itself operating. And in this way it is not repugnant that two things under these diverse notions be mutually one the end of the other and conversely; for so the intellect is for the sake of the vision of God, and the vision is also for the sake of the intellect, to perfect it. Nor is this unfitting, both on account of the diverse notions, and also because the intention of the agent is borne as it were adequately to the composite of both with the mutual relation of the components between themselves, in which way matter is for the sake of form, and form too is in some way for the sake of matter; but the whole is that which is per se primo and adequately intended. Although, however, the end to which and of which can be so compared mutually, yet this is not always necessary, as I shall at once declare.

6. A little question consequent on the resolution of the preceding.—But someone will ask further, granted that each of them is properly an end, which of them is more principal. I answer that the comparison can be made either in the notion of being or in the notion of causing. In the former way it is not per se necessary that one of these ends always be the more perfect being; for sometimes the end to which is the nobler thing, as when a man operates for the sake of acquiring health for himself; but sometimes the converse happens, as when the same man operates for the sake of acquiring God for himself, who is far nobler. And the reason is that sometimes a more perfect thing or supposit intends to acquire for itself another perfection, although less, for which it is enough that such subject behaves in a more perfect way with such form than without it, although, if it is precisely compared to the same form, it is something more perfect. But sometimes some thing is perfected through conjunction with a more perfect one, as man through conjunction with God, and then a less perfect thing can very well operate for the sake of another more perfect, so as to have and possess it as it can, in which way too matter desires form, and if it could operate anything for the sake of attaining it, it would do so; under which consideration the form has the notion of end of which, and matter of end to which, which is less perfect than the form.

7. But if those two are compared in the latter way, namely in the notion of cause and of end, it seems to be the same to ask which of them is more principal as to ask which of them is more loved and more intended. And certainly the reasons made before seem to persuade that the end to which is more loved, because it is loved more by reason of itself, and the motion of the will rests more in it. Only that example seems to stand in the way about the love of concupiscence and the intention of attaining God inasmuch as He is our good. For we cannot say that by that act we love ourselves more than God; otherwise that love would be disordered; nor yet can we say that that intention rests more principally in us than in God; otherwise absolutely the ultimate end of that intention would be we and not God, and so too the intention would be disordered.

8. Wherefore a distinction or limitation is needed; for in particular goods, which are loved chiefly or even wholly for the advantage of the lover, or to perfect him, or under some other relation to him, it is true that the end to which is more principally loved and is the more principal end. And the reasons made before prove this. Which can be confirmed, for often a particular good of this kind which is the end of which supposes the absolute love of that person to whom it is loved, and the love of it is born from that love; for so a man sometimes loves himself with proper love of benevolence and from that afterwards loves health for himself. And hence too it often comes about that such particular goods are loved as means and useful for other ends fitting to the lover himself; it is a sign, therefore, that with respect to these ends the end to which itself is more principal and more loved. But when the end for the sake of which is the highest good and the ultimate end, if it is loved and intended in an orderly way, it must always retain the more principal notion of end and draw the intention of the operator more to itself. Because, since it is simply the ultimate end, it cannot be so referred to another under some notion of end that it rests principally in the other. And so, when a man intends to attain God, although he himself is in some way the end to which that good is sought, yet absolutely the man rather orders himself to that end, for he wills to be conjoined to the good as to his ultimate end. Whence it comes about that, although in that motion and tendency with respect to the means and the operation the man is properly called the end to which, yet with respect to God Himself, who is principally sought, he is not so much to be called end as the subject which is ordered to attaining that end. Although I do not deny that he can also be called the end to which; for in truth he has that notion, yet so that he is understood rather to be ordered to the other, objective and ultimate end, than to order it to himself.

The second division of the end into operation and thing made

9. Secondly the end is commonly divided into that which is only operation and that which results from the operation or to which the action tends as to a thing made. Which division Aristotle touched upon, I Ethic., and bk. I Magn. Moral., c. 3. And as regards the formal notion of end, the division seems material, taken from the things which exercise this causality rather than from the variation of causing. Nevertheless for understanding the authors, especially various places of Aristotle, and for explaining other divisions, and especially for declaring the ends of diverse things and most of all of man, it is necessary. The examples of each member, then, are easy, both in works of art and of nature. For the end of healing is health, of building a house, of generation the thing generated, and so of others; but of playing the cithara there is no other end than the citharizing itself, and of contemplation nothing but contemplation itself. Although in the second member it must be noted that in those actions too the terminus can philosophically be distinguished from the action; for the terminus is always some quality; but the action is the way or tendency of that quality; yet, because the terminus of this action is such that it does not last except as long as it is being made, because in becoming and being conserved it depends on the actual motion or influx of the power, therefore, as regards the notion of end, there is no distinction between the action as action and as terminus; but in actions of the former genus the intended end is the thing made, which remains when the action ceases. From which it is also understood that this division is given only of the end of which; for the end to which is neither action, nor is made through action, but is rather supposed to the action, since it is the agent itself.

The third division of the end, namely, of the action or of the thing made

10. And hence arose the third division of the end, into the end of the action and the end of the thing made or generated. Which is taken from Aristotle, partly II Phys., c. 7, partly II De Caelo, c. 3. For in the former place he says that the form is the end of generation; but in the latter he says that each thing, and therefore the form itself or the thing generated, is for the sake of its operation. And so it comes about (as is also taken from Averroes, IV De Caelo, text 22) that the thing generated is the end of the generation, and the operation too for the sake of which the thing is generated is also the end, proximately indeed and immediately of the thing generated itself, but remotely and mediately of the generation. In which division only two things occur to be noted: one is that, when Aristotle says the form is the end of generation, under form he comprehends the whole composite or the thing itself generated; for generation is most of all for its sake; yet, because the thing generated is not made except by inducing the form into matter, therefore he explained the end of generation through the form. And what Aristotle said of generation is to be understood of every action, both natural and artificial, through which some thing is made so as to remain, and it can be extended also to creation; for the thing which is created too is the proximate end of that action.

11. The other thing to be observed is that the end of the thing generated is commonly thought to be some operation for the sake of which the thing is made, as the vision of God is with respect to man, or illumination with respect to the sun; yet, in order that we may comprehend every end of the thing generated, by operation it is necessary to understand every use to which the thing generated is ordered; for the end of matter, which is a certain thing generated or created, is not some proper operation, but is its causality, namely the sustaining of the form, or such composition of substance; similarly the end of a house is habitation, which is not an operation, but a certain protection and as it were extrinsic information of the inhabitants, and so of others. And according to this mode it happens that not only with respect to the thing generated is there given an end which is an operation, for the sake of which the thing generated itself is, but also with respect to one operation there is given another which is its end; for so citharizing is for the sake of delight and speech for the sake of intellection. For one operation can concur to another, either objectively, or effectively, or at least as a necessary or useful condition to another operation, and therefore it can be ordered to it as to an end.

The fourth division into objective and formal end

12. Fourthly, from these divisions, especially from the second, there arises another, by which the end is divided into objective and formal. For, as we said, sometimes the end is operation; but this operation, especially if it is immanent, requires besides the act itself an object about which it is concerned, as contemplation, which is the end of man, is concerned about some thing or truth worthy of contemplation, for the sake of which contemplation itself in some way is, because through it it is as it were procured and possessed according to the mode proportioned to it. And in this sense the theologians distinguish, in the end of man, the vision and God seen, and they say the vision is the formal end, which they also call the end by which, and the attainment of the end; but God they call the objective end, or the end which, because He is procured through the formal end. So it is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 8, and q. 3, a. 7, and q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, where he notes that these are not so much two ends as one, because neither can the object be attained except through the act, nor the act be made except about the object, and therefore the motion and intention of the agent is to both by way of one, and so they complete one final cause. Although, in the way in which they are diverse things, they can be compared among themselves and one ordered to the other. And in this way almost the whole doctrine which was handed down about the first can be applied to this division.

The fifth division of the end into that which is made and that which is obtained

13. And hence further it comes about (which can be a fifth division) that the end of which is sometimes supposed to the operation of the agent and intended not as to be effected but as to be obtained, which holds true of the objective end, and in this way God is the end of our actions, and this is extended to all things which are supposed as objects or matter about which, as riches are the end of the avaricious man, not to be produced but to be acquired, even if they already exist. But sometimes the end is not supposed, but is made through the action of the agent, whether to be made is said properly of a thing made, or broadly, as can also be said of action. And in this way the vision of God is the end of man, and universally every operation, or terminus made through it, is an end not pre-existing, but subsequent to the intention of the agent. And St. Thomas taught this division in terms, III Cont. Gent., c. 18, and it is taken from the doctrine of Aristotle, partly II Phys. and V Metaph., where he chiefly makes mention of that end which is made through the action of the agent; partly II De Caelo, text 64, and XII Metaph., text 36, where he says that God is the end for the sake of which the others act; but it is established that God is not an end which is made through the action of the agent, but which is supposed to the actions of all agents.

The sixth division into ultimate and not ultimate end

14. Sixthly, the end is divided into proximate and remote and ultimate. This division is frequent among authors, and has foundation in Aristotle, in the places cited, and in II Metaph., c. 2, where he shows that there is no process to infinity in ends. It can seem to someone, however, that the division involves repugnance with the thing divided; for it is of the notion of end that it be ultimate, as the very name displays. And because it is of the notion of end that it be loved for its own sake and other things for its sake, and consequently that it itself be not loved for the sake of others; for then it would no longer be end, but means; the end, therefore, is not rightly divided into proximate and remote or ultimate. In order, then, that the division be understood, two notions can be distinguished in the final cause: the prior is that by which the end is said to be loved for its own sake; the posterior, inasmuch as other things are loved for its sake and it is the reason of loving them. Under the prior notion, then, every end, if it is considered precisely inasmuch as it is end, has the notion of ultimate, as the reason made shows; for in that which is said to be loved for its own sake is included the negation of love for the sake of another; in which negation the notion of ultimate is consummated. It happens, however, that, although some object is loved for its own sake and for its own goodness, nevertheless either by its nature or from the intention of the operator it is referred and tends to a further end, as when someone gives alms, both because it is an honest action in the notion of mercy, and because it is accommodated to satisfying God for sins. Then, therefore, one end is ordered to another, although under that notion under which it is ordered it does not have the notion of end, but of means. That end, then, which is immediately loved for its own sake, is called the proximate end; but the other end to which the other is ordered is called remote; but if the intention of the operator rests in it, it will also be ultimate; but if it is ordered to a further end, it will be only remote, not however ultimate; but because one cannot proceed to infinity, one will have to stop at some one which is ultimate.

15. And so the necessity of the aforesaid division is easily established; for, because the intention of the agent must necessarily be immediately concerned with some end, because otherwise it would never be begun, therefore it is necessary that there be some proximate end; for it is that which the agent proximately and immediately intends by such act or intention. But it is not simply necessary that besides the proximate end there be a remote one, because the intention of the agent can rest in one end; yet, because it can also tend to a further end, therefore besides the proximate a remote end can be given. And similarly, although some ultimate end is always necessary, because one does not proceed to infinity, yet it is not necessary that the ultimate end always be distinct from the proximate; for if the will rests in one end only, which it can do, that will be at once proximate and ultimate, at least negatively, that is, after which there is no other; but when there are several subordinated ends, then it is necessary that these ends be distinct. And hence it comes about that, although it happens that several means are subordinated among themselves, so that the first is for the sake of the second and the second for the sake of the third, and so up to the end which is loved for its own sake, yet, if none of those means is loved for its own sake, but purely as means for the sake of another, none of them has the notion of proximate or remote end under the aforesaid notion; but that end to which the whole series of means is ordered, although it seems remote in the notion of object willed and material, yet in the notion of end is proximate or first, to which as to an end the will tends, and will also be ultimate, if it is not ordered to another end.

16. But if we consider the end under the other relation, namely inasmuch as something is chosen or made for its sake, so it is easier to distinguish those three notions of ends, not only in things which are desired for their own sake, but also in things which are pure means chosen for the sake of another. For when for one end several means subordinated among themselves are chosen, it is necessary that there be a first and a last means, both in the order of intention and in the order of execution; for in neither order can one proceed to infinity; otherwise either election or execution would never be begun. But that is called the first means in the order of intention which is immediate to the end and which is first chosen after the intention of the end, and that itself is last in execution. But conversely that means which is last in the order of choosing is first in execution; for where election is finished, there execution begins, so that gradually through the means one comes up to the attainment of the end. This means, then, which is first in execution and last in election has no notion of end, because neither is it loved for its own sake, since it is only means, nor yet is anything else loved for its sake, since in it election is finished; yet the second means has now the notion of proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was chosen for its sake. But the third means has the notion of remote end with respect to the first means, and so one can proceed through several ends more or less remote until one stops at the ultimate, which is always necessary, since one cannot proceed to infinity. And so that division is sufficiently established as regards the exposition of the terms; but some questions which arise from it will be treated more conveniently in the course of the disputation, especially two, namely, whether means participate in some way the causality of the end, and whether it is necessary to constitute some ultimate end, where also we shall declare various acceptations of ultimate end, and whether it has proper and per se causality inasmuch as it is ultimate or remote end.