Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reasons for doubting.—The first. The reason for doubting is, in the first place, that it is of the notion of cause that it be a principle, as is established from the definition handed down by us above; but the end is not a principle, for rather it is opposed to principle, as is established from the very name of end, and as Aristotle signifies, III Metaph., text 3.

2. The second.—Secondly, it is of the notion of real cause that it inflow per se and really into the effect, as was posited above in the definition of cause; but the end does not really inflow being into the effect; therefore it is not a cause. The minor is proved, because either the end inflows before it is, or after it already is; not the first, for what is not, what real influx can it have, since the foundation of all operation and likewise of all causality is being? Nor can the second be said, because when the end is, then the action and causality of the agent already ceases; therefore the causality of the end is not then necessary.

3. The third.—Thirdly, because nothing can be the real cause of itself; but the form, on the testimony of Aristotle, is the end of the natural generation by which the form itself is made, as health is the end of the healing by which it is acquired; therefore, inasmuch as it is end, it cannot have the true notion of real cause. You will say that the form is the end of the generation, which is distinguished from it. But against this, because nothing can be the real cause of the production of a thing unless it is also the cause of the thing produced, because the thing is not caused except through the action by which it is made; but the form cannot be the real cause of itself; therefore neither of the generation by which the form itself is made. Hence it is confirmed, for a real cause says a real relation to the effect; but the end is not capable of a relation of this kind, both because either when it causes it does not have real being, or when it has real being it neither causes nor is distinguished from the effect.

4. The fourth.—The fourth and chief reason for doubting is that the end can be considered either in the notion of a principle moving and alluring the agent to act, or in the notion of the terminus to which the action tends; for this twofold notion is commonly distinguished by the philosophers in the object of any power, namely, of motive and terminative object; and the same distinction has place in the end, which is the object of the will. But under neither notion can the end have the true notion of cause. And in the first place of the notion of terminus it seems manifest, both because as such it has rather the notion of effect than of cause; and as such it is the last thing of the action, not its origin; finally, as such it does not inflow, but rather the influx of the other causes tends to it. Next, neither under the other notion of mover can it have the notion of cause; for, as Aristotle thinks, I De Gener., text 55, the motion of the end is only metaphorical; it is not, therefore, true and real; therefore it does not suffice for real causality. And it is confirmed, first, because this metaphorical motion of the end is found also in God; for in truth God, on account of His goodness, by which His will is metaphorically moved or allured, communicates Himself to creatures, and yet it cannot be said that that end has true causality about God. And it is confirmed, secondly, because, if the end has the notion of cause only under this notion, then at least with respect to natural agents the end cannot be a real cause, because it cannot move or allure them to the love of itself.

5. And hence arises the fifth difficulty, because hence the whole foundation is overthrown on account of which this genus of cause was introduced by the philosophers, namely, because natural agents do not operate by chance or fortuitously, but tend by their actions to determinate ends. For from this foundation or indication it is only gathered that natural things have definite termini of their natural propensions and inclinations; for this is enough for them to operate determinate effects not by chance but per se, even if no other genus of causality intervenes. As the theologians say that the eternal Father tends per se and definitely (so to speak) through generation to such a terminus, namely to this Son, not from the causality of the end, but from the determination of nature. And in natural things a stone by natural inclination tends definitely to the lower place, even if that place has no genus of causality about that motion, but only the notion of the terminus to which the stone has natural propension. And the same can be said of one operating through elicited appetite, whether from necessity or freely, namely, that he is moved by an elicited motion towards the object proposed to him, because such motion is consonant with the natural inclination of the power itself to such object, without other causality of that object on such act; therefore there is no sufficient foundation for us to attribute to the end the true notion of cause.

6. The sixth.—Let the sixth and last difficulty be that it cannot be sufficiently explained what, or about what, the end causes. For either it causes something in the agent itself, and this cannot be said universally, because, although in created voluntary agents it could be defended in some way, yet not in natural agents, nor in God, who is the uncreated voluntary agent. Or it causes something in the effect itself, and this has universally the difficulty touched upon above in the third argument, and moreover has a special difficulty in created voluntary agents, because the whole causality of the end, whatever it may be, seems to be concerned with the wills of such agents; but about their effects only remotely and per accidens; and therefore the effects will not have a proper final cause.

Resolution of the question

7. Nevertheless a certain conclusion is to be laid down, that the end is a true, proper and real cause. This is a received dogma and as it were a first principle in philosophy and theology; Aristotle taught it, II Metaph., c. 3, and bk. XI, c. 1, and II Phys., c. 1 and following; and before him Plato had taught it in the Phaedo, where he reports Socrates to the same effect; indeed he wills the end alone to be a cause, perhaps by antonomasia, that is, the first and chief, of which we shall speak below in the comparison of causes. The reason, however, can be taken first from the common mode of speaking about the end and about cause; for the end is said to be that for the sake of which something is made or is; for in this way Aristotle everywhere describes the end; but it is established that that particle for the sake of signifies causality; for each thing is said to have being on account of its cause; therefore it is a sign that the end has the notion of cause. Moreover, the efficient cause, unless it acts rashly, must act for the sake of something; therefore the effect of the efficient cause too, in order that it can be made per se by it, intrinsically demands to be made for the sake of something; therefore such effect, just as it depends per se on the efficient, as that by which it is made, so in its genus it depends per se on something for the sake of which it is made; but that is the end; therefore it depends per se on the end; therefore, conversely, the end is the true cause of that thing which is made for the sake of the end.

8. But in this matter it is not so much necessary to multiply reasons as to expound the thing, so that the difficulties may be solved and the causality of the end, which is obscure, may be declared; for the difficulties posited at the beginning tend to this, not that a certain thing be called into doubt. In order that this be done more distinctly, however, let us distinguish three agents for the sake of an end. The first and supreme is the uncreated intellectual agent, which is God alone. In the second and middle order are created intellectual agents, among which men are better known to us, and therefore we shall always speak of them, although the reason is the same of the created intelligences. In the third and lowest order are natural agents or those lacking intellect, although among them there is some difference between those which have sense and appetite and the rest, which also we shall indicate in its place. The causality of the end, then, although in its way it has place in the actions of all these agents, yet in created intellectual agents is better known to us, and has a certain greater propriety and special mode, and therefore in them we shall peculiarly declare this causality of the end and dispatch the difficulties arising about it; but afterwards we shall speak of the other agents. That in agents created with intellect and will, then, the causality of the end intervenes, a sufficient argument is taken from human actions. For it is established to us by experience that we intend, when we operate in a human mode, that is, freely and rationally, some certain end to which we direct our actions and on account of which we choose means; we are moved, therefore, by the end, both to the love or intention of itself, and to choosing and executing means on account of it; but this motion is something in the nature of things; for it is not something imaginary or feigned by the intellect; and it is some genus of causality, since it is the origin of real operations; the end, therefore, is a true and real cause. And hence too it is established by the way that this causality has place most of all in intellectual agents, because they can most of all know the end and the means, and the order of one to the other, and the proper notion of each.

The reasons for doubting are solved

9. The arguments made at the beginning partly demand difficulties proper pertaining to God and to the lowest natural agents, partly inculcate those things which can be treated of a cause; but these are all those which are treated of the other causes, as Cajetan intimated, I, q. 5, a. 4, and II-II, q. 17, a. 5, namely, what things can cause finally, through what, or what is to them the notion of causing, either as principal notion or as proximate. Likewise what is the necessary condition, what the effect; in what, finally, its causality consists, which here is the most obscure of all. Lest, then, we involve and confuse all these things, they will have to be treated distinctly in the following sections; therefore the exact solution of the arguments will have to be awaited up to the end of the disputation. Now we shall run through each cursorily.

10. The first.—The end truly a principle.—To the first we deny the minor, namely, that the end is not a principle; for in the way in which it is something first, it has the notion of principle; but the end is first in intention, although last in execution. But Aristotle, in the said place of III Metaph., does not oppose the end to every principle, but to the principle of motion, by which he understands the efficient cause, which he distinguishes from the final.

11. To the second the minor is denied, namely, that the end does not inflow really; but to the proof the common reply is that the end inflows when it is not in reality, but only in apprehension or cognition. But a distinction is needed, both on the part of the end and on the part of the effect or action which the end causes. For, as I shall say in the following section, one end is that for the sake of which the action is made, another that to which the end is acquired; likewise one is the formal end, as the vision of God, and another the objective, as God Himself; likewise the end can cause the desire of itself, or it can also cause rest, or delight, all which we shall at once declare. The end to which, then, does not cause except when it exists; for the end to which is called the agent itself, inasmuch as it operates for itself or for its own advantage, which it cannot do unless it exists. Likewise the objective end can also be supposed existing when it causes finally, as God, for the sake of seeing whom we are moved to operate well. Again, the formal end, or the attainment of the intended end, does not cause delight or fruition of itself except when it exists, because delight is only of good possessed; but if it is of the hope of it, then hope itself has the notion of imperfect attainment. In all these, then, that argument does not proceed, because, the objective end or the end to which existing (which for the sake of clarity could be called subjective), the inquiry and causality of the end does not cease, unless the attainment of the end is also present, and, this being obtained, although the motion towards the end by way of desire ceases, yet not by way of rest and delight. Only of the formal end, then, or the attainment of the end, is it true, per se speaking, that it causes the desire of itself when it is not in reality, and of that it has rightly been answered that it suffices that it be in the apprehension and judgement of the intellect, because its motion is intentional and (so to speak) animal, through the sympathy and consonance of the powers of the soul, namely intellect and will.

12. What it is which the end causes.—The third argument demands what the end causes, and specially touches the difficulty how the form is the end of natural generation, which pertains to the difficulty about natural agents to be treated below; and therefore it is briefly said now that the end causes the desire of itself or another similar affection towards itself, and so does not cause itself immediately, but something distinct from itself. And hence too it is established, to the confirmation, that from this side it is not repugnant that the relation of cause in the end be real; for there is sufficient distinction between it and such effect; and when the end itself is not in reality distinct from its effect we shall say in sect. III.

13. But whether from another head it is repugnant that that relation be real, namely, from the fact that the end itself does not have real being while it causes, is a doubtful and controverted matter. Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 3, and Javellus, q. 6, say that that objective being which the end has in the intellect suffices for it to be really referred to the effect; but this is difficult to believe; for that objective being in the end itself posits nothing real, but only an extrinsic denomination from the act which is really in the intellect; but that act is not really referred to the effect of the final cause, because it does not concur per se to it, as I shall say below. They answer better, then, who deny that upon every real causality a real relation follows in the cause; for it is not necessary by virtue of causality, if other conditions do not concur, as is evident in the effective causality of God. Hence I add that, even if the end exists while it causes, it is not really referred to its effect, because in its mode of causing it is of a certain superior notion, because it is in no way ordered to the effect, but the effect to it. Wherefore, even if on the part of the effect a real relation is admitted here, which is probable, most of all when the effect is ordered to the end not only by extrinsic denomination but by intrinsic relation, according to what we shall declare below, nevertheless that relation is to be thought not mutual; for the effect can be referred to the end inasmuch as it depends on it; hence, just as for this dependence it is enough that the end pre-exist in the mind, so too it will suffice for a real transcendental relation, although perhaps a predicamental one is only to an actually existing end; yet, because the end causes as wholly unmoved and not ordered to its effect, therefore it is not necessary that on its part the relation be real. For just as Aristotle said that knowledge is really referred to the knowable, not conversely, so we can say of appetition and the appetible; for the reason is the same, and similarly the same of the appetible and of the end.

14. Why the motion of the end is called metaphorical.—In the fourth argument many things are touched upon pertaining to God and to natural agents; now, omitting them, we grant that causality belongs to the end as it has the notion of principle, and consequently as it has the notion of mover. But its motion is called metaphorical, not because it is not real, but because it does not take place through effective influx, nor through intentional and animal motion, and therefore nothing prevents its causality from being true and proper.

15. To the fifth, whatever be the case about natural agents, of which we answer later, the mode of operating of intellectual creatures cannot be understood without the causality of the end, because in truth they are allured and moved by the end to operate; and although they have natural propension to the objects or ends to which they are moved through proper vital acts, yet that natural propension cannot operate in its genus, that is, effectively, unless the end is sufficiently applied and concauses in its genus, and so the determination of the operation, or destination to a certain goal, which is discerned in intellectual agents, manifestly proceeds not from natural inclination alone, but from the causality of the end. To the sixth, so far as this place allows, it has been sufficiently explained what, or about what, the end causes; but the complete treatment of this matter we shall hand down below.