Disputationes metaphysicae

1. It remains to be seen in the last place in this disputation whether it is proper to the first cause to concur in the said way with secondary causes for their operations, and that the others depend on it, or whether among created causes too there is this dependence and this mode of concurring. Where the occasion also occurs of declaring the common distinction of efficient causes into those which are per se and essentially subordinated, and those which are only per accidens.

The reason for doubting

2. For from this division is taken the first reason for doubting in the proposed question, because not only are secondary causes essentially subordinated with respect to the first, but also among secondary causes themselves particular causes are subordinated to universal ones; but this essential subordination consists in the aforesaid dependence of the operation of one on the influx of another; therefore that mode of dependence is not only with respect to the first cause. The major seems to be taken from Aristotle, II Metaph., where, proving that there is no process to infinity in efficient causes per se ordered, he supposes that there is some subordination not only between two, namely the first and the second, but among several. And hence in II Phys., text 26, he says: The sun and man generate man. And II De Generat., text 55, for this reason he calls the sun the author of things to be procreated; and sect. XXVI of the Problems, q. 35, he calls it the author and parent of motions. And sect. XI, q. 5, he says that it is the sun which moves all things. And finally II De Generat., text 56, and XII Metaph., text 34, he says that the motion of the heavens is the cause of all generations and corruptions; and I Meteor., c. 9, he attributes this peculiarly to the motion of the sun. Similarly St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., c. 67, says that lower bodies act in the power of the heavenly bodies. And bk. IV, last chapter, he says that the generation and corruption of lower bodies is caused by the motion of the heaven. Finally all philosophers seem so to think of the causality of the heavens, and therefore call them universal causes with respect to all lower things.

The various senses of the question

3. In order to reduce this question to certain heads, it must be noted that the comparison can be made either between causes distinct in supposit, which are called causes ut quod, or between powers of the same cause or of the same supposit. This question, then, is chiefly treated in the former sense, and therefore we shall speak of that first; but we shall add something about the latter, in order that a full resolution may be had. Next it is to be observed that it is one thing to speak of causes concurring partially to the same action in the same order, another of causes essentially subordinated, with intrinsic dependence of one on another in operating. In the former way it is certain that several created causes often concur to the same action or effect; which can sometimes be per accidens from a fortuitous concurrence of causes otherwise per se sufficient; but sometimes it can be per se and from the institution of nature. And in this way several stars often concur to one effect, because each by itself would not suffice. Of this mode of partial concurrence, then, there is no difficulty; indeed perhaps the concurrence of the heavens is to be understood in great part in this way, as I shall say below.

4. In the latter sense, then, the present question is treated. In which the whole difficulty is about the dependence of lower bodies on heavenly bodies. For of immaterial substances it is a certain matter that they do not depend per se in operating on any created agent; because they do not depend on it in being nor in the faculty or power of operating; therefore neither are they subordinated in acting. Again, of the heavenly bodies themselves, by the same reason, it is certain that they do not depend per se in their actions on other created agents, because they do not depend on them in being; but operation follows being and imitates it. Likewise, because the heavens do not depend per se in their actions on the created intelligences, because neither do they depend on them in being or in their powers, nor can these effect per se in bodies anything besides local motion. You will say: at least by means of motion the action of the heaven can depend on the intelligence. I answer, according to the truer opinion, that that motion serves the action of the heaven only by way of application to diverse bodies¹; but that dependence is not per se, but per accidens, as is established. But if it is true that the heaven is the instrument of the moving intelligence for some actions, as to those there will be essential dependence; yet in truth there are no actions of this kind, as we touched upon above; because neither is there in the intelligence principal power for effecting corporeal effects of this kind, nor can local motion alone per se serve for communicating this power.

5. And by almost the same reason one heaven does not depend per se on another in its action, because it has neither being² nor power of acting from another. You will say: the heavens do not act except through the stars; but these do not act except through light, which they have only from the sun; therefore all depend on the sun in the power of acting, and consequently in action. It is answered, first, by denying the minor; for each star has its own innate and connatural power through which it inflows; for, just as they have proper forms diverse in species, so consequently proper powers and faculties diverse in species. Nor is it likely either that all the stars have power of acting through an extrinsic accident coming to them accidentally, or that the same quality of light, merely from being received in diverse subjects, has effects as various and diverse as diverse stars have; but of this elsewhere. And moreover, whatever be the case about this, the action of the moon, for example, illuminated will depend on the sun only as the action of heated water depends on fire, which is not dependence immediately from essential subordination, but only remote dependence, such as there is in every effect with respect to the remote cause which gave the proximate cause the power of operating.

6. Moreover, no question remains about the dependence of lower corporeal agents on the intelligences, because from what has been said it is established a fortiori that they do not depend on them per se, but at most per accidens, as on those applying active things to passive ones; and in this way too not always nor regularly, except as to the motion of the heaven. Finally, of lower bodies among themselves it is also a clear matter that they do not have the aforesaid dependence in operating, because none of them is compared to another as universal cause to particular, or has any reason of such dependence.

Diverse opinions about the difficulty of the question

7. The whole question, then, is reduced to the subordination of lower bodies with respect to the heavenly. For there are those who opine that essential dependence of this kind intervenes between these agents, so that the heaven actually inflows into all the actions of lower bodies. So opine Javellus, XII Metaph., q. 13; and Soto, II Phys., q. 4, concl. 1, and In IV, dist. 48, q. 2, a. 2, where from this principle he says that, the motion of the heaven ceasing, every action of lower natural agents would suddenly cease, and all living things would at once breathe out their souls, because they cannot live without some motion. Ferrariensis also signifies it, IV Cont. Gent., c. 97, § Advertendum tertio; for he says that in the generation of man the creation of the soul is from God, but the dispositions of the body are from the generator and from the motion of the heaven per se and immediately.

8. Javellus to prove this brings this reason (for the other authors bring none): every action of generable bodies is necessarily reduced to some ingenerable cause; but this is none other than a heavenly body; therefore. The major is evident, because, just as it is necessary that every motion be reduced to some immobile principle, so every generation to some ingenerable principle. But the minor is proved because that ingenerable agent is not a created intelligence, because that cannot immediately transmute matter to form. Nor yet is it the first principle itself, because that does not act through itself immediately on these lower things, but through intermediate causes; but here we treat of a cause immediately concurring to all the actions of lower generators; therefore it is the heaven. And it is confirmed from Aristotle, VIII Phys., text 1, saying that the first motion is life, that is, the fount and universal principle of things existing in nature, and so is compared to the universe as the motion of the heart to the animal, which ceasing every action ceases. Hence the Commentator, I De Caelo, comm. 63, says that the principle of life which is in the orb is the cause of all life; and he has almost the same in XII Metaph., comm. 18. It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise the essential order between the parts of the universe is taken away, which is against its due constitution, as is taken from Aristotle, XII Metaph., last text.

9. The contrary opinion is taken from Scotus, In II, dist. 14, q. 3, at the end; and from Richard there, a. 2, q. 6; and Durandus, there, 2nd part of the distinction, q. 3; Henry, Quodl. XI, q. 15, and Quodl. XIV, q. 1. For although in this latter place he seems in part to be opposed, yet, if rightly understood, he is not opposed, as we shall see. And this opinion seems to me most true; it needs, however, some explanation.

The full resolution of the question

10. The first assertion.—I say, then, first: no secondary cause depends per se and intrinsically in acting on another created agent, but only on the first cause, namely, as on the universal agent, immediately in its order inflowing into the action of the lower cause. The conclusion is first explained; for we treat of a secondary cause having, in the notion of proximate cause, sufficient power for some action or effect. For this must be supposed before all in order that essential subordination be understood; for if the particular cause is insufficient in its order, and as to that which is lacking is helped by another superior one, there will not on that account be essential subordination in acting, but a concurrence of partial causes. This being supposed, then, the conclusion is proved, first, because the secondary cause does not depend in its being on another created cause; for above we proved that elements and mixed bodies do not depend in being conserved on the heaven. And by the same reason the intrinsic and connatural powers of these things do not depend on it; therefore by parity of reasoning neither do their actions depend from their intrinsic notion on the heaven, and consequently neither on another created cause; for the others we have already excluded. The last consequence is evident, because operation is proportioned to being itself.

11. You will say: sometimes a form depends in being conserved on its agent, as light on the sun; therefore then at least it will also depend in its action on the immediate influx of the sun. It is answered that, even if the whole is granted, it matters nothing, because it is not unfitting that some quality depend in the said way on its agent in operating. But secondly it is said that from the force of the antecedent the consequent does not follow; for visible species depend in being conserved on the object, and yet they do not have a new immediate dependence in operating. From the negation of dependence in being, then, we believe independence in operating is excellently inferred; but not conversely, from any dependence whatever in being, a new and immediate dependence in operating is inferred. Because this is often not possible with respect to a created agent; but with respect to the uncreated agent that consequence is excellent, on account of the essential dependence of every participated entity on the first being.

12. The second reason, similar to the preceding, is that the effects of these natural agents do not depend per se and essentially in being on the heaven, as was also proved above, because as to this the reason is the same of univocal causes and their effects; therefore neither does the action of such causes per se and intrinsically depend on the heaven. The consequence is evident, because such as being is, such is becoming. And both reasons take their foundation from what was said in sect. 1, that the dependence of the secondary cause on the first in its operation is founded on this, that both the secondary cause and its action and effect are beings by participation, and therefore per se and immediately depend on being by essence. But this reason has no place with respect to another created cause, and, it being set aside, none sufficient remains for introducing that genus of dependence; but a multitude of causes is not to be demanded for some effect without reason and necessity. Hence for this too the reasons can avail by which Durandus, cited above, tried to take away this dependence on the first cause.

13. A third reason can be that, if the heaven inflows per se and as a universal cause into the actions of all lower things, it is understood to do so either immediately by immediacy of supposit, or only of power; not in the former way, because, as we suppose, no cause acts immediately by immediacy of supposit on a thing distant in place; but the heaven is far distant from lower agents and their actions. But if it acts in the latter way, it is necessary that it do so through diffused power; for the power inhering in the heaven itself is also far distant from lower causes and their effects, hence it cannot be understood to inflow immediately except inasmuch as it diffuses some participation of itself through intermediate bodies up to the particular cause proximately acting, and from the power, inasmuch as it reaches there, the action will immediately flow. But the influx of this power cannot be universally and generally affirmed with foundation; for who would believe that fire needs power superadded by the heaven in order to heat or illuminate? And where it intervenes, it does not pertain to the dependence of the particular cause on the universal, but to supplying the insufficiency of the particular cause, as I shall declare at once.

14. And the reason is clear, because, after that power has been impressed by the heaven on the lower body or agent, that composite of innate power and power infused by the heaven is a sufficient proximate cause for such action, in which it no longer depends per se on the heaven, but only remotely, inasmuch as it received the power of acting from it, as heated water depends on fire in heating. It is a sign, therefore, that that is not per se dependence in acting of one cause on another. And next it is also a sign that, if the particular cause in its order has complete and sufficient power, it will not need (per se speaking) another power inflowed by the heaven; for that multiplication of powers is superfluous. And this is what we directly intend in this assertion.

15. The second assertion.—I say secondly: it often happens that the power of some lower secondary cause is per se mutilated and imperfect in its order and insufficient for the effect, and for that reason needs the help of another created cause which completes or supplies the power of acting. And in this way lower bodies need the influx of the heavens for many of their actions, especially for the generations of mixed bodies, and most of all of living things. The arguments of the former opinion prove this conclusion; for it cannot be denied that there is some per se order between sublunary and heavenly causes; but, the former intrinsic and essential dependence being set aside, no other mode of per se subordination between causes of this kind can be understood. It can also easily be declared by induction; for the elements by themselves alone, and through their mutual action and reaction, cannot suffice for substantial mixture, so that from them and by them a true substantial mixed body be generated, both because neither in any one of them nor in all together is the form of the mixed body formally or eminently, and also because, since the elements are transient matter with respect to mixed bodies, the whole active and material power of the generation of the mixed body cannot be in them alone. Heavenly power is necessary, therefore, which helps to perfect the mixture. Again, inanimate mixed bodies, generally speaking, are very weak for generating things like themselves, as is established by experience. And the reason seems to be that they are both little active, because they have the primary qualities broken and remiss, and are much impeded in their action by surrounding bodies and by the contrary qualities of the patient bodies. For this cause, then, heavenly power was also necessary, which would either help these agents, or certainly wholly effect the generation of these things, as seems to happen in the effecting of gold and metals.

16. Again, of vegetable things it is perspicuous how much, as to their generation or increase, they depend on the heavens, which takes place in no other way than because through heavenly influence they either receive in themselves qualities like their own in power of acting, or receive increase or intensification of their qualities, or because the matter from which these living things are generated or nourished is disposed by heavenly power so that it can more easily be changed by their action. Again, in this way too the generations of animals depend much on heavenly influence, and so it is excellently understood how the sun and man generate man, because namely human seed has imperfect force unless it is fostered and helped by the heat of the sun to perfect that action. And in this way Henry above says that heavenly power inflowed into these seeds is necessary, by which they may be determined to their various actions; for, since seed has so various and manifold an action in the organization of the body, particular and intrinsic power does not seem to suffice for it, and therefore heavenly power is thought necessary. Which is probable, although it is no less obscure how power inflowed by the heaven, if in itself it is simple and naturally acting, suffices for that variety. But whatever be the case about this (which was touched upon above), it is established that the necessity of this heavenly influx always comes from the insufficiency of the particular power, either for overcoming the resistance of matter, or for protecting itself from contraries, or for completing the whole disposition as is necessary for perfecting generation.

17. And it is confirmed from the contrary, for where the power of the particular agent is found sufficient for its action, either less or no heavenly influence is necessary for it, so far as can be gathered from reason or experience. For thence it is that fire generates fire in the same way from the same matter, or other things being equal, in whatever aspect or disposition of the heavenly stars. And in the same way colour effects visible species, and sight elicits the act of vision, and the same holds of other vital actions, provided the disposition of the organs is conserved the same and other things are equal. And in this way St. Thomas said, Opusc. 10, a. 8, that if the living body of a man and with the same disposition of the members were conserved, the motion of the heaven ceasing, the man could move his hand or tongue in the same way; and q. 5 De Potent., a. 10, ad 8, he says that in that case the motion of the heart would last in a man.

How among created causes some are called universal

18. From these, then, it is established in what sense some universal causes besides the first can be admitted, and some per se subordination among some secondary causes among themselves, and what in this is proper to the first cause, or what is the difference between it and the others. For it is proper to it that every operation depend on it per se, immediately and essentially, so that, however great the inferior power may be, it cannot act without that influx, nor can it be supplied by another agent, nor through some created power even implanted by God Himself. But in this way the operation of one creature does not depend on another, as has been declared, and therefore it is proper to God alone to be in this way the universal cause of all actions. Yet, because natural, generable and corruptible things have imperfect powers for acting, and have many contraries by which they can be impeded from effecting their actions or generations, whose continuous succession is necessary for the conservation of the universe, therefore the author of nature provided certain superior bodies which should have various powers of acting and be applied in various ways through continuous motion, so that they might in various ways help lower agents for their generations or corruptions. And therefore those superior bodies are deservedly called universal causes, because they operate in some way towards the effects of all lower causes. In which way Dionysius says, c. 4 De Divinis nominibus: The ray of the sun contributes to the generation of sensible bodies and to life itself, it moves and nourishes, and increases, and perfects.

19. What subordination there is in lower agents to superior ones.—And in a similar way natural causes are understood to be per se subordinated to heavenly ones according to the order instituted by the author of nature. Not because either the powers or the effects of lower bodies per se and intrinsically say relation or dependence on the heavenly bodies, but because in fact, according to the order of the universe, they have been so instituted under them as to be helped and fostered by them in their actions and powers. But if God had instituted another order, either helping or supplying the defects of lower agents by Himself or through other bodies, these agents would perfect their actions equally well and connaturally according to their proper and particular natures. And by the same reason, if sometimes it happens in fact either that a lower particular cause is sufficiently helped by another lower cause, or is per se sufficient for its action, it will be able to exercise it without the concurrence of the heaven. And similarly, although the power of the lower cause is insufficient to perfect the whole generation, and heavenly help is wholly lacking, indeed rather resists it, and for that reason it cannot perfect the generation, nevertheless it effects some alteration or remote disposition for which such power per se suffices.

The opposed reasons are solved

20. The reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, remains solved from what has been said; for all the sayings of Aristotle and of other philosophers about the influx of the heavens and about the dependence of lower agents on them are sufficiently understood according to the mode of subordination and dependence explained by us. But to the reason of Javellus it is answered that the action of a generable and corruptible agent does not per se and intrinsically necessarily depend on another incorruptible agent besides the first cause; but if sometimes it depends, it is only when the power of such agent is per se insufficient and is helped by the partnership of a superior incorruptible body. But the proof which Javellus adduces from immediacy of action is improbable, and rather persuades the opposite; for the first cause acts more immediately in the actions of all corruptible bodies than the heaven. But the other confirmations have been solved from what has been said about per se subordination and about the mode in which the heaven inflows with lower causes. But what is touched upon there about the cessation of all lower actions when the motion of the heaven ceases is improbable in that sense, namely, of momentary cessation on account of essential dependence; for the motion of the heaven is not per se a cause, but only an application to acting. It could only be said, then, that from that time or moment all things would cease, because from then they would begin to be corrupted and to fail; of which elsewhere. See St. Thomas, who intimates it in the said Opusc. 10, a. 23, at the end; and Soncinas hands it down more at length, XII Metaph., q. 13, with others cited above.

21. How the faculties of the same supposit happen to be ordered among themselves.—Finally, from these another point touched upon above about subordinated powers of the same supposit can easily be resolved; for in them there happens to be essential dependence in acting among several powers, because they are much more connected among themselves than diverse supposits. Always, however, in subordination of this kind, if it is per se and physical and in the genus of efficient cause, the inferior power is compared as instrumental to the superior to which it is subordinated. And in this way the faculties of the soul depend essentially on the soul in the operations of life, and the intentional species on the power in which it exists as in a subject. And to the same is reduced the dependence which a habit has in acting on the power which it affects. I said, however, if it is per se, etc., because the intellect is in some way subordinated to the will in some of its actions, yet not as to one per se and principally cooperating, but as to one only applying and moving to acting. And conversely the will is subordinated to the intellect, yet not as to a co-efficient, but as to one applying the final cause. Wherever, then, there is per se subordination, there intervenes some notion of conjoined instrument and principal agent; under which notion such instrument by itself alone is an insufficient principle of such action and effect.