Disputationes metaphysicae

1. We have declared so far whether there is, and what is, the concurrence of God with secondary causes; now it remains that we expound how God bestows or offers this concurrence to secondary causes. And at the same time it will be declared how the first and the secondary cause come together and are conjoined for effecting the same effect and the same action. Nor is there difficulty in conjunction as it were local, or through undistance or presence of entities; for so it is easily understood that God, by reason of His immensity, can be conjoined to all secondary causes in order to operate with them, because He is intimately present by essence in all of them and in all their effects and actions.

The difficulty of the question is opened

2. But the difficulty is about conjunction for causing one and the same effect and the same action; for when two causes come together for effecting the same action, either they concur by chance and contingently, or by design and per se. The former of these modes, however, cannot be attributed to the concurrence of the first cause with the second, both because this is repugnant to the perfection of divine providence and operation, and also because otherwise there would not be per se subordination in the secondary cause to the first, or every operation of the secondary cause would come about by chance and per accidens. The latter mode too has difficulty, because, if two causes come together by design for the same operation, either this is because both are subordinated to some superior which applies them together, which has no place here, as is established per se; or because both are by their nature determined so to operate here and now, which also cannot be said here, because neither is the first cause so determined by its nature, nor the secondary cause, at least to the individual effect or action; or because one, from its peculiar intention, determines the effect and action to be effected, and consequently determines also the other cause to cooperate in the same action. And this mode does not seem able to have place here, because neither can the secondary cause so determine the first, as seems known per se, nor conversely can that mode of acting be attributed to the first cause with respect to the second, both because otherwise the first cause would move and apply the second to acting, which we have denied; and also because otherwise the determination of the action would in no way be from the secondary cause, which all deny; and finally because otherwise the secondary cause could act nothing else than that which it acts, because for nothing else does it have the concurrence of God, without which it can act nothing.

The question is resolved as to natural causes

3. Why God is said to concur with necessarily acting causes by way of nature.—This difficulty with respect to secondary causes acting naturally can be very easily dispatched by noting that, speaking absolutely and simply, God gives this concurrence to secondary causes by His will; for He acts as an intellectual cause, which can absolutely be compelled or necessitated by nothing to act; nevertheless He is said in a qualified sense to concur after the manner of nature. And this for a twofold reason: first, because in concurring He accommodates Himself to the natures of things and gives each a concurrence accommodated to its power; secondly, because, after He has decreed to effect and conserve secondary causes, He concurs with them by an infallible law for their operation, which law, if it is taken absolutely, supposing no particular and definite will of God, does not induce necessity, but is only as it were a certain debt of connaturality. Hence God sometimes dispenses in that law by denying concurrence of this kind. But, the efficacious will of God being supposed of concurring with this cause for this action here and now, the action now proceeds of necessity at such time and place, both from the secondary cause and from the first; but with respect to the secondary it is natural necessity; with respect to the first, however, it is only necessity from supposition, or of immutability.

4. This being supposed, then, the mode is easily explained in which the first cause gives its concurrence to these secondary causes; for God from His eternity, just as He decreed to produce these things and not others, and at this time, and with this order, and with these motions, etc., and not in another way, so also decreed to concur with the same things for their actions according to their capacity. And because, just as the knowledge of God is most distinct and in particular of all things, so too His will decrees all things distinctly and in particular, and descends to each according to the capacity and need of each, therefore in giving this concurrence He also decreed from eternity in particular to concur with this cause at such time, in such place, and about such subject, for such action and effect in the individual, and at such time for another, and so of all. I say, however, always for such action, because determination to one numerical effect would not be enough, because the same effect can be made through numerically diverse actions, or perhaps also specifically; but by determining the action it follows that the effect is necessarily determined; because the same numerical action cannot tend to another terminus except to that with which it is identified.

5. That the first cause does not concur by chance with necessarily acting causes.—And hence it comes about, first, that the first and secondary cause come together not by chance, but per se and by design for effecting the same action, which comes most of all from the mode of operating of the first cause, or from its knowledge and providence. Nor for this is another motion of the secondary cause necessary, but only this will of God as it were preparing and offering concurrence according to the laws of His divine wisdom and providence. It must be added, however, that this determination of concurrence, as to two things, has foundation in the nature of the secondary cause. For first, because it is of such power, therefore God decreed to give concurrence of such species, and as to this, as I noted above, it is said to determine the concurrence of God as to the specific notion, not because it absolutely determines the will of God to give such concurrence in species—for so God alone determines Himself voluntarily—but because it is the objective reason demanding such concurrence. Secondly, in the same way, because such cause is naturally acting, therefore God too absolutely and definitely wills to concur with it. And as to this the secondary cause can be said in the same sense to determine the concurrence of the first as to exercise, because by its nature here and now it determinately demands the exercise of such action. But the determination as to this individual action and effect does not seem able to be founded in any way in the secondary cause, for the same numerical cause here and now in this subject is able to produce several numerically distinct effects, nor does it demand concurrence more for one than for another; and therefore the determination of concurrence and of action as to this part is attributed to the first cause alone, as Gregory probably taught, In I, dist. 17, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7, and as was said above.

6. Natural causes, while they act this, can do nothing else even in the divided sense.—Secondly, it follows from what has been said that these naturally acting causes, in that instant or time in which they act, all things simply weighed, can do nothing except that thing in species and in individual which they do. And of the species indeed the matter is clear, because they have power determined to such effect in species—determined (I say) either simply, as in particular and univocal causes, or at least here and now about this matter so disposed, or with other causes concurring together. But of the individual it is proved by the reason made above, because, although a natural agent has active power for several effects in the individual, yet that power by itself alone is insufficient without the concurrence of God; and therefore, if it does not have it, it will not constitute the thing in proximate but in remote potency for acting; for so fire deprived of the concurrence of God will not be called simply able, indeed will be called absolutely unable so to heat. Thus, then, because causes of this kind have the concurrence of God prepared only for one numerical effect, they can absolutely make only that by proximate power, namely, which includes not only the bare faculty of acting, but also all the prerequisites for operating.

7. What divine concurrence is required for being able, what for acting.—You will say: concurrence is the action itself; but action is not required for being able, but for acting; therefore concurrence is not required for being able. I answer that it is one thing to speak of concurrence itself in itself and in second act, of which the objection proceeds, and as to it concludes rightly; but another to speak of concurrence in first act and in proximate application, in which way we say it is required for being able simply; which concurrence does not consist in action, but in the divine power or will, as proximately applied and as it were conjoined at such time with the secondary cause, by virtue of His eternal decree, to concurring with it; which others also call the preparation or offering of concurrence.

8. The concurrence of God is manifold according to the variety of secondary causes.—Thirdly, it is inferred by the way from what has been said that the concurrence of God is not one and the same with all secondary causes, but varies according to the diversity of secondary causes, because God so concurs with them that He accommodates Himself to each according to its need. And therefore, just as for numerically diverse effects He gives numerically distinct concurrences, so for specifically diverse actions He gives specifically distinct concurrences. And it is openly confirmed from what was said above, for the concurrence of God ad extra is nothing else than the action itself, and tends to the same intrinsic terminus; therefore according to the variety of actions concurrence too will be various. It cannot, therefore, truly be said that there is the same concurrence of God for all the actions of secondary causes, unless the discourse is either of internal concurrence or the will by which God concurs, or of only proportional identity, as to the mode and general reason on account of which all secondary causes need concurrence, namely, because they are beings and agents by participation.

9. God by Himself alone inflows into the effect otherwise than with the secondary cause.—Indeed hence too it may be inferred by the way that God inflows with respect to the same effect in one way if He effects it by Himself alone, in another with the secondary cause; because, when He acts by Himself alone, He applies an influx per se sufficient for the effect; but when He concurs with the secondary cause, He accommodates such activity as by itself alone would not suffice without the secondary cause, which is manifest from what has been said, because He does not will to act except by that action which is common to the secondary cause. But although that same effect could be from God alone, and therefore the influx of God for such effect absolutely and according to itself could be without the secondary cause, yet such action, which is from the secondary cause, cannot be without it, and therefore neither is the concurrence which God gives for such action alone absolutely sufficient for the effect, but only in its genus. The opposite of which Cordova seems to opine, q. 55, dub. 4; yet, if he is read attentively, he does not in reality disagree. It is sufficiently established from these things, then, how God gives His concurrence to natural agents.

The difficulty in free agents is treated and explained

10. But what we have said has the greatest difficulty in free agents; because, if the first cause determines concurrence for them in the same way as for the other agents, they will be no more indifferent in the use of their actions in particular, and in proximate power, which includes all the prerequisites for operating, than the other agents, and so they will never have the use and exercise of freedom. The antecedent is declared as to both parts, for God as first cause is conjoined to the secondary cause for cooperating through His will, which will is eternal and preventing the secondary cause; but it is absolute and efficacious, namely, that by which God wills such effect to be, because God operates ad extra through this will alone; but this will draws the secondary cause with it to operate, so that it cannot resist; therefore from this side the secondary cause is determined to one as to exercise by the first cause, even if it is free. And this is confirmed, for in order that two free causes concur per se and by a certain law for one work, the purpose and preventing will of one is not enough, unless it has efficacy over the other to draw it whither it wills; therefore, if in the present concurrence only the will of God precedes, by which He efficaciously wills to concur with the secondary cause for such effect, in order that the effect follow per se it is necessary that that will of God have efficacy over the free secondary cause, so as to draw it with itself to operate; and so indifference in the exercise of the action is taken away. Again, since God through that will defines the concurrence to be given, He defines it for one thing only, because He does not will several effects, but one only; therefore from this side indifference as to specification or variety of actions is also taken away. And it is confirmed, for it has been said that the first cause defines its concurrence to the individual and singular effect; which necessity has place also with respect to the free secondary cause, because it cannot itself choose one individual act before others of the same species.

11. Various opinions of the Doctors.—In explaining this difficulty the scholastic Doctors write many things. And some of them seem plainly to admit all that which is supposed in the difficulty touched upon about the mode in which God through His will gives this concurrence to secondary causes. Which Scotus seems most to think, In I, dist. 39, § Viso de contingentia, and dist. 41, § Primum istorum, and § Sed contra, and dist. 47, at the end, and Quodl. 14, letter S; and the Scotists follow, especially Bassolis, In I, dist. 38, a. 2, and dist. 39, a. 2; and Mayronis, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, and q. 3; Richard too, dist. 38, a. 1, q. 5, seems to suppose the same, while he says that God sufficiently knows all future things in His will. Which Durandus also asserted there, q. 3, even though otherwise he does not require the concurrence of God for the actions of secondary causes. And many modern Thomists follow this opinion and attribute it to St. Thomas. But in him no mention of it is made in his whole doctrine, nor can they bring anything besides those things which we treated and expounded in sect. 2, and what the same St. Thomas treats about the motion of the human will by God, I, q. 82, a. 2, q. 104, aa. 3 and 4, and q. 105, a. 4, and I-II, qq. 9 and 10, especially a. 4, ad 3, and q. 109, in the first articles, especially a. 6, ad 3. But in all these places he never explained that mode of giving general concurrence, but at most calls it the motion of the human will, and often does not speak of it, but of other modes in which God can morally move the will, especially through the helps of grace, which do not pertain to the present.

12. How the aforesaid authors satisfy the proposed difficulty.—This opinion being supposed, however, its authors answer the proposed difficulty in two ways. The former is that that will of God by which He determines concurrence for the action of the secondary cause is from the freedom of the same will, and therefore does not impede but conserves similar freedom in the secondary cause, if otherwise it has it. This reply has foundation in the doctrine of Scotus, who, as we saw above, for this cause asserted that, if God acted from necessity of nature, He would take away by the concurrence or motion by which He moves the secondary cause its freedom, but now does not take it away because He acts freely. Nevertheless this reply does not satisfy; for the freedom of God can contribute to His giving concurrence accommodated to the secondary cause and to its freedom. But if the concurrence or motion is such that, if it were given by God from necessity of nature, it would necessitate the created will, then, even if it is given by God freely, it will necessitate it, as I proved above, because, if the motion is the same, it has the same effect in the secondary cause; but the free relation to the first cause will make the action free to the first cause, but not to the secondary cause. Thus, then, in the present case it matters little that God freely gives concurrence in the way explained above, for thence it is only had that the action is free to God, but not to the secondary cause itself, because the proposed difficulty seems to show that that mode of concurring takes away its indifference. And it is confirmed, for God can bring in necessity to the created will, and nevertheless will bring it in freely; and then the action will be free to God, but necessary to the created will; therefore the relation of freedom to the first cause is not enough for the action to be free to the secondary cause, unless the mode of moving it and concurring with it is such as to be accommodated to conserving the use of its freedom; therefore from divine freedom alone the aforesaid difficulty is not sufficiently solved.

13. Another unravelling of the difficulty.—Another reply is that God, although He gives definite concurrence to natural and free agents through His will, yet gives it in a diverse way; for to necessary agents He wills to give concurrence by which they act necessarily, to free ones by which they act freely; and so God wills not only the action but also the mode of the action; and because the divine will is efficacious for both, therefore it achieves both together. And for this reason it is said of divine providence that it reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly. Which reply has foundation in St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 8, ad 2, and in other places, where he teaches that it pertains to the efficacy of the divine will that what it wills come about, and in the way in which it wills. Which doctrine, so taken generally, is most certain; yet it is also certain that, when God wills something to come about in a certain mode, it pertains to His wisdom and efficacy to apply causes accommodated to that mode of operating; for He would be repugnant to Himself if He willed something to come about in such a mode and otherwise impeded or took away the causes for that mode of operating. This, then, is what we are inquiring in the present case: how, since God wills the secondary cause to act freely and with indifference, He can define His concurrence without repugnance being involved in this. Hence it is not enough to say that it pertains to the efficacy and sweetness of divine providence to conjoin those two; but either it must be explained how there is no repugnance in them, which is not done by that reply, or another mode must be sought by which God can efficaciously and sweetly move the creature to act and to act freely.

14. The author's reply to the preceding difficulty.—On account of the proposed difficulty, then, I think with many other theologians that the mode in which God gives or offers His concurrence to free causes is to be explained otherwise. Which mode differs in two things from that which we explained in natural agents. First, in the determination as to exercise, because namely God, by virtue of that will by which He decreed to give concurrence to the free cause, does not wholly absolutely decree that the free cause exercise that act, nor simply wills that act to be, but wills that act to be with a condition as it were understood, so far as concerns Himself and on the part of His concurrence, which He has decreed to give, and to it by virtue of such will He applies His power, if, however, the secondary cause or created will also determines itself to it and inflows into it; for it can always not inflow, by its freedom.

15. The first reason.—And this difference is founded, first, on the diverse modes of operating connatural to these agents. For natural agents are by their nature determined to the exercise of their actions; and therefore, as I said above, the first cause, accommodating itself to them, absolutely defines concurrence for them; but free agents are not so determined by their nature to the exercise of their actions; since, therefore, God gives concurrence to each in a mode accommodated to its nature, to these agents too He offers concurrence without complete determination to exercise.

16. The second.—Secondly, the reason made seems to convince this; for if God offered concurrence by an absolute and efficacious will physically determinative and effective of such act, He would necessarily draw the secondary cause with Him; which necessity would be absolute with respect to such cause, because, although it would be from some supposition, that would yet be wholly antecedent, and so efficacious that the inferior cause could in no way resist it.

17. The third.—Thirdly, because, although actual concurrence is not among the prerequisites for acting, but included in the action, yet concurrence in first act, or (what is the same) to have concurrence so offered and prepared that it is in the power of man to have it if he wills, is one of the things necessarily prerequired for acting, as was proved above. For in truth it is not understood by any other reason how it is in the proximate power of man to begin his action. Therefore this concurrence must be offered so, and through such a will of the first cause, that, it being so posited, it is still in the power of the secondary cause to operate freely with it or not to operate; because otherwise this indifference with all the prerequisites for acting is not saved, which is of the notion of free action. Therefore it is necessary that it be understood to be offered through a will including a condition, as declared by us. For if it were wholly absolute, that offering of concurrence could not fail to pass to exercise or second act.

18. The fourth.—Fourthly, this is most necessary on account of the evil acts of the created will. For it cannot be said that God of Himself, by His absolute will, decrees that these acts be wholly made by the secondary cause; otherwise He would not only permit them, but also will them, which is foreign to sound doctrine. Moreover, because otherwise the first root and origin of the evil of our will would be reduced to God, for since the will of God is simply prior, it will always determine the created will to will; therefore the created will always wills because God wills it to will; therefore also when it wills evil, it wills because God wills it to will. The first root, therefore, of every evil will would be poured back into the divine, which is impious.

19. Nor will he satisfy who answers that all these things are true and to be admitted of the evil will as to the material, but not as to the formal, that is, inasmuch as it is evil. For in the present case one follows from the other, because the free act of the created will about this object and with these circumstances cannot be had without having concomitant malice; he, therefore, who wills by absolute will that act to be elicited by the created will about this object and with these circumstances, and especially if he so wills it as to draw the created will with him to exercising that act, plainly wills morally or virtually the malice necessarily conjoined to the act, and is its root and cause. But it is otherwise if God offers concurrence through that will including a condition, as explained by us; for then He simply does not will the evil act, nor determines or draws the created will to its exercise, but only offers concurrence by which He inflows into the act of the created will while it elicits it. And this is the most known difference on account of which God, being just, wills to permit the act of sin, as it is from the created will, which yet as such He cannot will, as the theologians to be cited at once explain more at length.

20. The fifth.—We can apply a fifth reason, because God can necessitate the created will even when it would suffer no necessity from the object, intellect or some intrinsic disposition, as was seen in the foregoing; but there does not appear a mode in which God could more efficaciously bring in necessity as to exercise to the created will than by His absolute will, efficacious and operative ad extra, drawing the created will to will that which He wills it to will. Therefore, conversely, when God wills so to concur with the created will as not to necessitate it as to exercise, He does not give concurrence through a will so absolute and efficacious; therefore He gives it through a will accommodated to the freedom of the human will, and so including on its part a virtual condition, such as we have explained. And in this way almost all the ancient theologians explained the mode of God's concurring with a free cause, whom I shall report at once, having first declared the second difference proposed above.

21. The second difference in the mode of divine concurrence with free causes and with necessary ones.—There is, then, another difference between the mode in which the divine will offers concurrence to natural and to free agents, because to the former it gives concurrence only for one act, but to the latter it offers sufficient concurrence for several acts, so far as concerns itself, which the difficulty posited above rightly proves. And moreover it can be proved by applying with proportion almost all the reasons made in the preceding. First, because God gives to each secondary cause concurrence in a mode accommodated to its nature. But this is the nature of a free cause, that, all the other prerequisite conditions being posited, it is indifferent to several acts; therefore it must also receive concurrence in first act in an indifferent mode; therefore concurrence must be offered, so far as concerns God, not only for one act but for several. Secondly, because otherwise the created will would never be proximately able to effect several acts; therefore it would never be free as to the specification of the act. The second consequence is evident from what was said above about the free cause. But the first sequel is evident, because a secondary cause is not proximately able for any effect unless it has the concurrence of the first cause prepared for it. And therefore a little before we said that a natural cause is always proximately able for only one singular effect, because for that alone does it have the concurrence of God prepared.

22. Thirdly, there is an evident argument, because the created will can will nothing without the concurrence of God; therefore, unless in some way it has in its power the concurrence of God for several acts, it can never simply and proximately elicit any of those acts; but it can never have the concurrence of God in its hand and power unless it first and antecedently has it offered, so far as concerns the will of God, because it is not given, nor can be given, except through the will of God. Nor yet can the created will as it were prevent the divine will, or effect something by which it may draw it to giving general concurrence, because the created will can effect nothing without that very concurrence. The will, then, in giving concurrence, must always precede, nor with respect to it, at least in the first volition, can the created will in any way prevent the divine. If, then, that divine will is defined to one act only or its concurrence, the created will can effect only that by proximate power, nor does it have concurrence for another in its power, and consequently the same holds of the other things which either follow upon it or are made per se by the same genus of concurrence.

23. Fourthly, the reason taken from evil acts is also applied here most efficaciously; for it is incredible that God should will to concur with the will of man here and now for an evil act, and for that alone,¹ even so far as concerns Himself. For neither can this be poured back into the will of the sinner himself, because the will of God concurring wholly precedes the will of the sinner and every free use of it. For I consider a man actually thinking of an evil object with all the prerequisite circumstances in order that the will can assent to it or dissent; but neither can it do through a positive act without the concurrence of God, and before it does either, it cannot be imputed to it that God wills this or that about the concurrence to be given; therefore, if God had purposed to concur with him for the evil consent and not for another act, this would be from the will of God alone, nor could it be imputed to the will of man; but how foreign this is to the divine goodness I leave to all to consider.

24. The authors who embrace the aforesaid mode.—Hence grave theologians declare in this way the concurrence of God with a free cause, most of all when they speak of concurrence for the act of sin. And it can be taken from St. Thomas, In I, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2, where he says that something takes place beside the consequent will of God's good pleasure, although nothing takes place against it, which he says on account of the evil act; but the consequent will of God is called absolute and efficacious will. And therefore in I-II, q. 89, a. 1, ad 3, he says that the will of God is the universal principle of the interior human motion, but the determination to such evil act is directly from the human will. As if he said that God of Himself offers indifferent concurrence, but that it is determined as it were materially from the cooperation of the free will. And generally he signifies such to be the motion or concurrence of God with a free cause, I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3, and q. 10, a. 4, and III Cont. Gent., cc. 73 and 90, and q. 3 De Potent., a. 7, ad 13, and q. 5 De Verit., a. 5, ad 1. Capreolus thinks the same, in the places cited above, sect. 2, and especially In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12 against the second conclusion; Conrad expressly and at length, I-II, q. 79, a. 2; and Soto, I De Natur. et grat., c. 16, who more expressly than the other Thomists, and more generally, says that God does not concur with the free will through the will of good pleasure, which cannot be resisted, but by another will, which can be resisted; his words are: Whatever God wills by absolute will, and that which is called of good pleasure, comes about, according to that: Who resisteth His will? But when He concurs with free man, He does not will it to come about except with human nature and free will safeguarded, which can therefore resist God.

25. Scotus too, although in the places cited above he seems to think otherwise, yet In II, dist. 37, § Ad solutionem istorum, in order to declare concurrence for the act of sin, says that the secondary cause has in its power to concause and not to concause with the first; and if it does not concause as it is bound, thence it comes about that there is not rectitude in the effect common to both. Where Lychetus expressly so declares the divine concurrence and the will of God through which it is given, and Mayronis also signifies it, In II, dist. 43, q. 4. Hence Vega, bk. VI On Trent, c. 7, for this cause says that the general concurrence of God is immediately in our power even when we do not operate; and he thinks this is necessary for our freedom. Cordova holds the same, q. 55, doubts 8 and 10, although he speaks less properly about the order of nature between the causality of the first and the second cause.

26. Almost all other authors too so declare the divine concurrence, especially Gregory, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12; Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 4, and a. 3, doubt 1, and dist. 87, a. 3, dub. 2; Marsilius, In I, q. 40, a. 2, part 1, concl. 4, at the end; Adam, In III, dist. 14, q. 3, doubt 2; Almain, tract. I Moral., c. 1. Alexander of Hales also favours it very much, I, q. 24, memb. 5, and q. 26, memb. 4, a. 3, and q. 40, memb. 4, ad 3; Bonaventure, In II, dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1, to the last; and many others, whom I omit for the sake of brevity.

Objections against the above doctrine

27. But the things which can be objected against this mode of explaining the divine concurrence with free causes will be easily solved from what has been treated in the foregoing. The first can be that it follows that the free act takes place without the absolute and efficacious will of God, which seems repugnant, since all things depend on this will of God. Secondly, because it follows that the free act takes place as it were per accidens or contingently with respect to God, because God of Himself does not prescribe what is to come about from His concurrence, and as it were tends uncertainly to that which the created will shall have done. Thirdly, hence it seems to follow that God applies His concurrence to these acts only in a general and confused mode, namely, to that which the created will shall have effected; but this seems to be a great imperfection. Fourthly, it follows that God does not have perfect providence in particular of these free acts, since He does not dispose of them in particular that they be or not be, but only confusedly, leaving the determination in particular to the secondary cause. Hence further it comes about, fifthly, that the determination of such act, both as to exercise and as to specification, is wholly to be attributed to the secondary cause. Sixthly, this seems to be repugnant to what we said above, that the determination of the effect in the individual proceeds in a peculiar way from the predefinition of the first cause; for this is no less necessary in free acts than in others, because, when the will loves, it is not in its power to choose this act of love in the individual rather than another which it could make. Seventhly, because it follows from what has been said that, the will of God concurring with the created will for its act being posited, it can happen that the act does not follow, even if on the part of the will there is sufficient power and all the other requisites; and by the same reason it will come about that God and the divine will on its part behave in the same way towards the man with whom He does not actually concur and towards him with whom He concurs, which is absurd, since He operates something in the one which He does not operate in the other.

28. Eighthly, it can be directly shown that that mode is not necessary; for God in His eternity foreknows what the created will will will on any occasion about any object and with any circumstances; therefore God can by absolute will will to give concurrence for that act alone which He foresees it will operate. Nor is it necessary that He offer concurrence for other acts which He certainly knows will never be future. And by the same reason it is not necessary that He attach some condition tacitly or expressly to His will, since He already foresees that that condition which could intervene there is future, namely, that the created will will cooperate. And for the same cause through this mode of concurrence the indifference of freedom is not taken away, because both that will of God is posited with some respect to the future cooperation of the will, and God would be ready to give other concurrence if the will were going to operate something else.

The objections are satisfied

29. To the first it is answered that it is one thing for a free act to take place without the absolute will of God by which He wills such act to be, another that God does not concur to such act from that absolute will. From our opinion, then, only this latter follows, which we admit as most true, because in order that God concur the will of concurring suffices, which, as to that which holds itself on the part of God, is absolute and efficacious, because by virtue of it God applies His power to concurring, and in reality in time concurs according to the purpose of the same will. Yet, because in the object of that will, as is established from the very word concurring, the concomitance or cooperation of another is comprehended, therefore on the part of the other is understood a condition without which that will of God will not have effect ad extra, and therefore from this side it can be called conditional. For since the transient action by which God concurs with the created will depends both on the divine will and on the created, in order that God concur to it it is not necessary that He absolutely will that action inasmuch as it is from both principles, but only inasmuch as it is from Himself, letting or granting to the other will that it too inflow, and consequently understanding the condition of the cooperation of the other will. For so God behaves about evil wills. On account of which Augustine said, V De Civit., cc. 8 and 9, and often elsewhere, that all powers are from God, but not all wills. And the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, for the same cause defines that God works these acts only permissively. And hence we openly gather that, by virtue of general concurrence and of the necessary subordination between the first and the second cause, the said will of concurring on the part of God suffices, whatever be the case as to whether about good acts God for special reasons has another mode of absolute will.

30. Hence the other proposition, namely, that the free act takes place without the absolute will of God, does not follow from our opinion, because, although that will is not necessary for concurrence, God can have it for another reason. And in good acts indeed God has it, whether it precedes knowledge by way of predefinition or follows by way of approbation, for this does not pertain to the present. But about evil acts God does not have that absolute will, because God does not simply and absolutely will these evils to be made, nor in those which He foresees as future does He simply take pleasure, for it is repugnant to His goodness; although neither does He absolutely will these acts not to be made, but wills to permit them, as St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3. And after He foresees that they are future, He takes pleasure in them inasmuch as they are from Him, which is only to take pleasure in the concurrence which He gives to them.

31. To the second it is answered by denying the sequel, because God from certain knowledge and His will concurs with the created will for any act of it; and therefore He does not concur with the created will by chance or contingently, but from most wise providence. And although He does not always by absolute will predefine what the created will is going to operate, yet He does not on that account tend uncertainly, because He either predefines or at least permits whatever such secondary cause is going to act, and also sees most clearly and most certainly what it is going to act; and to that He concurs by His will.

32. Hence too the third drawback is solved by denying the sequel. For not confusedly, but distinctly and in particular God voluntarily applies His concurrence to this or that act; always, however, with the condition of the free cooperation of the created will itself understood. For this condition has no less place in the will of concurring distinctly and in particular for such or such act than in a confused will of concurring, which need not be attributed to God except inasmuch as it is included in the will of concurring in particular for this or that act.

33. Wherefore what was inferred in the fourth place, about the imperfection or confusion (so to speak) of divine providence, by no means follows; for God provides about all things in particular, but not about all in the same way. Hence about good acts which are going to be He disposes simply and absolutely that they be; but about evil ones, although He also disposes in particular, yet not simply and absolutely that they be, but that they be permitted to be; and about them, inasmuch as they are already foreseen as future, God disposes how they be either cured or punished. Thus, then, God has perfect providence about all and each in particular, yet accommodated to each. And for this cause certain grave ancient authors, especially Greek ones,² deny that these evil acts are from providence, because by that word they understand peculiarly that absolute disposition by which God not only permits but absolutely wills something to be; or, as that particle from providence sufficiently indicates, they only intend that the root and origin of these evil acts is not from divine providence, nor are such acts to be attributed to it as to their proper cause. It is true that they sometimes extend that mode of speaking to good acts, but then they use that word more strictly for an efficacious predetermination of God bringing in necessity to the created will, as St. Thomas expounded, I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1.

34. To the fifth, about the determination of the created will, it has already been said in the foregoing how this determination can in some way be attributed to the secondary cause; for the same mode proportionally has place in a free cause. And by a certain greater and peculiar reason it is said to determine itself to its action. Not because it determines itself without the concurrence of God (for its determination is nothing else than its volition, which it is established cannot take place without the concurrence of God), but because the will and power of God, as so applied to concurring, is as it were indifferent and waiting so as to cooperate according to the free use of the will; which is not from imperfection, but from the most wise providence of God accommodating Himself to the secondary cause. Hence, although simply the concurrence of God is prior in nature, in the way explained above, yet in a qualified sense and in its genus this determination can in a peculiar way be attributed to the secondary cause. We speak, however, generally by virtue of concurrence, for in other ways or through other helps God is often the principal cause of every good determination of the will, and especially in those things which are done through grace, of which elsewhere.

35. To the sixth, we grant that the determination of the act or effect, especially as to the individual, arises from the determination of the divine concurrence. Nor is this repugnant to what has been said about concurrence for free acts; for that very determination of concurrence to the singular and individual act can be from a will not wholly absolute on every side, but including a condition on the part of the free cooperation of human choice. Again, that concurrence can be offered not only for one individual act of one species, but also for several of diverse species, as for this act of love and for this act of hatred; and so in each species the will is determined to such act in the individual, and nevertheless remains indifferent either to using the concurrence or not using it, or to using it in this or that species.

36. To the seventh, we grant the former part of the inference, namely, that, after the concurrence has been sufficiently offered on the part of God, the will can not operate, even in the composite sense. Nor is this a greater drawback than that, the permission of God being posited, the will can still not sin; which is true and necessary, because permission regards the power of the cause behaving towards both of opposites, as St. Thomas said, In I, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2. Finally, just as, all the prerequisites being posited, the will can operate and not operate, so also, the concurrence of God being sufficiently offered and prepared, it can not operate with it, because that is one of the prerequisites. I say, however, transient concurrence offered, not posited in reality, because then it is now impossible in the composite sense that the will not operate, because such concurrence is not distinguished in reality from its action. In which sense St. Thomas said, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, that if God moves the will, it is impossible that the will not be moved. For this concurrence is not among the prerequisites for the action, but intrinsically included in the action itself.

37. Hence, to the other part of the inference, the sequel is denied, for into that man who actually operates God also actually inflows, but not into him who does not operate. And so God does not behave equally towards both as to the external action with respect to God Himself. But if the discourse were of the will of God ad intra alone, by which He offers concurrence, it can happen that on its part it is equal, and that in one it has effect and not in the other, from their freedom, which is no drawback, because in the will of God itself that condition was included, as has been explained. But whether in another electing or predefining will, or in some help flowing from it, there is always inequality, it is not ours to dispute.

38. To the eighth it is answered that the conditional foreknowledge which is supposed in it, and which we willingly admit, does not impede the mode of concurring explained by us nor give place to another. For when God foreknows what the created will is going to do if it is applied with such circumstances, among the other conditions this one is to be posited, namely, if God offers sufficient concurrence, because without it it can operate nothing. But this sufficient concurrence, as included in this conditional, must be such as to be indifferent both to exercise and to the species of act; and therefore it must not be absolutely defined to one act only and its exercise. Although, then, God foresees what the will is going to operate here and now, if He Himself gives concurrence, it is necessary that He give it in that way which the nature of the will itself demands, and which was understood included in the aforesaid hypothesis. For if God changed the mode of concurrence, the effects would no longer follow in the same way. The will, then, by which God offers concurrence remains of itself always conditional in virtue, although from foreknowledge it is equivalent to absolute, because God foresees that it will have effect, the other will concurring together.

39. And by the same reason, notwithstanding that foreknowledge, God, so far as concerns Himself, offers concurrence for other acts, although the created will is not going to effect them, so that it can simply effect them, nor does it rest with God that it does not effect them. Just as God also wills to give sufficient helps to those whom He foreknows will not use such helps well, so that they can simply so operate; because otherwise it could not in fact be imputed to them that they did not operate, if on account of the said foreknowledge alone they were deprived of such helps. Indeed this very thing is supposed in that argument, when it is said in it that God is ready to concur for other acts if the created will were going to do them, for God is not so ready except through His will and free determination, not that which He would have in that event—for who can judge of that?—but that which He now already has. God, then, offers to free causes His sufficient concurrence not only for those acts which they do or are going to do, but also for those which they could do if they willed.