Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting on each side.—Many things are comprehended under this title which are necessary for declaring more exactly what this concurrence of God is, and they can be briefly dispatched from what was said in the preceding section, without a multitude of opinions and arguments. The first is whether the concurrence of God and of the creature are one action or several. For that they are several is indicated both by the multitude of principles and by the order of nature, by which the concurrence of God is thought prior to that of the creature. But that it is one seems to be convinced both by the immediate influx of God into the very action of the creature, and by the fact that there is no action to an action.

That the action of the first and of the second cause is one

2. And this latter part is without doubt true, and St. Thomas expressly teaches it, I, q. 105, a. 5, ad 2, where at the same time he answers the first reason for doubting posited by us, saying: One action does not proceed from two agents (supply: total ones) of one order, but nothing prevents one and the same action from proceeding from the first and the second agent. Add: Indeed it is necessary, because it depends on both essentially and immediately in its genus. St. Thomas has the same, III Cont. Gent., c. 70; and Giles, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 6; and there Capreolus, q. 2, a. 3, to the argument of Durandus against the sixth conclusion. Finally, no one who thinks rightly about the divine concurrence dissents from this opinion in substance; yet, in order that the diversity which can be in the mode of explaining be understood, I note that about the transient action of God there is a twofold opinion.

3. Whether the action by which God concurs is immanent or transient.—Some assert that the action of God is never formally transient, but that only the will of God is His action, while that action which passes into extrinsic matter is not compared to God as action, but as effect of His action; according to which mode of speaking the action of God and the action of the creature are most of all distinguished, as uncreated and created thing. Nevertheless it is true, even according to this opinion, that the action of the creature through itself flows immediately not only from the secondary cause, but also from the power or internal action of God, whether that action of the creature, in comparison with God, is to be called action or His effect, which can pertain to the name. Hence, to remove equivocation, it can be said in that opinion that the internal concurrence of God is distinguished from the action of the creature, but that the external or transient concurrence is the same as the action of the secondary cause, whether it is in it by way of action or by way of first effect. The other opinion, and truer, which we defended above, is that the transient action flowing from God is truly God's action, but that His will concurs rather by way of principle; and so both in reality and in the mode of speaking it is evident that the action of the first and second cause is one and the same.

4. God is the cause of all the effects and actions of the creature.—Which I demonstrate further thus, because, if in that effect there are two actions, one of God alone and the other of the secondary cause, terminated at one and the same effect, I ask whether the action of the secondary cause is from it alone and not from God per se and immediately. And this can in no way be said; otherwise it follows that only the effect of the secondary cause is made by the first, but not the action itself; the consequent is wholly false and falls into the opinion of Durandus treated above. And therefore St. Thomas and other theologians teach that God is the per se and immediate cause in His order not only of all the effects of creatures, but also of all their actions; and so too Scripture speaks, when it attributes to God all the operations and motions of creatures; and in John 1 it is said: Without Him was made nothing; but the action of the creature as such is something; it is not, therefore, made without the actual influx of God. And it is evident by reason, because either the action of the creature in reality is not something distinct from its effect, and so it is necessary that they flow from the same causes, because they are the same; or it is a mode distinct by the nature of the thing from the effect, and so it has some real notion which must immediately depend on God, by the same or greater reason as the other beings by participation; because that being which it has according to its mode is diminished and participated being, and therefore per se depending on the first being. But if it is said that the action of the secondary cause is not from it alone, but at the same time per se and immediately from the first cause, then it is one and the same action of both causes, which is what we intend; and another distinct action which is from the first cause alone to the same effect is superfluous, because through the prior action it sufficiently inflows into it in its order.

5. The action of the secondary cause depends on God through itself.—It will perhaps be said that the action of the secondary cause is also from the first, yet in a diverse way; for it is from the second immediately through itself, but from the first through another action proper to God alone, also transient and existing outside God; for so we are now speaking. But this multiplication of actions is irrelevant and against all philosophical reason; for to a transient action there is no other action, especially also a transient one; otherwise we shall proceed to infinity. For I shall ask of that prior action which is said to be from God alone whether it is through another action, also transient, or through itself. If through another, we shall proceed further, and so to infinity; if through itself, the same will be said better of the first action, that, just as it flows per se from the secondary cause, so it flows per se also from the first, because there is no repugnance in its flowing per se from both, since they are of diverse orders, as St. Thomas said above. Nor can a greater repugnance be assigned in its proceeding through itself from the first cause than in its proceeding through another action; indeed this latter is much more repugnant, for it is against the notion of action as such to be the terminus of another action. It remains, therefore, that the concurrence of God ad extra is nothing else than the very action of the secondary cause, as flowing per se and immediately from the first.

Whether the action of the secondary cause is from the action of the first

6. And hence another point pertaining to this section is easily dispatched, namely, whether the action of the secondary cause can be said to be made, to flow or to be from the concurrence or action of the first cause, or conversely, whether the action of the first cause causes the action of the secondary cause. For all authors seem so to speak, and this seems to pertain to the universal influence of the first cause. Likewise, the action of the creature is from God; therefore it depends on the action of God. Finally, for this reason the divine action is prior in nature to the action of the creature.

7. But it must be said with Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 of Aureolus against the sixth conclusion, that the action of God can be taken for the immanent act or volition of God Himself, or for the exterior action. In the former way the arguments made proceed rightly. In which sense not only the action of the secondary cause, but also the transient action of the first cause, both when it operates with the creature and when it operates alone, proceeds and depends from the internal action of God Himself. And in the same sense seems to be taken what St. Thomas says, In III, dist. 23, q. 3, a. 1, that the actions of all secondary agents are founded on the action of the first agent, because all are founded in some way on the divine will. Yet we have already said in the foregoing that this internal act of the will of God does not have the proper notion of action, which says flowing and tendency to a terminus, but has rather the notion of principle, because either it is the very omnipotence of God or, if they are distinguished in reason, it behaves as applying the omnipotence of God to acting.

8. But in the latter way the exterior action of God and of the creature is one and the same, as we have said. And therefore according to that notion the action of the creature cannot properly flow or depend from the action of God, nor conversely can the action of God properly cause the action of the creature, because the same does not cause itself nor depend on itself. Likewise, because action as action is only the cause of its terminus, and is not a cause except by way of way; but the action of God is not a way to the action of the creature, but to the effect, nor is an action the terminus of an action. To the universal influx of the first cause, then, it pertains only that every action of the secondary cause proceed from the will and power of the first cause itself, not that it proceed through another external action, but it can proceed through itself immediately from the will or power of God. Hence, when the action of the creature is said to depend on the influx or concurrence of God, either concurrence is taken for the immanent and internal act, inasmuch as it inflows into the external action, or the expression must not be taken transitively (so to speak) except according to reason. For it will more properly be said that the action of the creature is also from God, and as such is the very concurrence of God to the action of the secondary cause, from which it is not other according to the thing, but only according to reason or respect.

Whether there is an order of nature between the action of the first and of the second cause

9. Hence again the third point, often touched upon, is easily dissolved, about priority of nature between the action of God and the action of the creature. For one must distinguish, first, of internal and external action, to speak with many, in the said sense. Secondly, of priority of nature; for one is that which consists in proper causality and dependence of one on another; another which consists only in a certain greater dignity, or universality, independence, or another similar property. Comparing, then, the action of the creature to the internal action of God, it is clear that the action of God is prior in nature in both ways, namely, both in dignity and in causality; for in this way the action of the creature truly depends on the act of God. In this sense, however, not only the action of the creature as such, but also the exterior action itself of God, is posterior in nature to the interior action of God, for it is truly caused by it. And in this sense authors generally speak when they say that the action of the first cause is prior in nature to the action of the secondary cause according to causality, as is evident from Capreolus above. Nor does it stand in the way that the action of God in this way is prior not only in nature but also in time and eternity to the action of the creature, because in these expressions the internal action of God is not considered according to its absolute entity alone, but as it connotes the actual influx into the creature. In which way many say that active creation is from time, even if really it is immanent, because the actual influx which it connotes is temporal; and under that notion too it is said to be prior in nature, even if it is simultaneous in time with the effect.

10. But speaking of the external action, both of God and of the creature, one cannot so be called prior in nature to the other by priority of causality, because, as has been shown, since they are one and the same action, true causality cannot intervene between them. Nevertheless, distinguishing that action according to reason, as it is from the first cause or as it is from the second, it can be said to be first and more principally from the first than from the second; and in a similar way the first cause may be said to inflow into that action prior in nature to the second. First, because the first cause is higher, and inflows into the effect in a nobler and more independent mode. Secondly, because the first cause receives that action per se primo under a certain more universal notion; for the first cause inflows into any effect or action from the fact precisely that it participates something of entity; but the secondary cause always inflows under some posterior and more determinate notion of being. Hence it comes about, thirdly, that the influx of the first cause of itself and from its genus is said to be prior also by consequence of subsisting, which Aristotle placed among the priorities of nature; for the influx of the first cause absolutely does not depend on the secondary cause, but, so far as concerns its genus, can be without it, but not conversely. And in this way Cajetan explained this priority or subordination, I, q. 14, a. 13; and Scotus intimates it, In I, dist. 39, and In II, dist. 37.

11. A certain proposition taken from the book On Causes is explained.—And in the same ways is expounded that expression of the book On Causes, proposition 1, which is this: The first cause acts first on the caused, and enters it more vehemently; where St. Thomas too, in the Commentary, applies the same interpretation, adding from Proclus that the first cause inflows first, because the secondary cause does not act except in its power.

In what subject the concurrence of the first cause is

12. The fourth point pertaining here is whether the concurrence of the first cause is received in the second or in its effect. Which question has place only in transient concurrence; for the immanent is not received in a subject, but is the subsisting volition of God itself. In order, then, that we may abstract from opinions, it must be answered formally, according to what has been said, that the concurrence of God is in that subject in which the action of the secondary cause is. It is evident, because in reality they are not distinguished; therefore neither can they be distinguished in subject. Wherefore, if every action of the secondary cause is in it, as some hold, the concurrence of the first cause will be in the same, and through it will pass to the effect or to the passion or becoming of the effect, in the way in which (according to that opinion) the agent, by means of the action which it receives in itself, inflows passion into another. But according to the truer doctrine, which teaches that transient action is in the patient and immanent action in the agent, it must be said that the concurrence of God to transient action is not something received in the secondary cause, but in the patient; but that concurrence to immanent action is received in the agent itself, inasmuch as its action is received in it. And both parts are sufficiently established from what has been said, nor do they contain new difficulty.