Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Since it has been shown that this concurrence of which we treat is from the first cause, or belongs to it inasmuch as it is efficient, it is established that it can be nothing else than action or principle of action, comprehending under principle of action both the per se principle and every condition prerequired for acting; for besides these nothing is found in the efficient cause, as efficient, which could have the notion of concurrence. For we suppose that neither the acting supposit itself as such is the concurrence, nor yet the effect as such. For the supposit is as it were the first acting principle, while the effect is the last terminus of the effecting; but concurrence says something by way of influx or tendency from the acting supposit to the terminus.

The first opinion is proposed

2. There can, then, be three ways of speaking about this question. The first is that concurrence of this kind is something by way of per se principle. Which can be understood in two ways: in one way, that such principle is in God Himself. And this, rightly explained, can have a true sense; we are not, however, now speaking in it. For God concurs through His will with the creature for its action. Hence the very volition of God can in its order be called the concurrence of God with the creature, which by some is called concurrence ad intra; but the act of the will of God is in its way the per se principle of every action ad extra, a per se principle (I say) either by reason of itself or by reason of the executive power which it applies to acting, either according to the thing or also according to reason, according to the various ways of thinking about the executive power of God. Thus, then, the concurrence of God ad intra will be something by way of principle of action, not in the creature, but in God Himself. Now, however, we do not speak of concurrence in this sense, but as it is something flowing from God and received in the creature; and concurrence in strictness does not signify something ad intra, but ad extra. In another way, then, this opinion is understood: that concurrence is a certain thing flowing from the first cause and received in the second, completing it ultimately and determining it to effecting such effect. And for this reason this concurrence is said to be by way of principle, because it is the power of acting of the secondary cause, or at least formally completes it. And on account of this power all secondary causes are said to act in the power of the first, as is often said in the book On Causes; and conversely, by reason of the same power the first cause is said to act by immediacy of power, because this power inflowed into the secondary cause is the power of the first cause, and from it immediately the action proceeds. And this seems to be the whole foundation of this opinion. I find, however, no assertor of this opinion who expressly taught it, although those whom we shall at once cite for the second seem sometimes to favour it and to speak quite indistinctly.

The said opinion is refuted

3. This opinion, however, is false, and in one sense is as erroneous as the opinion of Durandus denying the actual concurrence of God to the actions of secondary causes, but in another is only improbable. The concurrence of the first cause can be understood in two ways to be a power implanted in the second as a per se principle of acting. In one way, that the concurrence of the first cause to the action of the creature stops in the influx of that power and does not concur more immediately to the action of the secondary cause itself. And in this sense I say that this opinion in reality falls into the opinion of Durandus and is equally false, inasmuch as it denies the immediate concurrence of the first cause to the action of the creature; but inasmuch as it posits something superfluous and without foundation, it will be more improbable, as I shall show in the other member. The said censure, then, is proved, because from that opinion it follows that only the created power is the per se principle of the action and effect of the secondary cause, but God only a remote principle and per accidens. But this is the opinion which is reproved in Durandus. The sequel is evident, because a cause which only gives another the power of acting, if it does not otherwise concur to its action, in truth concurs only remotely and per accidens, as fire which heats water does not otherwise concur to the second heating proceeding from the hot water; and the agent intellect which produced the intelligible species will not be said to concur per se to the act of understanding. Finally, in that way Durandus too says that God concurs to all the actions of creatures, by giving and conserving the whole power of acting up to its last complement, whatever it may be. For that that principle of acting be given prior in time, before the creature acts, or in the same instant or time in which it acts, matters nothing. Otherwise, because the sun illuminates in the same instant in which it is created and receives the power of illuminating, it would not need another concurrence besides the infusion of light. Similarly, whether that power be connatural and permanent, or extrinsically given by God and as it were transient (as some speak, and which is nothing else than to be dependent on God in becoming and being conserved), matters little for God, if He acts through that power only, to inflow per se and immediately as first cause. Wherefore, if perhaps some authors said in this sense that God acts by immediacy of power and not of supposit, they erred greatly, as is evident from what has been said and will be declared more at once.

4. In another way it can be understood that the concurrence of the first cause is by way of principle and implanted power, because in the conferring of this power it is as it were begun, yet does not stop in it, but proceeds further up to the action itself of the creature, so that into it there inflows immediately not only the power communicated to the secondary cause, but also the divine and uncreated power itself. And according to this sense it would have to be said that concurrence is not only something by way of principle, but also something by way of actual influx or action. Next, that multiplication of things in concurrence of this kind is improbable, for we are speaking per se and precisely of the concurrence necessary by virtue of the dependence of every effect and action on the first cause. Hence we suppose the secondary cause having complete power of acting in its order; for if the secondary cause itself is incomplete and imperfect, it will indeed need complement of power; yet that need does not arise from the dependence which the secondary cause has on the first, but from imperfection in the latitude of the secondary cause. And in this way it is true that God sometimes, at least supernaturally, supplies the imperfection of the secondary cause by adding power of acting, which He most of all does with us when He infuses supernatural habits; yet this is outside our purpose, because that infusion of power does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to the elevation or perfection of the secondary cause through the action of the first. Speaking, then, of the secondary cause perfectly constituted in first act in its order, it is irrelevant to adjoin another principle of acting received in it, because, by the very fact that it is something created, it pertains to the order of secondary causes, and so principles of acting are multiplied in the same order without cause or necessity. And against this concurrence so explained the arguments of Durandus made in the preceding section rightly proceed.

5. An evasion is refuted.—They will perhaps say that this power which the first cause gives to the second in order to concur with it does not pertain to the causality of the secondary cause as such, but to the causality of the first cause, because it is as it were its proper instrument for concurring with the second; and therefore, although that power is received in the secondary cause, the secondary cause does not act through it, but God, just as, although impetus is received in a thrown stone, the stone does not move itself through it, but he who threw it. Hence, just as the thrower is said to move immediately through the impulse, so God too will be said to concur immediately through this power, which immediacy, per se speaking, is of power, not of supposit. And similarly, although the power of the secondary cause is said to be completed through this power impressed by the first, yet not by a complement pertaining to the order of the secondary cause, but adding power necessary on the part of the first cause.

6. Nevertheless this reply either returns to the former sense, wholly reproved, or says something per se improbable and irrelevant; for if that power is said to be the instrument of God in such a way that the action of God stops in its effecting, but afterwards it alone concurs with the secondary cause to its action—as in the example adduced the action of the thrower stops in the impression of impetus, but afterwards the motion is from the impetus—if this (I say) is said, we return to the former sense, and so it comes about that the action of the creature says no immediate relation to the uncreated power of God itself as to its per se principle, which was reproved in the preceding section against Durandus. But if, besides the influx of that instrumental power, God is also said by His own uncreated power to inflow immediately into the action of the secondary cause, it at once appears per se how irrelevant is that instrumental power which holds itself on the part of God; for the divine power is there intimately present through itself, and on account of its eminence is sufficient and proportioned to inflow through itself into the action; indeed it must necessarily so inflow in order that any action can be made by the creature; therefore on the part of God that instrumental power is not necessary; it matters nothing, therefore, for the concurrence of the first cause, which is per se necessary and pertains to the essential subordination of the secondary cause with respect to the first.

The second opinion is proposed

7. The first foundation of the reported opinion.—The second opinion is that the concurrence of the first cause is something by way of principle in the secondary cause itself, ordered to its action, yet not as its per se principle, but only as a condition necessary for acting. So all seem to think who posit that the concurrence of God is concerned with the secondary cause antecedently to its action, by applying it or determining it to action. And this opinion is commonly attributed to St. Thomas, in places to be treated below; but undeservedly, as I shall show; Capreolus too is commonly cited, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, but equally unreasonably. Ferrariensis, however, II Cont. Gent., c. 70, at the beginning, distinguishes in created agents a twofold power of acting: one firm and permanent, which is proper and natural; the other he calls an intention of the divine power having incomplete being, and this he says does not belong to things except when they actually operate as instruments of the divine power. And at the end of § Ad secundum dubium, he says that God immediately acts in all inferior causes a certain participation of Himself, with which at the same time He immediately attains their effects; because the very power existing in God and its intention produced in the inferior causes are taken as one power; as art (he says) which is in the mind of the artificer and its intention received in the instrument are taken for one power. And through this power he says God applies secondary causes to operating, as the artificer his instruments. In which words he seems partly to allude to the former opinion, partly to this latter. But for positing this intentional power he is moved by no reason, but only by a certain testimony of St. Thomas, q. 3 De Pot., a. 7; and some later Thomists have followed this opinion. And they found it on certain received expressions of the ancient philosophers. The first is that secondary agents do not act except as moved by the first, and in this they constitute the per se subordination between these causes; and thence they conclude that one must come to one first agent not needing the motion of another. So Aristotle seems to have proceeded, VII Phys., c. 1, and bk. VIII, c. 5; and II Metaph., c. 2, whom St. Thomas always imitates, both expounding Aristotle and in other places to be cited at once; and in part Augustine, bk. VIII Genes. ad litter., c. 20, and V De Civ., c. 9. Indeed sacred Scripture too seems to attribute to God the premotion of inferior causes, as Job 13: Who changeth the heart of princes; and Prov. 12: The heart of the king is in the hand of God; whithersoever He will He shall turn it; Jer. 10: The way of man is not his; and the steps of man shall be directed by the Lord. Secondary causes act, therefore, moved by the first; but this motion cannot consist in the action itself of the secondary cause, both because motion is in the thing which is moved, while transient action is not in the agent by which it is done, and also because this motion precedes the action at least in causality, because secondary agents are moved for this, that they may act, because they cannot act unless moved.

8. The second.—The second principle is that the secondary cause is applied by the first to acting. Which is thought to be taken from the book On Causes, proposition 16, where it is said that the divine power is the power of all causes; because, namely, the divine power applies the other powers to their operations, as Giles expounded, Quodl. V, q. 1, and St. Thomas signifies, I, q. 105, a. 5, in the body, and ad 3. For in the body he says that the first agent moves the second to acting, and according to this (he says) all things act in the power of God Himself. But in the solution ad 3 he declares that this is because God not only gives and conserves the powers of acting, but also applies them to acting. And the necessity of this application, among others, is one, that to the power which regards the universal end it pertains to apply the inferior ones in order to its end; but God is the supreme agent regarding the universal end; therefore He applies the inferior ones to act accommodated to that end. This application, then, is not the action of the creature; for it is from God alone and precedes the action of the secondary cause; it is compared, therefore, to the action of the secondary cause as its principle.

9. The third.—The third principle is that the first cause arouses the second to the work; which mode of speaking is not so frequent among the ancient authors as the name of motion or application. It seems, however, to have the same force. And it can be declared in this way: the created power, while it acts, is in some way perfected in itself, because it is better to act than wholly to lack action; but this perfection does not consist in the action itself, especially in transient, since it is not in the agent itself; it consists, therefore, in this arousing by which such power is as it were ultimately actuated for acting. But this arousing cannot be from the created power itself, both because often it is not active upon itself, and also because for that efficiency it would also need arousing; it is, therefore, from the first cause.

10. The fourth.—The fourth and chief principle is that the secondary cause is determined by the first and per se and necessarily needs such determination. So St. Thomas thinks, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3, saying: This very thing, that secondary causes are determined to determinate effects, is to them from God. And a twofold reason of this necessity can be brought; one is universal for all secondary causes, because namely their powers are indifferent to producing various individuals, nor can they determine themselves to this individual rather than to that; nor can another sufficient determinant be thought of besides the first cause. But this determination does not take place except by adding something to the active power itself. The other reason is proper to the free will, which of itself is undetermined not only to individuals but also to species and to contrary acts, and therefore needs a predeterminer, because from an undetermined agent a determined effect cannot come forth. And this reason can be extended to universal natural agents, which also are indifferent to several effects diverse in species, whence they cannot determine themselves to one of them.

11. The fifth.—The fifth principle is that secondary causes are essentially subordinated to the first cause, as instruments to the artificer, as grave authors frequently speak, and especially St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3, and II Cont. Gent., c. 21, a. 4, and he indicates it in bk. III, c. 70. But this subordination cannot be understood unless the first cause premoves the second, and the action of the second depends on the motion of the first. Otherwise there would not be subordination, but a certain concomitance of two agents. Nor would the action of the first cause be prior to the action of the secondary cause; which is plainly repugnant to the dignity of the first cause and to the dependence of the secondary cause.

12. The sixth.—Sixthly we can argue that this mode of concurring of the first cause, using the secondary cause through its motion, and so perfectly subjecting it to itself, displays a certain greater perfection in the mode of acting of the first cause with the secondary ones, and includes no repugnance; therefore it is to be attributed to the first cause. The major is declared in various ways: first, because for this reason the dependence of the secondary cause on the first is greater, because it depends on the first not only in its effect and action, but also itself in causing; or, as others say, not only the effect or action taken incomplexly, but also this complex, the secondary cause acts, will be from the first. Or otherwise the first cause will not only make the effect or action of the secondary cause, but will also make the secondary cause make; which also is often attributed to God in sacred Scripture, and cannot be understood without that premotion. Again, conversely, it pertains to the perfection of the first cause that it use secondary ones for its ends and according to its will, as having supreme dominion over them; for the perfect act of dominion is the full use of the thing which falls under dominion. These are the chief reasons which can be brought for this opinion. Of which the first two seem most to favour this second opinion, but the third and fourth seem rather to proceed according to the former opinion; but the fifth and sixth are indifferent.

The preceding opinion is refuted

13. This opinion, however, is no more to be approved than the preceding; nor do I think it was the opinion of St. Thomas or Scotus or the ancient theologians. To prove which, I note that this latter opinion too can be taken in the two senses declared above.¹ The first is that the concurrence of the first cause is thought to consist wholly and precisely in acting, about the cause itself, that previous necessary condition, whether it be called by the name of motion, or application, or anything else, so that besides it the first cause has no other efficiency about the effect or action of the secondary cause. And neither Ferrariensis nor the modern authors seem to have intended this sense, as can be gathered from the last words of Ferrariensis cited above. And in truth in this sense such opinion would be no less false than the opinion of Durandus, because according to this explanation God would not concur per se to the action of the secondary cause, but only remotely and per accidens, namely by conserving the secondary cause and effecting in it a certain condition necessary for acting; but this concurrence is per accidens with respect to the effect of the secondary cause, as is evident in one applying fire to burning. For if he who gives and conserves the per se principle of acting, and concurs no further, causes only remotely and per accidens the effect flowing from that principle, much more he who gives a condition required for acting; hence he who does both will concur per accidens in two ways, but in no way per se. Of this sense, then, there is no need to dispute more; rather from it I elicit that, even if we grant that God effects that application or previous condition, the concurrence of the first cause does not consist per se and formally in it; for the first cause through its concurrence is the per se immediate cause, and total in its genus, of the effect and action of the secondary cause, as was demonstrated in the first section; but through the efficiency of this necessary condition God is not the per se and immediate, let alone total, cause of the action or effect of the creature; therefore the concurrence of God does not formally consist in this efficiency.

14. It remains, then, that we examine the other sense, namely, that the concurrence of the first cause is begun (so to speak) from this motion or application of the secondary cause, but consummated in the immediate and per se effecting of the effect itself or action of the secondary cause itself. In which sense we say that that opinion indeed differs extremely from the opinion of Durandus, but adds something to the truth which is neither necessary nor can be sufficiently understood, and can offer occasion of falling into some error, especially about the use of human freedom. In order, however, that we may prove all these things distinctly, we must proceed gradually, declaring and proving the third and true opinion.

Resolution of the question

15. The first conclusion.—I say, then, first: the divine concurrence, inasmuch as it is something ad extra, is per se essentially something by way of action, or at least by way of a certain becoming flowing immediately from God. I declare the single particles: for I say inasmuch as it is something ad extra, in order to omit the disputation about the very act of the will of God, whether it is to be called concurrence or not, and whether it is to be said to inflow by way of action or by way of principle; for as to this sense what was said above about creation suffices. And for almost the same cause I said or at least by way of a certain becoming, namely, in order to abstain from that question whether the action received in the creature is compared to God by way of action or only by way of effect; for, although it is truer that it is compared by way of action, as I shall also touch upon in the following section, yet for the present it does not matter. And the conclusion so explained is most received and to me most certain, and sufficiently proved from what was said in the preceding section against Durandus, and in this one against the reported opinions explained in the first sense.

16. And it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 5, and III Cont. Gent., c. 70, inasmuch as he says that the first cause through its general concurrence inflows per se and immediately not only into the effect but also into the action of the secondary cause; because not only the effect but also the action of the secondary cause has something of participated entity, and for that reason it is necessary that it flow immediately and per se from the first being by essence. From which principle the reason is concluded thus: the concurrence of God is intimately and per se included in the very action of the creature, and per se also and immediately tends to the same terminus to which the action of the creature tends; therefore per se and essentially it is something by way of action, or the becoming of the very action or effect of the creature. And it is confirmed; for this concurrence cannot consist in all that or in that alone which is given to the secondary cause by way of principle in order that it can operate; therefore it consists essentially in something which is by way of actual becoming.

17. The antecedent has been proved against the above opinions, and again is declared thus: any entity being posited which concurs only by way of principle, it does not imply a contradiction that the action or effect not follow; for God can suspend from actual action every created principle of acting, however applied to acting with all prerequisite conditions, and impede the effect from being made. But, actual concurrence ad extra being posited, it implies a contradiction that the action not follow or the effect not be made; therefore it is an evident sign that actual concurrence does not consist per se and essentially in those things which are by way of principle, but in something which is by way of action. The major seems known per se from the terms, because in them no repugnance or implication of contradiction is involved. And it is certain of faith that God did this in many powers operating by natural necessity, nor is there greater reason of repugnance in some than in others. Unless perhaps someone says that this is specially repugnant to the intentional power which they say is impressed by God and is as it were transient or inflowing, which comes from the fact that it has being inseparable from actual operation, as the power of art impressed on an instrument is inseparable from the operation of the art; for Ferrariensis above likens that power to this. But certainly, if such power is inseparable from the actual action of the secondary cause, even by the absolute power of God, this sufficiently declares that it is not a thing distinct from it, and consequently is not its principle, but the actual emanation of it from the first cause. Or conversely, if that power is supposed a thing distinct from the action of the secondary cause and its true principle, it is denied without probability that God can bring it about that it be and that the action not flow from it, because the power does not depend essentially on the action which flows from it, but conversely, and is in reality distinct from the action and prior to it; what, then, is repugnant in its being conserved without it? Likewise, that power being posited, the immediate influx of God is still necessary in order that the action follow, which has often been proved; therefore God can suspend that influx, and so impede the action.

18. Nor does the example of the power of art impressed on an instrument help anything, for that power can only be either impetus impressed on the instrument for moving it locally, or the motion itself. But impetus can be impeded from effecting motion, as the reasons made prove; nor do I see what stands to the contrary. But motion itself cannot be impeded from the actual motion of the instrument, because with respect to it it is not compared as power, but as the action itself or becoming. But if from the instrument so moved some other action distinct from the motion and its terminus is apt to follow, to which the motion of the instrument is compared by way of principle or power, all that action is separable from such motion by divine power, for the same cause. But that, actual concurrence ad extra being posited, the action of the secondary cause is not separable is the common consent and evident, because that concurrence is not separable from some terminus and effect of the first cause; for if it is concurrence ad extra, something is made outside God; but this must be made by the secondary cause; otherwise it would not be concurrence with the secondary cause, but the action of God alone. Hence the very name concurrence sufficiently declares inseparability from the action of the secondary cause. Therefore concurrence is essentially something by way of action or becoming, as it is from the first cause.

19. The second conclusion.—I say secondly: the concurrence of the first cause, besides that which is by way of action, does not include from intrinsic necessity something newly implanted in the secondary cause itself which is the principle of its action or a condition necessary for it. I say newly implanted, because it is certain that the concurrence of the secondary cause supposes in it the power of acting given and conserved by the first cause, which we here suppose, and we inquire what beyond it must necessarily be adjoined on the part of the first cause.

20. This conclusion, then, can be taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, aa. 1, 2 and 3, where he says that for the actions of secondary causes only two things are required, namely, intrinsic connatural power (for he speaks of natural actions, of which alone our discourse is in this whole disputation) and the concurrence of God, which he there calls the motion or help of God moving; why he so calls it we shall see below. But that he understood nothing else by that word is evident, both because otherwise he would have passed over that which is per se and most necessary, and also because there would then be necessary for the action of the creature not two but three things, namely its power, the motion and the concurrence. And so Cajetan seems to have understood it there, saying that that help of God moving is His cooperation. Who teaches the same opinion, I, q. 14, a. 13, and q. 19, a. 8, where, expounding that axiom, The secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first, he says it is to be understood not of a previous motion, but of a motion intrinsically cooperating with the action itself. And he adds: Such, however, is the cooperation of the first cause, of which it is written that it reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly, cooperating with each according to the mode of each. The same is the opinion of Scotus in various places, but especially In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ad ult., where he says that the secondary cause is not said to act in the power of the first because it then receives something from it, but because it has the order of the inferior to it; and he adds: From these it is evident that of the first cause into the secondary cause properly so called there is not a new influence which is the creation of something inhering in the secondary cause, but the influence there is the determinate order of these causes in acting the common effect. Almain thinks the same, tract. I Moral., c. 1; and Gregory, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12, where he declares that the concurrence of God consists only in the partial co-efficiency of God, so far as concerns the essential subordination of the secondary cause to the first; which I note because from another head he requires for good acts a special premotion of God, of which elsewhere; the same, In II, dist. 34, ad 8. Capreolus too, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12 against the second conclusion, where, reporting the opinion of Gregory, he approves it and says: St. Thomas agrees, I-II, q. 109, in almost every article. Gabriel too, In II, dist. 37, a. 3, dub. 2, imitates Gregory. Others I shall report in the following section.

21. It is proved by reason, first, because through this actual concurrence of God by way of action, as explained, every essential dependence is saved, both of the secondary cause on the first in causing, and of its action in becoming, and also of the effect in its whole being. Likewise by reason of this concurrence it is true that the first cause immediately and per se effects all things, and whatever else about it as causing all things is either believed on authority or can be proved by reason; therefore it is superfluous to feign anything else. The antecedent is sufficiently evident from what was said in the prior assertion, and more clearly in the solutions of the arguments. But the consequence is proved, both because nature abhors whatever is superfluous, as Aristotle too witnesses, I De Caelo, c. 4, and in other places; and also because the reasons made in the preceding section for the opinion of Durandus prove that only that efficiency of the first cause is to be conjoined with the secondary cause for its action which was per se necessary for the essential dependence of every entity or real mode on the first being; and finally because otherwise there would be no stopping-point, but any thing being posited someone could adjoin another, and, just as besides actual concurrence some require motion, others complement of power, someone could demand those three, and another at his pleasure could adjoin a fourth, as is sufficiently established per se.

22. The second reason is that nothing can be required as per se principle, nor as a necessary condition of the per se principle; therefore in no way; therefore the concurrence of the first cause as such requires nothing by way of principle, but only by way of action. The consequences are clear from sufficient enumeration. The major has been sufficiently proved in refuting the former opinion. But the minor is to be demonstrated by the same or a proportional discourse. For, just as the secondary cause in its order can be complete in power of acting, so it requires certain and determinate conditions necessary in the same order for acting, all of which we suppose it to have when we dispute precisely of the necessity of the concurrence of the first cause. For if any of them is lacking, it will indeed be necessary, if that cause is to operate, that that condition be first adjoined through the efficiency of the first cause, either alone or with another secondary cause; yet that necessity is not by virtue of concurrence or of dependence on the first cause, but from a peculiar defect. As, therefore, a cause complete in power does not need another complement of power, so a cause complete in the conditions prerequired for acting in its order prerequires no new condition. But to say that, besides those conditions known to us which secondary causes can procure per se or through other secondary causes, they require a certain other hidden condition which they can have only from the influx of the first cause, as it is said gratuitously, so it is easily despised, because it relies on no authority or reason of any weight or moment.

23. Whether and how secondary causes are applied by the first to acting.—An objection is dissolved.—But further we can show positively that no such condition can be devised, running through those four which were touched upon in the arguments made above. For first this condition was called the application of the secondary cause to acting. But we suppose every application known to us already made; but this application consists either in some local motion, or in a vital or animal action, as when the final cause is applied through cognition or the motive power through appetite. From which it comes about that, just as this application consists in some real action, so it cannot be without the efficiency of the first cause, ordinarily indeed through secondary causes, but extraordinarily through itself. But besides these, what other application could there be? For if it is real efficiency, it will be a real motion or change of the secondary cause. What terminus, then, does it have? Not local, nor of another genus outside quality, as seems known per se. Nor yet can it be some quality; for, if that quality is given as power of acting, it is no longer only a condition, but a per se principle of action, and the reasons made above return. But if it is given so as to act nothing, it is irrelevant to acting, nor can a reason be given why it is called a necessary condition. You will say that it is necessary in order to conjoin the second agent to the first, as an instrument to the principal cause. But these and similar things, which can be said in words, cannot be explained in reality, because that conjunction is neither some real union nor a more intimate presence, but only a certain new effect, whose office and necessity for the action of the secondary cause we are inquiring into.

24. Nor indeed can it be said that the terminus of that change which is called application is the very action of the secondary cause, both because one action is not the terminus of another, as I shall say more at length in the following section; and also because that application is a change in the secondary cause itself, while its action is often in the patient; and finally because that application is said to be a condition previous to the action; therefore its terminus too is previous; as, therefore, in the secondary cause there is nothing real which could terminate such change, so neither is there such application which is something real in it previous to the action.

25. How the first cause moves the second.—In another way that condition was called the motion by which the first cause moves the second to acting. And of this motion it can be inquired by the same discourse what terminus it has, and consequently to what species of motion or change it pertains, because it is necessary that every real motion tend to something and be in some species; but such motion is not local, because it is not necessary that secondary causes be changed locally whenever they act; of motion to quantity the matter is more certain; but of change to quality the reason made about application proceeds in the same way; but besides these there is nothing which can be made through that motion, as will easily be evident by running through all the genera of beings. Nor indeed can that motion be terminated per se at the very action of the secondary cause, both on account of the reasons made about application, and also because otherwise that motion would no longer be a condition prerequired for that action, but would be the intrinsic way to that action, since that action is said to be the proper and immediate terminus of that motion. From which it will further come about that, just as that motion is said to be from the first cause alone, so also its terminus, for the terminus is from the same cause from which the way is; therefore, if the action of the secondary cause is the intrinsic terminus of that motion, it will be from the first cause alone, which involves open repugnance; for how is it the action of the secondary cause if it is from the first alone? But if it is said that the action of the secondary cause is not the intrinsic terminus of that motion, but rather extrinsic or remote, another intrinsic and proper terminus will necessarily have to be assigned; but the discourse made by us sufficiently shows that none can be assigned.

26. How the power of the secondary cause is aroused by the first.—Thirdly, that condition was called the arousing of the power. Which, if it is posited to take place through true and real action of the first cause into the second or into its power, there will be made through that action some change in the cause, of which the whole argumentation just made will proceed. But if that arousing is not through true and real action into the secondary cause, then nothing is done in the secondary cause which behaves by way of principle, which is what we intend. And moreover it remains to be explained by those authors cited above by us, who require such arousing, how the arousing of power takes place without action or through extrinsic denomination, as they call it, and what is the necessity of such arousing coming from the first cause alone, besides all that which can be coming from the secondary cause. And in order that this be understood more fully, note that the arousing of a power to operate is found most properly in the powers of the soul, yet is extended in some way to some natural powers which do not act unless their subjects are first altered, as pepper does not heat unless it is crushed, and an odoriferous thing often does not send forth odour unless it is first heated.

27. This previous alteration, then, is commonly called arousing of power by metaphor; but in very truth it is either a complement of power through an added quality, or an application or disposition of the agent so that of itself it can emit some vapour or exhalation by means of which it acts, as while an odoriferous thing is rarefied by heating it can more easily exhale odour, and so of others. But the arousing of the first cause cannot be like this natural one through previous alteration, because neither is complement of power always necessary in the secondary cause, as has been shown, nor yet some material disposition; for in many secondary causes it is not necessary, as is evident in fire heating, the sun illuminating, and an angel moving the heaven; and where it is necessary, it is commonly made through other secondary causes, nor does it pertain to the subordination of the secondary cause with respect to the first.

28. But the arousing of the powers of the soul takes place in two ways. In one, by the object, either in the genus of efficient, as in the cognitive powers, or in the genus of end, as in the appetitive. And of this genus of arousing too it is known per se that the first cause does not arouse the second by virtue of general concurrence, because many secondary causes are not capable of objective arousing; and those which are capable are not always moved by the first cause as by an object. Nor yet does the first cause from its general office have to apply arousing objects except by concurring with secondary causes. For the works of grace God indeed arouses men in a peculiar way; nevertheless that arousing does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to supplying or helping the imperfection of some secondary cause; about which genus of divine arousing the theologians dispute specially in the matter of grace. In another way the arousing of the powers of the soul takes place through a certain as it were moral efficiency, through the natural sympathy which they have from the fact that they are rooted in the same essence of the soul, with subordination among themselves, which is also commonly called the motion or application of one power by another, in which way the motive power existing in the muscles is aroused or applied by the appetite, and the will is said in this way to move all the powers of the soul. But neither does this genus of arousing have place in the secondary cause with respect to the first, both because it intrinsically includes a vital mode of operating, and also because it requires the conjunction of the moving and moved faculty in the same radical principle. And so all the modes of arousing which we can explain or attain seem excluded; but to feign some other ineffable one and demand faith in it, when neither the Christian faith teaches it nor is reason or necessity of it given, is foreign to all reason.

29. A certain mode is objected in which God is said to apply secondary causes.—Someone can say, however, that there is found between the first and the second cause a certain sympathy arising not from the rooting of powers in the same essence, but from the essential subjection of the secondary cause to the first and the supreme dominion of the first over the second. And sympathy of this kind can consist in this, that, God willing that the secondary cause operate, at once by necessary consecution the secondary cause acts, not because it receives anything in itself by virtue of that will, but because it at once obeys by acting, as the motive power obeys the appetite. Through this will, then, God can be said to apply, move or arouse the secondary cause to acting. And because that willing of God always intervenes in concurrence with the secondary cause, therefore the first cause is said to concur by arousing the secondary cause. Nevertheless this mode of speaking, whether it is true or false, does not pertain to the present question; for here we treat only of external and transient concurrence; but that arousing explained in such a way takes place only through the internal willing. Likewise by virtue of that will the secondary cause receives in itself nothing by way of principle or of condition necessary for acting, of which we now treat. Therefore, in the way in which we now dispute, no arousing takes place in the secondary cause by virtue of the sole concurrence of the first cause. But whether that mode of arousing is true, because it is a difficult point and necessary for the completion of this matter, will be explained in section IV.

30. Fourthly, that necessary condition was said to be the determination of the secondary cause through the effecting of the first. But this is no more probable than the rest, and, arguing generally, if this determination is said to take place through true action of the first cause into the second, the arguments made above return, that that action brings in a change in the secondary cause, of which change no terminus can be assigned. But specially, this necessity of such predetermination is none in secondary causes acting naturally, because they are by their nature determined to one; which determination indeed they received from God not through concurrence, but through the influx and conservation of such nature. In which sense St. Thomas speaks, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3. But formally such causes have this determination from intrinsic nature. Hence under this consideration it is commonly said that the secondary cause determines the concurrence of the first to the species of action, rather than is determined by it, as St. Thomas seems to speak, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, in the body, and ad 3, and I Cont. Gent., c. 66, reason 5, where he says: Secondary agents are as it were particularizing and determining the action of the first agent. And it is taken from Dionysius, c. 4 De Divinis nominibus, saying that the action of God is of itself indifferent, but is varied by the diversity of subjects and causes. But particular causes are said to determine concurrence, not because they effect something previous for this—for what can they?—nor because God does not determine it by His will,² which we shall declare in section 4; but because this cause by its nature demands this concurrence rather than another, but God accommodates Himself to the nature of each, and therefore also this determination, as it is from the secondary cause, is commonly said to be in the genus of material cause. In these causes acting naturally, then, that previous condition which was called predetermination is not necessary. But if sometimes these natural agents, on account of universal power of acting, have some indifference in the faculty of acting things diverse in species, naturally and physically speaking they are always determined to one effect in species, either from themselves or from the concurrence of other causes, either material or co-efficient, as was declared above, disp. XVIII, sect. 1.

31. How the secondary cause is determined by the first to the individual effect.—Finally, even if we grant (which is probable) that as to the singularity of the action or effect the secondary cause is determined by the first, as the nominalists affirm, and as seemed probable to us in the foregoing, it is not necessary to feign that that determination takes place through some action of the first cause into the second, namely by adding something to its power; indeed it can scarcely be understood in this way, because that added thing too will of itself be indifferent to making several like individuals; for no thing which in some species has active power is determined of itself to effecting only one individual, as is evident by running through all natural powers. But if someone specially excepted this entity or power which the first cause adds to the second, he would assert it gratuitously, and without cause would be involved in many difficulties. For it will have to be confessed that, whenever the action of a natural agent is varied at diverse times, or about diverse subjects, those predeterminative entities too which the secondary cause receives in itself from the first are varied. And similarly, if fire heats successively, it must also continuously receive and suffer something in itself by which it is determined to that successive action. Finally, either that mode of determination is superfluous, or it will have to be confessed that the natural faculty is of itself sufficient for the specific notion of the effect, but not for its singularity. But that that added thing gives power for singularity is not intelligible,³ since in the effect, as it is made in reality, the specific and singular notion are not distinguished.

32. It must be said, then, that that determination takes place sufficiently through the voluntary predefinition of the divine concurrence. Thus fire, for example, is indifferent to making this or that heat, not indeed negatively or privatively, that is, because it has complete power in its genus for neither, but positively, because it is sufficiently able for both in the notion of proximate cause and determined to neither; but God by His will has decreed to concur with it for this rather than for another, and this is enough for this numerical effect rather than another to proceed from the fire. There is not necessary, therefore, such a predetermining condition, which is some thing received in the secondary cause itself.

33. From what we have said about natural agents, however, it is gathered that a condition of this kind is much less necessary in free secondary causes by virtue of the subordination and essential dependence of the secondary cause on the first. For the dependence of a free and of a necessary cause on the first cause is of the same notion as to this. Hence, if in a cause acting naturally that dependence is sufficiently saved through concurrence, which consists in action, it will also be saved in a free cause. Nor indeed on account of the peculiar mode of acting of a free cause is such condition necessary in it, because, although the will, for example, which is a free power, is of itself indifferent, all requisites being posited, to acting and not acting, yet in truth it is as able to act as if it did not have the other faculty; and conversely it is as able not to act as if it could do nothing else. Thus for both and for each it has full power; therefore, just as other agents, through the power which they have for one thing, can execute it with the common concurrence without that previous predetermining condition, so the free agent, through the power which it has for several, can with the common concurrence exercise one of them (we speak of acts contained within the order of nature) without that condition. And so far is the peculiar condition and indifference of freedom from standing in the way of this, that rather in this is placed its excellence and dominion over its action.

34. Hence, when it is said that an undetermined faculty cannot effect a determined act or effect, it has place at most in a power so indifferent to several that it is per se incomplete and insufficient for each, which as such is rather a passive and imperfect indifference than an active and perfect one; on account of which such indifference is commonly called negative. But when a power is indifferent through complete force for both of opposites and through dominion over its act, it can very well, although in first act it is undetermined and indifferent, effect a determined effect or second act, by determining itself to it. For this is its proper force and power, from which it has that it is free; just as the divine will too is indifferent to several objects or created effects, and itself determines itself to one of them; for the created will has received a participation of this efficacy and dominion, although far unequal in perfection and mode. For the uncreated will is indifferent to several objects outside itself, but not to several acts of willing or nilling, while the created will is indifferent also to several acts. Next, the uncreated will is determined without a new act added, the created through a new act. And finally, the uncreated will does not depend on another in its determination, while the created depends at least on the concurrence of the first cause; with it, however, just as it can will those things which are proportioned to it, so also it can determine itself to them.

35. Physical predetermination would necessitate the free cause both as to exercise and as to specification.—Hence I further add that that condition which is called predetermination is not only not necessary to the free cause on account of its peculiar mode of acting, but also for that cause is repugnant, if it is to operate freely as to exercise and specification; for the use of freedom as to both parts would be impeded by such predetermination. Which is declared first in indifference as to the specification of the act; for since the first cause alone is said to effect this predetermination, the will is only in passive potency to it; hence with respect to it it is not free, but is passively or negatively indifferent, as matter to other forms; for in passive potency as such there is not freedom, as we showed above. It is not, therefore, in the active and free power of the will that it receive this or that determination; since, therefore, it is determined to one act only, it can effect that and not another, because neither can it effect that unless it is determined to it, nor yet can it bring it about that it be determined to another, but this is in the will of the extrinsic agent alone. Therefore it is never proximately and actively indifferent to several acts, or as to the specification of the act. This last consequence is evident, because the will, before this predetermination is received, is perfectly and actively indifferent to neither act, because, if that predetermination is necessary, without it there is not complete power of acting with all the prerequisites for acting, as is necessary for freedom.

36. Nor yet is it in the hand of the will to have this determination, or one rather than another; for what will it do for this, since it can do nothing unless predetermined? Or, if it receives determination to willing an evil object, why will it be imputed to it that it does not receive determination to nilling it? For neither can it be imputed on account of some prior act, both because it can happen that none preceded, and also because that could not have been made without another predetermination, about which the same difficulty returns. Nor yet can it be imputed on account of the privation of some act, both because neither is predetermination to that act in its power, and consequently neither can the lack of the act be imputed, because universally the first root of not operating in the will, even other prerequisites being posited, is that it does not receive this predetermination, for if it received it, it would operate; and also because not always does there precede a positive evil act the lack of a prior due act, but at the same time while one is chosen, another is omitted. And finally in that progress one must not proceed to infinity, but stop at some first acts, of which the will voluntarily effects one and omits another. And in these it cannot be explained in what way passive predetermination to one rather than another is in the power of the will. If, then, such predetermination were necessary, indifference as to the specification of the act would be taken away.

37. And thence it is further concluded that it is taken away also as to the exercise of the act. For, as has been declared, if that predetermination is necessary, before it is received it is not in the active and free power of the will to exercise such act, because it is not yet proximate power, that is, complete and with all the prerequisites for acting; nor is it even remote active power (so to speak), because it is not in the power of the will to do anything by which that condition or predetermination be applied, but it is only in passive potency to it, which does not suffice for freedom; all which things have been sufficiently declared and proved. Again, that condition which is called predetermination being posited in the will, it cannot happen that it does not exercise the act; nor can it resist the determination or motion of it; therefore it never has the power of exercising and not exercising the act; therefore indifference as to exercise, which consists in this power, is taken away. The antecedent is certain in the opinion which we are attacking, for this predetermination is said to pertain to the actual concurrence of God. Hence, just as it is impossible that God concur with the will and it not operate, so it is impossible that the will receive that predetermination and not go forth into the work. And it is established from the very name of predetermination; for if, after the predetermination has been received, the will can not operate, let us posit that it does not operate; then it still remains indifferent to operating and not operating; therefore it needs predetermination in order to operate, and it was false that it had received predetermination.

38. The reply of some to our reasons is refuted.—Someone will perhaps say that, after the predetermination has been received, the will can indeed not operate, but will not admit that in fact it will not operate, because, although it can, it never so behaves. But this is frivolous and not consistently said. First indeed, because, if it can by a true power which suffices for freedom, whence can it be affirmed that that power is never exercised? Secondly, because there is so necessary a connection between that predetermination and the operation that it is naturally impossible that this be separated from that; indeed they themselves say that it implies a contradiction, as to be at once determined and undetermined with respect to the same, or the agent to move and the patient not to be moved; therefore there is not in the will a power to resist the activity of this predetermination, because there is not in it a power for the impossible; therefore it is false that, predetermination being posited, it can not operate. Finally, because, if the will can not will that to which it is predetermined, either this is because it can have the opposite act—and this not, as is evident from the proof of the former part, because this already pertains in some way to indifference as to specification—or this is because it can suspend the act—and this too not, because the will cannot resist the efficacy of that predetermination. Nor is that subject to the use of freedom, but rather subjects it to itself; therefore in neither way is that power in the will, and consequently neither freedom as to exercise.

39. Which is also confirmed from the definition of the free power handed down above, namely, that it is of its notion that, all the prerequisites for acting being posited, it can act and not act; for in the present case one necessary condition is said to be the predetermination made by the first cause, which being posited the will cannot act and not act, but only act; therefore it acts without freedom as to exercise and of necessity. Nor does it matter that that necessity is from supposition, for that supposition is antecedent to all use of freedom and comes from without, as has been sufficiently declared; but such supposition, if it brings in necessity, induces necessity simply and takes away freedom, according to the doctrine of Anselm and others declared in the foregoing. And therefore Scotus deservedly said, In IV, dist. 49, q. 6, § Duo ergo, that the freedom of the will is taken away if it is predetermined to one by some inhering habit; but by the name of habit is to be understood whatever by way of principle or first act precedes the second act; for of any such the reason is the same.

40. Hence finally each part can be confirmed thus, because for the will of itself indifferent to several to be physically and intrinsically determined to one of them is nothing else than to will it; therefore neither can such predetermination be prerequired for willing, nor can it wholly come from without from the first cause alone; because willing is not in us without us; and, although we granted that this could be done by absolute power, at least it could not happen that that willing be free, to which the will would behave merely passively. The antecedent is proved, because in the will there is nothing except either second act or first, nor can a middle between these be devised; nor has it been found by Aristotle or another philosopher; therefore either that predetermination is second act, and this we call willing, under which we also comprehend nilling and similar acts; or it is first act, and so either it is subject to the use of the will, and so does not predetermine it, as is true of all habits existing in the will; or it subjects it to itself and its necessary efficacy, and so impedes the use of its freedom. Add that a first act in the will which is not its habit is unheard of; and that it can be declared by no reason for what such first act is necessary, especially in the order of natural acts, as we now speak.

41. I see that the occasion is offered in this place of treating very many difficulties pertaining to the freedom of choice, especially those which are disputed among the theologians about divine foreknowledge, predefinition, predestination and grace, and most of all about that which consists in efficacious help. But we have already premised that in this place we treat nothing of supernatural actions nor of the efficacy of grace, but only of the general concurrence of the first cause with the secondary ones; for which we deny that that predetermination is necessary, or that in free causes it can be brought into agreement with the use of their freedom. Nevertheless it is true that God has eternal foreknowledge of all things which take place in time; because they do not take place without Him acting, and He does not act except what He knows, because He operates through intellect; but He does not know anything from time, but from eternity; but that knowledge does not require physical predetermination of causes, but eternal foreknowledge of all things which are in time. Similarly it is true that God can by His eternal will predefine effects consonant with His providence; can likewise move the wills of men whither He wills, and when, and how He wills; and so can also, and often does, confer on men efficacious helps of grace according to the measure of His will; but these do not pertain to general concurrence. But how they take place pertains to the supernatural mysteries of theology. This one thing we believe, that for all these there is not necessary physical predetermination of free choice, nor anything similar which injures the freedom of choice; but of these elsewhere.

42. Whether without physical determination the subordination of the secondary cause to the first stands.—Fifthly, that condition was said to be necessary on account of the subordination of the secondary cause to the first, as if true subordination could not be understood without some impression (so to speak) of the first cause into the second, which is as it were its use. Nevertheless the arguments made under the name of motion, application, etc., proceed of any real impression, or by whatever other word it is signified. Next, that it serves nothing for subordination I show thus: for subordination between the secondary and the first cause can be understood as twofold. One is radical or aptitudinal, which consists only in this, that the secondary cause is not apt to act except dependently on the first cause. But the root of this subordination, on the part of the secondary cause itself, is the essential dependence which it has on God in its being. But on the part of any effect or action which can flow from the secondary cause, the root is to be being by participation, which cannot be except from being by essence. For this subordination, then, that action of the first cause into the second is indeed necessary by which it gives and conserves being and power of acting; but that suffices, nor is another per se necessary, because by virtue of this is posited the whole root and cause of that subordination in first act.

43. But the other is subordination in second act. But that this too does not require a new action by which the first cause confers on the second something by way of actual principle, as they call it, I show in two ways. The former is that this actual subordination is not an intrinsic denomination in the secondary cause, per se speaking. Which is evident because it consists only in this, that the secondary cause depends on the first in acting; if, then, acting itself as such is not an intrinsic denomination in the acting cause, dependence in acting itself as such will not be an intrinsic denomination, but extrinsic, consisting in this, that the very action of the secondary cause depends essentially on the first cause as on the first and chief source of its being; therefore, in order that the secondary cause, inasmuch as it is actually acting, be essentially subordinated to the first, it is not necessary that it receive in itself anything new by way of principle, because according to this notion it is subordinated not as receiving but as acting; therefore this subordination is placed in the action itself, inasmuch as it depends essentially on the first cause.

44. Secondly the same is declared; for, although we admit that the first cause effects something in the second by way of principle, still the secondary cause, as affected with that whole principle precisely conceived, is subordinated to the first cause only in first act; therefore in the action it must be actually subordinated through a new dependence in acting, as was proved in the foregoing; therefore the actual subordination of the agent, as it is agent, does not consist in that previous action, which pertains only to constituting or completing first act; therefore, although it is supposed constituted without that action, through the sole effecting and conservation of the cause and its power, the actual subordination in acting will still remain intact.

45. Thirdly this very thing is declared by examples; for heat, for example, is subordinated to the form of fire in acting fire, not because it receives anything in itself from the form while it acts, besides its entity, but on account of the dependence of the action on those two principles so constituted between themselves that one is under the other, that is, is inferior to it, and posterior to it, and depending on it. Similarly in supernatural things, the sacrament, for example, of baptism is subordinated to Christ in acting, not because in the actual action it receives anything in itself, according to the more probable opinion. And many similar examples could easily be found. Neither, then, by virtue of subordination is it necessary, or can it happen, that the concurrence of the first cause consist in something which by way of first act is given to the secondary cause in the actual action itself.

The foundations of the other opinions are satisfied

46. From what we have said in proving our opinion, the foundations of the contrary opinion have been virtually answered; in order, however, that we may declare in what sense the expressions of grave authors are to be understood, and how with concurrence consisting in action alone those expressions and denominations are saved, it will be necessary to answer each singly.

That axiom is expounded: “The secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first”

47. To the first, then, it is said, first, that that axiom, the secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first, understood in that propriety that the cause, besides its being and all connatural power of acting which it has, needs a new true and real motion received in itself in order to act, is false, as has been proved. Nor is it found handed down by Aristotle anywhere in that sense. Hence it is also false that on that principle so understood is founded either the reduction of all motions to the first mover or of all beings to the first being. For that argumentation is founded either on physical experience and the order of sensible motions, or on the proportional dependence of all effects on their causes, not on that most hidden premotion, founded on no reason. Thus the physical discourse of Aristotle was that everything which is moved is moved by another, and all motions of lower bodies are in some way reduced to the motion of the heaven, but the heaven itself is moved by another; and so, since one does not proceed to infinity, one must stop at some first mover. But the proportional metaphysical discourse will be that every being which is not from itself flows from another, and that other, if it is not from itself, is again from another, and since one cannot proceed to infinity, one must stop at a being from itself. And in a proportional mode the discourse can be made among agents as such, by virtue of the essential dependence explained by us; for what is not an agent from itself is to be reduced to another on which it relies in acting, until one stops at something which is an agent from itself and relies on nothing else. Finally a natural discourse can be made from the sensible motions of the bodies of the universe, through which these corporeal things are so applied to acting or suffering as is necessary for the conservation of the universe; for this is a sign that all these things are governed by one supreme prince; that proposition, then, in the said sense, is neither true nor necessary for the aforesaid reductions.

48. Whence the expression about the motion of secondary causes by the first takes its origin.—That proposition, then, contains a metaphor and a certain analogy taken from artificial instruments, as Fonseca well noted, bk. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 9, sect. 2. For, because we see that these sensible instruments, which depend on us in acting and are subordinated to us, do not act unless moved by us, therefore, to explain the subordination and essential dependence in acting of secondary causes on the first, secondary causes are said not to act unless moved by the first. But the proper sense is that they do not act unless helped by the first, or (what is the same) as cooperating with the first. Add moreover that it is necessary that the secondary cause have being given and conserved by the first. And this continuous influx of being itself, or of active power, can be called as it were a certain continuous motion of the secondary cause by the first. Again, if the secondary cause needs some new local application or vital arousing for acting, it has that too from the first cause, operating either through secondary causes or sometimes by itself alone; for often it so operates, not by virtue of general concurrence, but from some peculiar providence. In which sense Scripture speaks in the testimonies cited there, which therefore are not to the point. And in this sense too it can in some way be verified that the secondary cause does not act unless moved; for if it is spiritual, it acts with a previous immanent action which it receives in itself, and so is changed; but if it is corporeal, it needs local nearness, which it receives through some motion, either which then takes place or which preceded before. Hence some of the authors cited, especially Augustine, do not say that secondary causes are moved while they act, or moved to act, but that every secondary cause is so active that it is also passive and mobile by some motion; in which they do not explain some condition which such causes require for acting, but the imperfection and potentiality which they have by their nature. Which also is enough for us to understand that one must come to some cause which so acts that it can suffer nothing.

This expression is expounded: “The secondary cause is applied by the first to acting”

49. To the second, that proposition, The secondary cause is applied by the first, is to be explained as that one, It is moved to acting. And indeed St. Thomas, who seems most to have used that expression, I, q. 105, a. 5, in the first place corrects the word itself, because he does not simply call the first cause applying, but as it were applying the second. Next, he there makes no mention of another concurrence or motion, but only of that application. Hence what in I-II he called the help of God moving, in I he called the application of the first cause. And both are nothing else than actual concurrence itself, lest we say that St. Thomas either was ignorant of it or kept silent about it, which both is per se absurd and is repugnant to the same St. Thomas, the said a. 5, ad 2, where from that application he concludes that the action of the first and second cause is one and the same; which is true only on account of concurrence by way of action, as will be declared in the following section.

50. The actual and immediate concurrence of action itself, then, just as by transference it is called motion, so also it is called application, in order to signify that it is given by the first cause as by a superior, and is directed and ordered by it to the ends intended by itself, which is a certain genus of application. And the reason touched upon in that second argument proves this, and nothing else. And the reason of that word, or of application, will be understood more if we distinguish a twofold application, one previous, as a required condition, of which it cannot be understood, as has been shown; the other we can call actual or formal, intimately included in the action itself; for so he who begins an action is said then to apply himself to the action; which application is nothing else than the exhibition of that action; in this way, then, the concurrence of the first cause is called application; yet that application is not from the first cause alone, but also from the second, the first helping, and under this notion also applying. For under this notion of application the action is signified according to its first emanation from its agent, and therefore, in order to signify that God concurs to it according to its every notion, God is said to apply the secondary cause to acting. And these things suffice for that expression.

What it is for the secondary cause to act in the power of the first

51. But the other expression posited in the same argument, namely, that the secondary cause acts in the power of the first, or that the divine power is the power of every acting cause, and other similar ones which are found in the book On Causes, are expounded in the words of St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., c. 70, where he says thus: The power of the inferior agent depends on the power of the superior, inasmuch as the superior gives the inferior the power of acting, or conserves it. And below: It is necessary, therefore, that the action of the inferior agent be not only from it through its own power, but through the power of all superior agents; for it acts in the power of all. For to act in the power is nothing else than to act through power participated from a superior power, and dependently in its action on its actual influx. And in the same way the divine power is called the power of all causes, because it conserves all and actually helps all. These two, then, suffice, and are per se required for the truth of similar expressions.

52. It is true that St. Thomas, q. 3 De Potentia, a. 7, adds a third, namely, a flowing instrumental power which the secondary cause receives from the first in order to act as its instrument; for he expressly numbers this as distinct from application and from the effecting or conservation of the secondary cause itself and its power. I think, however, that St. Thomas tacitly retracted that doctrine in the I, where, treating exquisitely every mode in which the first cause operates with the second, he omitted that power, which he could not have done in the proper and chief place if he had thought it per se necessary for the concurrence of the first cause; and similarly in III Cont. Gent., c. 70, he makes no mention of it. Nor is the discourse which he makes in the said a. 7 De Potentia efficacious. For it is founded on this, that the secondary cause cannot effect the being of existence except by way of instrument; which, speaking properly and strictly of instrument, is not true, as I shall touch upon in the solution to the fifth, and more at length below, disputing about the essence of the creature.

53. By what action agents are perfected.—To the third it is answered that that arousing is a fiction, unless metaphorically the natural inclination itself to acting is called arousing; but that inclination is not through an action distinct from those by which the secondary cause and its power are conserved and helped. But to the reason proposed there it is answered that created agents, while they act, are not perfected by a perfection distinct from the action itself; nor did any of the philosophers ever devise some prior perfection. But the action itself is immediately from God Himself, yet not from Him alone, but with the secondary cause itself. But if such action is immanent in the agent, it will be its intrinsic perfection; for such an agent has the power of perfecting itself, with the due and accommodated concurrence of the first cause. But if the action is transient, the question is whether according to something of itself it remains in the agent, or whether, although it wholly passes into the patient, it is also there to be called a perfection of the agent; of which we shall speak in its place, for for the present they matter nothing; for whichever of these is said, it suffices for this perfection of the concurrence of the first cause by way of action.

54. Why secondary causes are called instruments of the first.—The fourth and fifth reasons, with all that is touched upon in them, have been treated and dispatched in proving the second assertion, except for two points which are intimated in the fifth reason. One is that secondary causes do not act as instruments of the first, which is easy, for, although they are sometimes so called to indicate the dependence which they have in operating on the first cause, yet they are not properly and strictly instruments, but principal causes in their order; for they act through proper powers sufficient in their order, and produce effects like themselves, as St. Thomas noted, q. 24 De Veritat., a. 1, ad 4 and 5; and Scotus, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ad ult.; and above, explaining the divisions of the efficient cause, we declared the same. I omit also that in strict instruments it is not necessary that, before they act, they receive in themselves from the principal cause something by way of principle distinct from their entity, of which elsewhere. The other point was about the order of prior and posterior in nature which intervenes between the actions of the first and the second cause, of which I shall speak in the following section.

55. In what the perfection of the first cause concurring with the second is placed.—To the sixth foundation the assumption is simply denied, namely, that God would concur more perfectly if He concurred by inflowing something actual by way of principle; for greater perfection does not consist in the multiplication of entities, principles or influxes, otherwise these would have to be multiplied infinitely; but greater perfection consists in this, that each thing be made in due weight, number and measure. Two things, then, pertain to the highest perfection of the first cause, as operating and cooperating in causes and with secondary causes: one is that nothing of power or first act, or of required condition, which truly is something, be found in the secondary cause which has not been given and conserved by the first; the other, that the action of the creature cannot be made without the actual immediate influx of the first cause. But the multiplication of principles of acting, or of necessary conditions, does not per se pertain to perfection, speaking generally, but such principles are to be added only where some special and true cause and necessity, or at least utility, intervenes.

56. How it is from God that the secondary cause acts.—To the first proof, then, it is answered that it is the same for the secondary cause to depend on the first in causing and to depend in its action, or (what is the same) in its causality; for if it depends in its being, and in its whole power, and further in its action and causality, in what else should or can it depend? For what is added there about this complex, the secondary cause acts, is nothing new, for for the creature to act is nothing else than for the action to proceed from it. Hence the first cause, by effecting this action, effects it as proceeding from such cause. For, although the relation of the action to the secondary cause precisely conceived does not regard God as the terminus of that relation, yet, as it is something in reality, it is made by God Himself, just as passion as passion does not regard God, yet is made by God; in this way, then, it is also from God that the creature acts.

57. And the same holds of that expression, The first cause makes the second make, if the particle so that (ut) denotes nothing else than the conferring of power and of the physical concurrence necessary for operating. But if it denotes a peculiar relation of end, so that it is signified that the first cause peculiarly intends every action of the secondary cause in particular, this is indeed often true, yet is not always necessary; for some actions He does not intend, but permits; and then in that sense God does not properly make the creature make, but permits it to make and cooperates with it making. Hence it does not pertain to the perfection of the first cause that universally and for all things it concur in that way, but rather it is beside its wisdom and goodness. And so the argument can be retorted to the contrary, for from the opposite opinion it follows that God universally makes even those who do evil to do it; because by His proper action proceeding from His will alone He determines them so to do; of which reason we shall say more in the fourth section. In another, finally, and moral way God is said to make men make, by illuminations and inspirations, in which way that expression is found in Scripture; yet it does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to the order of grace or of special divine providence, whose consideration is not of this place.

58. How God uses necessary causes.—What finally is said in that argument, that it pertains to the perfect dominion of the first cause that it use secondary causes for its own ends, is most true; it is falsely and without foundation feigned, however, that this use consists in this, that it always acts about the creature something distinct from it and from its natural power. God can indeed sometimes in this way increase the power of acting, if He wills, or supply whatever was lacking to the creature; yet that this is always necessary does not pertain to dominion or the fitting use of creatures, but God will more easily use His creatures if we understand that He has given them complete powers in their genus and all the required conditions, with which, if He wills to adjoin concurrence, they will do what He has decreed; which is to use them for acting.

59. How free ones.—Although this mode of using the secondary cause requires something peculiar in a free cause, for it, all the prerequisites for acting being posited, and the concurrence of God also being prepared in the way which we shall explain in section 4, does not at once operate one thing determinately, and therefore, if God wills to use it for some determinate effect, He has a peculiar mode, moral rather than physical, by which He does this. Sometimes by properly acting and moving, as in good things, sometimes by letting and permitting, as in evil ones. Which pertains to that infinite wisdom of God by which He foreknows what the free cause, on whatever occasion and with whatever circumstances, will operate; which it is not of this place to expound further. This only I note, that when God concurs with the created will to an evil act, He does not properly use the will for that act (for far be it that God should intend that act), but uses the will so acting evilly for some good, which pertains both to perfect dominion and to the infinite goodness and wisdom of God.

60. How the action of the creature pertains to the dominion of God.—From which, finally, it is understood that the action of the creature does not always pertain to the positive use of the dominion of God, but a partition must be used; for inasmuch as that action is from God, it properly pertains to the use of His dominion, because it depends on His power and freedom; but inasmuch as it is from the created will, if it is good and conformed to the will of God, it will also be from the positive use of His dominion, inasmuch as He commands it or moves to it; but if it is evil, it will be only from negative use, because namely He does not impede it, although He can.