Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reasons for doubting.—First indeed it can seem that they do not so depend, because before a thing receives being it is no wonder if it depends on another in becoming; because, since of itself it does not have being, it cannot have it until it receives it from another, which is for the thing to be made; but after a thing has once received being, there is no reason why it should continually depend on the actual influx of another, because this actual influx is as it were a certain continuous, or rather repeated, conferring of being itself; but this not only does not seem necessary, but even superfluous; for any thing will retain the being once given to it, even if it is no longer given, provided it is not taken away. For no thing deprives itself of its being; therefore, if it is once given, it will, so far as concerns itself, retain it perpetually, even if it is no longer actually conferred, provided it is not taken away positively or through some contrary action. And this is confirmed most of all in incorruptible beings, which are necessary beings and of themselves, and to which being belongs per se; therefore they do not need actual conservation in order to be, because, although conservation ceases, no cause, at least outside God, can exercise an action about them by which it deprives them of their being; nor will they deprive themselves, since this is repugnant to their proper nature. And the same reason proceeds of corruptible beings, at least when they are not corrupted by contrary agents.

2. Secondly, it can at least seem that nothing else can be proved by natural reason, because this cannot be sufficiently shown either from the power of God or from the need of the creature. The former part is proved, for it rather seems to pertain to the power of God that He can make such effects as, after they have been made, remain in their being even if the operation of the agent ceases; just as it pertains to the industry and power of a human artificer that he make a building so firm that it can remain perpetually after the action of the artificer is finished; this is not, therefore, repugnant to the omnipotence of God, nor can the opposite be gathered from it. But the other part was proved from the prior argument; for the need of the creature seems to consist only in this, that it cannot have being unless given by another; not in this, that it cannot retain it unless it is continually given. And it is confirmed, for if there were any universal imperfection of the creature on account of which it needed this conservation, it would most of all be because it does not participate being from God with equality or with the same perfection with which it is in God; but this reason is of no weight, both because, even if the being of the creature were independent in this way, it would not on that account be equal, for it would still be inferior by infinite other titles; and also because neither does it follow conversely that, if the being of the effect is inferior in perfection to the being of the cause, it must also be actually dependent; for in secondary causes we see the opposite happen; for gold is made by the sun with a certain less perfect being, in which, however, it does not depend in being conserved on the sun itself. And heat is conserved when the action of fire ceases, even though it does not reach the perfection of the heat of fire. And a house outside is of a far diverse and inferior notion from the idea of the house which the artificer has, and nevertheless remains when the influx of the artificer ceases; why, then, can the same not be said of the effects of the first cause? or what singular reason can be assigned in them?

3. On this question there is among theologians no variety of opinions on this matter. Although those who deny that God operates immediately in every action of the creature will without doubt be compelled to deny that every created thing, or every being by participation, depends immediately on the actual influx of God, because what does not depend in becoming will not depend in being either. But of the false foundation of that opinion we must speak in the following disputation. Now, then, although we chiefly treat of the effects which are immediately created and made by God, yet, in order that the disputation may be universal, since the reason of all is the same, we suppose that all things are made immediately by God, even if they are not always made by Him alone. Again, those who deny that the creation of things can be proved by natural reason will much more deny that the necessity of conservation can be proved. But that foundation has already been disproved by us. Yet, even the demonstration of the necessity of creation being supposed, the necessity of conservation is not easy to prove.

Resolution of the question

4. It must be said, however, that all beings outside God depend in their being on divine conservation. This assertion under these terms is most certain and of faith. And it is frequently handed down by the Fathers of the Church, especially by Augustine, bk. IV Genes. ad litter., c. 12, where, treating those words of Genes. 2, And God rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done, he says that they are to be understood of rest from new works to be founded from nothing, not from governing and conserving the things founded. Otherwise (he says) they would continually fall apart. For the power of the Creator, and the might of the Omnipotent and All-holding, is the cause of subsisting to every creature. Which power, if it ever ceased from ruling the things which have been created, at once their species too would cease, and all nature would collapse. For it is not as with a structure of buildings, which when someone has built he departs, and when he ceases and departs his work stands; so not even in the twinkling of an eye could the world stand, if God withdrew from it His rule. Which, however, he does not prove by reason, but confirms by testimonies of Scripture, Acts 17: In Him we live, and move, and are; Wisdom 7: Wisdom is more active than all active things; and reacheth everywhere; and c. 8: She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly; John 5: My Father worketh until now. Expounding which words the same Augustine, bk. V Genes., c. 20: Thus (he says) let us believe, or, if we can, also understand, that God works until now, so that, if His operation is withdrawn from the things founded by Him, they perish; and bk. IX, c. 15, he repeats the same.

5. Gregory Nazianzen teaches the same truth, oration II On Theology, q. 36, where, solving the sixth objection, he expounds the words of John 5 cited above as said by reason of the government and conservation of things; and Damascene, bk. I, c. 3: The very (he says) structure and conservation and government of created things teaches us that it is God who has fitted together this whole mass of things and guards and conserves it, and perpetually provides for it; and Gregory, XVI Moral., c. 18: It is one thing (he says) to be, another to be principally, another mutably, and another immutably to be. For all these things are, but they are not principally, because in themselves they by no means subsist. And unless they are held by the hand of the governor, they can by no means be. And below: For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would tend again to nothing, unless the author of all held it by the hand of His rule. And in this way they seem to understand those words of Job 23: God alone is, namely, principally and without dependence on another. In which sense he thinks it was said in Exodus 3: I am who am. Hence in homily 17 on Ezekiel: God (he says) incomprehensibly rules what He incomprehensibly created. And below: He Himself is interior and exterior, He inferior and superior, superior by ruling, inferior by bearing, interior by filling, exterior by surrounding; so He surrounds that He penetrates; so He presides that He bears, and so is within that He bears, so bears that He presides. In which words he seems to allude to that of Hebr. 1: Bearing all things by the word of His power; for that bearing seems to be the same as conserving. Which is said more openly in Wisdom 11: How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by Thee? Finally Anselm, Monologion, c. 12: It can be doubtful (he says) only to an irrational mind that all things which have been made flourish by the sustaining of the same one, and persevere in being as long as they are, by whose making they have from nothing the being which they are. And below: As nothing has been made except through the creative present essence, so nothing flourishes except through His conserving power; which he pursues in c. 13, and tacitly so expounds that of Rom. 11: of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things, and that of Col. 1: All things consist in Him. For by these and similar expressions of Scripture it is signified that the conservation of things rests on God, that is, on the divine power and efficacy.

6. The conclusion can be demonstrated by natural reason.—From these things, then, it is sufficiently established that this truth is certain and infallible; but it must be added that it can be proved by sufficient reason, or even demonstrated; which, among the said Fathers, Damascene and Anselm more openly taught, and they think that by the reason by which it is proved that God is the creator of all things, it is also proved that He is conserver; which consecution, however, seems neither evident from the terms nor wholly easy. St. Thomas, however, tacitly proves it, I, q. 8, a. 1, and more at length q. 104, a. 1, where he has a long and very metaphysical discourse, which suffers several difficulties, which Cajetan diligently treats there. The sum of the whole discourse is that God is the cause of creatures not only as to becoming, but also as to being, directly and per se primo; but when an effect depends on its cause as to being directly and per se primo, it depends not only in becoming but also in being conserved; so, therefore, all depend on God.

7. But in order that the sense of the whole antecedent may be understood, it can at once be objected that in the major the question seems to be begged and what is to be proved assumed; for what else can it be for an effect to depend in being on a cause except to depend in being conserved? It is the same, therefore, to say that God is the cause of becoming and of being as to say that God is the cause in becoming and in being conserved; therefore what is to be proved is assumed. Otherwise the division of causes is vain, that some are causes of the becoming of their effects, others causes of their very being. For there is no cause which properly per se and directly makes becoming itself which is not per se and directly the cause of being itself; for becoming itself is per se terminated at that; indeed being itself cannot be first caused otherwise than through becoming. God, therefore, in the first instant in which He creates a thing, is the cause of its being because He is the cause of its becoming; and similarly fire, in the instant in which it generates fire by causing generation, gives being to the generated fire, whence it is the cause of its being. Therefore, in order that the cause in becoming can be distinguished from the cause of being itself, it is necessary that by being permanence in being be understood, and under becoming being itself be comprehended as it exists together with becoming; but in this way to be the cause of being itself, or of permanence in being, is to be the cause in being conserved; what is to be proved, therefore, is assumed.

8. It is answered that that distinction is not to be understood in that sense, as the argument proves and as St. Thomas himself and Cajetan declare, although somewhat obscurely. I think the matter is to be understood so, that that effect is said to be from a cause in becoming which does not demand such cause simply and absolutely in order to be, but only in order to be through such action or effecting; but that effect is said to be from a cause directly according to being which, in order to be absolutely and simply, demands such cause. As, for example, Adam will be said to be from God according to becoming and being, because he necessarily demands such cause in order to be; but Abel will be said to be from Adam according to becoming, because absolutely he does not need that cause in order to be, for he could have been from God alone, but only in order to be made in such a way, namely, through natural generation. You will say: by the same reason Adam will be said to be from God only as to becoming, because he could have been from another parent through natural generation. It is answered by denying the sequel, because he could not have been from another without being from God. And in this sense St. Thomas rightly says there that no effect which receives from the agent form and being according to the same notion in which it is in the cause is and depends on such cause according to its being, but only according to becoming, because otherwise that effect, by reason of its form, would essentially demand such cause; but this cannot be, because otherwise, since the form of the agent is supposed to be of the same species, it would essentially demand the same cause; therefore it would demand to be caused by itself, which is a repugnance. It is rightly concluded, therefore, from this that only that agent which is of a superior notion, and which does not communicate to the effect form or nature or being of the same notion, but a certain inferior participation of it, can be the cause of its effects not only as to becoming but also as to being.

9. According to this interpretation, then, the sense of the major proposition assumed is easy, and its truth most known, because God is so the cause of His effects that from their intrinsic nature and intrinsic necessity they demand such cause in order to be, because, as we said above, they depend on it essentially. And the a priori reason is that only the first cause is being itself by essence; but every other being is a participation of that being, and therefore from intrinsic necessity demands the influx of being itself by essence in order to be. Which reason seems to prove not only that God is the cause of His effects directly according to their being, but also that God alone is in this way the cause of the other beings, because no being is so made by another created cause that absolutely and simply it needs it in order to receive being; for it could be from the influx of God alone without another cause, although not conversely.

10. And this indeed is true, speaking simply and of absolute necessity; yet according to a certain participation and according to a certain order of nature, some equivocal causes are said to be per se causes of effects directly according to their being, because the form of such effect according to its whole latitude depends per se primo on such cause, and can be made by it according to its whole species, and according to the order of nature demands so to be made. And in this way the sun is the cause of light, comprehending under the sun whatever participates its nature as to the property of light; for so Aristotle said, II De Anima, that fire illuminates as it participates the nature of the heaven. And conversely light as such by its nature demands such cause in order to be, according to the natural order of causes, although absolutely it can be made by God. God, therefore, either alone or most of all is the cause of His effects not only as to becoming, but also as to being, directly and per se primo.

11. Again, hence the sense of the minor proposition assumed is also easily established, namely, that the cause of an effect not only according to becoming but also according to being is its cause also as to being conserved; for the sense is that, whenever an effect so proceeds from a cause that by simple and absolute necessity it demands it in order to be, it depends on its actual influx not only in order first to receive being, but also in order to endure and persevere in it, which is to depend in being conserved. Of this proposition so declared, however, I elicit two proofs from St. Thomas above. The first is that, when something is the cause of an effect in becoming, the becoming itself cannot remain when the action of such cause ceases; therefore, when something is the cause of an effect directly and per se primo according to its being, the being itself of such effect cannot remain when the action of the cause ceases, which is to depend on it in being conserved. Which consequence relies only on a certain parity and proportion, and therefore is not so evident. For someone could say that the dependence of becoming itself on the action of the cause is greater or more immediate than that of being itself; because being always depends by means of action, but becoming immediately through itself, because it is not distinguished from the action. But nevertheless the consequence is excellent; for it matters little that the dependence is equally immediate in the said sense, that is, through another action or through itself, provided it is equally essential. But participated being depends as essentially on being by essence as any becoming depends on its agent, and therefore it cannot remain without actual dependence or action.¹

12. And it is confirmed and declared; for, if such being, by reason of itself alone, demands the influx of the first agent in order to be at some time in the nature of things, then whenever it is it demands the same influx, because it is always the same, and what belongs to it per se primo always belongs to it. Finally I confirm it: either permanence in being is something over being itself, as some hold, or it is nothing besides being itself behaving in the same way. The first, although it is false, yet from it it necessarily follows that that permanence must be from God, because nothing, in whatever way it is, can be without Him. But if the second, which is true, is supposed, the other reason made proceeds, that whatever demands that being from intrinsic and absolute necessity in order first to be, demands it in order to remain in being as long as it is, because it is always the same and behaving in the same way.

13. Another proof of the assertion from St. Thomas.—Another proof from St. Thomas is indeed a posteriori and from a sign, but, as I think, most evident to an intellect well disposed; for we see that light depends on the sun in becoming and in being conserved, because the sun is a cause of a superior notion, and according to a certain participation is the cause of light not only according to becoming but also according to being, as has been declared. But any created being depends much more essentially on God than light on the sun, and much more inferior is the participation of the divine being than light is of the light of the sun; therefore much more does it depend on Him in being conserved.

14. The last proof of the conclusion.—We can construct the last reason in this way, for we can understand in two ways that all things, in order to remain in being, depend on God: first, permissively (so to speak), because namely they remain in being as long as they are permitted by God to remain, that is, are not deprived of their being by Him by whom they could be deprived; secondly, positively, that is, through actual influx into them. Now, then, I argue: it is evident that all things depend or are conserved by God at least in the first way; but they cannot so depend in that way unless they depend also in the latter way; therefore. The major is proved, because it pertains to the omnipotence of God that He can reduce to nothing the things which He has founded, if He wills; therefore, in order that they be conserved in being, at least His permission is necessary, which can consist only in this, that He does not will to reduce them to nothing, although He can. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is evident from the very terms; because God would not be perfect lord of all things if He could not dispose of them as He willed. But the minor is proved, both because there are many things which cannot be deprived of being through contrary action, as an angel and other simple things, and also because every positive action necessarily tends to some being; hence, if God always needed action to destroy things, He could not annihilate them; therefore, in order that He can do this, it is necessary that by the sole withdrawal of action or influx He can annihilate them. But this cannot take place except inasmuch as they depend in their being and being conserved on such influx and action; therefore.

15. The ancient philosophers knew the dependence of creatures on God in conservation.—This truth, then, is sufficiently known by the light of nature, which therefore Justin Martyr signifies the philosophers also acknowledged, in the Hortatory Oration to the Gentiles, and Eugubinus confirms it more at length, bk. I De Peren. Philos., from c. 26, and bk. III almost throughout; and it is taken from Plato in the Timaeus, and from Aristotle, or under his name, in the book On the World to Alexander, and bk. XII On the Divine Wisdom according to the Egyptians, c. 19, where it is said: From Him are perpetuity, place and time, and by His benefit they remain; and as the centre of a circle is in itself, but the lines drawn from it to the circumference and the circumference itself with its points exist in the same centre, so too all natures, both those which pertain to the intellect and those which pertain to sense, consist and are confirmed in the first agent. But below, inquiring how all things are said to remain in the first artificer, since the form remains in matter, and matter in form, and the affection in the subject, he answers that besides these modes there is another in which a thing is said to remain in another as in the agent, for example, light in the luminous thing, and the ray in that from which it emanates, and finally any simple essence in the efficient; Trismegistus too, in the Asclepius, calls God the Mind conserving all things, in which all things live and subsist. Seneca too, in the book On Consolation to Polybius, calls God the cause of causes, guarding and ruling all things; who also has much on this matter in the book On Providence. Finally the theologians so think of this natural truth, and persuade it by other reasons and declare it by examples, as may be seen in Bonaventure, In I, dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1; Gregory, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 3; Alexander of Hales, I, q. 10, membra 2 and 3; Hervaeus, in the treatise On the Eternity of the World, q. 6; and others, whom I shall report in the following section.

The reasons for doubting are solved

16. To the first reason for doubting the reply is evident from what has been said; for the same need which is in the being of the creature in the first instant in which it is made, that without the action of another it cannot be, is in it as long as it remains in being. Because, since by reason of its being precisely and inasmuch as it is such the creature needs the divine influx in order to be, as long as it is it needs the same influx. Nor can that conservation properly be called a repeated conferring of the same being, but, just as being itself is not repeated being but one being which remains the same, so too the influx by which the thing is conserved is the same, or the same conferring of the same being, as we shall explain more in the following section. Nor yet is this influx superfluous, because without it created things would not suffice to themselves to be sustained in being. Wherefore, this influx failing, they would at once be reduced to nothing, not because created things themselves would deprive themselves of their being, for that is repugnant, but because they would be deprived of it by the author of their being, not through contrary action, but through the suspension of the action necessary in order that they might be. And as to this the reason is the same of incorruptible beings; for these, although according to intrinsic potency and in order to natural agents they are called necessary beings, are not so in order to the extrinsic power of God, on which they always and continuously depend in their being. Hence, although they are said to be per se in order to the intrinsic cause, because they have being in which they subsist not through a distinct form but per se, which is most of all true of immaterial substances, yet in order to the extrinsic cause it does not belong to them to be per se, but through a superior cause and dependently on it.

17. The second.—To the second it is answered that this truth is sufficiently gathered from both heads proposed there. For in the first place it pertains to the amplitude of the divine power that nothing be or be able to be at any moment without its influx. To the same likewise pertains full dominion over all created things and the intrinsic power of annihilating them through the suspension of its influx. Wherefore in a human artificer, or even in univocal natural agents, that they can effect effects which remain in being when their action ceases is not a perfection simply, but one supposing some imperfection, namely in the artificer, that he cannot effect any thing according to its proper being and entity, but only according to some form and figure arising from the situation and order of such things; which imperfection being supposed, it pertains to the industry of the artificer to compose things from such things, in such order and disposition, that they cohere firmly and are stable. But in a natural agent it is supposed, for example, that it is of itself a univocal agent, which does not pertain to perfection simply; for, other things being equal, an agent which of itself is of a more eminent order than the effect and contains it eminently is much more excellent. Yet, that imperfection being supposed, that the cause is of the same notion and order with the effect, it will pertain to perfection not simply, but of that order, that it can effect an effect equally perfect and permanent. Again, the necessity of conservation is also sufficiently gathered from the imperfection of created being; for if of itself it were such that it could remain even for a moment without the actual influx of the first cause, it could also in the first moment or in eternity itself be without such influx, nor would it from its intrinsic notion demand dependence on another, which is proper to infinitely perfect being.

18. To the examples which are brought there, it is answered first that, although not every inequality of the effect to the cause suffices for the effect to depend in being conserved, yet this inequality which is between being by essence and by participation, or between independent being and that which is essentially dependent, suffices for this not to be able to be conserved without the influx of that. But in those examples it is asked that we explain when an effect depends in being conserved on a created cause. But we shall declare this more conveniently in sect. III.