Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Concerning the eternity of the world there is a twofold consideration, one as to its substance, the other as to motion. This latter is properly physical, and therefore is to be passed over in this science, although we shall not be able not to touch on it below in demonstrating that God exists and that there cannot be a process to infinity in efficient causes, whether subordinated per se or per accidens. But the former consideration is properly metaphysical, for it pertains to the causality of beings inasmuch as they are beings, and is necessary for declaring the notion of creation, and therefore falls very well into this place.

Arguments for the affirmative part of the question

2. For we said that creation is production from nothing; therefore it is necessary that the thing which is created was previously nothing; therefore it is of the notion of creation that before it there precede the simple and complete non-being of the thing which is created; therefore newness of being is of the notion of creation. This last consequence is evident, because everything which has being after non-being had at some time a beginning of being, and this is to have newness of being. Secondly, because it is of the notion of creation that it be distinguished from conservation, at least in reason and denomination, according to what is to be treated in the following disputation; but it is distinguished in nothing else except that creation says newness of being, which conservation does not say; for this is why the angel, which is now conserved by God by the same action by which it was created, is not now created, because in the present now it does not have newness of being; therefore. The major is evident, because, if in some effect creation were not distinguished from conservation, such effect would never have been created, but always conserved, which plainly seems to involve repugnance. For how will that be conserved which was not made or created? Thirdly, it is of the notion of a creature that it be not eternal; therefore it is of the notion of creation that it be not eternal; therefore newness of being is of the notion of creation. The consequences are clear; but the antecedent can, first, be proved theologically, because the holy Fathers gather that the Word is true God because He was produced from eternity. And thence they think it sufficiently proved that that production is not creation, because it is eternal; therefore they suppose that eternity is repugnant to creation. The consequence is clear; and the antecedent is proved from Athanasius, oration II Against the Arians; and Nazianzen, oration XXXII, with the scholion of Nicetas, n. 58; Basil, bk. IV Against Eunomius, § That the Son is not a creature; and Cyril of Alexandria, dialogue IV On the Trinity; Damascene, bk. I De Fide, cc. 8 and 9; Ambrose, bk. I Hexaem., c. 3, and others whom we shall report below. Secondly the same antecedent is proved by philosophical reason, because what is eternal is immutable; but immutability is repugnant to a creature. The antecedent is evident, because what is eternal must so remain with infinite duration as it was from eternity; otherwise there would be something eternal remaining with only finite duration, which is a manifest implication of contradiction. But what of necessity remains in the same way and in the same disposition through infinite duration is immutable. Hence it is confirmed, for if the creature were eternal, God would be compelled to conserve it for infinite time or duration. And with the same reason and necessity He would always perpetually conserve it, because there is no greater reason of one duration than of another.

Contrary opinions are reported

3. On account of these and similar arguments some theologians asserted that it is of the notion of creation that through it being is communicated after non-being, so that in real succession or duration being follows after non-being. So thinks Albert the Great, In II, dist. 1, aa. 6 and 10, and VIII Phys., ch.; Bonaventure, In II, dist. 1, a. 1, q. 1; Richard, in the same place, a. 3, q. 4; Marsilius, in the same place, q. 1, a. 2; Henry, Quodl. I, q. 7, and Quodl. IX, q. 17. Who all from this foundation teach that it was impossible that things, even substantial and incorruptible ones, were created from eternity; and some philosophers thought the same, as Philoponus in the book in which he answers the arguments of Proclus for the eternity of the world, c. 3. And in favour of this opinion Toletus gathers several arguments, VIII Phys., c. 2, q. 2, who also embraces it.

4. The contrary opinion is supposed by Aristotle, VIII Phys. (if it is true that he knew creation). But St. Thomas chiefly defends it, I, q. 46, a. 2, whom his disciples follow; Cajetan, there; Ferrariensis, VIII Phys., q. 3; Hervaeus, treatise On the Eternity of the World, q. 2, and In II, dist. 1, where also Capreolus and Deza; and also Giles, Ockham, Gabriel, Thomas of Strasbourg, and chiefly Gregory, q. 3, and Durandus, q. 2, who limits this to the creation of incorruptible things. Scotus, however, q. 3, thinks it a problem.

Resolution of the question

5. To me the opinion of St. Thomas seems true as to this part. In order to declare and confirm the matter, however, I note that some thing or production can be eternal in two ways. In one way from its intrinsic necessity, in which way the generation of the divine Word is eternal. In another way without simple necessity, from the freedom of the cause willing to effect it from eternity.

6. Creation is not necessarily eternal.—I say, then, first: it is repugnant to creation that it be eternal from within. Hence it can be said that newness of being is of the notion of creation, either in act or at least in aptitude. This assertion follows in the first place from faith, both because it is of faith that no creation was actually eternal; therefore much more that none is of necessity eternal; and also because it is of faith that God does nothing outside Himself from necessity of nature. Hence the reason is concluded, because every creature (under which creation itself too can be comprehended, as we saw above) does not have being of itself, and consequently neither necessity of being; therefore neither can creation of itself have this necessity; but neither does it have it from an extrinsic cause; therefore it cannot be eternal in the aforesaid sense. And hence follows the latter part of the conclusion, namely, that newness of being is of the notion of creation at least in aptitude. Because from its notion this newness is not repugnant; nor yet is it repugnant on the part of God, because, as we shall show below, God does nothing outside Himself from necessity of nature; therefore.

7. No natural reason proves that the world is from eternity.—And from this conclusion it is established by the way that it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason that the world is from eternity; for I suppose it established by natural reason that the world had being through creation, as was proved above. Hence the reason is concluded thus: for demonstration is only of necessary things; but that the creation of the world always was is not necessary, neither from its intrinsic necessity nor from the extrinsic necessity of the agent; therefore it is not demonstrable. I shall not linger, however, in solving the reasons of Aristotle, in which other writers have laboured with sufficient erudition; both for this very reason, and also because the philosophical reasons either are of no weight or tend chiefly to prove that the world did not begin through natural generation, which is most true, whatever be the efficacy of the reasons. But the metaphysical or theological reason, which can be of some difficulty or weight, will be touched upon at once.

8. A doubt is dissolved.—For someone may doubt about the proof of this assertion, for we see a certain thing founded on an uncertain and opinable principle, namely, that creation is something created and outside God, which is uncertain, as is evident from the preceding section. It is answered that for the reason made it is enough that passive creation, or the becoming of the creature (whether it is distinguished from the creature in reality or only in reason), is outside God and consequently outside all necessity of being. You will say: then, if we suppose that active creation is in God and not in the creature, it will have necessity of being and will be eternal from within; therefore of necessity it will bring in eternal passive creation. It is commonly answered by distinguishing the antecedent, namely, that that action will be eternal as to the thing which it posits in God, but not as to the relation of reason which it connotes to the creature; for this is not understood to be until the creature exists. But if you insist that that action is not action according to what the relation of reason adds, for that is nothing, but according to what of entity and reality is in it, it must be answered that in that action two things can be considered: one is its being, the other its actual efficacy, or that it actually brings in passion; as to the first it is eternal, but as to the second by no means, because that action is of such nobility and perfection that it does not bring in or posit its terminus except when the operator wills. And because action as action says not only the entity of that action according to itself, but connotes also the actual conjunction or passive emanation of the terminus, therefore that action is not simply of necessity eternal, but can be temporal.

9. And this doctrine indeed is true; if, however, someone considers it attentively, he will understand that whatever is by way of act which is understood eternal in God is not true action, as action signifies the actual way and flowing emanating from the agent and tending to the terminus; for action of this kind is not separable in reality from the terminus, since it consists in its actual flowing. Therefore whatever is understood eternal in God is by way of an act which is a principle of acting, whether it is a principle as the very power or form from which in time the action flows, or by way of an immanent act applying the executive power so that at such time it may bring in the action, in which way there is in God from eternity the act of the will by which He wills to create, yet not for eternity itself, but for the time or moment which He Himself willed to define.

10. From which is easily solved the argument which most could move the philosophers: for, if creation is in time, God would have had to be changed, at least by reason of the will to create; for if He creates in time, He wills to create in time; therefore He is changed. For the first consequent must be distinguished, in time He wills, on the part of the act or on the part of the object; the first is true, the second false; that is, if the sense is that in time He begins to have the act by which He wills to create, or its free determination, so the consequence is denied, for by an eternal act He could will from eternity the creation which He makes in time; but if the sense is that in time He wills to create objectively, that is, that to create in time was the object of the divine will, so the consequent is true. To explain which it is commonly said that it is more truly and properly said that God willed to create in time than that in time He willed to create; because in the former expression that in time is conjoined with the verb to create, but in the latter it seems to be conjoined with the willing itself; but from this true sense no change follows, since the will of that temporal object is eternal. But what that eternal will is, and what the free determination to a temporal object adds in eternity itself, is to be said below in treating of the attributes of God, for it does not matter for the present; for the difficulty is the same even if we understand that free determination of God to be to eternal creation.

11. It is not repugnant to creation to be exercised from eternity.—How the particle from nothing in the definition of creation is to be understood.—I say secondly: actual newness of being, or that it not be made from eternity, is not of the notion of creation. It is proved, because neither is this included in the definition of creation rightly understood, nor from any other head is it necessary, or the opposite repugnant. The former part is proved, for when creation is said to be production from nothing, that from does not signify the succession of one after another, as when we say that evening time comes from morning; for besides the fact that that expression is very improper and inept for a definition, it also denotes an order per accidens, except in successive things inasmuch as they are successive; but creation is not of itself a successive emanation, but momentary or whole at once. That from nothing, then, either taken negatively signifies the lack of a material cause, and from this side there is no necessity of newness of being, because creation, even if it were eternal, could be independent of a material cause; or it denotes the relation to the terminus a quo, which must be simply non-being, and so it denotes only order of nature, not of duration, as Avicenna also noted, VI of his Metaph., c. 2. But this order of nature consists only in this, that the creature of itself has no being at all unless it is communicated by another through creation, and so of itself is nothing negatively, that is, does not have being of itself. And for this reason, even if it were created from eternity, it would be created from nothing, because from what does not have being of itself it is made having being from another, so that being itself (which, if it were not made, would be nothing) is made through creation. And then, although in no real duration is it true to say the creature is not, or it is nothing, nevertheless it is true to say that prior in nature it is nothing rather than something, because that prior in nature does not exclude its so being in some real duration, but is to be explained negatively, namely, that without the causality which is through creation the thing would be nothing. Which Scotus rightly noted, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, distinguishing a twofold priority of nature, namely, positive and privative. As in the same instant in which the form enters matter the privation is said to be expelled, which is said to be in matter prior in nature to the form's being introduced, not formally or positively, but causally or negatively, because, unless the form were introduced, there would be privation there; so, then, it is to be understood in the present case.

12. The latter part.—The latter part is proved, because from no other head can repugnance be shown, which will be most easily established by solving the difficulties posited at the beginning. Now, however, it is declared briefly, because it is not repugnant on the part of God, as is established, since He is omnipotent; nor is it repugnant on the part of created being itself as such, because, although it is made from eternity, it will be truly created and dependent; for it is not of the notion of such created being that at some time a parte ante it was not, just as it is not of its notion that at some time a parte post it will not be; it is only of its notion, then, that it be not from itself and that it not have absolute necessity of being; but it would have both even if it were made from eternity, because it would both flow effectively from another and depend on his free determination. Nor yet is the eternity of the effect repugnant to the freedom of the cause, because, just as the determination of the divine will is eternal and nevertheless free, because prior in reason to that will's being understood determined in its eternity it is understood indifferent to willing this or that object outside itself, so, although He created from eternity and for eternity itself, He would be indifferent prior in reason to creating or not creating. Again, neither from the mode in which creation takes place is it repugnant that it be eternal, because it does not take place successively but whole at once and indivisibly, and therefore, although eternity itself is understood indivisible, creation can coexist with it.

13. An objection is satisfied.—Some say that, although creation as such takes place whole at once, yet conservation takes place successively; but eternal creation necessarily has adjoined conservation and infinite successive duration; since, therefore, it is repugnant that succession be eternal, as we suppose, it will also be repugnant that creation be eternal, at least on account of the adjoined conservation. Which objection would indeed have place in the opinion of Bonaventure and others, who think that in the being of incorruptible things, or in their duration or aevum, there is real succession; that opinion, however, is false, as we shall show below in disputing about durations. Wherefore it is also false that in the perpetual conservation of these things some real succession is necessary, for they are conserved in the same permanent being and in the same indivisible duration, and by the same indivisible action, as I shall say in the following disputation. Only according to our mode of conceiving is that conservation or duration apprehended by way of succession; because we cannot otherwise measure or conceive that duration except as it were through coexistence with an infinite imaginary succession.

14. A thing created from eternity is not infinitely perfect.—And so it is also easily understood that from eternal creation no real infinity follows in the created thing; for, although eternal duration is called infinite inasmuch as it lacks beginning, yet it is only either a certain extrinsic denomination of coexistence with the eternity of God, inasmuch as it lacks beginning, or (which seems truer) a certain negation of beginning in existing; but in reality no infinite perfection is adjoined to the creature, but it is the same always existing; as for an angel to coexist or endure for a thousand years of the heavenly motion is not a greater physical perfection in it than to exist for one moment, but it is the same according to its whole self enduring without intermission; therefore from no head is it repugnant to creation that it be eternal.

15. Permanent corruptible things could be created from eternity.—And hence I further gather that the limitation which Durandus adds about incorruptible things is not necessary; for the creation too of permanent corruptible things, if it takes place whole at once without succession, as the condition of permanent things of itself demands, does not require newness of being from its intrinsic notion, nor has it whence eternity of being should be intrinsically repugnant, for the whole discourse made can be applied in the same way to things of this kind. But Durandus says that infinite duration, even in the declared sense, is repugnant to a corruptible thing, because a corruptible thing cannot endure for infinite time; but a thing made from eternity must endure for infinite time. The common reply is that the argument proves that a corruptible thing cannot be created from eternity and left to its nature, because thence follows that contradiction, namely, that the thing endures and does not endure for infinite time; but that it does not prove that it is absolutely repugnant that things of this kind be created from eternity, because God could not leave them to their nature, but conserve them for infinite time.

16. But I think it must be answered otherwise, that corruptible things too can endure for infinite time left to their nature, if a contrary agent is absent, or is so affected or disposed that it cannot act on them, because nothing destroys itself, per se speaking. But if corruptible things were created from eternity, they could suffer nothing from eternity from contrary agents, because they could suffer nothing except through successive motion, which it is repugnant should be from eternity. I say, however, from contrary agents, because we are treating of corruptive action; for perfective action, as illumination, vision, intellection, can very well be eternal, because it can take place whole at once without resistance, and once made can of itself endure for infinite time. In which way Augustine said, VI De Trinit., c. 1, that the splendour of fire or of the sun would be coeternal if the fire or the sun were eternal. But corruptive action, which takes place with contrary resistance, requires motion and succession, and therefore cannot be from eternity, as Durandus himself teaches and we suppose. And so it comes about that corruptible things created from eternity and left to their nature, that is, with no special protection of God applied besides the general influx, could endure for infinite time through defect of action of a contrary agent, so that, although fire and tow created from eternity were near, the fire could not act on the tow in eternity, and consequently not for infinite imaginary time either. It is proved, because, if the fire acted on the tow, either it would corrupt it and change it into itself by a simultaneous and indivisible action, or it would alter it successively. The first cannot be said, both because it exceeds the efficacy of fire, and also because it is repugnant to the position; for if eternal fire by indivisible action at once generated another fire, the thing generated would be as eternal as the generator; but in order that it be generated from tow, it is necessary that the tow at some time have existed; there will, therefore, be together in eternity the tow and the fire generated from the tow, which is plainly repugnant. Nor can the second be said, because (as is supposed) successive alteration cannot be eternal. And this can easily be understood by explaining the argument made; for successive alteration is from a contrary and through it the contrary is removed from the disposition pre-existing in it; therefore, if successive alteration is eternal, the patient existing with the disposition contrary to the alteration is also eternal; therefore in eternity itself it at once had that disposition and was deprived of it through the contrary alteration, which is an open repugnance. And the a priori reason is that a thing which is created from eternity is created in some real disposition, and therefore it is necessary that it endure in it for infinite time; therefore in the whole of that no contrary alteration can take place; it is necessary, therefore, that it begin in time. And for the same reason, if some man were created from eternity, even in pure nature, he could not for infinite time suffer any alteration from within, because the reason is the same of the alteration of one part in another, or of natural heat in the humours or nourishment, as of any other agents or patients whatever; and therefore such a man would not need food for infinite time, and for the same he would not only not die, but would not even be able to die.

17. You will say: all these things are preternatural to corruptible things and to contrary agents and patients; therefore things of this kind are no longer left to their nature, as was supposed. It is answered that by these and similar arguments and inferences it is declared at least a posteriori that eternal creation is not consonant with the natures of these things, because each thing by its nature demands to exist, and also to be made, in that measure and in that state in which it can exercise its actions in a mode accommodated to its nature. But corruptible things made in eternity could do nothing accommodated to themselves for eternity itself. Hence neither could they afterwards of themselves begin action and passion; for that infinite imaginary time, for which they would necessarily endure in the disposition in which they had been created, would not have a certain terminus a parte post, but could be ended before any designated instant, and so too before any instant the action of the creature could be begun; therefore they could not of themselves begin action by determining the instant for which it was to be begun, but this would pertain to God, which also is preternatural. Nevertheless, eternal creation being supposed, we say that all these things follow by natural necessity, and from that supposition of eternal creation we say that, although in other respects things of this kind are left to their natures, they will endure for infinite time.

18. Incorruptible substances would not exist wholly connaturally if created from eternity.—But I add further that this disproportion or (so to speak) preternaturalness, although not wholly equal, is found almost the same in the eternal creation of incorruptible things, because it is necessary that any thing created from eternity remain wholly unchanged for infinite time, both in substance and in all the accidents with which it was created, because all those are eternal, and therefore on that side infinite in duration according to the whole reality or real mode in which they were created from eternity; therefore it is necessary that they remain unchanged for infinite duration. But every creature, however incorruptible, is mutable according to place or other operations, and therefore it is also preternatural that it be made in that state in which it could not exercise or vary its natural motions or operations for infinite time. Nevertheless, this is not simply impossible or repugnant, which is what we intend.

Solutions of the arguments

19. The first argument made at the beginning has already been sufficiently solved from what has been said; for we have shown that it is not of the notion of creation that nothing precede it in real duration, but only in the order of reason and causality. Nor does it stand in the way that Anselm, in the Monologion, c. 8, also approves that exposition, that what is created is said to be made from nothing because previously it was nothing and through creation becomes something. For he first teaches there the true interpretation handed down above, namely, that through that particle every subject and all matter from which creation is made is denied; but afterwards he applies that other interpretation, not as necessary nor as fitting creation from the fact precisely that it is creation, but as declaring creation as it was made.

20. To the second it is answered, first, that there is no drawback in granting that a thing is created by the action by which it is conserved, as we shall say shortly. Next it is said that even in eternal creation creation can be distinguished in reason from conservation. For as that creation is said to be absolutely in eternity itself, as a simple participation of created being, it has the notion of creation; but as in it we conceive a certain imaginary succession, so for any designated instant of such succession it has the notion of conservation. Which we apprehend in almost the same way in the eternal generation of the Word. For as it is in its eternity it is true production and generation; but as it is understood coexisting with instants of our time or imaginary ones, it is (so to speak) a certain permanence in the same generation; for the name of conservation, which denotes imperfection, is not to be attributed. See St. Thomas, q. 3 De Potent., a. 14, ad 10.

21. How the Saints prove the divinity of the Word of God from His eternal existence.—To the third the antecedent is denied, namely, that eternity is repugnant to the notion of creature. To the Fathers, however, it can first be said that they speak from the supposition of faith, which teaches that no creature was created from eternity; from which they rightly gather that, if the Word is eternal, He is not a creature. But because they sometimes signify that coeternity with God is repugnant to a creature, this is to be understood according to the former conclusion. In which way Augustine said, XII De Civit., c. 15, that, although the angels had been created from eternity, they would nevertheless not have been coeternal with their creator, for He always was by immutable eternity, but these were made. To the reason it is answered that what is eternal from within is immutable from within; but that what is made from without in eternity need not be immutable from within, but it is enough if for eternity itself, or for the infinite duration which is thought of in it, it remains unchanged.

22. Hence, to the confirmation, I grant that by the very fact that God creates something from eternity He must of necessity conserve it for infinite imaginary time, in the declared sense. Nor is this a drawback, because this is not absolute necessity but from supposition, which proportionally has place in any action of God. For if He wills to produce a thing in time, at least for that time it is necessary that He conserve it; therefore, if He wills to produce it in eternity, what wonder that for eternity He necessarily conserves it? This necessity, however, is only a parte ante, because ascending towards the beginning no terminus is ever found in that duration; but not a parte post, because in any designated instant in that eternity God could cease from the conservation of that thing, and before any designated one, in any designable one too, He could cease at His choice. The rest of this matter we refer to VIII Phys.¹