Disputationes metaphysicae

1. So far we have spoken almost only of the power of creating, and at the same time have declared its effect, inasmuch as it is the object or terminus to which that power says relation, at least according to our way of conceiving; it remains that we speak of the action itself, or creation, what it is.

Various opinions

2. The first.—In which matter I find there can be three ways of speaking. The first is that creation in the notion of action is not something in the creature, but is in the creator Himself, the very act of the divine will or of the divine command by which He produces things ad extra. I say, however, in the notion of action, for in the notion of relation, which supposes the action already terminated and results from its terminus, creation is said to be something in the creature, namely, a certain real relation to the creator. This is thought to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 3, whom Cajetan and other Thomists so expound. The reason of St. Thomas is that creation is not a change; therefore there can be nothing in the creature except a relation. The antecedent is evident, because change is about some subject, as is established from the definition of motion; but creation is not about a subject, as is also established from its definition touched upon above. The first consequence St. Thomas proves, I, q. 45, a. 2, because action and passion agree in the substance of motion and differ according to diverse relations to agent or patient, from III Phys., text 20. Therefore, motion being taken away from creation, nothing can remain except relation, either of the creature to the creator or of the creator to the creature.

3. Secondly, because creation cannot be formally a transient action; therefore it is formally immanent in the creator, and can be called virtually or eminently transient, because it has power to posit an effect outside, which fits excellently the act of the divine will or command. The consequence is clear, because between those two members there is no middle. But the antecedent is proved, because transient action is an accident, and consequently of necessity requires a subject; but creation does not require a subject; therefore it cannot be an accident; therefore it cannot be a transient action.

4. Hence I argue thirdly: every action is prior in nature to its terminus; therefore creation too is prior in nature to the created thing; therefore it cannot be in the created thing, but in the creator. This last consequence is evident, because it is impossible to understand creation as an action outside God and prior to the created thing, because in that prior it is not understood in what or how it is, and action, as action, cannot be conceived in itself alone and as it were subsisting per se.

5. Fourthly the Thomists argue that not only creation, but no action of the divine power, can be transient with respect to it, nor can there ever be an action intermediate between the power of God and its effect which is distinct from the power of God; therefore much less can this be in creation. The antecedent is proved, first, because the divine power is intimately present in every effect of it; therefore it produces every effect of it immediately and per se, and not by means of some action. Secondly, because otherwise the power of God would be the principle not only of its effect but also of its action, which however St. Thomas denies, I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 3. Thirdly, because transient action is the complement of active power; but God cannot have the complement of His power in a creature, otherwise He would depend on it; therefore.

6. The second.—The second opinion is that creation is something outside God, yet in reality not something distinct from the creature which is created, and so properly is not in it except according to reason, but really and essentially is the creature itself; namely, that the creation of man is the very essence of man, and the creation of an angel the essence of the angel, and so of the others. This opinion, in placing creation in the created thing, is founded on this, that action as action must necessarily be in its terminus, either by identity or in some other way, because action is nothing but the dependence and emanation of the effect from the cause; but dependence must necessarily be in the thing which depends. Which principle we shall prove at length below, for it is most true. But in order to affirm that creation is in no way distinguished except according to reason from the created thing, this opinion can, first, be founded on the general proposition that no action is distinguished in reality from its terminus, but only in reason. And in this way this opinion can be attributed to the nominalists, who do not posit an action intermediate in reality between effect and cause, as may be seen in Ockham, In II, q. 9, and Gregory, In II, dist. 1, qq. 4 and 5, who in q. 6 adds that creation is in the creature, or rather is the creature itself.

7. Secondly, this opinion can be founded on the special notion of creation, namely, that it is an action from nothing, and therefore cannot be an accident, but a substance or by way of substance, if perhaps a separated accident is created.¹ And to confirm this the opinion can be helped by the arguments of the former opinion, especially the third. And it can be confirmed, because, if creation were something in the creature distinct from it and as it were mediating between it and God, that, whatever it were, would be something created and made; for it would be distinct from God and flowing from Him; therefore it would be necessary to distinguish its creation from it, and so there would be a process to infinity, or, if one must stop somewhere, let one stop at the first creature. And to confirm this the arguments can avail by which Scotus, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, tries to prove that passive creation (he speaks of the relation) is not a thing distinct from the creature, which Capreolus reports and solves there, q. 2.

8. Thirdly, this opinion can be founded on the essential notion of the creature as such; for it is of the essence of the creature that it depend on the first being; therefore the dependence by which it depends is both in the creature itself and is not other than its essence. But this first and essential dependence of participated being on being by essence is creation; therefore creation is both in the creature itself and is nothing other than its essence; hence it can no more be distinguished from it than the essence of each thing from itself. The first antecedent is evident, because, just as it is of the essence of the first being to be being by essence, and consequently to be from itself and not from another, so it is of the essence of every other being to be being by participation, and consequently to be dependent on another. But the first consequence is proved, because to depend is something intrinsic to the creature; therefore it belongs to it through something intrinsic; but it belongs to it through dependence. Again, if the formal effect is essential, so is the form; but to depend is as it were the formal effect of dependence; therefore, if the creature is essentially dependent, the dependence itself is of its essence. Therefore this is most true of the first and most immutable dependence; but such is creation, because, as we said above, this is the first emanation of participable being from being by essence, and through it any creature can be from God alone.

9. But from this foundation it is inferred (speaking consistently according to this opinion) that in every created thing there is included some dependence on God wholly immutable and inseparable from the created thing itself, both because what is essential is immutable, and also because what is not distinct in reality is not separable while that thing remains (for so we speak). Hence it comes about, secondly, that this dependence is on God alone; for every dependence of one creature on another is separable from the creature, especially speaking of created things, not of the modes of things; for in this way it is true that God can make by Himself alone whatever He makes through a creature, or with it, or in it, or from it. And so every dependence on a creature in any genus of cause is accidental and mutable, but dependence on God alone is essential and immutable. Thirdly, it is inferred that this dependence on God alone is most proper creation, since it includes no order to a material cause. Fourthly, hence the best reason seems to be given why a creature cannot concur to creation, even by way of instrument, because by the very fact that it depended on another creature it would not be essential to the other creature, and so would no longer be creation.

10. The third.—The third opinion is that creation is something in the created thing, not indeed really distinct from it as having its own entity, but distinct by the nature of the thing as its mode. This opinion, as regards that part about the existence of creation in the creature, is quite common. Gabriel holds it in the place cited; Aureolus, cited by Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, in the argument against the first conclusion; Ockham, In I, dist. 43, q. 1; Thomas of Strasbourg, In II, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1; Giles, In II, dist. 1, p. I, q. 3, a. 2, and On Being and Essence, q. 7; all which authors also sufficiently explain and declare that creation is not a thing wholly distinct from the created thing; sometimes too they call it passive creation and the dependence of the creature on God; they also call it active creation or transient action. The modal distinction, however, they do not sufficiently explain; indeed Giles and some others seem to deny it. St. Thomas could be cited in favour of this opinion, In I, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, where he calls creation a transient action and compares it to heating; yet St. Thomas there speaks very ambiguously; for in every transient action he seems to place the action formally in the agent, but in the patient only effectively or by way of passion, and so Deza interprets him, In I, dist. 27, q. 1, note 1. Hence Cajetan too, I, q. 25, a. 1, says that, if in God the executive power is distinct in reason from intellect and will, it cannot be denied that creation is a transient action, and nevertheless says that that action is not something distinct from the essence of God, because universally he holds that transient action is formally in the agent. Wherefore this ambiguity of expressions must be guarded against.

Resolution of the question

11. Among these opinions this last, as proposed, seems true to me; in order, however, that we may declare the matter, and begin from those things which seem more certain, it must be said, in the first place, that the dependence of the creature on God is something really and intrinsically existing in the creature. This assertion seems sufficiently proved in the third opinion, and I have read no one who denies it under these terms, and in equivalent ones all grant it. For all confess that passive creation is in the creature, not only as it signifies the resulting relation (for that is nothing), but as it says passive emanation, or the becoming of the creature from God, whether these are distinguished in reality or in reason, for we are not now treating this; but dependence is nothing else than passive emanation or creation, speaking of the first dependence on God alone, of which we are now treating. The reason, however, is that for the creature to depend is not an extrinsic denomination in the creature, but rather it is an extrinsic denomination in God that the creature depends on Him; but the creature is called dependent from dependence; therefore dependence is something in it, and not only in God. Likewise, because the dependence which light has on the sun is something in the light itself, and the same holds in any effect with respect to a created cause, according to the mode of dependence which it has on it, either in becoming only or also in being conserved. And by the same reason, if God alone illuminated the air, the dependence of that light on God would be something in the light itself; for the reason is the same as of dependence on the sun, or perhaps greater; therefore that dependence too by which the creature according to its whole self depends on God is something in the creature itself. The consequence is evident, because, if in other effects dependence is something in them, this is because dependence says a mode or condition of the effect, not of the cause; but this reason proceeds equally or more in total dependence.

12. The dependence of the creature on God is distinct from it in reality.—I say secondly: this dependence of the creature on the creator is not wholly the same as the creature which is the terminus of that dependence or creation, but is something in it, distinct from it on the part of the thing. It is proved, first, by parity of reasoning, induction being made in all the other dependences of effects on their efficient causes; for in all the action, and consequently also the dependence, is distinguished by the nature of the thing from its terminus, as was touched upon above and will be treated ex professo below in the proper predicament; therefore the dependence of creation too will be distinct in reality from the terminus; for it differs from the others only because it is dependence on the efficient without the concurrence of matter or subject; but this difference matters nothing for taking away the distinction, as will be established from what is to be said. Secondly it is proved, because this dependence is mutable and variable in the creature, the same thing which is made remaining; therefore they are distinguished on the part of the thing. The consequence is founded on the principle treated above, disp. VII, sect. 2, where we showed that this is a certain sign of distinction, either real or at least modal, if of two real extremes one can be without the other on the part of the thing. And this is the chief indication by which in other actions we prove that the action is distinguished on the part of the thing from the terminus. The antecedent, however, is proved, because the dependence by which God now conserves quantity without a subject in the Sacrament is distinct from that by which He conserved the same quantity in the substance of bread; for that former depended on matter, but the other not at all, but is by way of creation; therefore, if God created quantity from the beginning outside a subject, and afterwards united it to a subject and conserved it dependently on it, the same quantity would remain without the prior dependence of creation; for that two total dependences should remain there together is improbable, as I shall show below; therefore the dependence of creation is separable from the created terminus. What, therefore, appears in this example is to be understood in every creation, both because the reason is the same, and also because, if there seems to be any difficulty in this, it intervenes in every creation; but if in some thing it ceases, it ceases also in all.

13. The conclusion is proved by examples.—We cannot, however, bring examples in the ordinary mode of the creation of substances, because creation of this kind is always made by God alone and from the nature of the thing, and whatever is properly created by God from nothing is perpetually conserved by the same action, as will be said below, because the nature of the thing demands this. Yet from this an argument of complete identity and inseparability cannot be taken; for it is enough that, a miracle or supernatural work intervening, the dependence about the same creature can be varied, because this very thing could not take place without some distinction in reality. But that this can take place by miracle can be declared (besides the argument made) according to the probable opinion that a creature can be an instrument of creation; for then God can create the same thing either by Himself alone or through an instrument, and then the dependences about the same thing are diverse; for when He creates through an instrument, the dependence is far diverse than if it were from God alone; for through it the effect depends at once on God and on the created instrument, which cannot be understood without a new and distinct dependence. For neither, when an effect is made by God through a secondary principal or instrumental cause, are there two dependences there, one on God alone, which always remains, the other on the creature, which is changed, as we shall show in the discourse of this section and shall often repeat in the two following disputations; therefore it is necessary that the whole dependence be varied about the same thing. Wherefore, since it is probable that, when worms or flesh are generated from the consecrated species, the same numerical prime matter which before was in the bread is created again under them, and it is also probable that it is created by means of the humanity of Christ as an instrument, then, although the prime matter which is created is the same which before was, yet its dependence is diverse on account of the said cause. And finally, if God annihilated one angel and afterwards created it again, it would not be necessary that the dependence be numerically the same as it had been before; for although God can do this, there is no reason why we should say it is necessary; because, if the same light successively depends on diverse agents through diverse dependences, why cannot God make the same angel successively depend on Him by diverse dependences? All these things, then, sufficiently show that there is some distinction in reality between the dependence of the creature and its terminus.

14. The a priori reason for the conclusion.—Thirdly there is the a priori reason, because this dependence is not of the essence of the dependent substance, quality or quantity, but is a certain way to it. Which is evident from the very notion of substance, and the same holds of the others; for substance, although it is created, is in its essence something absolute and only includes essentially to be per se, and in the species of substance the essential notion is understood to be completed through similar absolute differences, without that transcendental relation which actual dependence essentially includes. And this could be confirmed, because it is not of the essence of the creature to be actually; therefore neither actually to depend; which inference has force according to the opinion which distinguishes existence from essence as actually created; but according to our opinion it has less efficacy. But that this actual dependence is not essential will be proved more at length and more efficaciously below against the second opinion, from the drawbacks which follow from it, because it does not rightly declare the essential dependence which the creature has on the creator.

15. The dependence of the creature on God is a mode distinct from it by the nature of the thing.—I say thirdly: this dependence which is in the creature is not a thing wholly really distinct from the terminus of creation, nor is it only the relation resulting from the terminus of creation, but is a certain mode distinct by the nature of the thing from the terminus itself. In all these things we equate creation with all other dependences, in which almost all these things are certain, and from them an argument sufficiently efficacious is taken by induction and likeness, because the difference that an action is from a subject or not from a subject matters nothing for all these, as is easily evident from what has been said and will be more established from the solutions of the arguments. And moreover I prove each briefly. And in the first part indeed there is no controversy, both because it is superfluous to devise that entity, since for all that we have said a distinct mode suffices, and also because the second foundation of the second opinion proceeds efficaciously against an entity of this kind, and finally because that entity cannot be a substance per se distinct; for who would understand or devise it? or who would say that God cannot create one substance alone? and similar drawbacks can easily be inferred from that position. Nor yet is it a proper entity which is an accidental form, since it is not in a subject, nor can an accident be intrinsically terminated to giving substantial being; it remains, therefore, that it be a mode, which is what we intend.

16. The second part, about the resulting relation, whether it is a thing, or a mode distinct by the nature of the thing from the creature, or not: in the way in which it is said to be resulting, it cannot be the dependence of which we are now treating, because it is founded on the dependence itself; for it can have no other foundation or reason of founding, from those which Aristotle enumerated, V Metaph., c. 15, text 20. And it is evident, because the creature is referred to God because it depends on Him. Likewise, because the relation is posterior in nature to the created thing and is subjected in it as in its proper subject; but dependence is prior in the order of nature not only to the relation but also to the created thing, at least under some notion, namely, because the way is prior to the terminus, and becoming prior to having been made. Thirdly finally, because this relation is said to result, the foundation and terminus being posited; but dependence does not result from the terminus, but is rather the way to it, or its emanation from God. It remains, therefore, that it is only a certain mode modally distinct from the creature which depends. Which, finally, that sign of distinction by the nature of the thing which we adduced above excellently confirms. For although the creature and its dependence are so compared that this same creature can remain, the dependence or creation being varied, yet conversely this creation or dependence cannot remain without carrying with it its intrinsic terminus, because essentially it is the becoming or being conserved of such terminus; it is a sign, therefore, that only modal distinction intervenes between them.

17. I say fourthly: this dependence does not have the true notion of change; it has, however, the true notion of way, or of the becoming of the creature, and so is called passive creation; it also has the true notion of emanation from God, and, inasmuch as it is from Him, can truly and properly be called the action of God Himself, formally transient, by which He produces the creature. In order that the whole conclusion be understood, I suppose that in an action which takes place from a subject these three are conjoined, which are distinguished by us in relation and denomination, yet not in reality, even with modal distinction, namely, the becoming of the terminus, the action of the agent, and the passion or change of the subject; for the same mode of dependence, with respect to the form which it induces, is called becoming or way to it; with respect to the agent it is called its action; and with respect to the patient it is called change or passion. Of these three, then, this last has no place in creation. And this is the first part of the assertion, which St. Thomas rightly taught in denying that creation is a change; and Gregory proves the same at length above, concl. 2, in which for this cause he deservedly says that, although every passion is action or has action conjoined, yet not conversely does every action bring in passion, because action is not always concerned with a subject or patient; but passion cannot be understood without a patient, nor change without a mobile. Since, therefore, the dependence of creation does not suppose some subject from which it is made, it cannot have the true notion of passion or change.

18. You will say: the creature itself is changed when it is created, for it is otherwise than before; hence it is referred to God by a new relation, not indeed through the change of God, but of the creature itself, according to the doctrine of Augustine, V De Trinit., last chapter. It is easily answered that change is sometimes said properly, and so is said only of a subject which in duration (or, according to some, in order of nature) pre-exists and through action is otherwise than it was before. And in this sense we deny that creation is a change, and it would be said more clearly that it is not a passion. But sometimes change is said more broadly of every action or effecting which posits some newness in the effect, and so through generation not only matter but the thing generated will be said to be changed; and in this sense creation can be called a change, yet less properly, because the thing which is created is not properly said to be otherwise than before, because before it was nothing, but is to be said to have simply the being which it did not have before.

19. From this reason and reply, however, it is understood that there has place in creation that relation of way to terminus which is commonly called passive becoming. For in the first place a way or becoming of this kind from its formal notion does not say relation to a subject, but only to the terminus; therefore from its precise notion it is not repugnant to creation. Next, becoming of this kind in other effectings is nothing else than the dependence of the effect on the cause, inasmuch as it is a certain tendency to the effect. But this whole is found in this dependence of creation. Moreover, because in everything which has been changed being changed intervenes; therefore in everything which has been made becoming intervenes. Especially because this very thing, namely, to have been newly made, is in some way to have been changed, at least speaking broadly, as we said.

20. The active notion of creation truly belongs to the dependence of the creature on God.—Finally, hence the last part of the assertion is easily shown, namely, that to this dependence of the creature, inasmuch as it says relation to the divine power from which it flows, belongs the proper notion of action or of active creation. In which part the dissension among authors about the present question seems chiefly to be placed. Care must be taken, however, lest one contend only about a name. For this question depends on that philosophical one, whether transient action is formally in the agent or in the patient, which we shall treat below in the proper predicament. Now I only note that among those who place transient action in the agent, some posit it as a certain absolute mode including a transcendental relation newly coming to the active power when it acts and actuating it. And those who think so of transient action speak quite consistently in denying such action in God; for it would be a great imperfection in Him. Nevertheless that mode of explaining transient action is not only against Aristotle and the weightier philosophers, but also plainly improbable, as having been devised without foundation or reason, since it can scarcely be understood. Others, then, also placing transient action in the agent, say that there is nothing in it except a real relation resulting in it from the production of the effect. And these too consistently deny transient action to God, because in God real relations do not result from His effects. These, however, would perhaps say consistently that action in God is a relation of reason, which is sufficiently established per se to be improbable. And similarly that opinion relies on a foundation of little probability; for that relation, if it results in a created agent, supposes the effect already produced; how, then, will it be action? But if it does not result, but is said to be made as it were per se and primarily by the acting power itself, as some Scotists imagine, it is a mere fiction and without foundation. Others finally, also placing transient action in the agent, say that it is not something new, absolute or respective, distinct in reality from the power and added to it, but is the acting power itself as actually conjoined to its effect, or connoting that the effect actually depends on it. And these will not be reluctant to grant transient action even in God Himself; indeed they will speak consistently. But these place transient action in the agent in name only, and therefore we do not now dispute with them.

21. An objection is satisfied.—We suppose, then, with Aristotle, IX Metaph., text 16, that actions which have a terminus made outside the acting cause are in the patient itself or terminus, and not in the agent. And according to this opinion we say that the dependence of the creature, as it is a certain flowing from God, has the true notion of transient action. And it is proved, first, because in the heating of fire and in all similar cases, the dependence by which heat is made in the patient is the action of the heat existing in the fire for no other reason than because it is a certain flowing from the heat emanating from it; but the dependence by which the creature is made by God is a certain flowing emanating from God Himself; therefore it has the true notion of action. Some say that for the notion of action it is not enough that it be a flowing from active power, but that it must be its actuality and complement. But this reply seems to consist only in words, because no active power as such receives complement or actuality from action, but only exercises its actuality; but this exercising is not to actuate itself, but to reduce another to act, which belongs also to God. For in any merely active power there is only an extrinsic denomination; for active powers by immanent action actuate themselves, yet not inasmuch as they are only active, but inasmuch as they are also passive.

22. Hence I argue secondly: for what stands in the way of this flowing of creation, as from God, having the true notion of action? Either the lack of a subject stands in the way, because action must precede in the order of nature the thing made; and this not, because as to this the reason is the same of that dependence as it is passive becoming; hence, just as according to the relation of dependence or way it can precede in its genus, even if it is not in a subject, so it can also in the notion of action; and both will be more established from the solutions of the arguments. Or the perfection of the divine power stands in the way; and this not, because transient action does not perfect the power from which it flows, but rather whatever perfection it has it receives from the power; it does not, therefore, derogate more from the perfection of the divine power that transient action flow from it than that its effects themselves flow from it. But that action mediates between the effect and the power derogates no more from the perfection of the power of God than that dependence mediates, and both come from the limitation and potentiality of the effects themselves. Finally, even if we freely grant that, with respect to some created power, transient action can be called its extrinsic complement or perfection, because such power is by its nature ordered and instituted for such action, yet it is not necessary to attribute this to the action emanating from the power of God, because this power is such that it is not of itself ordered to action, but only from the fullness of its perfection can have it. Which by a certain participation belongs also to some created principles of acting, as was touched upon above and will be said more at length below in disputing about powers. It is not, therefore, of the notion of transient action as such that it be a perfection of active power, even in that extrinsic and improper way.

23. Thirdly I argue that the active power of God ad extra, formally speaking, is neither the intellect nor the will, but an executive power distinct from them in reason, as we shall show below in disputing about the attributes of God; therefore the action of such power cannot be formally immanent, because only intellect and will in an immaterial thing act immanently; but the executive power is immediately active ad extra. The act of the will of God, therefore, is not the very action by which He acts ad extra, since it is only the application of the executive power to acting. Indeed, even if someone holds that the will of God is the proximate power of acting ad extra, he will not rightly say that the volition of God, according to what is really in it, is the action by which He produces ad extra; for rather it is the very principle of acting ad extra, because it is the very formal perfection of the will of God, which is in Him by way of act rather than by way of a power receptive of its act; but the principle of acting ad extra never enters (so to speak) the action itself, since such action flows from such principle. But the respect of reason which is understood to be added to the free act of the will of God as willing the thing which He produces ad extra cannot have the notion of real action, since that is nothing, while this is true and real production or making, from which God is denominated maker of heaven and earth. And the same reason can be applied to the intellect, even if executive power is placed in it. Hence Scotus rightly, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, § Ista ergo, proves generally that the act of intellect or will cannot be productive of the terminus as action, but only as principle, because the productive action and that which is produced are in the same. In which he openly favours this opinion, although In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and in other places, he seems to think otherwise.

The foundations of the other opinions are solved

24. Whether action includes motion and relation.—To the first reason of the first opinion it is answered by granting the antecedent, namely, that creation is not a change, but denying the consequence, namely, that it is not action; for it is from the inferior to the superior negatively; for action extends more widely than change. But when it is said that action includes the substance of motion and relation, if it is understood of the precise notion of action (as the argument seems to require), the assumption is false; for it only includes the substance of flowing or dependence with transcendental relation to the principle from which it flows. But if that proposition is understood of action with motion, or a subject being presupposed, then as to both parts it can be well or badly understood; for if we speak really or identically, it is true that such action is the very substance of motion; yet it does not have this from the fact that it is action, but from the fact that it is such action, namely, because it is from a subject; but according to precision and formal concepts it is not true, because motion as such says the act of the mobile, which action as action does not say, and therefore, although the notion of motion or change is taken away, the substance of flowing or dependence can remain, which suffices for the notion of action. Similarly, when it is said that relation conjoined to the substance of motion is of the notion of action, this can be understood either of predicamental relation resulting, either in the acting cause or in the effect made, and so the proposition is false, because action is not an aggregate of predicamental relation and motion; likewise because action is prior, as the reason for founding a relation of this kind. Or it can be understood of the transcendental relation of the emanation or dependence itself to its principle, and so the assumed proposition is true; yet it is not rightly inferred thence that, change being taken away, nothing remains except predicamental relation, either of the effect to the cause or of the cause to the effect; for there can still remain the transcendental relation of the dependence itself to its principle, although it is dependence without a subject and without proper change. All which seem so clear per se that it is scarcely credible that St. Thomas used that reason to conclude that creation is only a predicamental relation resulting in the created thing made. And therefore some try to expound it of transcendental relation, so that by it he understood that dependence which we said is in the creature on the creator. For this mode of speaking is not unusual with St. Thomas; for in III, q. 2, he often calls the union a relation, and never distinguishes between predicamental relation and the mode of union, although it cannot be denied that there is that mode including transcendental relation to the unitable things. This exposition, then, is probable; it cannot, however, be accommodated to all the expressions of St. Thomas, as is evident from the solutions of the arguments, I, q. 44, a. 3.

25. Creation is formally a transient action.—To the second the antecedent is denied; for creation is formally a transient action, not that it passes from one subject into another, as Deza above seems to attack, but that it goes out effectively from the agent and is in the terminus, and therefore is said to pass to it. But it is asked in that argument whether this creative action is an accident. In which Giles and others affirm; for it is univocally action, and consequently is of the predicament of action, which is one of the predicaments of accidents. Nor is it repugnant that an accident be a way to substance, because substantial generation too has this; and by the very fact that it is called a way it is called something imperfect and a being of a being. But when the subject of this accident is sought, they answer that it is the terminus itself; for although in one genus, namely of terminus, it is posterior, yet in the genus of subjective cause it can be prior in nature. But this last is difficult for me to believe; first, because I do not think creation has a material cause; therefore neither can it have a subjective cause, for they are the same. The antecedent is evident, because this is the chief difference of the creative action from all others, that it takes place from the sole force of the agent without concurrence of matter or subject. Secondly, because I do not understand that the terminus of a way can be prior to the way itself under some notion including real existence. Which I add on account of the notion of end, under which the terminus is prior in nature, because the final cause as such does not prerequire real existence; but the subjective cause intrinsically prerequires real existence; therefore the terminus cannot be understood under that notion before its way in the order of nature, because it has no real being which has not come to it through that way.

26. Whether creation is an accident, and of what subject.—Wherefore it seems it can more easily be answered that action as action does not require a subject of inherence, but a principle from which it flows, because action as action does not say relation to that in which, but to that from which; for thence it comes about that action as action confers no formal denomination on the patient, but only on the agent. Nevertheless this reply, although it can satisfy about action as action, yet about passive creation or dependence as such the difficulty still remains, because becoming as such does not say relation to the principle, but to the thing which depends or is made, and therefore of it as such it must be explained in what subject it is. Hence again the difficulty about action can be pressed; for although action as action does not regard a subject of inherence, yet in reality it must always have some subject of inherence.

27. In what predicament creation is placed.—Many, then, deny that this dependence which is creation is an accident, asserting that it is a substantial mode of the thing which is created, which reductively pertains to the predicament of substance, because it is nothing else than the substance itself according as it is in becoming and as it were in an imperfect state. And this can be confirmed, for motion for this cause is not placed by Aristotle in any predicament, but is reduced to the predicament of its terminus, which is to be understood of motion precisely as it is a way to the terminus, because, as it is action or passion, it is placed in its predicaments, because as such it is compared by way of form to the agent or patient; yet, as a way, it is not properly compared to the terminus as form, but only as imperfect to perfect. Thus, then, passive creation, inasmuch as it is a way to a substantial terminus, is reduced to the predicament of substance; but it does not have the notion of passion, because it is not in a subject. Hence, inasmuch as that becoming is conceived as prior in nature to its terminus, it must be granted that it is not in a subject, but is conceived as it were in itself, which is not unfitting, indeed rather this is the singular excellence and mode of the dependence of the creature. But in the same instant of time in which it is made it is, through intimate conjunction and a certain identity, in the terminus itself, not as in a subject, but according to the special and proper relation by which the way regards the terminus; in which priority of nature on the part of the terminus is not required, because it does not require true causality, but mere termination. As heating is both in the thing which is heated and in the heat which is made, in the former as in a subject of inherence, which it supposes, but in the latter as in the formal terminus to which it tends, and therefore does not suppose it but brings it with itself and is identified with it. Thus, then, in the dependence of the creature, the order to a subject, which it does not have, being taken away, there remains the relation to the terminus, in which it is not as in a subject, but by another special and proper reason, as a certain mode of it. For this is common to many other modes, that they have a proper notion of affecting, as is established of the mode of union and of the mode of subsistence, as we shall see below.

28. Hence it can consequently be said that that creative dependence, as it has the notion of action, is not an accidental action, such as that which needs a subject, but is a substantial action, and therefore is not placed in the predicament of action, but is reduced to the predicament of substance. Or it can also be added that in the predicaments of accidents are placed not only those things which are true and proper accidents, having true inherence in a subject, but also many which imitate the mode of accidents in denomination and as it were extrinsic or intrinsic information, as habit, containing place, and similar things, and perhaps action as action universally so behaves; thus, then, in the present case it can be said that, although the dependence of creation in itself is a certain substantial mode, yet through relation to the agent it puts on the mode of an accident, and this is enough for it to be placed in the predicament of action. Which reply is probable, but the former seems truer, as I said in tome III of the III Part, disp. L, sect. 5. From which reply has also been made to the third argument of the same first opinion.

29. Every transient action is God's.—To the fourth it is answered that the antecedent is false, namely, that there is no transient action with respect to God; rather every transient action is the action of God Himself; for if it is from a creature, it is from God through general concurrence, so that one indivisible action is the same of the creature and of God. From which it comes about that not only is every transient action of a created agent also transient with respect to the uncreated, because it flows outside both, but also every immanent action of a created agent is transient with respect to God, because, as it is from God, it flows outside Him. Nor can it be said that these actions are not compared to God as actions but as effects, both because this is said gratuitously, since the relation to both agents is of the same mode, and also because that action tends to a further terminus, hence from both agents it is as a certain flowing to the terminus, and this is to be action. Finally, because there is no action to an action. And by the same reasons it is concluded a fortiori that, when God acts by Himself alone from a presupposed subject, transient action of God intervenes there; for who would believe that the heating or illumination made by fire or the sun is action, but not that made by God alone? or that this has anything less in reality than that? or, if it has nothing less in reality, that it is not equally true action?

30. God, when He acts, always acts by means of action.—To the first proof of that antecedent, then, it is answered that from the intimate presence of God it is only concluded that God acts in all things by immediacy of power and of supposit, but not without a mediating action; for this does not intervene on account of the distance of the agent, but because it is His formal causality, which must always be in the effect. To the second it is answered by granting the sequel; for the executive power of God is truly the principle of its effect and of its action; for it is of the notion of transient action that it really flow from its power; but St. Thomas, in the place cited, either speaks according to the first opinion, or speaks of the power of God with respect to the immanent act, which is also the cause of effects ad extra. To the third it has already been said how action as such is not a true complement of active power, or, if this is attributed by some in a broad way, yet that it is not of the notion of action as such.

31. To the foundations of the second opinion, so far as they persuade that dependence is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from the terminus, it must be said, first, that this, taken universally of every action and its terminus, is false, as was touched upon above in explaining the causality of the efficient cause, and will also be said below in treating of the predicament of action. Next, it is denied that as to this there is a special reason in creation, and that dependence is less distinguished from the terminus in it than in other actions, as has been sufficiently proved above, and it has been declared how it is no obstacle to this distinction that creation is production from nothing. Nor does a process to infinity follow, for the same could be inferred in any action; for any action in its way is an effect of the agent from which it flows, yet it is not made or does not flow through another action, because it does not flow as an effect, but as the very flowing and dependence. So, then, creation can broadly be called a creature, inasmuch as it too is made by God from nothing; yet it is not a creature simply, as a thing made and terminus of the effecting of God, but as the very dependence and effecting, and therefore for it another creation is not necessary, because its essential notion is that it be dependence, and therefore for it another dependence is not necessary. Which reply is also taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 2. And hence it is that, although the creature can change its dependence on this or that agent, yet in the dependence itself the relation to this or that agent cannot be changed unless the dependence is changed, because through itself and not through another dependence it says intrinsic relation to such agent.

32. Hence, to the third part of those arguments, it is answered that the creature can be understood in two ways to be a being essentially depending on God; in one way, that the actual dependence itself is of the essence of the creature; and so it is not true except of the actual dependence itself alone, which it is established is its own modal essence. But it is not of the essence of that creature whose mode and dependence it is, since it has been shown to be something separable from it; and in this sense that whole argument proceeds, which therefore concludes nothing. In another way, then, the creature is to be understood to be a being essentially depending on God, because namely it is a being of such nature and essence that it cannot exist without some dependence on God. And this sense is most true, and is excellently proved from the nature of participated being. But thence it does not come about that the actual dependence itself is of the essence, but only that that condition or imperfection on account of which such nature needs dependence is essential. Which is evident, because, although it is of the essence of the creature that it depend on God, it is not so that it depend on God alone, or (what is the same) that it depend through a dependence saying relation to God alone, although it can also sufficiently depend through such dependence; therefore it does not essentially determine for itself a certain dependence, but only the condition or need of dependence.

33. Some inferences of the second opinion are reproved.—And hence it is established, first, that the first inference of that opinion is false, for the thing which is properly created does not determine for itself some determinate dependence wholly immutable and inseparable, as we have proved. Secondly, it is established that the second and third inferences of that opinion are also false, because even dependence on God alone is not essential or wholly immutable in every created thing. Otherwise all things, and forms, and accidents, would depend on God now and always through some essential and immutable dependence regarding God alone, because of themselves they are apt so to depend, and this could be enough for their existence, and finally because they are true creatures producible from nothing. From which it further follows, first, that in every production of forms true creation is mixed in, against what was proved above and what St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 45, a. 8. It follows, secondly, that created agents either do nothing or act an act, or at least do not attain by effecting the forms themselves, either substantial or accidental, but at most their modes or unions, and that God alone creates all forms. Hence it further follows, thirdly, that there is no natural reason why other forms should cease to be by separation from a subject rather than the rational soul; all which are against true philosophy and sound doctrine, as I treated more at length in tome III of the III Part, disp. IX, sect. 1, towards the end.

34. And from what has been said here and there it is sufficiently established that the fourth inference of that opinion too is false; for that reason which from essential and immutable dependence infers that there cannot be an instrument of creation relies on a false foundation; indeed it openly begs the question, for it supposes that it is of the notion of creation that it be dependence on God alone, which was to be proved. Add that the authors of that opinion are compelled to posit in generable things two dependences at once, one essential on God alone and another as it were accidental (yet connatural) on created causes; therefore, although ingenerable things have essential dependence on God and do not have connatural dependence on a created agent, God could nevertheless supernaturally bring it about that they be made by a created agent through an as it were accidental and preternatural dependence. For thus grace, although it has the said essential dependence, according to that opinion, and does not have another connatural dependence, is nevertheless made supernaturally through the sacraments; therefore so it could be said of an angel, so far as concerns the force of that reason; but that second dependence would be true creation, because it would be action, unless such angel is said to be made from itself, which is improbable; that reason, therefore, is in many ways inefficacious and has a false foundation.