Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There is no natural instrument of creation.—It is not my intention to treat this matter ex professo and theologically, but only to touch on it briefly, so far as can be concluded from the discourses made. For from what has been said it seems to be efficaciously concluded that a creature cannot be an instrumental principle of creating—such an instrument (I say) as by its nature is instituted and ordered to such action and has a natural instrumental power for it; for it is established from what was said above of the created acting cause that among the active powers connatural to created agents there are some instrumental and not principal, such as is the power of seed. In this sense, then, we say that it is rightly proved from what has been said that there cannot be a created power which of itself and by its nature is an instrumental power of creating. It is proved, because the instrumental power of a creature for physical and real actions is always accidental; but to an accidental power the mode of acting through creation cannot be connatural, even instrumentally. The major is established by induction in all proper instruments, which are called instruments not only on account of relation or denomination to some prior agent, but properly on account of the intrinsic mode of acting and the insufficiency of the power for the effect. And moreover it is specially proved in the present case, because, if such instrument were not an accident, it would be some substance. Of whom, then, would it be the instrument in creation? Not of itself, as is established; nor yet of another created substance, because there is none which is a principal agent for creating, and an instrument is named from the side of the principal agent; nor finally of God, because on the part of God an instrument is not necessary for any creation, as is established per se; nor indeed on the part of the substance itself can any be thought of which by its nature demands to be instituted for this end, that it be an instrument of creation, since that end is very extrinsic and very accidental to the creations of things. Indeed, since a substance is a being per se, it is never the end connatural to any substance that it be an instrument for some action, unless such substance is in some way partial and is compared to that whose instrument it is as part to whole; and then too it behaves rather as bearing the instrumental power than as an instrument through its own substance.

2. But that an accidental power cannot be a natural instrument of creation can be proved by almost the same reason which was made of the principal power. For the connatural mode of acting must be proportioned to the mode of being of the form, whether it acts as principal or as instrumental power, because in both ways the action follows upon the natural being of the form; but the mode of being with independence from a subject cannot be connatural to an accident; therefore neither can the mode of acting from no subject be connatural; therefore an accident cannot be a power by its nature instituted to operate so, even by way of instrument. And the reason by which St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 5, proves that a creature cannot be an instrument of creation confirms this well, namely, because a creature cannot be an instrument except inasmuch as through something proper to itself it operates dispositively towards the effect of the principal agent.

3. Wherefore, if St. Thomas in that article spoke only in this sense, namely, of an instrument by its nature instituted for this action and having connatural instrumental power for creating, there would be no difficulty either in his conclusion or in his reason. For what can be objected against that reason, that the action of the instrument is often not other than the action of the principal agent, and that then the instrument does not operate dispositively towards the effect of the principal agent, but effects it immediately, as many think of the phantasm with respect to the intelligible species—this (I say) has a fitting solution and interpretation of that principle. For the natural instrument always operates towards the effect of the principal agent according to something proper to itself which in the effect proportionally corresponds to it; but it is said to operate dispositively not always with complete strictness and propriety, that is, by inducing a previous disposition really distinct from the effect of the principal agent, but either in this way or because the instrument, according to that which is proper to it, determines the action of the principal agent, which determination can be reduced to the genus of material or dispositive cause, in which way the phantasm determines the action of the agent intellect to producing such a species. But in neither of these ways can a creature by natural power concur to creation as an instrument. Not indeed by introducing a previous disposition, because such action always supposes a subject which is to be disposed, which is repugnant to creation. Nor yet by determining, through something proper to itself, the action of the principal agent, because every created form, according to its proper and connatural mode of acting, has no proportion with action from nothing, and therefore cannot, according to something proper to itself, determine an action of this kind by concurring to it.

4. Which reason so expounded can be accommodated also to secondary principal causes, which in that sense can be said to operate dispositively towards the effects of the first cause, inasmuch as by their proper powers they determine its action. Yet in them this reason by itself alone will not suffice unless it is supposed proved from elsewhere that the powers of secondary causes cannot by their nature be sufficient or proportioned in their genus to producing an effect from nothing, because thence alone it can be proved that they cannot determine the concurrence of the first cause to such action. Rather, that reason, applied to proper instruments and understood in the said way, supposes it proved that created power cannot be a principal principle of creating. For it is founded most of all on this, that the instrument, as regards that which it operates dispositively or (so to speak) determinatively through that which is proper to it, behaves as if it were a principal power as regards operating according to the mode connatural and proportioned to such nature.

5. Add moreover that, if we look only at the discourse of St. Thomas in that article, it does not seem able to proceed in another sense except of the connatural instrument. For that principle, the instrument through something proper to itself operates dispositively towards the effect of the principal agent, is not necessary or true in another sense, the more common doctrine being supposed about divine instruments supernaturally elevated to the works of justification, transubstantiation and the like; for those instruments operate nothing through their own power towards the effect of the principal agent, as was treated at length in tomes I and III of the III Part. And the proof of that principle which St. Thomas at once adds sufficiently confirms this sense, saying: If, therefore, it (supply: the instrument) did nothing there according to that which is proper to it, it would be employed in vain for acting. Nor would it be necessary that there be determinate instruments of determinate actions. For this reason is excellent in the instruments of nature, which are per se ordered, determinate and necessary to their effects. But in divine instruments that proof has no force, because it is most true that divine instruments are not determinate but indifferent and as it were universal through obediential potency; they are determined, however, to determinate actions through the divine will and elevation or most special concurrence. Wherefore such instruments are indeed not necessary, for without them God can equally make the same effects; yet they will not on that account be said to be in vain, because, both when they are elevated and assumed, they truly act, and they are not elevated to act without an end and reasonable cause.

6. The Master of the Sentences did not assert a natural instrument of creation.—But although the reason and discourse does not seem to conclude more, yet all the disciples and interpreters of St. Thomas understand his opinion more generally, namely, that a creature, even as an instrument elevated by divine power, cannot concur to creation. And certainly St. Thomas, when he there attacks the opinion of the Master, sufficiently signifies this. For the Master had not said that a creature can be a natural instrument of creation, but through divine ministry; for he was treating of the sacraments inasmuch as they are divine instruments, as is evident in IV, dist. 5. Hence the same St. Thomas, III, q. 13, a. 2, expressly distinguishing between the power of nature and the instrument of grace, denies that a creature can be an instrument of creation or annihilation; the same in II Cont. Gent., c. 21; and in the same opinion are all the theologians who attack the opinion of the Master, as Albert, Scotus, Henry and Giles, in the places cited in the preceding section. Nevertheless this controversy, so far as it concerns the supernatural instrument, is to be examined in theology; for I think it cannot be defined from the proper principles of creation.

7. For if it were true that a creature either can in no way be elevated by divine power to act something by true physical action which exceeds its natural potency and power, or only through some power received in it which has connatural force for such effect—which many theologians opine, and not improbably,—if this (I say) is true, it is quite consistently and very well said that a creature cannot be elevated to be an instrument of creation; but if God can elevate a creature so that through its very entity, without another superadded thing, it effects an effect exceeding its natural power—which I judge far more probable (for so I think He elevates water to effect grace, and fire to torment spirits, and words to transubstantiate)—if this (I say) is true, I do not see by what reason the consequence can be denied, that God can use one creature as an instrument to create others. Because neither is a sufficient reason of difference assigned nor is any special reason brought by which this is proved impossible.

8. The former part is evident, for the only difference seems to be that creation is not an action from a subject, as the other actions are. But this difference in the first place is not universal; for transubstantiation too is not an action from a subject¹, as St. Thomas teaches, III, q. 75, a. 8. But that in transubstantiation something is supposed as remote matter and as terminus a quo, or under another similar relation, certainly matters nothing for it to be less repugnant that a created instrument concur to that action than to creation. Next, from that difference what is to be proved is not proved, but assumed. For from the fact that creation is an action without a subject it is excellently inferred that it cannot be connatural to a creature either as principal power or as instrument; yet, this notwithstanding, from the proportional reason to other divine instruments we contend that this action can be communicated to a created instrument through elevation. For the action converting a whole substance into a whole substance too cannot be connatural to a creature either as principal cause or as instrument; similarly action on a spirit, especially because in it a supernatural quality is made, cannot be connatural to a body; and yet both are communicated by divine power through elevation; therefore the same holds of the other action.

9. The drawbacks inferred by some against an instrument of creation are repelled.—The other part, however, will easily be established by applying the reasons made about principal power and about the connatural instrument, and by considering that they do not proceed in an instrument through elevation. For what some say follows, namely, that such an instrument has infinite power and perfection, by no means follows; for the action of this instrument is not measured from its perfection but from the perfection of the first agent and the obediential potency of the instrument. Hence in this order of instruments a more perfect thing is not necessary for a more perfect effect or action. Nor can that gradation be made here, that for producing a thing from greater potency greater power is required; for with the same instrument God can educe a form from a subject however resisting. Finally, the same reason could be made of the instrument of transubstantiation; for to transubstantiate too by proper or connatural power infinite perfection is required.

10. Again, what others say follows does not press, that something could be assumed as an instrument for creating itself. First, we deny that this follows in strictness and propriety; for in order that something be a physical instrument it must necessarily be supposed existing, and therefore its creation is supposed, to which it itself could not be an instrument. That reason would have some force, however, against those who say that a non-existing thing can be a physical instrument; but we judge that opinion improbable. Wherefore, although by virtue of creation it is not repugnant that any creature whatever be made through a created instrument, yet from the condition presupposed and prerequired for acting it is repugnant that the same thing be the instrument of its own first creation. Which is evident by arguing in a similar form about the instrument of generation or eduction; for no one will deny that God can use grace existing in Peter to produce grace in Paul; he will deny, however, that He can use it to produce itself, not on account of a repugnance of such instrumental action taken per se, but on account of the aforesaid presupposition of existence for acting. Wherefore, if it is true that the same thing can be produced twice, or by two total actions truly and properly terminated at its being, there is no drawback in granting that the same thing already created can concur effectively to its own re-creation, as the humanity of Christ concurs effectively to the transubstantiation of bread into itself; of which elsewhere. Finally, proceeding in the same way through the reasons made above, it will easily be established that they have no place in this genus of concurrence or effecting through obediential potency.

11. Whether there is some action so proper to God that it can be communicated to no creature.—Some, however, reckon it a great drawback that there should be no action ad extra which God cannot communicate to creatures; for if there were any, it would most of all be creation. But I think neither the consequence necessary nor the consequent, rightly understood, a drawback. For someone could say that that action by which the hypostatic union is made is higher and more incommunicable to a creature; and likewise that in the treasuries of the divine power there are other modes of actions which by other titles surpass creation; for although creation is the first of all and as it were the foundation of the others, it is not yet the greatest of all. Again, it is one thing to speak of actions, another of the things which are made through actions; speaking, then, of things made, there is no drawback that God can do through a creature, as through an instrument, whatever He can make by His power alone; rather this pertains to the efficacy of the divine power, just as conversely it also pertains to the same efficacy that God can make no thing through a creature which He cannot make by Himself alone. But speaking of actions, many are so proper to God that they cannot be from a creature, as is the very action of creating by principal power alone. This, however, is not proper to God; for even the action of the creature, as such, cannot take place without that creature nor through another creature. The reason of which we shall explain in the following section, where we shall also touch upon another reason on account of which others say that an instrument of creation is impossible, and we shall show it to be inefficacious.