Disputationes metaphysicae

1. A creature never created anything.—There were not lacking philosophers who said, not only of the possible but also of the fact, that the power of creating was communicated to creatures, and that a superior angel created the inferior one next to it, and the lowest created corporeal things. Which Avicenna opined, whose opinion we touched upon above in treating of the eduction of forms, and it will occur again below in treating of the active power of the created intelligences. The true and certain doctrine, however, teaches that in fact no creature has created anything; for the true faith acknowledges God alone as creator of all things, and all the Saints teach it, especially St. Augustine, XII De Civit., c. 24; Tertullian, book On the Prescription of Heretics; Damascene, bk. II, c. 3; and Cyril of Alexandria, bk. II Against Julian, near the end. And finally it has been defined in the chapter Firmiter, On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith.

2. But from this certain principle it is gathered with almost the same certainty that no creature in fact has the power of creating, because it is not likely that God gave this power to some creature and did not grant or permit its use; for it pertains to the providence of God to let creatures operate their proper motions or actions, and because otherwise such power would be in vain in the nature of things. Likewise, because what has never been made by any natural cause is deservedly reckoned impossible through natural causes. And so both the Fathers and all the theologians deny in the same way and with the same certainty that a creature has natural power of creating as they deny that one creature has created another.

3. But although these things are certain to us from revelation, we inquire (which is proper to the present task) whether they can be persuaded and convinced by natural reason, which we think depends wholly on the proposed question; for, if we prove that the power of creating, on account of the infinite perfection which it requires, is incommunicable to a creature, there will remain demonstrated that which faith teaches of the fact; but if the power of creating does not essentially include that infinity, and therefore is not repugnant to being communicated to a creature, it cannot be proved by reason that both the power and its act have not in fact been communicated; for it will depend on the free will of God, whose decree, if it is not manifested by effects, can become known to us by revelation alone.

The reason for doubting is posited and the sense of the question is opened

4. The reason for the difficulty in the present question, then, is that no sufficient reason, let alone a demonstration, has so far been found which persuades that simply infinite power is required for creating. I speak, however, of principal power, which by its own force can produce an effect; for of instrumental power we do not wish to dispute ex professo, because it is a merely theological matter. But the principal power of creating can be understood in various ways: first, as being in that order universal or adequate to the creatable object; and of this it is most evident that it cannot be communicated to a creature; nor has this (so far as I know) been called into doubt by any author. And the reason is clear, because such power has an object infinitely perfect syncategorematically; for in that latitude of the object none can be designated of so great perfection that another of greater perfection cannot be created, and so to infinity; therefore in the power which by its force contains that whole object simply infinite power and perfection is required, because neither can an actually finite one suffice—otherwise it could be equalled and surpassed by some part of its object—nor can that power be syncategorematically infinite, because it has its whole power and perfection existing at once and actually. Nor will it be enough that it be infinite in a qualified sense or in some order of beings; for in the first place such an infinite is simply and actually finite, and moreover the latitude of the object is not enclosed under some genus or order of things, but absolutely embraces the whole latitude of creatable being; therefore the power which contains and surpasses all that cannot be infinite only in a qualified sense, but simply and in the whole latitude of being.

5. A second reason can be applied, because it is impossible that any productive power enclose itself under its adequate object, because it is impossible that something be able to create itself; but every creature is contained under creatable being, as is known per se; therefore it cannot have as the adequate object of its power creatable being as such; otherwise it would enclose itself under its object. And for this reason no generable thing can have such a power of generating as has for its adequate object generable being. Nor can any individual have a power whose adequate object is the species itself. By these reasons, then, it is sufficiently demonstrated that the power of creating in this way is infinite and proper to God and incommunicable to creatures.

6. In another way again the power of creating can be understood as one which has the force by itself alone and without dependence on or concurrence of another to produce something from nothing. And in this way too I think it can be sufficiently proved that such a power, not only as it extends to everything creatable, but also as determined to creating any being whatever, is infinite and incommunicable to a creature, of which matter we shall treat below, disp. XXII. For as to this the reason is the same of the power of creating and of any created faculty for acting from a presupposed subject, because none can be independent in acting from the first cause, and such independence requires infinite perfection, as we shall see there.

7. In a third way, then, the power of creating can be understood only by way of a proximate principal cause, dependent in acting on the first cause and limited to a certain order or species of things to be created, as for creating bodies, or these species of angels, or something similar. And of this power there does not appear a sufficient reason why it should require simply infinite perfection, or why it cannot be communicated to a creature, because neither on the part of the object does it have infinity, since it is posited limited to an object of finite perfection, nor from the mode of acting, since it is posited dependent on the concurrence of another.

8. Nor does what many say satisfy, that infinity is gathered from the mode of acting, not on account of the independence of the action from a superior acting cause, but on account of the independence of the action from a material cause; namely, because to reduce something from potency to act requires some power, and the more that potency is removed from act, the greater power is required in the agent; therefore what is so removed from act that it is contained in no passive potency requires infinite power in the agent in order that it can be made; this reason (I say) does not satisfy, first indeed, because the independence of action from a subject does not seem to be of so great moment, nor to indicate so great perfection, as to require in the agent simply infinite power; for why should it? For the concurrence of matter is something finite; why, then, cannot it be supplied by the power of an agent of a superior order and perfection, granted that it is not infinite? Next, because that gradation or proportional computation is not formal, both because at most it infers a power of acting of a superior order to every power defined to acting from passive potency, whether near or remote, or more or less removed from act; and also because that progression must be understood with respect to the same thing, and other things being equal; for it can happen that, to produce a more perfect form from near potency, greater perfection is required than to produce the lowest form from remote potency. Thus, then, to create the lowest thing, for example prime matter, a finite power could suffice, distinct however in species from every generative power.

9. And the difficulty is increased, for the principal power for acting can be attributed to a creature in two ways. First, as connatural and due, or flowing from the principles of nature, as is heat in fire, or as superadded or implanted in nature, as is the light of glory in the blessed. Although, then, we freely grant that the connatural power of created agents cannot extend to creation, on account of the said disproportion, yet of power superadded to nature that reason proves nothing, because that power can be supernatural, and so of a superior order, and therefore sufficient to overcome that disproportion. For so the theologians answer when a similar argument is made, namely, to see an intelligible object mixed of act and potency, an intellectual light of some perfection is required, and the more such object has of act and the less of potency, the more perfect a light is required to see it; therefore, if the object is pure act having no potency, an infinite light is required; the theologians answer (I say) by denying the consequence and asserting that a light of a superior order suffices. Why, then, can we not answer in the same way about the power of creating?

Various opinions

10. On account of these and similar causes, then, some theologians say that it is shown by no sufficient reason that the power of creating is simply repugnant to a creature. So plainly thinks Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, a. 3. For although he simply teaches that a creature cannot create, yet, inquiring the reason of this thing, he answers that no other can be given except that this is the condition of the creature, which it received from God, whose order it cannot transgress. But that creatures received this condition of operating he says is established only by experience. But in the first place this experience is had at most in material agents and effects; but how did Gabriel experience that angels do nothing nor ever did anything except from a patient? How likewise did he experience that one man, while he generates another, does not attain the soul itself by effecting? Next, it seems to be founded only on the condition and order which the creature in fact received from God; either, then, he thinks that God could have granted another condition or mode of acting to the creature, or he does not sufficiently answer the question. Durandus holds the same opinion more clearly, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, who denies that infinite power is required for creating, and consequently denies that it is repugnant to a creature to effect something without change from a subject, and solves all the reasons which are commonly adduced to prove it.

11. Nevertheless the contrary opinion is the common one of the scholastics. The Master holds it, In IV, dist. 5, and St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 5, and often elsewhere, and all his followers; and Scotus, whom his own also follow, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1; Ockham, In II, q. 7, although he thinks it cannot be sufficiently demonstrated; the same, Quodl. II, q. 9; Henry, Quodl. IV, q. 37; and Giles, Quodl. V, q. 1.

Resolution of the question

12. And to me indeed the latter opinion seems true and certain; I think it most difficult, however, to bring a cogent demonstration to confirm it. A sign of which is that the authors who agree in the conclusion disagree greatly in giving the reason, and each attacks the reasons of the others. Wherefore with me the most efficacious reason is that which is taken from the principle of faith, and therefore I said that the assertion is certain to me rather than evident; for just as, from the fact that a creature never created anything, we rightly reason that no made creature has the power of creating, so, from the fact that no made creature has the power of creating, I think it is rightly gathered that no makeable creature is capable of this faculty. This consequence I prove, first, because, if such a creature were possible, it would surely constitute another order and grade of creature besides those which now exist, because it would have a distinct and higher mode of operating; therefore it would have pertained to the perfection of the universe that there be in it such an order or grade of creatures; therefore, conversely, since God has founded the universe without such a creature, it is a sign that it is not contained in the order of creatures nor is possible, and therefore does not pertain to the completion of the universe. Which reason we shall enrich below, disp. XXXVIII, when by a similar discourse we shall show that there are created intelligences in the universe.

13. Secondly the same reason is explained more fully, because among creatable substances there can be no higher grade than that of the angels or intellectual things; but among accidents, if we speak as philosophers, there are none better than those which are connatural to these supreme substances; but if we speak as theologians, there can be none better than those which pertain to the order of grace and the beatific vision; if, then, in these supreme orders of things the power of creating is not found, it is possible in no creature. For that in the grade of angels others more perfect in species could be made than are all those made is not enough for their having a mode of operating of so diverse an order and notion; and therefore Augustine, III De Trinit., c. 8, holds it as ascertained that, if angels both good and evil cannot create, no creature can.

The reason of Scotus is weighed

14. Thirdly, Scotus tried to give some reason for this induction or experience which we suppose, and from it to gather the cause on account of which no makeable creature can be a creator, whose discourse we can propose and amplify thus: every creature is either material or spiritual; but neither of these can create; therefore none. The consequence is evident, because those two members, which include immediate and contradictory opposition, embrace all possible creatures. But the minor, as to the former part about material creatures, is proved, because a material substance would create either through matter, or through form, or through accidents. Not through matter, because this is not active nor can it be; for it is repugnant intrinsically to its entity and imperfection, because essentially it is pure passive potency. Hence, since this reason is common to all creatable matter, it cannot happen that prime matter is a principle of creating. And this indeed seems known of itself and from the terms; for so great a perfection as creation indicates is plainly repugnant to so great an imperfection as prime matter displays.

15. Nor can a material form (for of this we are now treating) be the principle of creation. First indeed, because such as the mode of being is, such is the mode of acting; but this form has in its being connatural dependence on a subject; therefore also in every action of which it is the proper and connatural principle. Secondly, because such form is not producible in a connatural mode through proper creation, but either through eduction or through concreation with the whole composite; therefore neither can it itself be a principle of creating. The consequence is evident, because at most it can be a principle of producing a form like itself, and in a mode too proportioned to itself and connatural to the form to be produced. Which I declare thirdly thus; for such form would be a principle of creating either matter, or form, or the composite; not matter, because such form is posterior to matter and in the order of nature supposes it in order to be able to exist, and therefore also supposes it in order to be able to act. Especially because so imperfect a form cannot contain matter itself eminently, and therefore cannot procreate a thing so unlike itself. Nor can it create a form, because it cannot produce a spiritual form, since it cannot exceed its order; nor can it produce a material form except in a mode connatural to the form to be produced; for it cannot change the order connatural to things themselves; but such form, when it is not concreated with matter, is not makeable through creation but through eduction alone, because it is not capable of its proper being without dependence on matter.

16. Hence it also remains that such form cannot be a principle of creating the whole material substance, because this cannot be created except by him who can create matter. But that much less can it create a spiritual substance is supposed as evident, because it cannot transcend its order in acting. And by the same discourse it is easily concluded that a material substance cannot according to its whole self or per se primo be a principle of creating, both because, as has been said, matter cannot be a principle of acting, let alone of creating, and also because the whole composite cannot have the power of acting except from those parts of which it essentially consists; if, then, neither in matter nor in form can there be that power of creating or proportion to such action, neither can it be in the whole composite.

17. It remained to speak of the accidents of this substance, which was the third member proposed in that former part; but of accidents in general we shall say more at once; now we take this member as sufficiently proved from what has been said of the substantial form; for, if this cannot be a principle of creating on account of the natural dependence which it has on matter, much less can a material accident, which is both more dependent and less perfect, especially since we are now treating of the principal cause. And this discourse about material things seems to me indeed efficacious, and to proceed equally of made and possible substances; for it is founded on the proper nature and imperfection of material substance as such and on the connatural proportion between acting and being, which cannot be changed; for although God can act in a creature or through a creature something other than is connatural, yet He cannot make connatural to some creature that which is disproportioned to its nature.

18. I come to the other part proposed in the principal argument, about spiritual substance. Which Scotus proves in no other way than because a created spiritual substance can effect nothing except by means of an accident; but by means of an accident it cannot create anything; therefore no angel can have the power of creating. The major he proves from the fact that an angel can effect nothing except by means of acts of intellect and will; but these acts are accidents, nor can an angel be made in whom such acts are substance and not accident, as he proves at length there and we now admit, whatever may be the efficacy of his reasons as to this part, of which we shall speak below in disputing about the created intelligences. The minor, however, is proved by Scotus because an accident could only be required for creating either as the action itself which is terminated at the created thing—and this cannot be said in the present case, because an action of this kind is in the terminus itself, as we shall see below; hence such action cannot be an intellection or volition of the angel—or the accident could be required as the principle of such action; but that this cannot be he proves only from the general principle that an accident cannot be the principle of producing a substance. Which indeed all admit of the principal principle, and in this sense it seems sufficient for the present intention; for, as we said, we treat only of the principal principle.

19. Nevertheless Scotus himself extends that proposition also to the instrumental principle, in which sense it is not universally true, as we saw above; but whether by a peculiar reason it is true of the instrument of creation I shall say below. This discourse of Scotus supposes, however, as to this last part, that, if a creature could create, it would have to create substance; which it deservedly supposes, because, as we said above, nothing can be created except a subsistent thing or one by way of subsistent; but a creature cannot create an accident by way of subsistent or separated from a subject, because such a mode of being cannot be connatural to an accident; but a creature cannot have power for producing a thing in a preternatural mode or without the other causes on which by its nature it necessarily depends. Add that an accident inhering in a substance, and unable by its nature to exist otherwise, cannot by its nature be a principle of creating an accident per se separated, because such a mode of acting surpasses the mode of being connatural to such accident.

20. In what the discourse of Scotus fails.—There is one thing only, then, in which this discourse of Scotus seems deficient, namely, that dilemma that an accident could only be required for creating either as action or as principle of action; for besides these there could be a third member, namely, that an accidental act be prerequired to apply or direct the proximate power of acting; for in this way intellection and volition are also required for the works of art and for moving locally. Someone could say, then, that one angel can create another proximately and immediately through its substance as through the principle of acting; yet, in order that that principle act in a free and intellectual mode, an act of the will is required as applying that principle or executing power to operating, and an act of the intellect as directing, and in this way it is not unfitting that an accidental act be required for the creation of a substance. For thus in animals the power of generating is applied to operating through appetite, and in man through the will; and the intellect, although it is a more perfect power than the will, is subordinated to it as to exercise or application to act. Thus, then, the power of creating, even if it were substantial and more perfect, could be subordinated to the will and be applied to its action through the will's accidental act.

21. What must be added to the discourse of Scotus.—For this cause, then, I do not think this proof wholly efficacious as to spiritual and intellectual creatures. There can, however, be applied here the conjectures by which we shall prove below that angels cannot at the nod of their will transmute matter to form; for, if this is true, with much greater reason they will not be able to make anything from nothing; but of those reasons we shall speak below. Moreover, it is certain that no finite intelligence can create another more perfect than itself; for this is above the power of a principal cause. Nor is there any reason why it should be able to create material substances, because it does not contain them eminently, since it is limited to a definite species and has no proportion with corporeal things; but to other spiritual substances it is so compared that within the same grade they are co-distinguished as perfect species, as the species or genera of animal are distinguished. Hence, just as, per se speaking, one animal cannot generate another of a diverse species, even less perfect, so neither could one angel create a lower one; it only remains to be proved, then, that neither can it create one like itself in species. The reason of which would easily be given if it were true that intelligences cannot be multiplied in number within the same species. But because that opinion is not true, it can therefore be said that at least the multiplication of individuals is not per se intended by nature, but only for the sake of conserving the species, and therefore that it is not connatural to incorruptible individuals to have proper power of producing things like themselves in species. Finally, accommodating the discourse of Scotus, a conjecture can be added, because created intellectual substances, in the operations most proper to them, such as are those of intellect and will, can effect nothing except from a presupposed subject; therefore it is likely that they cannot have natural power for effecting a wholly substantial action independent of a subject.

22. Ockham adduces another reason, the said q. 7, namely, because every creature acts either naturally or freely; but in neither way can it have the power of creating; therefore. The minor, as to the former part, is proved because such a cause acting naturally would create at once whatever it could, because it would not depend on the disposition or capacity of a patient; it would create, therefore, infinite things, either in species or in individual, because no finite number can be assigned which it could cause. The other part, about a free cause, is proved because, although it would not necessarily create all those things, yet at least it could will, and consequently could create, all those at once, which is a drawback. But this reason is less efficacious than the preceding; for neither member is sufficiently attacked; for although such a cause acted naturally, it would yet depend in acting on the divine concurrence, and by the same could be determined to acting finite things, and these rather than those; as now a natural agent applied to a patient is of itself indifferent to producing this or that individual form out of infinite ones, but is determined through the concurrence of God. But Ockham says it is a drawback that such a creature be suspended from its action if it can produce infinite things. But this same argument can be made thus of the divine power; therefore that drawback is none, because infinite things are not producible actually all at once. And by the same reason the proof of the other part is attacked, because it can be applied to the divine will too; such a creature, therefore, could not will to create infinite things at once, because the object would be impossible, or, if it willed it, it would will vainly and inefficaciously; it could therefore only at its choice create these or those out of infinite ones. The argument rightly concludes, however, that such a creature could, within the same species or the same genus, create syncategorematically infinite things, that is, not so many that not more, at least successively, which Ockham too thinks a drawback, but it is none; for the sun too can so generate more and more to infinity successively, although those which it can make or conserve at once in any instant are not only finite but also in some determinate number and quantity, because finite power at least requires a terminus of this kind. Nevertheless this same could be said of the power of a creature for creating, if it were once posited.

The first reason of St. Thomas why infinite power is required for creating is weighed

23. Omitting, then, the reasons which either proceed in particular of this or that creature or through very extrinsic middle terms, St. Thomas tried from the proper object and mode of creation to bring two general reasons on account of which universally all creation is repugnant to every possible creature; the former he has in I, q. 45, a. 5, in the body; which can be formed thus: the effect or terminus of creation is proper to the most universal cause, so that it cannot belong to another; therefore both creation and the power of creating are so proper to the first cause that they cannot be communicated to another. The consequence is clear, because the action and power can only be of him whose effect it can be. The antecedent, however, is proved, because being as such is the proper effect of the most universal cause; but the proper terminus or effect of creation too is being itself as such; therefore the proper terminus of creation can be the effect of the first cause alone. The major is evident, because more universal effects are to be referred to more universal causes; therefore also the most universal effect to the most universal cause; but being is the most universal effect; therefore. The minor, however, is proved, because through creation being is produced inasmuch as it is being; therefore through it being as such is communicated according to its absolute notion, according to which it is the most universal effect and proper to the first cause. Scotus attacks this reason in the place cited, and other Scotists, In II, dist. 1; and Cajetan defends it at length, I, in the place cited, and Ferrariensis, II Cont. Gent., c. 21, and Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 3. And indeed some of the objections of Scotus have a true and easy solution.

24. How being is said to be the proper effect of God.—For he attacks, first, that proposition of St. Thomas that being is the proper effect of God, as if the sense were that God alone effects being itself in any creature, and secondary causes do not concur actively to effecting the being of existence. But this sense is without doubt false, as I shall show below in disputing about the existence of the creature, and is not intended by St. Thomas, but he only calls being the proper effect of God formally and per se primo, either because God alone can make being from wholly non-being, or because He alone can make in any thing all that is required for its being. And these senses are true, yet they do not serve for the present matter, because the question would be begged, since this very thing is to be proved. Another sense, then, will be that God alone regards makeable being as the adequate object of His power; and in this sense too the proposition is true, as is established per se and from what was said at the beginning of this section, and the arguments of Scotus do not proceed against it. But how it serves the present reason will be evident from what is to be said.

25. A more universal effect is to be reduced to a more universal cause.—From which it is also easily established what sense the other proposition gives, that a more universal effect is reduced to a more universal cause, which Scotus also attacks, because either the discourse is of universality of perfection, both of the cause and of the effect, and so, although the general proposition would be true, it is false that being is the most universal effect, because it is not the most perfect but rather the most imperfect of all, since it is the most common; or the discourse is of universality of predication, and so neither would the proposition be to the point nor the subsumption true, because God is not in this way the most universal cause. But this has an easy answer, because the discourse is of universality proportioned to the effect and the cause. Hence on the part of the cause the discourse is of universality in causing; but on the part of the effect the discourse is of the effect universal in multitude, and consequently of an adequate objective notion more universal in predicating. And in this way it is most true that the more universal or more common effect, that is, the notion of being or of such being, the more universal it is, the more it is regarded by a more universal cause as the objective notion per se primo and adequate to its power. And the reason is clear, because, although the universal cause is in itself simple, yet it is called universal through order to the many things which it contains eminently and can effect; therefore, the more universal it is, the more things it will contain and be able to effect; therefore the more universal in predicating will be the objective notion which it has, that is, containing more things under it; therefore also, conversely, the more universal an effect is in this way, the more it is to be reduced to a more universal cause, if it is said to correspond adequately and per se primo. Nor does it stand against this that notions more universal in predicating are less perfect; for although this is true considering those notions according to the precision of the mind, yet not as they include all the inferiors; but in this way being and other similar notions are said to be adequate to some active power; for it does not attain that precise notion, but the whole which is contained under it; and in this way creatable being is said to be the adequate object of the divine power, all which things are sufficiently manifest. Others answer that being as such, even taken in general for the being of existence, is the greatest perfection of all. But of the sense of this expression we shall speak below in the aforesaid disputation, for now it is not necessary.

26. In what the difficulty of the reason of St. Thomas lies.—The greater difficulty is certainly in the application of these general principles to concluding the intended proposition, because from them at most two things seem able to be inferred, which we said above are certain. One is that a creature cannot create independently of the first cause. But that it cannot do so with the concurrence of the first cause does not seem at all to be inferred. For to give being is not proper to the first cause except with the aforesaid independence. Hence in the book On Causes it is said (which St. Thomas also adduces): The second cause does not give being except in the power of the first and inasmuch as it participates the operation of the first, which is true for no other reason except because the secondary cause can act only through power received from the first and dependent in its action on the actual operation of God; therefore in this way a creature can communicate being, even through creation, so far as concerns the force of that principle. Again, from those principles it is excellently concluded that a power of creating which has as its adequate object creatable being, or being itself as it includes the whole latitude of participable being, is not communicable to a creature. Hence, however, it cannot be concluded that every participation of that universal creative power, limited and determined to some genus or species, or certainly to some individuals of creatable things, is incommunicable to a creature; for neither does a power of this kind so determined involve repugnance in its very terms nor can it be shown impossible from those principles. The first is evident, because the creation of a lion, for example, is distinct in species from the creation of a man; therefore from the terms it is not repugnant that there be a created power commensurate with the creation of such species and not with creation according to its whole latitude, as is manifest in the generative or eductive power from the potency of matter, which, as it extends to every possible generable thing, is proper to God alone, especially with independence; but limited to a certain species of generation it can be communicated to a creature with dependence on the first cause. The second is evident, because such a created power, even if it is for creating, will not have as its object the most universal effect, but a determinate and particular one. Hence what St. Thomas subsumes, namely, that through creation being is produced absolutely, not inasmuch as it is this or such, is indeed true of creation in general, but not of this creation in species; for through this in truth being is produced inasmuch as it is such, namely of man or of angel, and therefore it is not necessary that the power which regards adequately not creation as such but such creation be the most universal power; therefore it is not necessary that it be proper to the first cause.

27. The first unravelling of the difficulty.—To this difficulty it can be answered, first, by granting that nothing more is proved by that discourse, and that this is not against the authority of St. Thomas, because he does not seem to have wished to conclude more by such discourse. Which is evident, for immediately after that reason he reports the opinion of those saying that a creature can create through power received from God, and although St. Thomas there calls this creating instrumentally, yet in truth he seems to take that instrumentally only broadly, as secondary principal causes too are called instruments of the first cause. Which can be proved, for in this way he at once reports the opinion of Avicenna saying that one intelligence created another; but Avicenna did not posit that an intelligence creates as an instrument strictly taken, but as a secondary principal cause. In this reply, however, two drawbacks remain; one, that the reason is not defended nor does the conclusion remain proved. The other, pertaining to the mind of St. Thomas, that the reason by which he at once proves that a creature cannot be the instrument of creation proceeds also of a secondary principal cause, which however is difficult, as we shall declare below in touching that reason.

28. The second.—Secondly, then, we can answer that the efficacy of that reason consists in this, that from the formal object and mode of creation it elicits that there cannot be a power of creating which of itself does not regard as its adequate object being according to the whole latitude of participable being (for being of this kind is to be understood whenever in this matter being inasmuch as being is said, unless that inasmuch is taken specificatively, as I said). But St. Thomas seems to place the force of that inference in that proposition: To produce being absolutely, not inasmuch as it is this or such, pertains to the notion of creation. And the deduction can be formed thus: through every creation being is made per se primo, not only inasmuch as it is such being, but also inasmuch as it is being; therefore every power from which such action is regards as its formal and adequate object being itself, not only inasmuch as it is such being, but absolutely inasmuch as it is being; therefore such power must necessarily be universal and embracing every participable being. The consequence is clear, because every power embraces all things which are comprehended under its adequate and formal object. The major too is established from the doctrine of the Philosopher, I Phys., touched upon above, which Cajetan also declares well, I, q. 44, a. 2. For an effect is said to be made per se primo according to that notion which did not precede on the part of the effect; for, if it preceded, it will now be said to be made not per se but per accidens; for when fire is generated from air, body is not made per se nor element, but fire is made per se. Thus, then, in every creation being or existence is made per se, not only as such, but simply as being, because no notion of being or existence is supposed to creation, since it is from nothing.

29. The minor, however, is proved, because that notion according to which a power per se primo attains its effect seems to be the formal objective notion under which such power attains the same effect. Hence it comes about that a power is as universal and abstract in causing as is in its order that formal objective notion which it per se primo attains.

30. Another discourse of St. Thomas explaining the former is declared.—We can add, moreover, to confirm the same deduction, another discourse of the same St. Thomas in the same article, in the solution ad 1. Because whatever creates anything creates being absolutely, and not only by applying being, or the nature of being, to this being; therefore, so far as concerns itself, it can create any creatable being. The antecedent is explained, for it cannot happen that one who participates some nature produce it absolutely, but only by applying it to something; as Peter cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, otherwise he could be the cause of himself. Hence he can only be the cause that human nature be in Paul or Francis. But just as this man participates the nature of man, so any created being participates the nature of being; it cannot, therefore, produce the nature of being absolutely, but only by applying it to this being. Therefore, just as a man cannot through his action or production apply the nature of man to this except by presupposing something by which that determination of the common nature to this individual takes place, so universally a being by participation cannot communicate the nature of being except by presupposing something by which the nature of being is determined to this, which is repugnant to creation. Therefore, conversely, every power which can produce being absolutely, presupposing nothing, produces the nature of being absolutely, and not only by applying it to this; therefore every power which can so produce is a universal power; hence it cannot be a participated being, but being by essence.

31. Some objections against both discourses of St. Thomas adduced.—But still the mind does not rest, but finds several difficulties in both discourses. For in the former, that subsumed proposition in which the whole force of the argument lies, namely, every power per se attaining in some effect some notion of being is of itself universal for all things which are comprehended under such notion, does not seem universally true; for when wheat, for example, is generated, not only is wheat generated per se, but also a living thing, because the notion of living is not presupposed; for wheat or grass is generated from non-living earth, and yet, because it has the power of generating wheat, it does not on that account have the power of generating every living thing. The same holds when a horse generates a horse, not only from non-horse but also from non-animal, namely from seed; for then both horse and animal are generated per se, and yet that generative power does not regard the notion of animal as adequate, nor can it effect the generations of all animals. Moreover, otherwise it follows that God too could create Himself, because when some being is created, not only is the notion of creatable being made per se in it, but also the notion of most abstract being, because no notion of being is presupposed on the part of the effect; therefore, if the said consecution is universal, the adequate object of the creative power will be not only creatable being but absolutely and precisely being; therefore it will comprehend under itself absolutely every being, even God Himself. Nor can it be said that being as such abstracted is not created per se, because the notion of being is supposed at least in the creator; for this does not impede per se production, for fire per se generates fire, although the notion of fire is supposed in the generator, and therefore I said above that the notion which is made per se must not be supposed on the part of the effect, because on the part of the agent it does not stand in the way.

32. But if it is answered that this does not follow, because the power of creating does not attain that most abstract notion of being by reason¹ of it taken precisely as such, but inasmuch as it is included in the notion of creatable being—which we said above in dialectical terms is to attain it not reduplicatively but specificatively—it is indeed an excellent answer; yet by the same the whole force of the reason and discourse of St. Thomas is broken. For in the same way it will be said that through a power of creating communicated to a creature the notion of creatable being as such is not made per se, except inasmuch as it is included in the notion of such being, and so that such power too does not attain being inasmuch as being reduplicatively but specificatively, and therefore it is not rightly gathered that such power must be most universal and comprehend every creatable being. Hence, for the sake of clarity, we can distinguish between being made per se and being made per se primo, and assert that for the former it suffices that the thing, according to that notion by which it is said to be made per se, be not supposed on the part of the effect; but that the latter adds that the thing according to such notion be made as the proper and as it were formal terminus of the acting power, and not only as included in the formal terminus. Through creation, then, being inasmuch as creatable being is made per se; it cannot, however, be proved from the notion of creation that it is necessary that it be made per se primo according to that transcendental notion; for it can be created by some power per se primo inasmuch as it is such being. But although that proposition, which is the foundation of that discourse, is admitted of the effect per se primo, it cannot be admitted of every per se effect, as the arguments made conclude; it is not, therefore, sufficient for concluding what is intended.

33. Nor is the difficulty less, but perhaps greater, in the latter discourse; for that proposition, He who participates some nature cannot produce it absolutely, but by applying it to something or to this, is true in this sense, that he cannot produce it absolutely, that is, in all the things in which it exists; namely, if that nature is specific, he cannot produce it in all the individuals in which it is apt to exist; but if it is a generic nature or a transcendental notion, he cannot produce it in all the inferiors, due proportion being kept. And this sense that reason proves excellently, because otherwise such a thing could effect itself. According to this sense, however, either it is not true or at least it is assumed without proof that whatever creates creates being absolutely; for why could it not create some beings and not others, as we have argued so far? But that proposition can give another sense, which seems more intended in that discourse, namely, that he who participates some nature cannot produce that nature absolutely, that is, according to its whole self and according to every part of it, but only by presupposing some part of it and applying another to it, in which sense it is most truly said that whatever creates creates being absolutely; yet that proposition in that sense, whether true or false, is not proved in the aforesaid discourse; for although someone produced a nature like himself absolutely in the said sense, it does not follow that he could be the cause of himself; for he could produce such nature according to its whole self in one or another individual, yet not in all, or in one species (if the nature is generic) and not in all. And by parity of reasoning he could create some being absolutely in the said sense, that is, according to its whole entity, yet not every being.

34. Hence further, in a good sense it is true that he who participates some nature does not make it exist absolutely, but is the cause that it be in this individual or in this being; yet it is not rightly inferred thence that to the action through which such individual or such being is made some individuating principle is presupposed; for the whole thing with its whole individuating principle can be made through that action. For when the specific nature is said to be made in an individual or applied to an individual, it is not to be imagined that one thing which is made is applied to a pre-existing one, but it is only said to be applied because it is made in one individual and not in its abstraction. Hence also, when God created Adam, He did not create the whole human species absolutely, that is, abstract, but created it by applying it (according to that mode of speaking) to this individual, not indeed presupposing in it on its part the principle of individuation, but creating it together. Thus, then, although one angel created another like itself in nature, applying its specific nature to such individual, it would not be necessary that for its action it suppose some principle individuating the other angel, but that it produce it together; especially since this individuating principle in single natures is nothing else than the very entity of the nature, if it is simple, or the principles by which it is intrinsically constituted, if it is composite. And it is confirmed, because otherwise by the same discourse it would be proved that, one angel being supposed, God could not create another like it, because either by that action He would create such specific nature absolutely—and not this, because by that action He does not create the prior angel—or He produces it by applying the specific nature to this individual, and so a principle individuating would have to be supposed to such action. But if it is then said, as must truly be said, that that nature is applied to this individual by producing absolutely its whole entity from nothing, wholly the same would be said even if one angel created another like itself, either in species or in genus; for that a like nature is supposed in the agent itself in no way stands in the way of creation, as has already been said above.

35. Judgement on the aforesaid objections.—I confess that I do not know how to satisfy all these difficulties; for against the latter discourse they seem to me to conclude positively (so to speak) that that ratiocination is not apt; but against the former at least they show that it does not convince, because not all the principles which are assumed in it are sufficiently proved, although it is not established that they are false. And all are reduced to this, that every power of creating must necessarily be such as to extend to everything creatable. But this does not seem to be sufficiently convinced from what we have said so far, and precisely considering the terminus to which creation tends. It remains to be seen, however, whether, by conjoining the terminus a quo, and the special relation of these termini, and the mode of acting proportioned to them, this can be inferred more efficaciously.

36. The last reason by which St. Thomas proves the assertion.—There is, then, the last reason of the same St. Thomas, the said a. 5, ad 2, for the power of creating must necessarily be infinite; therefore it cannot be created; and in the same way it can be inferred that it necessarily extends to everything creatable; for a simply infinite power is also most universal, and its object must be infinite, as much as it can be in the notion of a makeable object. The antecedent is proved by St. Thomas because the power of a potency is measured not only from the thing made but also from the mode; but the mode of producing from nothing indicates infinite force in acting, for to produce something from remote potency great power is required, and from more remote greater; therefore to produce from no potency or from nothing infinite power is required. Albert has the same reason, In II, dist. 1, a. 7, and others.

37. Some found this reason on the fact that between being and nothing there is infinite distance.² But not rightly, as Scotus answers above, because no being is distant from nothing except according to those grades of entity which it has in itself. Hence St. Thomas too, In IV, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5, says that there is not infinite distance between being and non-being on the part of being itself except when the being is infinite, because one of opposites is as distant from the other as it participates of the remaining one. And therefore matter, because it is most imperfect, is said by Augustine to be near nothing; but the angel is said to be near God; and each being, the more perfect it is, the more it approaches God and the more it recedes from nothing. But nothing itself can in a certain way be said to be infinitely, or rather indefinitely or indeterminately, distant from being, because nothing can be more distant from being than nothing itself, or because it does not have one determinate distance, but can have greater and greater according to the various grades of being. But this does not matter for the present case, because through creation this whole distance of nothing is not transcended (so to speak) according to its whole latitude, but only according to those grades of entity which the being that is created receives.

38. Others, then, commonly found that consecution on the greatest disproportion which is between being and nothing. For to act from potency more removed from act greater power is required; therefore in whatever proportion the effect will be made from more remote potency, in the same greater power will be required; therefore where the removal of act from potency is without any proportion, there power greater without any proportion will be required; but this is none other than infinite; for every finite power preserves some proportion to another finite one. Which mode of arguing is frequent in Aristotle, as is established from IV and VIII Phys. From which Cajetan argues by a similar proportion, for if for producing something from nothing finite power sufficed, it would follow that equal power is required for producing something from some matter and from nothing; for let the creative power be finite as four, but the power producing from remote matter be as two; therefore the power necessary for producing from matter twice as remote will be at least as three; therefore for producing from further matter, also twice as remote, power as four will be necessary; therefore as much power is required for producing something from some matter as for creating.

39. Objections against the aforesaid reason.—Against this reason, however, Scotus and Durandus above object many things. But all tend to prove that between being and nothing there is either no distance or not infinite, which does not matter for the reason made; for we have already shown that it is not necessary to imagine that infinite distance, proper and positive, nor to take the argument from it, but from the disproportion, which indicates such a mode of operating as requires the highest efficacy in the agent. Nevertheless, that objection which we proposed above seems greatly to weaken this reason; for the argument excellently proves that creative power is from this head disproportionable to the power eductive from the potency of matter; but thence it is not rightly inferred that simply infinite power will be necessary, for it will suffice if it is of another order, which is also commonly called infinite in a qualified sense, which it is no drawback to admit. And this is enough for that power not to preserve proportion with respect to any power which can operate only through the eduction of form from the potency of matter; because proportion is preserved only between things which are of the same notion or quantity. And this is declared more from the very discourse; for when it is said that to produce something from more remote potency greater power is required, the discourse is of passive potency and of greater or less removal from act through defect of dispositions or on account of repugnant dispositions, and consequently the comparison is also made between active powers only through eduction from passive potency. But when it is inferred that to produce something from nothing greater power is required, that from nothing does not designate some passive potency most remote from act or very indisposed, but designates rather the lack of every passive potency; therefore it cannot be concluded that the power productive from nothing is greater or infinite by an increase (so to speak) of the eductive power, but only that a power so active, namely from nothing, is of another and superior order to every power only eductive, even if it be able to educe a form from any real potency however remote. And so that drawback does not follow, that the creative and eductive powers are equal, because they are disproportioned. Add that, if other things were not equal, but they were compared to diverse effects unequally perfect, that would not be a great drawback, as we also proposed above in arguing at the beginning.

40. The sum of all that has been said, and proof of the assertion.—The conclusion is strengthened by the authority of the Saints.—On account of these difficulties, then, I said above that this truth becomes more certain to us from the things which have been made than from a reason which efficaciously demonstrates and convinces that it cannot be otherwise. And in the same way I think it is most probably shown from the things made that for the creation of any thing simply infinite power is required; for, since several substances so perfect have been made by God, none of them received power for creating even the least thing, and that which is near nothing; therefore it is a sign that this comes only from the limitation of all these creatures, however perfect; otherwise no reason could be given why the greatest perfection which is found in the angels or Seraphim does not suffice for this. And hence further a conjecture arises that that superior order, to which the creative power must necessarily belong, is none other than that of being itself by essence; for among participated beings no new order or new grade can be found besides those which have been made; since, therefore, by computation it is concluded that the creative power must be of another order, it is concluded that it is infinite; for that order is none other than that in which is being itself by essence. And Athanasius signified this, sermon 3 Against the Arians, when he said: To administer belongs to creatures and servants, but to found and create belongs to God alone and to His Word and wisdom. Moreover this can be declared further; for the very mode of efficiency through creation indicates a certain highest efficacy and independence in the creator, because, since for acting it supposes no real potency outside itself, it requires only objective or possible³ potency through non-repugnance; but this indicates the highest force in the active power; and therefore perhaps Cyril said, bk. II Against Julian, that to be able to operate efficaciously as creator and to produce things which at some time were not is one of those things which are proper to the sole and supreme substance of all.

41. Next, creation is the first of all actions, through which participated being can be communicated, and in this sense it tends per se primo to producing the whole being inasmuch as being; hence, then, it becomes sufficiently likely that this action is such that by its nature it essentially demands to flow from being itself by essence, and therefore that there cannot be a participated entity which has power for such action.

42. And from the same principle it is understood quite probably that that gradation made above, that to produce from a greater potency greater perfection is required, is to be understood not only within some genus of being but absolutely in the latitude of being; and therefore that for creating there is required power not of any superior order whatever, but of the supreme one which can be understood in the whole latitude of being or of active power. And hence further it becomes very probable that principle, that the power of creating necessarily extends to everything creatable, because it does not wait (so to speak) on the part of the object for anything except non-repugnance in order that the effect be or be made, and because the principle of the first emanation and participation is from being itself by essence, and therefore such power can be nothing but the power which is being itself by essence, which is the most universal power and of itself able for every participated being. And for this cause perhaps Augustine said, bk. IX De Genes. ad lit., c. 15, that an angel can no more create any thing whatever than it can create itself.

43. In these ways, then, we understand that, although the above reasons are not wholly cogent demonstrations, yet they contribute very much to indicating the height of the creative power and the reason why it is repugnant that it be created.

44. Finally, another conjecture of Giles⁴ does not wholly displease me (although Scotus despises it), namely, that, since every creature is mutable and in some way consists of act and potency, it is likely that it is not by its nature capable of power of acting except through motion or change and by inducing act into potency. The consequence is evident from that principle that the mode of acting imitates the mode of being. From which it comes about, conversely, that it belongs to God to be able to create inasmuch as He is pure act and being itself by essence, and finally inasmuch as He has infinite power.

The reason posited at the beginning is satisfied

45. The first reply.—From these things the principal reason for doubting posited at the beginning has been sufficiently answered. But what was added in increase of the difficulty, about principal power not innate but superadded, can also be easily dispatched in two ways from what has been said. The former is taken from what we in fact believe, because in fact no such principal power for creating has been communicated to created substances, and yet powers and qualities of the most perfect order have been added to them; therefore it is a sign that no power can be superadded to the natures of things which is a principal power of creating. Hence, in my judgement, those do not speak rightly nor consistently enough who say that all the supernatural qualities which are infused into us are created; otherwise supernatural acts too, as the beatific vision, would be created, for they are true qualities and as supernatural as the habits themselves. From which it would come about that the light of glory, for example, which is the principal principle for making vision, would also be a principal power for creating; which is absurd.

46. The second reply.—The latter reply is that the reasons made before prove not only of connatural power, but simply of created power; for they tend to show that no power of creating can be created or limited, which proceeds equally of power implanted in nature from without and of that which is born from within; for the power which is added from without must be created. Hence another reason also arises, because power added above the nature of a thing must necessarily be accidental, for a substance cannot be added to itself or be supernatural to itself; and therefore the superadded power is necessarily accidental; but accidental power cannot be the principal power of creating. Which can be sufficiently gathered from its mode of being, according to what we said above in explaining the first discourse of Scotus; for, since every accident by its nature depends in being on a subject, it cannot happen that it have a connatural mode of acting outside a subject or independent of a subject, such as is the mode of creation; therefore it cannot be a principal power of creating. For it must be attentively considered that, although some form which is the principal power for some act is supernatural to the subject, and therefore that mode of acting is also supernatural to such subject, yet that form has its own proper essence and nature connatural to itself; and therefore that mode of acting is connatural to the form itself. Since, then, the mode of acting without a subject cannot be connatural to an accident, neither can the power of creating be connatural either to the subject or to the accidental form itself; and therefore such form cannot be a principal power.