Disputationes metaphysicae

1. It must first of all be supposed what the name of creation signifies, for what the thing itself is will be declared afterwards. Creation, then, signifies the effecting of some thing from nothing, as the theologians define it.¹ That particle from nothing, however, in order to distinguish this action from others, excludes every concurrence of a material cause and the dependence of the thing which is created on any subject, as Anselm rightly expounds, in the Monologion, c. 8, so that from nothing is the same as from no subject; and so this action is distinguished from the other, which is by eduction from the potency of a subject. For these two actions adequately divide all efficiency; and therefore, just as by that particle creation is sufficiently distinguished from eduction, so too by it the notion of creation is sufficiently explained. Hence the theologians infer that whatever is created must be subsistent or be made by way of a subsistent,² because it must be made outside a subject, or without dependence on a subject. But what exists without dependence on a subject subsists or behaves after the manner of a subsistent; which I say on account of an accident, if it were made by God separated from a subject, which would truly be created, because it would have a mode of being like subsistence. But the rational soul, even if it is made in the body, is yet truly made from nothing, because it is not made from the body itself; for it is not educed from its potency nor does it depend on it in its being; and therefore it also truly subsists while it is made in the body, as we shall say below in treating of subsistence.

Reasons for doubting

2. The first.—The word creation being thus explained, it seems that it cannot be known by natural reason that creation is possible; first, because what Aristotle, Plato and other weighty philosophers did not know, it is likely cannot be known by natural light; but those philosophers were so ignorant of creation that they held as a first principle and known per se that nothing is made from nothing, as is established from Aristotle, in I Phys.; therefore.

3. The second.—Secondly, of no being can it be demonstrated that it is created; therefore neither can it be demonstrated that creation is possible. The antecedent is evident, because every being is either substance or accident; but an accident, if it is in a subject, is neither created nor can be created, even if it is most supernatural, as was shown above; but that an accident exists and is made separated from a subject cannot be discovered by natural reason. Again, substance is either spiritual or material; of the former it can scarcely be investigated by natural reason whether it exists, let alone demonstrated what it is like or whence it is; therefore it cannot be evidently known that there is some spiritual substance made by another; and consequently neither can it be demonstrated that creation is necessary or possible on account of these substances. But material substance is always made from matter; but that matter itself is made, or needs the efficiency of another in order to be able to exist, cannot be demonstrated; hence Plato and many philosophers posited it eternal and unproduced, nor does a natural middle term appear by which the opposite can be demonstrated. For if there were any, it would chiefly be the imperfection and potentiality of matter. But why can it not be said that matter has of itself this its entity, although least and imperfect? For it is not known per se that this imperfection of passive potentiality has a necessary connection with that other imperfection of objective potentiality which a thing needing effecting or creation includes.

4. Thirdly, for creating infinite power is required; but it cannot be demonstrated that an infinite active power is possible; therefore neither that creation is possible. The major is declared a posteriori, because otherwise a creature could have the power of creating, because, if it is not repugnant on account of infinity of power, there is no reason why it should be repugnant; but the consequent is per se quite absurd. The minor, however, is proved, because there is no natural middle term for demonstrating infinite power in acting; for Aristotle tried to demonstrate this from motion, yet did not attain it, as I shall show below; and the reason is the same of any other natural reason. Hence many try to demonstrate from creation that there is some infinite power in acting; but this is a circle or a begging of the question in this matter which we are disputing.

5. Fourthly, it is repugnant that being as being be made; therefore it is repugnant that anything be created; the consequence is established from the definition of creation, because, if something is made from nothing, it is made per se primo according to the whole notion of being; therefore it is made per se primo inasmuch as it is being. The antecedent is proved, first, because, if being as being were makeable, every being would be makeable; because what belongs to some notion per se primo and as such belongs to everything in which such notion is found; but this is plainly false, because it is necessary that there be some being which cannot be made; otherwise there would be a process to infinity in producers and produced, which is impossible. Secondly the same antecedent is proved, because being as being abstracts from entity according to the being of existence and according to the being of essence; but it is impossible that any being be made according to this whole being; therefore it is impossible that it be made inasmuch as it is being. Hence it also comes about that it is impossible to be made from nothing, because it is impossible to be made according to the being of existence without being supposed according to the being of essence; which being is not wholly nothing, for through it true things are distinguished from fictitious and chimerical ones; therefore.

Various opinions

6. In this matter it was the opinion of many theologians that it cannot be demonstrated that any thing is made or can be made through creation. So holds Gregory, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, towards the end, and Gabriel inclines to it in the same place, q. 2, a. 2. Bassolis holds it, In I, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3. Which authors a fortiori suppose that it cannot be demonstrated that every being distinct from God is made by Him, or that there cannot be several real unproduced beings. For although, the creation of some beings being admitted, it is not at once evidently inferred that it is impossible that there be two uncreated natures, or that every being distinct from God is made by Him, but this needs proper demonstration, yet, if creation were not possible, it would be wholly impossible that all beings distinct from God should be made by Him, because it is evident that there are many beings which cannot be made except through creation, if they are to be made. As all spiritual things, which, since they do not have matter, cannot be made from a presupposed subject; likewise the heavens, if we suppose that they cannot be made by generation, as their nature, operation, motion and whatever we experience of them seem sufficiently to show; likewise prime matter, which cannot be made from prior matter.

7. The second opinion is that this truth can be demonstrated by natural reason. This is the more common opinion of the theologians, which St. Thomas holds, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, and he supposes the same in I, q. 44, a. 1, and q. 45, a. 2; Alexander of Hales also holds it, II p., q. 6, a. 6; Scotus, In I, dist. 8, q. 1; Thomas of Strasbourg, In II, dist. 1, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 1; Henry, Quodl. VIII, q. 6. And this opinion is more conformable to the divine Scriptures; for these teach that from this visible world it can be shown that God exists, because the creatures themselves cry out that they have another author or maker; which places we shall weigh below, when we demonstrate that God exists. The holy Fathers too speak in the same way, whom I shall report in the same place below. And this is without doubt the true opinion, which cannot be better proved than by bringing forward the middle terms by which this truth can be demonstrated.

Resolution of the question

8. We can prove two things, then: one is that creation is possible; the other is that creation actually is, or has been made, or is exercised in the universe by some efficient cause. From which we shall elicit a third, namely, that there is in the universe, and is necessary, one first cause to which all other beings which have being are reduced through creation as to the first origin of their being.

It is shown that creation is possible

9. First, then, we can prove a priori that creation is possible, if we suppose it proved from elsewhere that God exists and is supremely perfect, as much as can be or be understood in the latitude of being. For, as I shall say in the place cited below, although absolutely we cannot know God or His perfections a priori, yet, some principle or attribute being demonstrated a posteriori, from it we can gather another a priori, as immortality from immateriality. Thus, then, in the present case we suppose it demonstrated that there is one supreme most perfect being, indeed also most powerful; we shall prove it below, not from creation, lest we beg the question, but from other middle terms. Now, then, I argue in this way: effecting through creation is not so impossible as to involve in itself repugnance or contradiction; therefore neither is the power of acting in this way in itself impossible or involving repugnance or imperfection; therefore such power is in fact in some being, at least in the first; therefore by virtue of it creation is possible. This last consequence is clear; it is necessary, however, to distinguish that word or denomination possible; for in one way it is taken negatively, as it is the same as not repugnant; in another way positively, for that which can be or be made, in which sense it says a denomination from some power, either active or passive. In the antecedent, then, possible is taken in the former way, but in the consequent in the latter; for in order that creation be possible, two things are necessary and suffice: one, that in itself it be not repugnant; the other, that it be possible through some power; and so, the antecedent being supposed, the consecution is evident.

10. The first antecedent, however, is proved, first, because no repugnance can be shown in something's being made from nothing, in the true sense declared by us. For it is not to be imagined, as some thought, that nothing itself is to be the matter from which such being is made, which is plainly repugnant; for that particle from does not there say the relation of material cause but of terminus a quo; but so there is no repugnance that that which of itself was nothing begin to be something through the effecting of another. But if we wish to interpret that particle from according to the relation of material cause, it must be expounded not positively but negatively, so that that is said to be made from nothing which is not made from any material cause; in which too no repugnance can be shown; for why, just as something is made in act which was previously possible through active and passive potency together, could not something also be made in act which is possible through the sole power of the agent, more eminent and more efficacious?

11. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: just as it is repugnant that something be made in act which was previously possible through passive potency alone without active, so conversely it is repugnant that something be made in act which is possible only through active potency without passive; for why can there not be an effect from the suffering potency without the agent, if it can be from the agent without the recipient? It is answered that the reason for the diversity is quite perspicuous; for action as action says an essential order to the efficient, and therefore it implies a contradiction that there be action without an agent; but action as action does not say an essential order to the patient nor to passion, speaking of action in its whole latitude, but says a relation to the effect which is made through it and depends on the acting cause. And similarly passive potency says an adequate relation to active, because it cannot receive anything unless it receives it from something; but active potency does not say an adequate relation to passive, as we shall say more at length below in its place, because it is not of the notion of active potency that it can act on something, but that it can act something, and therefore something can be simply possible through active potency alone, but not through passive potency alone. Moreover, passive potency is imperfect, and alone is not simply able for the effect unless it is perfected by active; but active is of its genus perfect, and therefore of itself involves no repugnance that some active potency be in its order so perfect that by itself alone and without dependence on passive it contains virtually in itself both the effect and the action. And so at the same time the first consequence has been proved, which also is most evident, the antecedent being supposed. For what greater repugnance can be devised in a power of this kind than in the said mode of effecting? Or what imperfection, and not rather the greatest perfection?

12. And both can be confirmed if by that from nothing we understand it to be signified that the whole thing which is made per se primo as the adequate terminus of the action, which is called ut quod, be made wholly and according to its whole entity, no part or thing of it being presupposed; for all these senses are true and come back to the same. But in this too great perfection is indicated on the part of the active power, and there is no repugnance on the part of the effect or of its effecting. For what implication is there in this, that a whole thing which was not should receive being according to its whole self? Certainly from the terms no greater appears than in this, that a thing which was only begun according to one part should be perfected by the addition of another part which before was not, except that the former requires greater force in acting. There is, then, no repugnance in a power or effecting of this kind, but only greater perfection. Someone could only hesitate what kind of action this can be without a subject, or how this is not repugnant. But we shall easily explain this in what follows; for it is enough now that no repugnance is shown in it. Especially since some understand creation without transient action.

13. It remains to prove the second consequence, in which is the force of that reason, namely, that this power is to be posited in the nature of things at least in the first being, if in itself it involves no repugnance or imperfection. This, however, can be proved, first, from that general principle that in the first being is formally every perfection simply simple, which we shall demonstrate below in treating of the perfection of the first being. For a power of this kind from its proper objective concept says perfection simply simple; for it says a perfection of itself not repugnant nor involving imperfection. From which it plainly comes about that in the latitude of being it is better to have it than not to have it, in which consists the notion of perfection simply; therefore such power must necessarily be attributed to the first being. Almost the same argument is that this power is necessarily included in omnipotence, because omnipotence extends to everything possible, that is, to everything of itself not repugnant; but it is of the notion of the first being that it have omnipotence; therefore also that it have this power. The whole antecedent is to be demonstrated below in treating of the attributes of the first being.

14. To these are added other reasons of themselves very probable, for this mode of acting without dependence on another cause outside itself, whether efficient or material, is very consonant with the essential perfection of the first being. First indeed, because the mode of acting is proportioned to the mode of being; but the mode of being of the first being is with all independence; therefore its proper mode of acting too will be independent of every cause, even material. Secondly, because an active power defined to acting in a subject and from a subject is very contracted and limited; therefore it is not to be attributed to the first being, because there is no source from which it could have such limitation in it; for the power of acting is proportioned to the essence; as, therefore, the essence of the first being, because it is pure act, has no source from which it should have limitation, so neither its power. Thirdly, because it is consonant with reason that in God there be a power of a higher notion than in every other natural or created agent; but all others need a subject for acting; therefore the divine power must not be so needy, but the more perfect it is the freer it must be for acting, especially since that excess is in grade and in every possible perfection.

It is shown that creation in fact exists

15. The conclusion is proved in the heavenly bodies.—Secondly it must be added (by which the preceding conclusion will be confirmed more evidently) that creation is necessary in the beings which now exist, so that without it they could not have existed. It is proved, first, by induction, beginning from material things. And in the first place I ask of the heavenly bodies whether they are made or unmade. This latter cannot be said, first, on account of the reason common to all finite things, of which at once; next, because things much nobler than the heavens are not without efficiency, as is evident most of all of man. Likewise, because the heavens are so imperfect that they need motion for the complement of their actions, and moreover an extrinsic mover to move them, because they cannot have that motion of themselves; therefore much less is it likely that they have being of themselves. Likewise, we see that the heavens in all their powers, positions, aspects and motions are so constituted as was expedient for the conservation of lower things and their generations and corruptions; therefore it is an evident argument that they are not from themselves, but were founded by the common author of all. Which reason we shall pursue more at length below in demonstrating that God exists. But if the heavens are made, I ask again whether they consist of the matter of the elements, and therefore were made from it, and so the reason will be the same of them as of generable things; or whether they consist of matter of a higher notion, or are simple beings, and so it is concluded that they were made only through creation, because, if they are simple, they could in no way have been made otherwise, as is manifest per se. But if they consist of a superior matter, this is because they are ingenerable, and therefore could be made through creation alone. Add that the reasons by which we shall at once prove that the matter of generable things cannot be unmade prove equally of the matter of the heavenly bodies.

16. The conclusion is proved in the lower bodies.—I come, then, to the lower world, inasmuch as it embraces the elements and mixed bodies, and I ask whether this mass is made or not; it cannot be said not to be made, because all the species of things which are in it are made in their individuals; therefore in no species of those things can there be some individual not made or having being of itself; for this would be a great and most essential difference between such individual and the others, and consequently they would not be of the same species. Hence, just as Aristotle often argues against Plato that there is no man separated from the individuals, because he would be incorruptible but these corruptible, and so they would not be of the same species, so we say that there is no singular man who has being of himself without the efficiency of some cause, otherwise he would not be of the same species with other men; and the same argument holds of the remaining species, and so of this whole corporeal mass of elemental things. For although the elements are commonly said by the philosophers to be incorruptible according to their whole selves and corruptible according to their parts, this is not to be understood of intrinsic incorruptibility through the constitution of nature—for in this way the nature of the whole and of the parts is the same, especially of homogeneous ones—but of incorruptibility from the power and mode of acting of natural causes, because so the elements can never be corrupted according to their whole selves; absolutely, however, they are generable, and so they could not have being of themselves without effecting; this corporeal mass, therefore, is not unmade.

17. Who asserted that matter was not made, but coeternal with God.—Again, then, I ask whether it was made from nothing or from matter; if the former, what is intended is had; if the latter (which almost all the philosophers thought), I ask again whether matter itself was made or not. And indeed almost all the philosophers denied that matter was made, but asserted that it was coeternal with God and had being of itself and wholly necessarily. In which error Tertullian reports that the Stoics and Pythagoreans, and Plato himself, and Hermes Trismegistus were, book Against Hermogenes, cc. 1 and 8, and book Against the Valentinians, cc. 15 and 16, and Irenaeus signifies it, bk. II, c. 19; but Epiphanius, heresy 7, also adds the Peripatetics; and Lactantius, bk. II On the Origin of Error, says that both poets and philosophers thought the same, and specially designates the Academics, and most of all Cicero, book On the Nature of the Gods. Which philosophers many heretics imitated, as Hermogenes, Manichaeus and others, as is established from Tertullian above, and Augustine, book On Heresies, in 46 and 59; and Gregory of Nyssa, book On the Making of Man, c. 23, and Eusebius, bk. VII De Praeparat. Evang., cc. 8 and 9, where he also attributes this error to Sabellius.

18. The preceding assertion is attacked.—That this, however, is foreign to all natural reason, besides what was said in the prior assertion and besides what is common to all created beings, can be shown, first, from the imperfection of prime matter; for, since it is the lowest of all substances, even corruptible ones, it is incredible that it should have this highest perfection, which is to have being of itself, of which perfection all the other species of generable things and their forms are not capable. Whence a second reason can be taken; for, if matter is coeternal with God and has being of itself, either as such it was lacking every substantial form, or it had some of itself. The former cannot be said, because it is repugnant to the nature of matter; for, although it does not imply a contradiction, yet it is foreign to the natural order of things, and therefore it is not likely that matter has its entity of itself and yet has it in a preternatural state and without any formal perfection, and consequently without use or utility. But if it had some form of itself, then not matter alone, but a certain integral substance has being of itself. From which it further comes about that that whole substance is simply necessary and can no more not be than prime matter itself, because what is independent of another in its being cannot lose it. Hence it will also come about that that matter cannot serve for other generations, because it will always remain under that form.

19. Someone will perhaps say that matter has of itself its perpetual entity and has also had a perpetual form, not however of itself, but from God. But this too cannot be said, both because it involves repugnance that it should have being of itself and not whatever is necessary for being, and also because otherwise that form would flow from God of necessity of nature; for, if it were made freely, whence would it be established that it is eternal? But it is against natural reason to say that God acts outside Himself from necessity of nature. And moreover it follows that, with the same necessity with which God makes that form, He conserves it, and consequently that matter is always of necessity under that form, and therefore can in no way serve for the generations or corruptions of things.

20. It remains, therefore, that matter, since it is not of itself, needed some efficient principle by which it was made; but it could not be made except through creation, because it could not be made from prior matter; therefore the creation of some thing is wholly necessary in order that these material things can exist. You will say: the effecting of matter could not be creation, because creation is of a subsistent thing, as we said; but matter is not a subsistent thing, because it is not that which is. Some answer that matter, although it is not properly created, for the said reason, is yet created at least improperly or in a broad way. I say, however, that matter can be understood to be made in two ways: first, by itself alone and separated from form, and then without doubt it would be created most properly, for it would both be subsistent and be made by way of a whole, although of itself it is a part; for the rational soul too is a part, and yet is most properly created. Indeed, if quantity were made separated, it would properly be created by the opinion of all. In another way, however, matter can be made (and so we believe it was made) existing under some form; and then, properly speaking, the whole composite of matter and such form is said to be created, because that properly is; but to be made is properly attributed to that to which being also is; but then matter is said to be concreated, which is enough for the demonstration which we intend; for to the action, inasmuch as through it the whole is made and nothing is presupposed to it, belongs the notion of production from nothing. But if we wish accurately to distinguish that composite action into the several partial ones of which it consists, we shall find that the whole notion of creation which is in it comes from that part which is the effecting of matter from nothing, as was touched upon above in explaining the eduction of form from the potency of matter. And so the Fathers and Doctors of the Church absolutely and without any addition teach and demonstrate that matter was created by God, as may be seen in Tertullian, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, in the places cited a little before; and Augustine also, bk. I Genes. ad litter., c. 14, and XII Confess., c. 4; and Ambrose, bk. I Hexaem., c. 1; and Athanasius, book On the Incarnation of the Word, at the beginning; and elsewhere passim.

21. It remained to speak, in order to complete this induction, of the intelligences or immaterial things. Nevertheless no special argument can be made about them, besides that universal one taken from this principle, that it is repugnant that there be several unproduced beings, and that an unproduced being, or one from itself, is infinitely perfect in the genus of being; because neither special notions, nor differences, nor any proper effects of the intelligences are known to us from which we might demonstrate that they have being from another and not from themselves. I speak, however, of demonstration simply, because some conjecture can be taken from the motion of the heaven, as I shall show below in demonstrating that God exists. Where also that principle is to be demonstrated ex professo; now, however, let it be supposed. But from the fact that the intelligences have an efficient cause, it is evidently inferred that creation is necessary in order that they exist, because, since they do not have a material cause, as was touched upon above, they cannot be made by another mode of production. Which the production of the rational soul excellently confirms, which can only be creation, because it is not eduction from the potency of matter, as was also proved above. Which reason proves that creation is necessary in order that men be generated, because it is always mixed in (so to speak) with their generation. Hence the use of creation is as frequent as human generation. Unless someone is so foolish as to say that rational souls pre-exist before bodies, which would be an error not only in faith but also against natural reason, as is to be shown in its place; but for the present it does not matter, for even if souls existed before bodies, they would not yet be from themselves and without an efficient, because, besides the other reasons touched upon, since the soul is the natural form of the body, if it existed of itself necessarily, it would exist from eternity informing the body; for a thing which has being of itself cannot have it in a preternatural and as it were violent state, such as is the state of the soul outside the body. Whether, then, the soul begins with the body or before it, it is necessary that it have an efficient cause, and consequently be made through creation.

A first creating cause is demonstrated

22. Thirdly it must be said (and it is gathered from what has been said) that there is necessary in the universe one first efficient cause which through creation has effected the other things. This is sufficiently evident from the discourse made in the preceding assertion. And the necessity of this first efficient cause with respect to all other beings is to be demonstrated more at length in the place cited. But that, this necessity being supposed, that first cause could not have given origin to the other things without creation is established from the definition of creation given above, because the first cause could not produce things from some matter, since not all produced things have matter, and in those which have it, the matter itself had to be produced. It is only to be noted that the species of generable things could have been made in their first individuals from matter existing prior in time, and then they would not be made through creation in full strictness; inasmuch, however, as they necessarily suppose the creation of matter, to that extent we say that creation is necessary for their production. And for this reason the name of creation, especially in the usage of the holy Fathers, is often extended to new production from pre-existing created matter, as is evident from Augustine, bk. I Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, c. 24.

The arguments are solved, and what the philosophers thought of creation

23. To the arguments I answer: in the first of them it is asked that we explain what the philosophers thought of this truth, and especially Aristotle. About which matter Eugubinus disputed much, bk. VII De Peren. Philos., c. 3 and following. But as regards the other philosophers, they indeed often teach that this world was created by some first author; yet, if they are rightly weighed, they do not attribute true creation, but formation from pre-existing matter, which they also called chaos, as is established from what Tertullian and the other authors cited above report,³ and Lactantius, bk. VII, c. 3. And this indeed they explained of the effecting of this sensible world. But of the superior and intelligible world, that is, of the angels, they spoke most obscurely; nor is it wonderful, for since they could not form them from chaos, it does not appear how they could constitute them as produced by God, unless perhaps they made them too material, although subtler than body; for they held it as ascertained that God can produce nothing except as an artificer who works from pre-existing matter. And this Anaxagoras signified, whom Aristotle praises, I Metaph., c. 6, text 18, because he said that all things are mixed together except mind, and that it alone is pure and free from all mixture. Hence Galen too, De Usu Partium, c. 10, reproves Moses because he said that God produced all things by His command.

24. What Aristotle thought.—Passing over the others, many think of Aristotle that he did not know creation, as Gregory, In II, dist. 1, q. 1; and Henry, Quodl. VIII, q. 9; and Jandun, II Metaph., q. 5; Marsilius, In II, q. 1, a. 2; and Bessarion, bk. II Against the Calumniator of Plato, c. 6; and the Commentator seems to think the same, VIII Phys., comm. 4, and Simplicius in the same place. And this opinion has no small indications in the principles of Aristotle. First, because everywhere he admits and supposes that principle: From nothing nothing is made. Secondly, because he defines all actions through order to passive potency, and thinks that every action has conjoined passion and motion or change, as is established from III Phys., from the beginning. But if it is said that Aristotle in those places speaks only of the action and efficiency of natural causes, it still stands in the way, because never, even in the Metaphysics, does he extend his doctrine to another mode of action. Rather, V Metaph., c. 12, he defines active potency through order to passive, saying that it is the power of transmuting another inasmuch as it is another; and c. 2 he defines the efficient cause in the same way through order to motion; he did not, therefore, know another mode of effecting. Which is also confirmed because he posited incorruptible things as eternal, thinking them per se necessary, and therefore, II Metaph., c. 1, he says in the plural that the principles of eternal things have no causes; but by eternal things he seems to understand the motions of the heavens and the perpetual series of generations and corruptions, whose principles are the heavens and the intelligences.

25. Others, however, think that Aristotle knew creation and that God is the creator of all things. So thought Averroes, II Metaph., comm. 4, and XII Metaph., comm. 44, and book On the Substance of the Orb, c. 2; and Alexander of Aphrodisias, in these places; and St. Thomas, in the same places, and I, q. 44, and II Cont. Gent., c. 15, and q. 3 De Potent., a. 6, and VIII Phys., lect. 2; Scotus, in Quodl., q. 7, and In II, dist. 1, q. 3; Thomas of Strasbourg, q. 4; Hervaeus, treatise On the Eternity of the World, q. 4, and others. And it is proved, for in II Metaph., c. 1, he says that there is some being most true and most perfect of all, which is the cause of the others. And he plainly speaks of the efficient cause, as the Commentator also expounds there, saying that only the first being is per se being and true; but the others acquire being and truth from it. Hence by that plural the principles of eternal things Aristotle seems to understand God alone, either on account of His eminence or on account of the several notions of causing. Moreover, in I De Caelo, c. 9, text 100, he posits a certain immortal and divine nature, on which, for the others, for some more exactly, for others more obscurely, their very being and living depends; and II De Gener., c. 10, text 59, he says that it does not belong to all things always to be, since some are far distant from the principle itself, and therefore (he says) God, providing in the way that remained, completed the universe, having instituted continuous generation; in bk. VIII Phys. too, and XII Metaph., he concludes that there is one first being and prince of all; but He would not be prince unless He were the principle of all. Hence Aristotle, XII Metaph., text 38, says that the heaven and nature depend on God. He also teaches most clearly in the same places that there is one end of all; from which it plainly comes about that there is also one efficient, because, as we shall hand down below, there cannot be final causality without efficient; but there cannot be one efficient cause of all except creation intervening, as was proved above. Moreover, II Metaph., c. 2, he proves that principle through which we most come to the knowledge of the first cause, namely, that there cannot be a process to infinity in efficient causes. Finally, in the book On the World to Alexander, he seems to teach this most clearly: It would be as it were a shameful thing (he says) in disputing of the things of the world to pass over that which is held highest in the world. And so it is an old report, and indeed hereditary among all mortals, that all things have been constituted for us from God and through God. Nor indeed does any nature suffice of itself, bereft of the preservation which He brings.

26. Others use a distinction, saying that Aristotle did not know creation with newness of being, but knew creation by way of natural and eternal emanation from the first being, and in this way posited that incorruptible things flowed from God from eternity. But although this could be sustained of the other things, yet of the rational soul it cannot; for he himself, II De Gener. Animal., c. 3, says that the rational soul comes from outside, that is, is not educed from the potency of matter, and consequently is made through creation. A special reason, however, can be given of it, because it is not made except on the occasion of the creation of the body, and for the sake of the composite. Nor is it likely that Aristotle posited the soul not made, if he knew all the rest outside God to be made. Nor can it be said that he thought all souls were eternal and afterwards in time united to bodies; for the same Aristotle, XII Metaph., c. 3, text 16, says generally that the form does not pre-exist before it is united to matter, and openly comprehends the rational soul; for he adds that in it there is the singular thing that it remains afterwards, that is, after the composite is dissolved; but in the beginning, because it begins together with the composite, he admits no exception. This part, therefore, is more likely, although it cannot be denied that Aristotle had slight knowledge of this matter, and therefore treated very few things of this efficiency, although, IX Metaph., c. 1, he sufficiently intimated that he knew an active power which does not need motion or change for acting.

27. To the second argument, it has been sufficiently proved by contrary induction how it is demonstrated that there are some beings which can be made only through creation, which is established to us especially of material things. Of immaterial things, however, we prove only from hypothesis that, if there are any outside God, they can be made only through creation, nor can they exist if they are not made. But whether it is proved by natural reason that there are substances of this kind besides God, of rational souls we indeed suppose it from the science of the soul, of the others we shall see below, for at present it does not matter.

28. To the third, about the major proposition, namely, that infinite power is required for creating, we shall speak in the following section; now we say only that from other middle terms it is sufficiently proved both that creation exists and that there is in things a power which is a sufficient principle of it, whether it must be infinite or a finite one suffices. Hence, if from elsewhere it is sufficiently proved that infinite power is required for creating, from the necessity of creation it will be sufficiently concluded that there is in things an infinite power. Nor will there be a begging of the question or a vicious circle, because either we do not prove that creation is possible from the infinity of that power, but because from elsewhere we gather its necessity and non-repugnance, both of it and also of the power which is its principle, abstracting from whether it is finite or infinite; or, if from the infinity of the power we conclude that creation is possible, we take the very infinity of the power as demonstrated from the infinity of the divine essence and perfection, which we gather from other principles, as we shall see below.

29. How being as being is made through creation.—To the fourth I answer that that proposition, through creation being is made inasmuch as it is being, can have several senses: one is if that inasmuch is taken reduplicatively and falls on the most abstract notion of being, common to God and creatures. And this sense is false, for by it it is signified that being, by virtue of that precise notion, is the terminus of creation, which is false. And that fourth argument supposes this sense and sufficiently attacks it; it nevertheless stands nothing in the way of the truth of creation, because that proposition in that sense does not follow from the definition of creation, as is evident. For if being is made reduplicating only the notion of finite or makeable being, that will be enough for the notion of creation, for it suffices that the thing be made wholly from nothing. And this can be another sense of that expression, which is true, and from it it only follows that every finite being is creatable; which also is true. But the last and proper sense is that that inasmuch be taken specificatively only. And in this way the proposition is most true, because through creation per se primo the thing is made according to the whole notion of being, because creation supposes no notion of being in it. For according to the doctrine of Aristotle,⁴ that is said to be made per se primo which is in no way supposed in the thing which is made; for being to be made inasmuch as it is being, then, is nothing else than that the very notion of being be per se primo made in such effect through such action. From this sense, however, it does not follow that every being according to the notion of being which it has in itself can terminate creation, because, as is established from dialectic, the particle inasmuch, taken specificatively, does not infer a universal or distributive sense, because it does not denote the adequate notion or cause of the predicate, but only designates the part or notion according to which it belongs. It is rightly inferred, however, from that sense that the very notion of being as such is not found univocally in the beings which can terminate creation and in uncreated being, as we shall say below in declaring this division.

30. To the last proof, taken from the fact that the being of essence of things is supposed to their creation, those who think that the being of essence according to itself is something eternal would perhaps say that creation is from the nothing of existence, not however of essence. But Wyclif said that creation is not production from nothing simply, but from intelligible being to being outside God, as Waldensis reports, vol. I, c. 17. Scotus likewise, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, says that creation is production from nothing, that is, not from something according to the being of existence nor according to the being of essence, yet not from nothing, that is, from what is in no way being, either simply or in a qualified sense; for he supposes that things have known being before they are made. But the truth is that the being of essence of the creature, or known or intelligible being, before creatures are made, is nothing real outside God, as we shall say at length below, in the disputation on the essence and existence of the creature. Wherefore that being in no way stands in the way of the creature's being made through creation from nothing and inasmuch as it is being.