Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The disputation about chance and fortune is conjoined with the disputation about fate, because, fatal necessity being taken away, it seems to follow that many effects come about in the universe by chance and fortuitously. And since nothing can take place which does not have an efficient cause, it seems also to follow that effects of this kind, chance or fortuitous, must have some efficient cause which may be named chance or fortune. Of this cause, then, we inquire whether it exists and what it is like. For it seems not to be any of those which act necessarily or freely, and so that none can exist. The assumption is evident, because a cause operating necessarily attains its effect either always or more frequently; but chance effects are said to be among those which rarely come about; therefore they do not come about from a cause operating necessarily. Again, a free cause always operates from purpose and from the intention of an end; but chance is said to be when something happens beside intention; chance, therefore, is not a free cause; therefore chance cannot be any efficient cause.

On the chance effect

2. Although these names chance and fortune are often used for the same thing, yet strictly they have diverse signification; and therefore we shall speak first of chance, then of fortune. The name of chance, then, properly signifies the effect rather than the cause, and is said of any unexpected effect, which Boethius noted, bk. I De Consolat., prose 1, where he does not wish chance to signify the cause but the effect; yet use has now prevailed so that it is also said of the cause; for that effect cannot lack some cause; and so Aristotle treats of chance, II Phys., and with him the other philosophers; yet, the effect being explained, the cause will be better understood. That effect, then, is called chance which, per accidens and beside expectation or intention, is conjoined to the per se effect of some cause, as that one digging the earth finds a treasure. This is established from the common signification of that word, for a chance effect is the same as one contingent rarely and beside intention. Two things, therefore, seem to be of its notion. One is that it come about rarely, as Aristotle thinks, II Phys., c. 7, and there Averroes, Alexander, St. Thomas, Albert and others, although Avicenna wished to limit this without cause, as I shall at once say. But when that effect is said to come about rarely, it is to be understood in the composite sense (so to speak), or such cause being supposed; for often an effect is rare because the cause is rarely posited, although, it being posited, the effect always or regularly follows; and then it is not chance, but can be per se, unless the positing of such cause too, or the concurrence of several causes, is chance. In another way, then, the effect follows rarely even when the cause is posited; and in this way the chance effect is said to come about rarely. Because, however, such effect always comes from the concurrence of several causes, it is necessary that that concurrence not have a certain and definite cause in the universe; from which it also comes about that it comes about rarely, and therefore an eclipse is not a chance effect, nor is every other which is regularly conjoined with a per se effect.

3. Secondly, it is of the notion of such effect that it come about beside the intention of the acting cause; as, that a stone falls while Peter passes by is called a fortuitous chance, because it was beside the intention both of the man passing and of the falling stone, or of the generator which moved it to the centre. But if that concurrence had been intended by someone, with respect to him it would not be called a chance effect, but per se in its genus; it is, therefore, of the notion of chance that it be an effect beside the intention of the agent, because it is an effect per accidens.

4. And from this explanation it is understood that there are no chance effects in the universe with respect to God, but only with respect to secondary or particular causes; and the reason is that nothing can come about beside the intention of God, because nothing can escape His foreknowledge. You will say: sometimes something takes place in things beside the intention of God, as sins in human acts. And perhaps also in natural effects some can happen which, although they are foreknown by God, are yet not intended. It is answered, first, that with respect to a cause operating through intellect and will, it is required, in order that an effect be chance or fortuitous, not only that it be beside the will, but also that it be beside the knowledge or expectation of the operator. For, if from my action there follows something which I foresaw would be, it cannot be called chance or fortuitous to me, even if it can be not voluntary but only permitted, or even in some way involuntary. Hence Aristotle, bk. II Magn. Moral., c. 8, says that there is less of fortune where there is more of intellect. In order, then, that nothing happen to God by chance, it is enough that nothing come about beside His knowledge and foreknowledge. But we add, moreover, that it is one thing to speak of the effect which is in sin, which is always some thing, another of the defect which is only the lack of due moral perfection; for, speaking of the effect, it cannot be chance with respect to God, not only because it is foreknown, but also because it is caused not only per accidens but per se by God Himself, and so can be said to be in some way intended, at least as regards the will which God had of concurring to that effect, the secondary cause also concurring. And for this reason no natural effect can be called chance with respect to God, not only on account of foreknowledge, but also on account of per se efficiency and some intention of such effect which God had by the very fact that He willed to procreate such natural causes apt for such effect and to concur with them. Hence some effects too which with respect to particular causes are reckoned chance, with respect to universal causes, as the heavens (if they concur per se to such effect), are not chance, as monsters and certain other things which are said to be generated per accidens. But the defect which is conjoined to the effect in sin, in order that it be not chance, need not be per se intended, because this is beside its notion, since no one operates intending evil; it is enough, then, that it be foreseen and permitted; especially since it is always ordained by God to punishment, or to be the occasion of some greater good; ordained (I say) not by a preordination which according to reason precedes foreknowledge, but which follows. And simply speaking, such effect can never be chance or fortuitous with respect to God, as St. Thomas rightly teaches, I, q. 103, a. 7, ad 2, and q. 116, a. 1, ad 2; and Augustine, bk. LXXXIII Quaest., q. 24; Boethius, I De Consol., prose 1.

On chance as it signifies the cause

5. Chance is a cause per accidens.—From what we have said about the chance effect it is easy to declare what chance is, as by this word the very cause of the chance effect is signified. For it must be said that it is not some peculiar cause instituted per se for such effect, but can be any created efficient cause, inasmuch as, by accident and beside intention, another rare and wholly accidental effect is conjoined with its per se effect. This is the opinion of Aristotle and of other philosophers in the places cited; and St. Thomas declares it, I, q. 16, a. 1,¹ because this effect contingent in the said way, as such, is not absolutely a being nor one, but in a qualified sense, namely, one per accidens; therefore it is not necessary that it have a cause simply and per se, at least a natural one, but only per accidens; therefore chance is not a determinate cause per se, but only a cause per accidens. The antecedent is evident, for the contingent effect is, for example, that one digging a grave finds a treasure; but this is not one thing; and therefore (says St. Thomas) there can be no cause in nature which per se inclines to that effect, because a natural cause always tends to something properly one. But we deservedly speak of a natural cause, because an intellectual cause can per se intend, as one, that which is per accidens, as that concurrence of causes or effects; and therefore among intellectual causes there can be a per se cause of this effect, as we said a little before of God; but then with respect to that cause the effect will not be contingent, because it will not be beside its intention. Hence the reason can be concluded in this way: for if chance were a per se cause, it would be either intellectual or natural; not the former, because an intellectual cause is then per se when it operates from knowledge and intention; but the chance effect is beside intention; nor the latter, because nature does not incline to what is one per accidens in that way; therefore chance is not the per se cause of any effect.

6. How God is the cause of a chance effect.—You will say: then neither is God the per se cause of a chance effect as such; the consequent is false, for to be chance is something in the effect; but there is nothing in the effect which is not per se from God. It is answered that to be chance adds nothing real to the effect, but a denomination taken from the conjunction or relation to such cause, by means of its per se effect. Next it is said that God per se causes the contingency of effects, because He Himself willed that such effects should take place by chance, not however that they should be constituted in the notion of chance effects through order to God—for that was repugnant—but through relation to the created cause; which relation God Himself also causes, in the way in which it can be or be made.

7. Again you will say: what effect is it which in events of this kind takes place wholly per accidens and without a per se cause, since everything which is per accidens must be reduced to a per se cause? It is answered that it is not necessary that every effect, whatever it be, have a per se cause, but it is enough that it be conjoined to the per se effect of some cause, and in this sense it is to be understood when it is said to be reduced to a per se cause. And so it happens in the present case; for example, in the example of the finding of a treasure, that gold was generated there was per se from some cause; the very digging of the earth too is done per se and from intention by the man. But that conjunction is so per accidens that it has no created per se cause, and therefore the finding of the treasure, which comes from it, is called a fortuitous effect, whose per accidens cause is partly the man digging the earth, partly he who placed the gold in that place; and the same holds in similar cases.

8. It must further be noted that these per accidens and contingent effects come about not only from the concurrence of efficient causes, but also from the fortuitous concurrence of the efficient cause with the material; for thus monsters are generated, which come about rarely, on account of the disposition of the matter; then, however, the effect is not chance with respect to the material cause, but with respect to some efficient. Which Avicenna did not sufficiently note, bk. I Sufficient., c. 13, and therefore he said that chance effects are not only those which come about rarely, but also those which come about ad utrumlibet, that is, which can equally come about and not come about for some subject, as with respect to a surface that it become white or black. But this is not rightly said, for chance does not signify the material cause but the efficient, with respect to which no effect is contingent ad utrumlibet except in free causes. For natural ones are determined to one; but in free ones such effect is not chance from that head, but free; it will, however, be chance if it is beside intention, which is not found properly except in those which are rarely conjoined to per se intended effects. But the indifference of the material potency contributes nothing to an effect's being called chance, both because the effect does not follow by virtue of it, and also because on its part the effect is not per accidens or beside intention; for this properly pertains to the efficient cause, as is established per se.

9. What fortune is.—Finally, from these things it is easily established what is to be said of fortune, about which the Gentiles told many fables, who, ignorant of the cause of many chance effects which happen to men, feigned a certain goddess whom they called Fortune, who should be the cause of these effects. But this fiction was attacked, among others, by St. Augustine, bk. IV De Civit., c. 18, and Lactantius, bk. III De Vera Sapientia, cc. 28 and 29; and Albert may be read, II Phys., tract. III, c. 10, and Scotus in Quodl., q. 21. It must be said, then, that the fortuitous effect is formally of the same notion as the chance effect, and differs only in that it is called fortuitous specially in human affairs, or with respect to an agent acting from purpose, from reason and proper elicited intention. Hence fortune too is a cause per accidens of the same notion as chance, and only says determinately that it is a cause acting from purpose which is per accidens with respect to the effect following beside intention. Hence it can happen that the same effect is fortuitous and chance, or from fortune and chance, with respect to diverse things; as the finding of a treasure is fortune with respect to the man digging the earth, but chance with respect to the natural cause generating the gold. But if it was not generated there, but placed there by another man, he too is a cause as fortune; yet with respect to him it will be called bad fortune, with respect to the other good; for these names do not signify diverse per se causes, or divine ones, but denominations taken from prosperous or adverse effects. And so Aristotle explained the notion of fortune, II Phys., c. 5, and in the book On Good Fortune.

10. The effects of fortune lie under the divine will.—Only two things are to be noted. One is that fortune was so taken by some philosophers as if its effects were subject to no providence at all, and were intended, foreseen or ordained by no cause even supreme. And for this reason St. Augustine sometimes reproves himself, as in I Retract., c. 1, for having used the name of fortune; but we subject all fortune to divine providence, because nothing happens to us by chance which is not either ordained or permitted by God, as was declared above, and as was elegantly said by Augustine, bk. III De Trin., c. 4, in these words: Nothing takes place visibly and sensibly which is not either commanded or permitted from the interior invisible and intelligible court of the supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions, in this most ample and immense commonwealth, as it were, of the whole creation. And he touched on the same in bk. LXXXIII Quaest., in q. 24. The other thing to be observed is that some effects take place in us which we think fortuitous because we are ignorant of their cause, although they are not effects which come about from us per accidens, but take place per se in us from some superior cause; as when someone, intending or premeditating nothing of the kind, feels some good motion of mind in himself, or when someone about to go by this way is as it were seized by the desire and will of going by another way, and so escapes the ambushes of enemies, it is called fortune by men; yet that effect has a per se cause intending it, namely some angel or God Himself. And therefore Augustine said, I Retract., c. 1, and bk. I Against the Academics, that that is commonly called fortune which is ruled by a hidden order and has a secret reason and cause. Which the Philosopher too touched on, book On Good Fortune, c. 2. And so much about fortune and about created efficient causes.