Disputationes metaphysicae

Various errors

1. There was an ancient opinion of some philosophers who attributed all the effects of the universe to fate. They placed fate, however, in a certain connection and order of the causes of the universe, from which they said that all things come of necessity, as Cicero reports of the Stoics, bk. I De Divinat., near the end, and Diogenes Laertius, bk. VII, in the life of Zeno. That force, however, they attributed chiefly to the stars and to their positions and dispositions, the motions of the heavens being added; for from these, by inevitable necessity, come the various aspects and concurrences of the causes of the universe, from which they said that with the same necessity all effects in this lower world come about. Hence they defined fate as the binding together of causes, drawing its efficacy from the motions and power of the stars, as Albert reports, bk. II Phys., tract. II, c. 19, from Apuleius and others. And many of them asserted this not only of natural effects but also of human actions, both virtuous and evil. For they thought that the heavenly bodies inflow with the same force and direct action into human wills as into other things, as Augustine reports, bk. IV Confess., c. 3, and bk. V De Civit., c. 1. Where he also notes (which Plotinus too reports, Ennead III) that some of these were so stupid as to deny that this disposition of the causes of the universe, to which they ascribed fatal necessity, had proceeded from the divine wisdom or will, but held that it has of itself an intrinsic and wholly inevitable necessity.

2. Others, however, although they did not deny that this order of secondary causes proceeded from the divine will, nevertheless attributed to it a wholly inevitable necessity, even with respect to God, because perhaps they believed that God acts from necessity of nature. Castro, Against the Heresies, under the words Freedom and Future contingent, reports that among the heretics Peter Abelard thought so; and he reports the same of Wyclif, that he said all things come about with so inevitable a necessity that not even God Himself could have founded things otherwise than He founded them, nor govern them otherwise than He governs them; and that from them so founded and governed no other actions can come forth than come forth. Many other heretics too have in fact followed this opinion as it was asserted by the said philosophers.

3. Others, however, placed the necessity of fate not in the stars but in the divine will; so Seneca, bk. II Natural. Quaest., c. 35: As (he says) the water of rushing torrents does not run back upon itself, nor even delay, because that which comes on hurls down the former, so the eternal series rules the order of fate, whose first law is to stand by its decree. And at once, c. 36, defining fate, he says it is the necessity of all things and actions which no force may break. The same very well in bk. IV De Beneficiis, c. 7. And Plato seems to have been of the same opinion, last dialogue of the Republic. Certain new heretics too (which we can attribute to Calvin and his followers) introduced this kind of fate, although perhaps not under that name; for they teach that all things come about of necessity, not from the influx of the heavens alone, but from the superior influx of God so moving and applying all secondary causes to acting that they of necessity do that to which they are impelled, and nothing else. This necessity, however, they subject to the divine will, and with respect to it they say it is simply variable; although, the eternal disposition of God being supposed, now immutable, by which He decreed so to found, govern and impel all things that all come about of necessity, it is with respect to creatures simple necessity, but with respect to God necessity of immutability.

Resolution

4. In this doctrine of fate so explained many errors are contained, not only against the Catholic faith but also against natural reason, as can easily be established from what has been treated so far. On account of which the thing itself has been condemned by the Church in some councils, and has been most diligently attacked by the holy Fathers, and the very name of fate is odious to all Catholics, although some, a sound interpretation being added, do not think it wholly to be rejected.

The said errors are noted and refuted

5. The first.—First, then, to attribute to secondary causes a fatal necessity independent of God is plainly foolish and against natural reason. This is to be proved in no other way than by demonstrating that all things depend on God in becoming, being and operating; which we shall carry out in the three following disputations.

6. The second.—Secondly, to establish the necessity of fate under the causality and influx of God, inevitable even to God Himself, is repugnant to natural reason. It is proved, because that opinion includes either two errors or one only, namely, either that God is not omnipotent, or at least that He does not operate freely whatever He operates outside Himself; for, if God has these two perfections, what disposition, influence or necessity of secondary causes can there be which He cannot change or impede by His omnipotent and free will? But that there are in God omnipotence and free will we shall demonstrate below, disputing about God and His attributes. The conclusion, however, is to be understood of simply inevitable necessity; for if the discourse is of inevitability only in a qualified sense, coming namely from the immutability of God, from this side there will be no error, if it is not mixed in from elsewhere, as we shall say.

7. The third.—Thirdly, to establish such a necessity of fate as flows from the influx of the stars and of other natural causes to all inferior causes, comprehending under them human wills too, is an error also repugnant to natural reason. This conclusion is understood, however, even if this necessity is posited as dependent on the divine will and changeable through it. It is proved, because a fatal necessity of this kind destroys the freedom of choice. On which title that opinion was condemned in the First Council of Braga, c. 9, and by Leo I, epist. 91, cc. 11 and 13, and against it Eusebius gathers much, bk. VI De Praepar. Evang., c. 5 and following, and Chrysostom also writes at length in the orations on Providence, and Augustine, the said bk. V De Civit., almost throughout; and Gregory of Nyssa or Nemesius, bk. VI of his Philosophy; Boethius, bk. VI De Consolat., and others frequently. Indeed the philosophers too attacked this kind of fate, as is taken from Aristotle, bk. I Ethic., c. 1, and bk. I De Interp., last chapter, and Ammonius and other interpreters there, and bk. II Phys., c. 6, where Simplicius, Themistius and others; and Alexander of Aphrodisias, book On Fate; Plutarch, book On Fortune; see other things in Julius Sirenus, book On Fate. The foundation of that opinion also includes another error, namely, that the influx of the heavens falls directly and per se on human souls and wills; which is against the immateriality of the soul, and consequently against its immortality.

8. Fourthly, to establish that fate by attributing it to the efficiency and influx of the first cause necessitating all secondary causes, even rational wills, to single effects, is an error both against faith and also against natural reason. It is proved from what has been said, because in this way too free choice is destroyed. Hence in this sense too this fatal necessity has been condemned, although not under the name of fate, in the Council of Trent, sess. VI. And it is declared by philosophical reason; for either among secondary causes there are some which by their nature do not need for acting that necessitating motion of God, or there are none such; if the latter is said, then there is no cause of itself free and indifferent. But if the former is said, then either the first cause always draws the secondary cause out of its natural mode of operating, which is foreign to all right reason, because the first cause, according to the ordinary mode of providence, cooperates with the secondary only so far as it needs, as we shall say below; or certainly the secondary cause is not always so necessitated to act by the first, which is what we intend; therefore hence it comes about that the position of fate in the aforesaid sense is wholly false.

In what sense fate can be admitted as to the thing itself

9. Fifthly, to establish fate in that sense in which it extends only to the effects of natural causes to which neither the angelic nor the human creature in any way concurs by its freedom, and in those effects to posit fatal necessity coming from the series and order of the causes of the universe, inevitable by secondary causes, and by the first according to its ordinary power and according to the mode of operating and concurring connaturally due to causes of this kind, or also from the immutability of some decree or predefinition of God Himself, not however from His absolute power and will—in this way (I say) the establishment of fate contains no error, but true doctrine, although in the use of words moderation must be kept, as we shall say below. This whole assertion is established from what was said in the preceding section, nor is it necessary to add any other proof or declaration. In this sense, however, Luis Vives reports from Plutarch and others, on V De Civit. Dei, cc. 1 and 10, that the Stoics and Plato posited fate, for they excepted human wills and free actions from the necessity of fate. Hence Damascene too, bk. II De Fide, c. 25, without naming them, reports that the philosophers did not posit fate about human actions which are contingent, but about necessary ones. And similarly Tertullian, book On the Soul, c. 20, says that the philosophers too distinguished fate and the freedom of choice; and he adds from his own opinion: And we according to faith already know that these are to be distinguished by their proper title.

10. But you will ask whether fate, with respect to such effects, is an efficient cause, or what it is; for some think that fate formally signifies a certain relation, because Boethius, De Consolat., prose 4, defines fate as the order of secondary causes executing divine providence; but order imports relation. So it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 116, a. 2, ad 3. But it must be said that fate of this kind is neither a relation alone—for this contributes nothing to effecting—nor some one efficient cause—for none by itself alone suffices to induce that necessity which fate indicates—but is a collection of causes so disposed by divine providence as is necessary in order that such effect follow. This is established from the very explanation of fate which we have handed down and from the assertion laid down. But that disposition of causes, which others call order or series, is not a relation, but says in the single causes and in all an application accommodated so that such effect can follow; which application indeed is not a relation, although perhaps it is the foundation of a relation, or is declared by us by way of relation. And so St. Thomas above can be expounded of relation for its foundation, from the same St. Thomas, opusculum On Fate, which is the 28th, c. 5, where he thinks that fate says a condition of the cause. And the same is meant by those who number fate among efficient causes. See Alexander, the said opusculum On Fate, c. 2. But from what has been said it may be understood that under this collection of causes are comprehended not only efficient but also material causes; for on these in great part the necessary consecution of such effect depends; fate is reduced rather to the efficient cause, however, because this is what per se induces the effect, such matter and the other conditions required for acting being supposed. Again it is gathered from what has been said that fate, according to this interpretation, is not always the per se cause of all effects; for some are effects per accidens which are chance with respect to particular causes, as we shall say below, which do not have a per se cause, as will be proved there. Hence with respect to the collection of all natural causes they come about necessarily, yet they cannot be attributed to any per se natural cause which may be called fate; so, then, the said conclusion is to be limited.

What is to be thought of the name of fate

11. Sixthly, to place fate in the disposition of natural causes inasmuch as they are subject to divine providence and operate infallibly according to its preordination or permission and foreknowledge contains in the thing itself no error, but rather Catholic doctrine, consonant also with natural reason; the mode of speaking, however, must be corrected or sufficiently explained. This whole conclusion is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 116, a. 1, and from Augustine, whom he cites, V De Civit., c. 1, saying: If anyone calls the will or power of God by the name of fate, let him keep the opinion and correct the tongue. And Boethius intends the former part of this assertion in the place cited above, while he tries to bring the name of fate back to a fitting and true signification. And many think the opinion of Plato and Seneca reported above can be reduced to the same; for they did not intend to deny the freedom of our choice. Which Plutarch also seems to think, bk. I De Placitis, c. 27, and Aristotle, book On the World to Alexander, near the end, where he speaks very well on this matter. Indeed Augustine, V De Civit., c. 10, teaches that the Stoics too did not think otherwise of fate nor take away the freedom of choice, as was touched upon above. And finally it is declared, because through fate so expounded nothing else is signified except that secondary causes are subordinated to divine providence, inasmuch as all these causes are ordered by God to producing these effects, which is most certain. Next it is signified that these secondary causes operate nothing which is not both foreseen and preconceived or pre-spoken by God (for the name fatum is thought to be said from fari, to speak) and also in some way preordained or permitted, and, speaking more generally, provided for; which also is most certain and consonant with natural reason, as we shall show below in disputing about the attributes of God. And hence it comes about that in order to divine providence there is a certain infallibility, or, as Boethius says, immobility in the effects of secondary causes; because they can never wholly escape the order of the providence of God. And this immobility is declared by the name of fate. Which does not exclude the contingency or freedom of some causes, because it does not consist in absolute necessity, but in the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence and its immutability, to which corresponds a similar necessity in the effects of secondary causes, which is called necessity from supposition or of consequence; because it cannot happen that they come about otherwise than they were foreknown, as St. Thomas explains above, a. 3. It must be noted, however, that even this signification being admitted, it is not rightly attributed to God, as St. Thomas notes in the same place from Boethius above. For fate is the disposition of causes as it is under God, but is not properly God Himself or the will of God except causally, as Augustine sometimes speaks, bk. V De Civit., c. 1, and Seneca and Aristotle above. And the very name fatum agrees, which is said from fari, whence it signifies that which has been spoken, not him who has spoken. Add that neither is fate properly attributed in the said signification to the free acts of the created will, because free choice is subject immediately to God and not to other causes or their disposition except per accidens and remotely; and therefore the proper acts of free choice can be attributed to fate either in no way, or only most improperly, by calling the very providence of God and His immediate influx fate.

12. And hence finally the last part of the assertion is established, which is only about the use of this word fate; whose use St. Thomas says the holy Fathers refused on account of those who placed fate in the influx of the stars. Which is established to be true from those cited above, and from Augustine, bk. V De Civit., c. 9, and tract. XXXVII on John, and Gregory, homily 10 on the Gospels, and Gregory of Nyssa, bk. VI Philosoph., c. 2, or otherwise Nemesius, book On the Soul and its Faculties, cc. 35 and 36. And the reason is that fate from its primitive imposition was instituted to signify the root of fatal necessity, which those who invented the name fate thought to be absolute necessity; and therefore in its proper signification it cannot be attributed to all secondary causes, even as they are subject to divine providence. From which it also comes about that neither are the natural effects which come about in this lower world to be said to come about by fate in that propriety, because regularly they never come about without the intervention of some free cause, either angelic or human; so that neither rains, winds and similar effects, which seem most natural, are to be said to come from fatal necessity; for, God permitting or ordaining, they are often impeded or aroused by means of some action of good or evil spirits. For this reason, then, the name of fate is not to be used by us absolutely; but if someone, correcting its signification, wishes to use it, one must not contend with him; the declaration or correction, however, is that the name fate signify only the series of causes subject to divine providence, which does not impose necessity on them, but lets each act in the mode proportioned to itself. Alexander of Aphrodisias adds, book On Fate, c. 3, that fate sometimes signifies the nature of each thing, and that signification has a foundation in Aristotle, bk. V Phys., c. 6, text 57, where they call natural generation or corruption fatal. According to which signification fate has neither greater necessity than nature nor greater universality. Hence, just as not all things come about by natural order or necessity, but some freely, others by chance, so not all things take place by fate. Nevertheless, this signification of that word neither seems to be in common use nor to have foundation in the etymology of that word by which fatum is said from fari, as we noted from Augustine; wherefore, in order that fate be something, divine foreknowledge and providence is not to be excluded.