Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The second difficulty touched upon above was how the will is called a formally free power, since in its chief acts it is found not free. In which difficulty two questions are intimated. One is whether the will can elicit some acts freely and others of necessity. The other is, if it can do both, which acts it exercises freely and which necessarily.

The former point, on the twofold mode of operating of the will

2. On the former part the opinion of Scotus can be reported here, In I, dist. 2, q. 7, and dist. 10, q. 1, and in Quodl., q. 16, in which places he asserts that of one power there can be only one mode of operating; and therefore, since the will by its nature is free in operating, it cannot have another mode of operating in its acts; and so he concludes that the will exercises all its acts freely, so much so that he asserts that God too loves Himself freely, and that the Father and the Son (for the same reason) freely produce the Holy Spirit. But in this there cannot be controversy among Catholics, if there is no equivocation in the word freedom. Scotus, then, in the place cited, does not take free as it is opposed to necessary, but as it is opposed to coerced or non-voluntary. For there he expressly confesses (nor could he have denied it without heresy) that the procession of the Holy Spirit is wholly necessary, so that it implies a contradiction that it not be, or that God not love Himself; he contends, however, that necessity is not repugnant to freedom, but rather confirms and perfects it; and conversely that the natural mode of operating is repugnant to the will, because free and natural are modes of operating not only diverse but also opposed.

3. Nevertheless the whole discourse of Scotus is founded on an equivocation of names; for he clearly takes free for the perfect voluntary which follows upon intellectual cognition and without controversy sometimes admits necessity; and we freely grant to Scotus that this acceptation of the word free is not wholly unusual; for St. Thomas too sometimes uses it, as is evident from q. 10 De Potent., a. 2, ad 5, when he says that God loves Himself freely. We, however, as we noted in section II, do not take free in this way, but as it adds something beyond the voluntary; for it is distinguished from it by the Philosopher, III Ethic., cc. 4 and 5; but it is not distinguished from it with respect to the human will unless the free excludes necessity in operating, as the other theologians taught, In II, dist. 24 and 25; and Alexander of Hales, II, q. 72, memb. 3, a. 5; and St. Thomas, q. 6 De Malo; and it is sufficiently established from those things by which we proved that we are free from the necessity of acting.

4. The same will can love some things freely, others necessarily.—This true sense, then, being supposed, it must be said in the present matter that it is not repugnant that the same will love some things freely, and others not freely but necessarily. It is evident by induction, because the divine will necessarily loves God Himself, but other things not necessarily but freely; and the same is found, due proportion being kept, in the created will. The a priori reason, however, which at the same time dissolves the foundation of Scotus, if it is applied against this, is that those two do not include opposition, because they are not with respect to the same. For that the same act should be at once and according to the same free and necessary plainly involves contradiction; but that diverse acts, and about diverse objects, or through diverse means, one proceed freely and the other necessarily from the same power, there is no repugnance. Nor is it necessary that the other mode of operating be adequate to such a power, for it can be a superior and more universal power; likewise it can have about one act a twofold power, namely, of acting and of not acting, but about another only one, namely, of acting. Finally this difference can be founded in the objects themselves, and thence the a priori reason is taken, as will be declared at once in the other part proposed in this section.

5. From which it is understood what is to be said of this same thing under those terms freely and naturally; for in this latter word too there is an equivocation in Scotus above. For sometimes that is said to operate naturally which operates not only from the impulse of nature but also without previous cognition, and consequently without elicited appetite; and this natural excludes not only the free but also the voluntary, in which way we say that earth is moved naturally, fire heats, etc.; and in this sense what Scotus says is true, that the will cannot operate freely and naturally, even in diverse acts, because it must operate with previous cognition and voluntarily. In another way, however, not less usual, that operation is called natural which is from the inclination of nature as wholly determined to one, even if at the same time it is from previous cognition and from vital appetite, and finally voluntarily, in which way brutes are said to move themselves naturally or to desire something; and in this way St. Thomas says excellently, I, q. 41, a. 2, and q. 8, aa. 1 and 2, that it is not repugnant that the same power of the will which exercises several acts freely should elicit some naturally, because the will itself has its proper nature, by which it can be determined to some act, although it is not determined to all on account of the difference of objects, as we shall see at once.

6. Why the will cannot be moved except voluntarily.—But someone will ask: since the will operates both voluntarily and freely, why is it repugnant to it to have another mode of operating than the voluntary, but not repugnant to have another mode of operating than the free? It is answered that this happens because the former mode is adequate to the will, but not the latter; for the will is adequately will, but is not adequately free choice; for this is as it were inferior or more limited; for free choice necessarily includes the will or principle of a voluntary act, as was declared above, and adds freedom, that is, indifference or power of not operating. Next, this reason can be explained more from the objects; for the adequate object of the will is the good, which must necessarily be supposed known, because the will essentially is an elicitive appetite; and therefore it necessarily operates with previous cognition and by way of appetition; and this is to operate voluntarily. But under this adequate object there can be various objects differing much in goodness, and therefore also lovable in diverse ways as to freedom or necessity. Finally, that an act elicited by appetite is voluntary consists in a positive mode of such act, so intrinsic that it is not distinguished from the act, and therefore is inseparable from it; but free in the act only superadds a denomination from the power, inasmuch as it is able not to elicit or to suspend it, which denomination can fail to belong to the act if the will does not have such power over the act.

The latter point: to what objects the will is necessitated

7. About the latter part various questions could be treated about the necessary acts of the will, either in the present life or also in the future. But those questions have their proper places, either in the science of the soul or in theology; here they are touched upon only so far as they are necessary to explain in general the various modes of efficient causes and the necessity or contingency of the effects of the universe, and to solve the difficulties occurring about this; for the whole of this disputation tends to this. Chiefly, however, a certain opinion of many is to be treated, saying that the will is free only in the election of means, not in the love or intention of the end. Which opinion can have a foundation in Aristotle, III Ethic., cc. 2 and 3, where he says that consultation is not about the end, but only about means. From which an argument can be constructed; for everything free can fall under consultation; but nothing can fall under consultation except election; therefore nothing is free except election. The major is evident, for in everything free there is some indifference and reason of tending or not tending; therefore it can fall under consultation whether such object or such act is expedient or not. And it is confirmed, first, for the will is so compared to free choice as the intellect to reason; but the intellect, as it is reason, is not concerned with principles, but with what it gathers from principles; therefore the will, as free choice, is not concerned with the end, but with what it chooses for the sake of the end; for, as Aristotle said, bk. VI Ethic., c. 2, as principles are to speculable things, so are ends to operable things. It is confirmed, secondly, because it is necessary that everything variable and mobile be founded on something invariable and immobile; but free election is of itself variable; therefore it must be founded on something invariable; but it is founded on the intention of the end; therefore this must be invariable and not free.

8. How the intention of the end is necessary.—But this opinion needs moderation and declaration. Let us suppose, then, in the first place, the common distinction of twofold necessity and freedom, namely, as to the exercise of the act or as to specification, the exposition of which terms is sufficiently established from the foregoing. Again, let the distinction of twofold end be supposed, namely, proximate or particular and ultimate or universal; of which partition we must speak ex professo below in the disputation on the final cause; now briefly, a particular end is called any private good which is loved for its own sake, as health or knowledge. But the ultimate is called the very happiness of man, whether this is constituted in some determinate thing or taken in general, or under the formal notion of beatitude absolutely, or under the more universal notion of good in general. Moreover, let us now omit the state of the future life, and especially of supernatural happiness already obtained, about which it does not pertain to the metaphysician to consider. The theologians, however, dispute at length whether in that state the will is determined of necessity even as to exercise to the love of God; for Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, denies that even in that state this necessity has place in any act of the will; but St. Thomas teaches the contrary opinion, I, q. 82, a. 2; Capreolus, In I, dist. 1, q. 3; Cajetan, there, a. 2; Ferrariensis, III Cont. Gent., c. 62; and others commonly, which opinion we suppose as truer; here, however, we treat only of the will operating according to its nature, and especially for the state of this life.

9. And in this sense we say, first, that the will has no act simply necessary as to exercise, whether about the end or about means. So St. Thomas, in the said place, I, and I-II, q. 10, a. 2, and the Thomists commonly. It is proved, however, by St. Thomas, because the will in this life can always turn away the thought of any good proposed to it. Which reason does not seem universal or universally true, and so not sufficiently to prove the assertion; for the first thought of a man is merely natural, which the man cannot turn away; therefore it is not always in the will of man to turn away the thought. Which difficulty Cajetan touched upon in that article, and grants that the first thought is not in the power of the will; and similarly he grants that the first love or first act of the will is necessary as to exercise, as he taught in I-II, q. 9, a. 4. Nor does he think this is against St. Thomas in the former place, because St. Thomas (he says) does not simply deny that the will has some act necessary as to exercise, but denies that the will suffers that necessity from the object, which is true, because it comes only from the natural condition and propensity of the will itself. And similarly he says that the will, so far as concerns the force of the object, can turn away every thought, and that St. Thomas asserts only this, to whom it is not repugnant that sometimes from such disposition or another cause it cannot turn away such thought.

10. I, however, in the first place think that interpretation contrary to St. Thomas and to the truth. The first is evident, for St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 2, absolutely denies necessity as to exercise in our will outside the beatific vision, and does not speak only on the part of the object, but absolutely of the will itself. The second is evident, because, just as the will has no act except with the object concurring in its genus, so it suffers no necessity in its act (I speak of intrinsic and connatural necessity) which is not caused by the object in its genus, namely, in the notion of final cause, attracting and moving metaphorically. Hence even in the state of beatitude God clearly seen so moves the will that in the notion of object and ultimate end He determines it of necessity to one; for that necessity too is intrinsic and connatural to the will as informed by charity. Which is not repugnant to St. Thomas in the other place, I-II, q. 10, a. 2, because there he speaks of the will of the wayfarer tending to beatitude; rather this doctrine is taken from the same St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 2, argument 2, with its solution; for the argument was that the object is compared to the will as mover to mobile; but motion follows of necessity in the mobile from the mover. He answers, however, that the mover then of necessity causes motion in the mobile, when the power of the mover exceeds the mobile, so that its whole possibility is subjected to the mover; but since the possibility of the will is with respect to universal and perfect good, its whole possibility is not subjected to any particular good; and therefore it is not moved of necessity by it. Therefore St. Thomas clearly thinks that the whole possibility of the will is subjected to universal and perfect good, and therefore it is moved of necessity by it. Hence, whenever St. Thomas gives the reason of some act of the will necessary from within, he always assigns it on the part of the object, as may be seen in the places cited.

11. The first act of the will in one using reason is not necessary as to exercise.—And hence further I think that what Cajetan says is false, namely, that the first act of the will in a man already using reason is necessary as to exercise; although other Thomists think the same about this, as Ferrariensis, bk. I Cont. Gent., c. 23, and more clearly bk. III, c. 89; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 24, q. 1, ad 7, who also adds that that act is not actively from the will, but only passively, which is improbable, as we touched upon above in disputing about the efficient cause. And similarly it is false that it is simply necessary, as Scotus rightly taught, in Quodl., q. 21, and Henry, Quodl. XII, q. 26; and Conrad thinks the same, I-II, q. 9, a. 4, and other expositors there. And it is proved, because the will is never moved necessarily as to exercise unless the object itself in its genus sufficiently concurs to that necessity and wholly subjects the will to itself; but the object which is proposed through the first thought is not of this kind, because often it is some particular and deficient good; therefore. Likewise, otherwise the first volition of the angel would have been necessary as to exercise, and consequently there would have been no merit in it, which is foreign to the common doctrine of the theologians, especially of the school of St. Thomas. Likewise, if the foundation of Cajetan or Ferrariensis were solid, not only the first act of the will of the whole life would be necessary as to exercise, but also the first on each day, or whenever a man begins to advert through the intellect and to consent through the will. But the consequent is plainly false and against experience. And the sequel is evident, because the first thought on each day too is natural, and the first act of the will is from that alone, tending to the object by its own efficacy. But neither reason is of any weight, because, although the thought is natural, it can apply a non-necessitating object; and although the will alone effects that act, it can effect it freely, because through its very entity it has a certain eminent power for making that act and a natural inclination to it, and at the same time it also has the power by which it can restrain and suspend it.

12. The first act of the will of a man first using reason is not necessary as to specification.—From which, moreover, I add that that first act is not only not necessary as to exercise, but not even as to specification. It is proved by a proportional reason, because it can happen that the object applied through the first thought is not sufficient to bring in necessity, even as to specification; for it can happen that it is not beatitude nor good in general, but some particular good nearer to the senses, as health or some pleasure. Hence below, in treating of the final cause, we shall show that it is not necessary that the first act of the human will be about the ultimate end simply. And it is confirmed, for this first act in the human will can be both morally good and evil; for the first object proposed can be evil, which the will can either reject or embrace, and so operate well or badly. But whether the same holds as to this in the angelic will is a matter for another consideration.

13. To the objection made against the reason of St. Thomas, then, it is answered that, although the first thought of a man is natural, and therefore it is not in the power of the man not to have it for that instant in which he naturally receives it, yet it is in his power, as soon as he sufficiently adverts, to take it away; and this is sufficient for the will not to be necessitated as to exercise, since it is free either to consent or not to consent, but to divert the thought. Next, even if the first thought is natural, yet the judgement about the object to be loved or not loved can be not wholly natural, because, that natural thought standing, the will can apply the intellect to consider and inquire more into the thing in order to pass judgement. But if the intellect has not yet so sufficiently adverted that this is in the power of the will, there is not yet sufficient actual use of reason; and therefore there is not yet full freedom either; and thence follow the motions which theologians call indeliberate.

14. Finally I add that, even if full and perfect thought were wholly natural, if it did not propose the object as a wholly necessary good—indeed not only the object but the act itself—the will would not therefore be moved of necessity. And this I think is the a priori reason of the conclusion laid down. For the will, when it is borne to an object, not only wills the object, but also virtually wills the exercise of its act, because it is intrinsically voluntary, as was declared above; and therefore, in order that the will be necessitated as to exercise, it is necessary that the man apprehend and judge such exercise here and now as a simply necessary good, so that the lack of such act can be apprehended under no notion of good; but this in this life never happens about any act of the will, as is known by experience, and because there is no reason or occasion of such necessity. But if someone imagines that someone from error has here and now such a judgement about some object, and the exercise of the act about it, I shall easily grant from the hypothesis that such a man will operate necessarily; I say, however, that the supposition is humanly impossible in a man who is not stupid, or who does not lack sufficient use of reason.

15. The second assertion.—Secondly it must be said that, although about the end proposed under the notion of universal good the will is borne necessarily as to specification, yet, while it loves or intends other particular ends, it is done freely even as to specification. This assertion I think is consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas in the places cited, and as to the former part it is declared and proved, first, for, good in general being proposed, although the will is not compelled actually to love it, yet it cannot hate it, because it finds no notion of evil in it; and therefore, if it wills to exercise an act, it must be one of love and not of hate. And this is necessity as to specification. The same holds of happiness in general, for, as Augustine often says,¹ if a man is asked whether he wishes to be happy, there is no one who answers or can answer that he does not wish it, but he will either be silent or answer that he wishes it most of all; but this is necessity as to specification. The reason, however, is that in these and similar objects no notion of evil appears; but we suppose that nothing can be hated except under the notion of evil, just as nothing can be loved except under the notion of good.

16. As to the other part, the conclusion is also easily established by induction and reason; for he who intends to obtain knowledge, health or similar goods does not so love them that he cannot also hate or reject them; for in these particular goods there is sometimes found some defect or some disadvantage or difficulty, by reason of which they can displease the will. Indeed, under this notion even the love of God Himself is free, not only as to exercise but also as to specification, because, although God according to Himself is the universal good, yet He can be apprehended by way of a certain particular good, and in Him some notion of evil or disadvantage can be apprehended, at least in order to His effects; and much more can this disadvantage or difficulty be found in the intention or love of God Himself, and therefore He can easily be rejected by the will, and sometimes God Himself can even be held in hatred.

17. An objection taken from St. Thomas.—But someone will object St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, saying that man naturally through the will desires certain particular goods, as the cognition of truth, to be, and to live, and similar things; but natural appetition includes necessity at least as to specification. Hence in the same place, ad 1, he declares that in appetition of this kind the will operates by way of nature; but when the will operates as nature it tends with some determination to one, for this is the mode of operating of nature.

18. Solution and explanation of St. Thomas.—It is answered, first, that St. Thomas there does not speak of any necessity even as to specification, but of the mode of operating naturally, as is established from the title of the article; but that word naturally does not there signify the same as necessarily; for St. Thomas openly distinguishes these two words in that article and in the second. To be moved naturally, therefore, there signifies the same as to be moved from the propensity of nature; for St. Thomas intends there to teach that the will has a natural propensity not only to private advantages but also to the proper goods of the other powers or parts of the whole man. And in this way he says that it naturally desires knowledge, life, etc. With this natural propensity, however, freedom as to specification stands in the elicited appetite of these goods; because, as I said above, the will has the power either of suspending the act to which it is inclined or also of eliciting the contrary, when there can be in the object some other notion on which an act of this kind can be founded. And that this is the mind of St. Thomas is established from the solution ad 3, where, notwithstanding that natural motion or propensity, he adds that the will is determined to no particular good, but only to good in general. Where he speaks of determination as to specification; for, as he at once declares, a. 3, even to good in general the will is not determined as to exercise, but only as to specification. But it can further be added that with respect to these goods some necessity as to specification can be admitted, namely, either per se speaking and extrinsic reasons being excluded; for some of these goods are so consonant with nature that they can scarcely or in no way be hated, except very per accidens and on account of very extrinsic reasons. Indeed, even on account of these, these goods are very rarely hated in themselves, but their pursuit and procurement displeases on account of its difficulty, or because it impedes other sensible advantages. Or these too can be necessarily loved if they are apprehended as simply necessary for happiness; although then they are loved not so much as ends as means or parts of the necessary and universal end.

19. Thirdly it must be said that the freedom of the will is more evidently and perfectly exercised in the election of means, so much so that every free act, as such, participates in some way the notion of election, and under that notion can fall under consultation. The reasons made at the beginning of this doubt persuade this conclusion. And it is declared briefly, because the will is borne to the intention of the end from some natural inclination only, although it is borne freely; but to the election of means it is borne by virtue of the appetition of the end, which the will itself has joined to itself beyond the natural inclination; and therefore in a more special way, and more from its own resources, the will is said to move itself in the election of means than in the intention of the end; but it operates more perfectly freely when it moves itself more perfectly; therefore. Moreover, the other part is declared, because the freedom of any act comes from various notions which are in the object or in the act itself, and from the formal or at least virtual comparison of them. For if there is freedom as to specification, it is necessary that in the object there be some notion of good on account of which it can be loved, and some defect or some notion of evil on account of which it can be hated; but if there is freedom only as to exercise, it is necessary that either in the object or at least in the act itself there be some defect or lack of goodness on account of which it can be apprehended as here and now unfitting or at least not necessary; and so, whenever the act and its omission are free, there takes place between these notions a certain explicit or implicit comparison, and so there also takes place a certain election of one act before another, or of one act before its omission, or the contrary.

20. In this election of one before another, however, it is necessary that the comparison be made in order to some third thing or to some common notion, to which the will is in some way affected formally or virtually, in order that it can have some principle or foundation of the election to be made, as was proposed in the arguments at the beginning and is declared from the thing itself. For he who chooses between honest and delightful good is certainly supposed affected to good as such; otherwise he would not at once choose between special goods, but would first determine with himself whether good was to be pursued by him; and the same holds in all similar cases. Thus, then, although the tendency to a particular end, inasmuch as it is a motion to some object for the sake of its goodness and to others for its sake, is love or intention of the end, yet, inasmuch as it is a free act by which this good is preferred to others, it is a virtual election of this good as a means, or certainly as a part of the happiness which the will intends in its acts. And the very act of intention or love even of ultimate happiness, inasmuch as it is exercised freely here and now and is preferred to its lack or to idleness, is a virtual election by which such act here and now is chosen as a means to beginning or obtaining happiness. And for this reason it is commonly said that every intention of a particular end is a virtual election of happiness, for which it is not always necessary that an elicited intention of happiness itself precede, but a natural and necessary propensity suffices. Thus, then, every consultation is concerned in a proportioned mode with election, and every free action participates some notion of election; and therefore formal election itself, so properly so called, which proceeds from proper and elicited intention of the end, is reckoned the most free action; and for this reason free choice is said, as it were by antonomasia, to be concerned with election, although it has several other free acts, as has been declared.

21. Whether it is more perfect to operate freely or necessarily.—And by these things the reasons posited at the beginning of this doubt have been sufficiently answered. But to the difficulty referred here from the second section, on the occasion of which we made this section, it has already been declared how the same will is capable of both modes of operating, freely and necessarily. But when it is asked, if the mode of operating freely is more perfect than the mode of operating necessarily, why the will attains it in some acts and not in all, and in the less perfect and not in the more perfect, it must be said that to operate freely is not always and in all things better than to operate necessarily; but the rule of perfection is that the object be loved according to its dignity and capacity, so that, if the object is the highest and most necessary good, it is loved with complete necessity; but if the object is a less good one, or not necessary, the act too about it is under the dominion of the one loving. And for this reason God loves Himself necessarily and other things freely, although His act is most perfect under every notion; the same, therefore, must be said, due proportion being kept, in the created will.