Disputationes metaphysicae

1. But there still remain to be solved three difficulties touched upon in the fourth reason proposed in section 2, and in its confirmations. The first is: if the will can at pleasure will something against the judgement of reason, how is that dogma of the philosophers and of many theologians true, that there cannot be a defect in the will unless it precedes in the judgement, as something erroneous, or at least imprudent and inconsiderate? Which principle Aristotle handed down, bk. III Ethic., cc. 1, 3 and 5, and bk. VI, cc. 12 and 13, and bk. VII, c. 3, and bk. III De Anima, text 58, from which places that axiom was taken: Every sinner is ignorant. Which the Wise Man also seems to have taught, Prov. 14, saying: They err that work evil. And it can be confirmed, for otherwise it could happen that a man should always judge prudently through the intellect and yet be vicious in the will, which is against all moral philosophy and experience.

2. The first opinion.—In this difficulty Scotus and other authors do not reckon it a drawback to grant that there can be a moral defect in the will with no pre-existing defect in the intellect, because for failing morally the freedom of the created will suffices, whatever the intellect operates, as is evident from Scotus in the places cited above, with whom Gabriel and the nominalists commonly agree, In III, dist. 36; and Almain, Moralia tract. III, ch. on Prudence.

3. And Adrian follows almost this opinion, Quodl. IV; he limits or expounds it, however, saying that he who operates evilly always has a practical judgement by which he simply judges, consonantly with his affection, that this is to be done by him, or that it is fitting that this be done by him, such affection being supposed, although otherwise he is ignorant of nothing nor errs in the judgement about all the honesty and malice of the object or work.

4. This limitation, however, does not seem to be consistently added nor fully to satisfy, because it is not necessary that every evil affection of the will proceed from that practical judgement by which something is simply judged to be done consequently upon a prior affection. For either that affection or appetite which precedes such practical judgement is elicited by the will, or it signifies only the natural or even habitual propensity of the will. But in neither way is it necessary that such affection or a conformable practical judgement precede. For I take the first evil will which is in a man or an angel previously well affected and disposed even in natural or habitual inclination: in him no practical judgement precedes from some prior affection either evil or inclining to evil.

5. It can be answered that even then some natural or elicited inclination precedes, which, although it is not evil in itself, yet, because the man lets himself be so led by it that he judges not prudently but inconsiderately that something is to be done or loved by him, can be the occasion of sinning. As, for example, in the example which Adrian uses, if someone has the affection of freeing a man from death, and then understands that he cannot free him except by lying, even if that prior actual and elicited affection is not evil, the man can judge absolutely, consonantly with that affection, that he must lie. Similarly, from natural self-love, not evil, or even not elicited, someone judges that this delightful good is to be pursued by him. And in this way, before every morally evil act and before the first evil affection, there always precedes that practical judgement by which some less good object is simply proposed as to be loved, chosen or preferred even to another greater good, which judgement is called practically false because it is not conformed to right appetite.

6. But a difficulty still remains, because it is never sufficiently proved that this judgement so absolute is necessary in order that the will be moved, since I said above that a judgement is necessary not about the object as to be loved, but as lovable, nor as to be chosen, but as eligible, nor is a comparative judgement (so to speak) always necessary, namely, that this is eligible before others, but an absolute one suffices, namely, that this is eligible or useful. Or if it is comparative, it can be with equality, or with excess not simply but in such a notion of good, for instance of the delightful, etc.; for example, if from the intention of obtaining health someone consults about two means, and judges both to be apt and useful, but this more honest and that more delightful, and at the same time actually judges that according to reason or the law of virtue the former is to be preferred, but according to the inclination of the body or of sense the latter is to be put before it, no other practical judgement seems to be required in order that the will by its choice elect one of them; for no necessity of another judgement can be explained; for through what we have said the object is already sufficiently proposed, and judgement is required only to propose the object, as was said above from the opinion of St. Thomas, which he also has in I-II, q. 82, a. 4, and best in q. 22 De Verit., a. 11, ad 5, and a. 12.

7. And this can be declared further; for this absolute judgement, This is to be done (as Adrian noted above, and it is much to be noted for understanding all that we have said), can have three senses. The first is that it says only the futurity of the act, as when we say that Peter is to be chosen for the episcopate; and this sense is irrelevant to moral actions, as is established per se. The second is that it signifies the debt of law and honesty. And this sense too is irrelevant in the present matter, because it is clear that it is not necessary that everyone who operates freely judge so; otherwise, in order to operate evil, it would be necessary to have a heretical judgement, such as would be to judge of such an act that it is to be done in that sense. The third is that it signifies the necessary consecution of one thing from another, or the necessary connection of a subsequent work with a prior purpose or intention. As he who has decreed to take vengeance on an enemy, an occasion being offered, at once judges that he is to be killed. And this sense pertains more to the matter; yet it seems evident that such judgement too is not always necessary for operating either good or evil, because there does not always intervene that necessary connection between the work which is judged to be done and some antecedent affection, as the arguments made sufficiently prove.

8. We can add further a fourth sense, namely, that it signifies the absolute (so to speak) resolution of the man about executing such a work or willing an object. And this act, if the matter is attentively considered, cannot precede the free decree of the will, but follow it: both because that judgement in that sense cannot be inferred by virtue of the consultation from any premisses, which show only on the part of the object its goodness or utility, not the resolution of the man; and also because that resolution is free, and in reality is nothing else than free election or execution; for no other object of that judgement in that sense can be understood; but a man could not truly judge of such a free resolution unless he already had it; and finally because, since that judgement is absolutely free, it must arise from some free will; but there is no other free will from which it could arise except that by which the man decrees to do that which he so judges is to be done by him; therefore in no sense is it true that that practically false judgement necessarily precedes every evil deliberation of the will.

Resolution of the question

9. Wherefore in the proposed difficulty I think it must be said that we can speak of the judgement, disposition or defect of the intellect which precedes the free deliberation of the will, or which follows it, at least in the order of nature. Likewise, that the discourse can be either of physical and absolute necessity in order that the will be able to operate, or of moral necessity according to what, morally speaking, always happens.

10. First, then, I do not think it absolutely necessary, for operating evil through the will, that a defect of error precede in the judgement of the intellect, either speculative or practical. Which the arguments made sufficiently prove to me; and we confess that this follows from that principle that no judgement of the intellect per se suffices to determine the will. Nor can the opposite be founded on the words of Aristotle, since he speaks not of error but of ignorance. Nor on the words of the Wise Man, both because he does not speak of error preceding the will, but can be understood of that which follows, as I shall at once say; and also because Adrian expounds those words, and not badly, of an error of morals, not of understanding, as he is said to err who departs from the right way, even if he does not have a false judgement in the intellect.

11. Some defect of the intellect morally precedes the defect of the will.—Secondly I assert that, morally speaking, the will never slips without there preceding in the intellect some defect, at least some inconsideration of several reasons or motives which could restrain the will from that affection in which it sins. Experience sufficiently proves this, and the Philosopher can be understood of this inconsideration; for this inconsideration is called a certain practical ignorance. Indeed St. Thomas interprets the words of the Wise Man of it, I-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 1; because the judgement about things to be done or desired, absolutely pronounced with such inconsideration, is a certain practical error, for it is an imprudent act and of itself unconformed to right appetite. I do not understand, however, that it is necessary, even morally and according to what regularly happens, that this judgement be either formally comparative, namely, that this is to be chosen before another, or that it be formally about the object as wholly to be loved or done in any of the senses posited above; for against this the arguments made above sufficiently proceed; but I understand that morally and regularly there intervenes a judgement by which it is absolutely judged that this object or this work here and now is fitting on account of delight or honour or another similar reason, and worthy or sufficient to be sought here and now. For this judgement suffices in order that the will can be moved, as has been broadly proved, and I shall say below in the disputation on the final cause. But such judgement is frequently had in that absolute and simple mode; for regularly several judgements are not had together, nor are various objects compared among themselves, nor several notions of good and evil of the same object; indeed, although this comparison sometimes precedes, in that moment in which a man freely wills an evil object he regularly turns away the eyes of the mind from the other reasons and attends to that one which moves the will to such act, and so conceives the aforesaid judgement. And this is enough for it to be reckoned practically erroneous; for virtually it includes a comparison and preference of that object to others, and consequently includes unconformity to right appetite.

12. The practical judgement follows the free act of the will.—But I add, thirdly, that it is probable that from the free consent of the will about things to be done there follows of necessity in the intellect that practical judgement about the same things by which it is simply judged that this is to be done, in the third and fourth sense declared above. And if this is true, by reason of such judgement those who operate evil can deservedly be said always to err, even according to the intellect, not with speculative error but practical, and not with an error which precedes the free consent, but which follows from it. You will say: if such judgement in no way precedes the free consent, then it is not posited to represent the object to the will nor to induce it to consent; for what, then, is such an act necessary? It is answered that it seems necessary, first, from the natural sympathy and consensus of these powers, which was necessary in order that man might better execute what he decrees is to be done. Next, because prior in time or nature to a man's consenting, he does not know that he will consent; and therefore it is necessary that, as soon as he consents, he know and (so to speak) notify or promulgate to himself his consent; but this takes place through that judgement.

13. And hence it further comes about that, if that free consent is about some thing to be done, and therefore is to be committed to execution through some action, at once the intellect judges wholly practically that it is to be done; and this is the command which St. Thomas places in the intellect after the efficacious election of the will. But if the consent of the will is through simple love or delight without order to another action to be executed, then there does not follow in the intellect a judgement about some thing to be done which is as it were impulsive to the work; there follows, however, a judgement about such consent as already exhibited, and it can be called as it were a certain knowledge of approbation by which the man, by virtue of the evil free consent, as it were approving that consent, practically judges that that is to be loved by him. That, however, cannot be called command with respect to such consent of the will, because command as such regards a subsequent act; for what has already been done is not commanded, but what is to be done, as St. Thomas rightly notes, I-II, q. 17, a. 3. And these things seem enough about that first difficulty for the opportunity of this place. (See St. Thomas, II Cont. Gent., c. 48, and there Ferrariensis, about the third reason.)