Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The first opinion.—It still remains, however, that we reply to the difficulty proposed in favour of the second opinion, which requires another question, namely, how the will, while it wills freely, is determined by reason. In which the disciples of St. Thomas cited above, and other more recent writers, contend absolutely that the will cannot be determined to a free act unless there precedes in the intellect a definite practical judgement or, as others say, a command by which here and now, all things weighed, it pronounces a definite sentence that this is to be chosen by the man, or effects an impulse which is expressed by this word: do this. The reason can be that the will cannot be borne except to an object known and proposed by reason, since it is rational appetite, III Ethic., c. 2; therefore, until reason determinately judges what is to be chosen, the will cannot choose; otherwise it would tend to an unknown object, because true cognition is not without judgement; for by pure apprehension it is not yet known whether a thing is such or is not; therefore also conversely, that definite judgement standing, this is to be chosen, the will cannot not choose, because otherwise even then it would be led without reason, and formally, or at least virtually, would be borne to the unknown, because by not choosing, either by a formal or a virtual act, it rejects that object, or wills not to embrace such a means without any reason or judgement; it is repugnant, therefore, that the will operate so. On account of which perhaps Bernard said, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, that the will always has reason as its kinsman, because, although it is not always moved from reason, yet it is never moved without reason.

2. The second opinion.—This opinion, however, does not please Henry, nor yet Scotus and his disciples, as is evident from the places cited and from Antonius Andreas, IX Metaph., q. 2. And certainly the reason intimated in the preceding section, in reporting the second opinion, is irrefutable for me; for, if that judgement of reason is so prerequired for operating that in its genus it is a necessary cause of the free act of the will, and, that judgement being posited, the will cannot not consent to it, then the will is not such a power as, all the requisites for operating being absolutely posited, can will and not will; therefore it is not a free power. The whole inference seems evident according to the principles demonstrated above. And it is declared further; for, the judgement being posited, the will wills of necessity in the composite sense (as they say); which the authors of that opinion will easily grant, so much so that Medina, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, dub. 2, after the second conclusion, says that, an efficacious command standing on the part of the intellect, no freedom remains in the will to contradict. And he adds that the command does not have this efficacy from that will, per se speaking, because, since there is no going off to infinity, one must necessarily come to one command of the intellect anticipating every action of the will, which efficaciously carries the will along with it. And Bellarmine, who holds that opinion, bk. II De Grat. et libero arbit., c. 8, says that, just as the will of the blessed is determined to loving God when the vision of God is posited, so in any particular thing to be chosen the will is determined to one as to specification and as to exercise, and will in fact necessarily choose when there is present a particular practical judgement dictating here and now absolutely, all things considered, that this is to be chosen.

3. But then I ask again whether that judgement is absolutely and simply necessary, so that it is passed by the intellect by virtue of the object alone and an evident middle term, or of another cause necessitating the intellect to such judgement, or whether it is a simply free act. If the first is said, the use of freedom is evidently destroyed, because such use is discerned neither in passing the judgement itself nor in the act of the will which necessarily follows upon it. Nor does the composite sense help anything here, because that supposition with which the act is necessarily composed is in itself simply necessary and not free, and is antecedent as a cause necessitating the subsequent act; which mode of composition is found in beatific love, nor can an act of the will be necessary in any other way. But if it is said that that judgement is free (as Javellus finally concedes after useless and obscure distinctions, IX Metaph., q. 4), I ask again whether that judgement is free elicitively by the power of the intellect, or imperatively by the will. The first cannot be said in the opinion in which we who dispute this point agree, that the intellect is not a formally free power. But if the second is said, either there is a process to infinity or that opinion is wholly destroyed; for of that act of the will which determines the intellect to such judgement I ask whether it is determined by another judgement of the intellect, and of that the same argument will return, and so there will be a process to infinity. But if that free act of the will is not from the determination of a similar prior judgement, two things contrary to the opinion are inferred. The first is that the will is not determined in all its free acts by the judgement of the intellect; the second is that it is never so determined except in virtue of some prior free volition, by virtue of which the rest follow and participate freedom from it.

4. Someone will perhaps say that, that judgement standing, it is impossible for the will not to consent, but that the will can take away that judgement, and therefore its act is free and not necessary; but this reply does not satisfy the proposed argument, but tacitly and implicitly admits that that judgement is free; otherwise the will could not take it away; it does not declare, however, through what will it is free from the beginning. Nor is it enough if it is said that it is indirectly free because the will did not impede it, both because at least the will could have had a free volition by which it would impede that judgement, about which the same argument returns, and also because, although for the negation of an act the indirect voluntary may perhaps suffice, yet for the positive exercise of a free and commanded act it does not suffice, but a formally free act, commanding and determining the power, is necessary. Another evasion besides, which can be taken from Javellus above, does not weaken the force of the argument; for he says that that judgement is radically free, which it has from the intellect and not from the will; but this is not to answer the dilemma made, but to elude it, because to be radically free is nothing else than to be the root of the freedom which is in the will, about which there is no inquiry, but about formal freedom; for that very act of the intellect which is the root of the act of the will is truly and formally elicited by its power, and about it the inquiry is whether it is elicited by the power of necessity or with indifference. Others answer by distinguishing between speculative and practical judgement, because not the speculative but the practical determines the will. And this they say is free, even if it happens that the speculative is natural. But this does not weaken the proposed difficulty; for if, the whole speculative judgement about the fittingness, utility, honesty or baseness of the object being posited, and the other reasons or circumstances, the practical judgement about loving or choosing such a thing is free, about it the whole argument made returns, namely, by what the intellect is determined to such judgement. If by the intellect, then the intellect is free; if by the will, what determines it? And so it is concluded that the first free determination of the will takes place without such judgement, and that there is no judgement wholly determining the will to any act except in virtue of a prior free volition.

5. The third opinion.—Some say finally that that practical judgement is free by virtue of the will loving that object, and that the will itself loves that object by virtue of such judgement, and that those two acts are causes of each other in diverse genera of causes, because both the will determines the intellect to judge so practically, and the intellect determines the will to will such a thing. Nor is it repugnant (they say) that those two mutually precede and follow each other, because this takes place in diverse genera of causes. For the will determines the intellect efficiently, but the intellect the will finally. But this doctrine does not satisfy me; for first it is founded on no reason, nor is it necessary for anything; and from elsewhere that mutual priority and motion between those two acts can scarcely be conceived by the mind. And moreover I show that it is impossible; for in every vital act the sufficient application of the object necessary for the act precedes such act simply and in every genus of cause, nor can it happen that the very application of the object comes effectively from the act to which it is ordered; but the judgement of reason is required for the act of the will as applying the object; therefore it is impossible that the judgement of reason necessary for the act of the will should come effectively from the same act. The major can be shown by induction in all other vital acts besides that of which we are treating. And from natural things a proportional argument can be taken, because it is impossible that an agent which needs a patient in order to act should not suppose, absolutely and in every genus of cause, the application of the patient to such action, or that through the action itself it should apply the patient to itself. And the reason can be given, because the agent is unable to act except about applied matter; therefore it is impossible that through that action it should effect the application itself, but it must wholly suppose it. Likewise, because otherwise such action, as applicative of the patient, would not be concerned with it as applied but as distant, which will be declared more at once in the matter of which we treat.

6. The minor of the first syllogism, however, is certain from that principle that nothing is willed unless it is foreknown. But if someone contends that the judgement of reason is not only a condition and application of the object, but also an efficient principle with the will of its act, he does not weaken but increases the force of the argument; for from this it will be more repugnant that that judgement be effectively from the motion of the act of the will, since that very judgement is said to be an efficient principle of such act of the will. And it is confirmed moreover, first, because the will does not apply any power to its act except by willing that act; therefore, if the will directly applies the intellect to that judgement, it will do this by an act by which it wills that the intellect so judge; what, then, moves the will to will this? Is it another prior judgement, or the very one which is to be willed? If another, then the will is not determined to that act by the judgement which it wills, but by that which precedes. If that same one, then that judgement by way of object moves the will before it has been judged about in any way. And it is confirmed, secondly, for otherwise the first act of the intellect could be from the will itself, which is against the opinion of all, founded on that principle: Nothing is willed unless it is foreknown. And the sequel is proved, because of the first act of the intellect too it could be said that it is free and voluntary from the motion of the will, and nevertheless in its genus is the cause of the same act of the will by which it itself is voluntary. But if in the first act this is impossible, as in truth it is, it is not because it is simply first, but because it is in such a way the cause of the act of the will that it is presupposed to it simply and in every genus of cause; but this reason proceeds in every other act; it can never happen, therefore, that the judgement of the intellect be free through an act of the will subsequent to it. Or otherwise it cannot happen that the will be determined to a free act through a judgement which is born from the same free act. And so it comes about that either it is determined through a wholly necessary judgement, which is repugnant to freedom, or that the free determination does not arise from such judgement, which is what was intended.

Resolution of the question

7. On account of these difficulties, then, I think that for the free determination of the will such a practical judgement wholly determining it is not necessary. Which, besides the discourse made (which seems to be a posteriori and from the drawback), can be declared a priori and from the thing itself, because the judgement of the intellect does not move the will except by means of the object which it proposes; but the proposed object does not always bring in necessity to the will or determine it to one, nor is this necessary in order that the will can tend to the object; therefore neither is such determination necessary on the part of the judgement, indeed not even possible. The major is proved, because either the judgement moves only by reason of the object, or it itself by reason of itself has a peculiar efficacy for determining the will. This latter cannot be said, both because such efficacy would be repugnant to the freedom of the will, as has been said, and also because such a mode of moving is foreign to the office of the intellect, which is to illuminate and direct and regulate the operations of the will, and finally because that mode of moving is proper to the will, which was given specially for this end, that it should move the other powers efficiently as to exercise; it cannot happen, therefore, that the intellect, which is moved efficiently by the will, should in turn move it in the same way. And this St. Thomas expressly teaches, I-II, q. 9, aa. 1 and 3.

8. But some object that the intellect through practical command efficaciously moves the will to the work. It is answered that the practical command of the intellect, by which someone is understood to command himself or his will, is not other than a perfectly practical judgement, wholly definite with all circumstances. Nor can an impulsive act of the will be understood in the intellect except by way of judgement; just as, with respect to others, command is not understood except by way of speech intimating what is to be done; and whatever else is imagined in the intellect is both gratuitously asserted and it cannot be explained what it is, and it is outside the notion of the intellect, which essentially and adequately is a cognitive and judicative power; and therefore it cannot have an act except by way of apprehension or judgement. Since, therefore, this command of which we treat is not mere apprehension, as is established per se, it can only be a practical judgement. Nor do Aristotle or St. Thomas ever declare command otherwise than by way of a wholly practical judgement, as is treated more at length in I-II, q. 17. This judgement, then, of itself moves only on the part of the object, as has been declared. But if sometimes it seems to impel efficaciously, it is only in virtue of some efficacious act of the same will which preceded; for if the will has efficaciously proposed or intends to attain this end, or has chosen to apply such a means, the intellect, the occasion being found, judges here and now that this is wholly to be done, the prior will being supposed. And then the will is wholly determined, not so much by the judgement as by itself. A sign of which is that it is determined not absolutely, but as it were conditionally, namely, if it wills to persist in the intention or election made. Hence, if it wills to withdraw from the prior will, it can, and can impede a command of this kind. But when such an efficacious will does not precede, it is impossible that the command of the intellect have that efficacious impulsive force; otherwise it would destroy the freedom of the will, and praise or blame would be attributed not to the will but to the intellect. And Medina finally confesses this, on account of the authority of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 17, a. 5.

9. It remains to prove the other part, namely, that the will is not always determined to one by the proposed object, which is certain and received by all, and St. Thomas proves it ex professo, I-II, q. 10, a. 2. For it is the same to say that the will is not necessitated by another as that it is not determined to one by it, as the arguments made above prove; but it is certain that it is not necessitated by all objects; therefore neither is it determined to one; therefore as to exercise it is determined to one only in the fatherland, by the infinite goodness of God clearly seen, according to the received doctrine; as to specification, however, by good in general or other similar objects, as we shall touch upon below; but not by all, because not in all does some necessary notion of good appear, or such goodness does not appear as does not have mixed with it either malice or some disadvantage or defect. But although the object does not so determine the will, it can be so sufficient to arouse and attract it that the will by its freedom determines itself or is borne to it, because, if some notion of good is represented in the object, that is of itself sufficient to move the will; therefore that necessary determination is not required in order that the will be moved.

Reply to the contrary foundations

10. From which not only has our opinion been proved, but also reply has been made to the foundation of the opposite opinion. For from the fact that the will cannot be borne to the unknown it is only had that the judgement of the intellect is necessary in order that the will can choose; it does not follow, however, that that judgement must determine the will to one. Which Bernard elegantly said, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, in these words: Reason is given to the will to instruct it, not to destroy it; but it would destroy it if it imposed any necessity preventing it from turning itself according to its own choice. Hence, when it is assumed in the argument that it is necessary that the intellect first judge what is to be chosen, the proposition can be ambiguous; for if the sense is that it first judges what of goodness, utility or fittingness the means to be chosen and the election itself have, the proposition is true; but if the sense is that it must first be judged absolutely and wholly that this is to be chosen, the proposition is false. For it gives this sense, that, all things weighed and considered, it is now here and now under some notion necessary to choose this, and therefore it is wholly to be chosen; but there is no reason why such judgement should be necessary before every election; indeed this is repugnant to the freedom of election, as has been shown. That judgement suffices, therefore, by which this means is judged useful and, all things weighed, apt to be able to be chosen; and the same holds of any good object, namely, that it be judged sufficiently good to be able to be loved. For, just as, in order that sight can be borne to an object, it is not necessary that it be applied as seen or as to be seen, but as visible, so, in order that the will be moved by the object, it is enough that it be proposed as lovable, although it is not judged wholly to be chosen.

11. Which is declared, first, in the divine will and intellect; for in order that God in His eternity will something outside Himself determinately and freely, it is not necessary that before every free determination there precede in the divine intellect, according to our way of understanding, this judgement: This is wholly to be loved or chosen by me; for such judgement would be rash and without foundation and in strictness false; for it includes that such an object outside God is in some way necessary to Him; therefore only the judgement precedes that such an object is fitting or eligible; therefore the same is to be understood in the created will. It is confirmed and declared, secondly; for, in order that the will choose one means, it is not necessary that the intellect so judge of it as to have no judgement of any other, because the will needs only cognition of that object to which it is borne; ignorance or inconsideration of another object is irrelevant to it, per se speaking; therefore, if the intellect judges this means to be useful or eligible, even if at the same time it judges another to be useful, the will can choose one, nor is it necessary that the intellect first judge determinately of the other that it is to be chosen, nor even that it is more eligible than the other.

12. An objection is answered.—You will say: if the judgement of the intellect is undetermined, how can the election of the will be determined? It is answered that a judgement cannot be called undetermined when through it it is judged what the object is like and what fittingness or lovableness it has; but it can be called either a multiple judgement, when it is judged about several objects what they are like, or it can be called a determinate judgement about an indifferent object, that is, one not having necessary conjunction with the will, although it has some goodness or fittingness; and such determination of the judgement, although it does not suffice to impose necessity on the will, yet suffices in order that the will by its freedom can determine itself and follow that judgement.

13. But you will press: for if only one judgement is present, the will will wholly follow it, because it has no other to which to turn. But if several are present, it will necessarily follow that which is of the more useful means or the better object, and so it will always be determined by the judgement. It is answered, first, that there can be judgements of equal means, and then the will will neither be able to be determined by the judgement nor will it necessarily be suspended; but this is its freedom, that it can choose one and omit the other. But if it cannot do this, I do not see how it can be called free; but in truth it can, because it is free for this, that it can will what is good and not will what is not necessary. And an illustrious exemplar of this freedom is the divine will, which between this matter and another wholly equal and similar, and between these heavens and others wholly equal (and so of other things), chose to create these rather than others, which cannot be referred to an unequal judgement, because neither on their part nor on the part of God is there any reason on which such a judgement could be founded which would be true; that preference, therefore, is only from the free determination of the divine will. Again, even when objects or means are judged unequal, I judge it more probable (although less certain) that the will is not necessarily determined to that which is better by virtue of the judgement. It is proved, because, by the very fact that neither is proposed as necessary, the will can not love either; therefore it can also indifferently love either of them, the other being passed over. And in the divine will this seems necessary to many, because He could have made better things than He made, and yet He did not will to. Hence all theologians teach that the Incarnation of God was the best means for redeeming men, and that God judged this necessarily prior in reason to willing it, and nevertheless, that judgement standing, God could not have willed it, but something else. The judgement, therefore, of the better or more useful means does not determine the will to willing it. I said, however, by virtue of the judgement, because by virtue of a prior act or intention of the will it can happen that it is wholly determined to choosing the more useful means, if that greater utility is necessary for attaining the end as it had been intended; for then it is no longer only more useful, but necessary for fulfilling such intention. But if that greater utility is not necessary for the intention of the end, the judgement about it will not determine the will to will such a means wholly.

14. From which, finally, it is established what is to be said when only one judgement is present; for, even if the intellect thinks of one object only, and judges it to be fitting and worthy to be desired, and, so far as it can, practically invites the will to desire it, the will can still by its freedom not love it, because for not exercising the act precisely it does not need another judgement, but it is enough that through that which the man now has he does not judge this good to be here and now necessarily to be loved by him. Hence the will can then either suspend the act, or divert the intellect from thinking of that object, or apply it to inquire more diligently about such object how great its goodness is, and whether it has joined to it some malice or unfittingness, on account of which it can not only not love it, but even hate it. Never, therefore, does judgement as such wholly determine the will, unless otherwise the object on account of the excellence of its goodness has that force, which we shall touch upon below. In this way, then, the whole proposed difficulty is excellently solved and our freedom is excellently defended; and it is clearly understood how it is formally in the will, and how the intellect operates towards it and towards its use.