Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This difficulty is sought in the second argument posited at the beginning of Section II, and Scotus also touches it in that argument, that the secondary cause or created will cannot do anything except as moved by the first; but when it is moved by God, it necessarily moves itself; therefore its motion with respect to the same is never free and contingent. The major is in terms that of St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3, and aa. 4 and 5, and will be proved below when we treat of the dependence of secondary causes on the first. The minor is that of the same St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, where he says: It is impossible that God move the will and the will not be moved. And it can easily be persuaded, both from the efficacy and perfection of the divine motion and from the mutual relation between moving and being moved. The same difficulty is proposed in another way; for a free cause is one which, all the requisites for acting being posited, can act and not act; but one of the requisites in order that the secondary cause act is the motion of God, which being posited it cannot act and not act, but necessarily acts, just as, that not being posited, it necessarily does not act; therefore that definition is repugnant to every secondary cause, and so with respect to it there is no contingency or freedom, but only with respect to the first.

The first way of speaking is proposed

2. This difficulty is one of the chief ones of this matter, and offers occasion to declare further what a free cause is, or what conditions it requires, where at the same time the common and received definition of a free cause will be expounded. The authors, then, whom I reported above, placing the whole notion of freedom in objective indifference (so to speak), will easily dispatch the present difficulty by saying that a free power is that which, all the requisites on its part being posited, still remains indifferent, or not determined to one by virtue of the object; and therefore that it is no obstacle to the use of freedom that, the motion of the first cause being posited, the will now remains determined to one, so that it cannot not exercise the act to which it is moved. And in this sense, to solve the former difficulty, that common distinction of necessity in the composite sense and in the divided sense is applied; for that the will moved by God operates necessarily is only necessity in the composite sense, and therefore it is not repugnant to the freedom of an act so necessary. To the latter difficulty, however, they will answer by limiting the major and common definition of a free faculty, namely, that it is that which can act and not act, all requisites being posited, namely on the part of the intellect and of the will itself, but not on the part of God. Which modification Almain had indicated before these modern authors in his Moralia, which, however, he does not approve, although he does not sufficiently attack it.

3. Hence the said new theologians devised another definition of a free act, namely, that it is a motion of the will made from such a judgement of reason as by itself, or through the object which it proposes, is not sufficient to determine the will to one. Which they confirm, first, because the whole freedom of the will arises from the judgement of reason; therefore a free act is best and sufficiently defined through its order to such judgement, or, what is the same, through its order to all the requisites on the part of the intellect and the will. Secondly, because for freedom indifference of the object suffices and indifference of the power is not required, as is evident in the divine will, which of itself is always determined to one; yet, because created objects are indifferent, that is enough for it to will them freely; the same, therefore, will suffice for the free act of the will.

The said opinion is refuted

4. This whole doctrine proceeds from a false foundation, as I proved in the immediately preceding section; and the occasion of erring seems to have been that the root of freedom is not sufficiently distinguished from the formal freedom of the power and of the act. For the indifference of the judgement is the root of freedom, as was touched upon above and is the common opinion of theologians; it is not, however, formal freedom itself, because the judgement itself is not free in itself nor is it proximately from a formally free power, as I shall say below; but it is called indifferent objectively, or on the part of the object, because it proposes the object as so indifferent that it does not draw the will of necessity. And hence it comes about that an indifferent judgement sufficiently indicates, in a nature which can so judge, some formally free faculty, and consequently also free use or act, if such a faculty is permitted to operate in its proper mode and suffers no extrinsic force by which it is coerced, or, more properly speaking, necessitated to tend to an object otherwise of itself indifferent. For it was proved above that this is possible, from which we deservedly inferred that absolutely, and without the aforesaid limitation, an indifferent judgement and a faculty of itself free are not enough for free use.

5. The first inference.—From which we further gather that the received description of the free faculty, namely, That which, all the requisites for acting being posited, can act and not act, is not rightly limited—is not rightly (I say) limited to the requisites on the part of the judgement and of the will itself, because, all the requisites on the part of the judgement concurring, and the faculty itself being of itself free, it can be not free in the use itself, or, what is the same, the act can be not free; therefore, in order that that definition comprehend not only the faculty free in itself (so to speak) or in first act, but also the free use or act, those requisites do not suffice. Hence the heretics of this time, when they see that we operate from judgement and advertence of reason and are not borne or determined of necessity by the objects themselves, nevertheless say that we do not operate freely, because we suffer necessity from God Himself. In which indeed they err, asserting that God in fact always operates so in us, which is repugnant to faith and to the divine Scriptures and to right reason; they do not err, however, in the inference, namely, that, if God brings in extrinsic necessity to the act, it is not in fact free; nor would they err if they said only either that this mode of operating of God is possible, or that, it being posited, indifference of judgement does not suffice for free use.

6. The second inference.—It is further inferred that the difficulties posited are not satisfied by the replies of that opinion. For that distinction of the composite and divided sense, by which the former difficulty is dispatched, although rightly explained it satisfies, as we shall see below, yet taken so generally it cannot be enough; for we shall show that some necessity, even in the composite sense, is repugnant to the use of freedom and destroys it. And it is evident easily from what has been said; for God by some motion and activity of His can bring in necessity to the will, and then the act would not be necessary in the divided sense, because the will of itself, and that motion being excluded, could not exercise that act; but it would be necessary in the composite sense, because, that motion being posited, it cannot not be exercised; and yet that necessity in the composite sense would take away free use, because we suppose that God then necessitates the will as much as He can; something, therefore, must be added in order that that distinction satisfy. Again, that limitation of the common definition of freedom, by which the latter difficulty is solved, has already been disproved, besides the fact that it is arbitrary and offers occasion to introduce any similar one at pleasure in this matter. For by parity of reasoning someone could say that, a certain influence of the heaven being posited, or a special motion of a demon being applied, our will cannot not operate following it, and nevertheless will then operate freely, because, all the requisites on the part of the judgement and of the intrinsic faculty being posited, that operation does not follow necessarily, even if from another supposition it follows necessarily.

7. The third inference.—Finally, it is established from what has been said that that new definition of a free act was falsely devised, namely, that it is that which is done by the will from a non-necessitating judgement of reason, because an act can be necessary from elsewhere with a necessity impeding free use, as has been declared; therefore that definition can belong to some absolutely necessary act. The first reason, however, on which that definition is founded proves only that indifferent judgement is the root of freedom; it does not follow from this, however, that the definition of a free act is completed by its proceeding from such a judgement, but it must be added that it proceed from a faculty consonant with the judgement, not impeded nor suffering extrinsic necessity, which the common definition explained in those words, that, all the requisites being posited, it can act and not act. In the second proof, however, something false is assumed when it is said that for a free act indifference of the object so suffices that indifference of the power is not necessary; for how will an act be free if the power is not indifferent to exercising it? Or why is the object, in the notion of object, called indifferent, except because it does not bring in necessity to the power, but leaves it indifferent? The example of the divine will, however, either assumes something false or is not to the point, because it is brought in what is not similar. For the divine will, although in a higher and more perfect way, is yet truly of itself indifferent to willing created objects; for it is not naturally determined to this; otherwise how would it be free? And although it determined itself from eternity and in that determination necessarily always perseveres, yet that very determination (whatever it may be) is from freedom; and its necessity is not of nature, but of immutability, which does not take away the proper indifference which a free thing has of itself. Yet, because in the will of God there is not the efficiency of its own act, nor composition of potency and act, therefore that indifference is not in a potency with respect to an act, but in pure act with respect to objects, and therefore in this the indifference of created freedom is not to be compared with the divine.

The definition of freedom is explained

8. In order, then, that we may satisfy the difficulties proposed, that description of the free faculty must first be retained and explained, in which two things are demanded. One is that it be an active power, having of itself and from its internal faculty the power of exercising and suspending its action. The other is that that faculty, while it exercises the act, be so disposed and proximately (so to speak) prepared for the work that, all the requisites for acting being posited, it can act and not act. In the first part of this sentence there is no difficulty, nor is new explanation almost necessary, what was said in Section II being supposed, where we showed that freedom consists in an active faculty as such; for from this it manifestly follows that freedom requires an active faculty indifferent to acting and not acting. Hence, for the sake of clarity, we can prescind in a free power two powers, or as it were two parts of one power. One is for willing or exercising the act; the other for not willing or suspending the action. For this latter part of this power, although in itself it is a certain positive perfection, yet in use it can be exercised by the sole negation or lack of the act of such a faculty, if we speak of its absolute power, as is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 3, and other theologians there, because not willing, as such, can be free, while not willing taken precisely does not include an act, but the lack of an act, which, if it is with perfect advertence of reason and full power of willing, will be free. I say, however, if we speak of absolute power, because morally or ordinarily lack of appetition of this kind is not exercised without a positive act, which is either a nolition by which the proposed object is rejected, or another act about it, for example, love or intention of it, or is a turning to another repugnant or diverse object, as is sufficiently established by experience; because it would be most difficult, perfect and practical advertence of reason existing, to suspend every act of the will.

9. From which, by the way, it is understood that this indifference of the free faculty is first and precisely sufficiently saved through its relation to the act or the lack of the act, which is commonly called freedom as to exercise, because through it the very exercise of the act is indifferent. Since, however, this free faculty is vital, and so perfect and spiritual that it can reflect upon itself and its motions, whenever it can freely not exercise some act it can also through another positive act will that lack, or not will to exercise such an act. And in this way there is never freedom as to exercise without some freedom as to specification; for whenever the will can freely not love, it can also elicit some act according to its notion and species repugnant to love, and so there is there some indifference as to the specification of the act. Besides which another can intervene in order to contrary acts with respect to the same object, inasmuch as it can be either freely loved or also hated. Which twofold power the free faculty also includes, taken according to itself and absolutely, although it is not necessary that it have it about each and every object, because it is not necessary that it be equally free about all of them, as we shall touch on below. And so much about the first part of this sentence.

10. In the second part of the sentence proposed is declared not only the notion of the free faculty, but also what is necessary for the use of freedom or the free act; for the aforesaid definition of freedom comprehends all this, and deservedly, because the whole difficulty of freedom and its utility is placed in the very use and exercise of freedom. It must be considered, however, that something can be said to be required for an act in two ways: in one way, as prerequired for the action; in another way, as intrinsically or essentially included in the action itself. The former is commonly said to be prerequired antecedently, or on the part of first act, whether it is a proper principle of the action or a condition prerequired for it in any way or in any genus of cause. The latter, however, can be said to be required concomitantly, or in the second act itself, because it is not distinguished from the free action itself, which is the second act of the free faculty. When, therefore, it is said that that is free which, all the requisites for acting being posited, can act and not act, it is to be understood of the requisites antecedently and in first act, not of the others. And this very thing is intimated in the aforesaid sentence when it is said that the free faculty must be so disposed and proximately prepared for the work that with that disposition it can act and not act; for in that preparation are included all those prerequisites in first act for operating.

11. And indeed that for free use it is necessary that with all those the said indifference and as it were twofold power remain intact can easily be shown. First, because otherwise cessation from work, for example, would not be from intrinsic power and faculty, but from the defect of some required condition; but this contributes nothing to freedom, for there is no natural power acting so necessarily that it cannot sometimes not act from the defect of a required condition, such as the nearness of the patient or another similar one. Indeed, if one rightly weighs it, that is not to be able not to act, but rather inability to act, or not to be able to act with such a defect; but the indifference of freedom is not founded on inability to act, but on power not to act. Hence, when the will itself lacks some act on account of natural inadvertence of reason, that lack of act is not from power not to act, but from inability so to operate or to will, and therefore such lack cannot be free. In order, then, that a faculty have free use, it is necessary that, all the conditions prerequired antecedently or in first act being posited, it can from its internal power and faculty act and not act. When, however, we say from its internal power and faculty (to meet objections), we do not exclude the divine concurrence, or greater help necessary for the quality of the acts, but we leave that to the theologians.

12. That the said definition is not to be understood of the requisites concomitantly is proved because these, as we said, are included in the action itself; for just as action is required for acting, so whatever is included in action can be said to be required. But action is required as that by which the power is formally determined and constituted acting in act, and therefore it cannot be included in those conditions with which the power must be indifferent to acting and not acting, because a manifest repugnance is involved; therefore neither must there be included in those requisites all that which is of the intrinsic notion of the action or is essentially included in it; for the reason is the same of all those as of the action itself. And this interpretation of that definition is gathered from the common opinion of theologians, In I, dist. 38 and 39, and In II, dist. 24, and from the doctrine of Anselm, which we shall explain at once.

The former difficulty is dispatched

13. The twofold motion of our will by the divine.—And from this interpretation the two difficulties touched upon at the beginning are easily dispatched. To the first, then, it is answered that a twofold motion of God with respect to our will can be understood. One is antecedent to the actual concurrence to the act of the will; the other consists in the actual concurrence itself. The former is little known in metaphysics, or from the principles of nature alone; in theology, however, it is certain, and whatever it may be, it is contained under the conditions required for the act antecedently, or by way of principle or first act. For, although this motion takes place through a vital act, which is second act with respect to the power in which it is, yet with respect to the other act for the sake of which that motion is given it is compared by way of principle, and for that reason is said to be by way of first act; as the judgement about good to be done is the principle of the act of the will by which such good is loved; hence, although in the intellect it is second act, yet with respect to the will it is compared as first; and the same holds of other similar cases. The latter motion is better known by natural light, because physically it is more intrinsically necessary for the action of the creature; that motion, however, is counted among the requisites for the act concomitantly, because the concurrence of God is essentially included in the action of the creature.

14. Of the former motion, then, it must be said that, it being posited, the will can still not operate that act for the sake of which such motion is given, because, since that motion is among the conditions prerequired for the free act, unless it left that power unimpeded it would take away free use, for it would determine the power to one. For what freedom or choice would there be where only one part had been granted? as Evodius rightly said to Constantius, in Turrianus, bk. IV for the Pontifical Epistles, c. 2. And therefore the Council of Trent, sess. VI, c. 4, defines of a prior motion of this kind, even in works of grace, that, it being posited, it is still in the power of the will not to consent. Nor is this against the efficacy of the divine motion, both because it does not come from impotence but from the wisdom, providence and will of the first mover Himself, and also because, when He wills, He also efficaciously brings it about that the will infallibly consents, although it can not consent. But per se and absolutely it is not repugnant, this motion standing, that the will be not moved by that act or free motion for the sake of which such motion is given; nor as to this are moving and being moved correlatives, when one motion is compared to another act as its principle and not only as the way to a terminus. In which way Augustine said elsewhere that he who is so moved cannot not feel the motion, but can not consent; but this matter has in theology a grave and prolix disputation, from which we deliberately abstain, and, abstracting from all opinions, we are content with that reply which all embrace under the aforesaid words, although there is dissent in their sense, about which we do not now pass judgement.

15. Of the other motion, however, the difficulty which we are treating properly proceeds; for it is that by which the action of the secondary cause per se and essentially depends on the first; and, as I said, it is nothing else than the very concurrence of God, why it is called motion we shall say below in treating of the dependence of the secondary cause on the first in operating. Of this motion, then, it is true that, it being posited, the will cannot not be moved; we deny, however, that this is repugnant to the use of freedom, because that motion is not among the conditions prerequired for the act, but is essentially included in the very action of the will. But what this concurrence or motion of God is, and how it is together with the influx of the created will itself, and whether it can be called in some way prior without injury to freedom, and finally how it is in the power of man to have or not have this motion of God (for this too is true and necessary for freedom), we shall say in the place cited a little before.

Reply is made to the latter difficulty

16. Finally, the second difficulty has already been dispatched from what has been said; for, the former motion being omitted, which neither pertains to us nor is the discourse about it in the argument, of the latter, or the concurrence of God, it is denied that it is among the antecedent prerequisites of which the definition of freedom speaks, as we explained; and therefore we confess that, it being posited, the will cannot not be moved, because it is now supposed constituted under its action, yet not without its free determination. And in this sense too it is answered excellently by that distinction of the composite and divided sense; for, this motion being posited in the composite sense, the will cannot not operate, because it is now supposed operating; hence this is not repugnant to freedom, because in the very supposition is included and already supposed the use of freedom, of which, as of any other thing, it is truly said that, when it is, it necessarily is, although simply and absolutely (which is said in the divided sense) it could not be. And this very thing is what Anselm said, book On the Concord of Foreknowledge, from the beginning, and bk. II Cur Deus Homo, cc. 17 and 18, that necessity from antecedent supposition takes away freedom, but not from consequent supposition. For he calls antecedent supposition all that which we have said is prerequired antecedently, or on the part of first act, for the free act; hence he calls this antecedent supposition the cause of the thing, and therefore, if from such supposition the act necessarily follows, freedom is taken away, of whose notion it is that with all those prerequisites the power remain intact for acting and not acting, even in the composite sense with respect to such antecedent conditions, as has been declared. But he calls consequent supposition every one which includes the very action of the creature, because it already supposes the free use, as has been declared. Hence necessity from it cannot take away the free use itself, because it is not necessity of the thing, but of inference only, as St. Thomas said, q. 24 De Verit., a. 1, ad 13, who confirms this doctrine in bk. II Phys., lect. 15, at the beginning; St. Augustine too favours it, V De Civit., c. 10.