Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The first argument, then, asks in the first place whether the first cause operates freely or from necessity of nature; but this is to be treated below in the proper disputation on the divine perfections; here we suppose that it effects not necessarily but freely whatever it properly effects outside itself, which is not only certain by faith, but we believe can also be sufficiently proved by natural reason, as we shall show in the said place. And so that first argument remains solved by denying the antecedent.

2. The opinion of Scotus and its foundation.—There still remains, however, concerning the same argument a hypothetical question: whether, if God acted from necessity of nature, a created cause effecting freely could still be understood; for this question is controverted between Scotus and the chief followers of St. Thomas. For the former absolutely denies that it can come about that a secondary cause effects freely if the first acts from necessity of nature; and he thinks that Aristotle, or any other philosopher who taught those two things together, namely, that God operates necessarily and man freely, taught contradictory things. The foundation of Scotus was touched upon above in the first argument, namely, that the secondary cause does not act except as moved by the first; hence, if the first acts and moves necessarily, it is necessary that the second be moved and act with the same necessity. So Scotus holds, In I, dist. 1, q. Y; dist. 4, q. 4; dist. 38, ad 1; dist. 39, § Quantum ad primum; and In II, dist. 1, q. 3; and the followers of Scotus think the same, as may be seen in Cordova, in bk. I, q. 55, dub. 4; and some of the modern commentators of St. Thomas follow the same opinion, I, q. 19, a. 8.

3. Others, however, more ancient, think that from that hypothesis that God operates from necessity of nature it does not follow that every secondary cause operates from necessity, but that there can be a contingent effect by reason of the proximate cause, although the first inflows with natural necessity. The foundation is that, when an effect depends on several causes, it can have a peculiar condition or defect by reason of one cause and not by reason of another. For so from two assents to the premisses, one certain and the other uncertain, an uncertain assent to the conclusion is effected; and from a perfect first cause and a defective second one an imperfect effect follows; because, as is said, good comes from an integral cause and evil from any defect. Thus, then, in order that an effect be free or contingent, the freedom of the secondary cause can suffice, although the first cause operates necessarily. For, since the effect depends on both causes, the influx of both is required in order that the effect follow; but in order that it not follow, it is enough that one cause be lacking; and by parity of reasoning, in order that the effect follow necessarily, it is necessary that both causes inflow of necessity; but in order that it be free or contingent, it is enough that one can not inflow. So, roughly, Cajetan, I, q. 14, a. 13, about ad 1, and q. 19, a. 8; and Ferrariensis, II Cont. Gent., c. 67, about reason 5; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 38; who attribute this opinion to St. Thomas, because in the aforesaid places he says that, although the knowledge of God is a necessary cause, contingent effects come forth from it because its influx is modified in the secondary cause; and the same St. Thomas has similar things in q. 2 De Veritate, a. 14, ad 5, and q. 5, a. 9, ad 10. Gabriel holds the same opinion, In I, dist. 38, q. unica, a. 1, part 2 of it; and Palacios, disp. 2.

4. Each of these opinions contains something true; neither, however, exactly declared or confirmed the matter; for that conditional or hypothetical question can have several senses, which it is necessary to distinguish; for according to them the question is to be determined in diverse ways.

The first sense of the question and its resolution

5. The first sense, then, is: if in the first cause there were no freedom in acting, whether there could be freedom in some secondary cause. And in this sense it must be wholly denied that any secondary cause can be free if the first is not. In which sense what Scotus says is true, that the philosophers were deluded who said that God acts from necessity of nature but men freely; although Scotus neither intends this sense nor does his reason prove it, as we shall see. The first reason, then, is that, if God does not have freedom, there is no source from which the creature should participate it. You will say: in the same way someone could argue that, because God does not have sense, there is no source from which the creature should participate it. I answer that it is not similar, because freedom as such pertains to pure perfection, which, if it is not formally in God, cannot be in the creature either. Hence the more similar argument is that, if there were no cognition in God, neither could there be any in the creature, and consequently neither intellect nor sense. The second reason is that, if any secondary cause is capable of freedom, most of all the intellectual creature; but if there is no freedom in acting in God, neither can there be in the intellectual creature; therefore. The minor is proved, for God is intellectual by essence, the creature by participation; therefore whatever of perfection can be devised in the intellectual grade from which freedom might arise is in God in a more excellent way. As, for example, perfection of understanding, universal cognition of all goods, immateriality of powers, non-necessary connection with extrinsic goods or independence from external things, or whatever else of this kind there is which, either on the part of the object or on the part of the subject or of its own nature, can be the reason of freedom—whatever (I say) is of this kind is found in God in a more excellent way. If, therefore, all these things cannot suffice in God for Him to be free in acting, neither will they suffice in the creature.

6. Of what genus of perfection freedom is.—You will object: freedom requires perfection mixed with some imperfection, namely potentiality or mutability, and from this head that consecution may not be evident. Hence we too confess that in the creature there is freedom with indifference to various acts, but not in God. It is answered by denying the assumption; for freedom, taken precisely and absolutely, includes no imperfection, because it can be saved with indifference to objects or effects without any composition or potentiality with respect to diverse acts, and it says only a certain dominion and independence with respect to such things or objects. And in this way there is freedom in God, because it is freedom by essence; but in the creature it is only by participation, and therefore it has joined to it that imperfection which indifference to diverse acts includes, in which whatever there is of potentiality and composition is of imperfection; but, this imperfection being supposed, the very indifference and dominion over its own act is of perfection, which perfection could not be participated by the creature unless the very perfection of freedom were in God pure and without imperfections. Nor does the reason of the second opinion proceed against this sense; for it supposes indeed that, the necessity of God in acting standing, there are free secondary causes, the opposite of which we have shown to follow from the aforesaid hypothesis.

The second sense of the question and its resolution

7. The second sense of the question is: if by an impossible supposition it happened that God acted from necessity of nature, but the creature had a faculty of acting free by its nature, whether God, on account of His natural mode of acting, would impede in the creature the use of freedom, so that in fact it would not have free action even if it had free power. And indeed the negative part seems manifestly to follow from the opinion of certain Thomists, who think that for the free action of the creature it is enough that it operate through a faculty of itself free and that it not be drawn of necessity by the object, or determined to one. But God would not take away these two things, even if He acted from necessity of nature with all His power in the will and with the created will; therefore, notwithstanding that mode of acting of God, the creature would still act freely.

8. This foundation, however, is false and offers great occasion of erring in this matter. For in the first place it does not sufficiently distinguish between these two things, namely, to have a free faculty and to have the unimpeded free use of such a faculty, although they are very distinct; for the former pertains to the power alone or first act, the latter to second act. But although a free act cannot exist without a free faculty, because second and vital act essentially supposes first, yet a free faculty can exist without the use of freedom, not only when it does not operate, but also while it operates it is impeded from having that dominion over its act which by its nature it could have. For this dominion consists in the power of not doing what one does, or of doing something else. But it can happen that an agent, otherwise of itself indifferent, is so borne or determined to acting by another superior agent that with respect to such action or mode of acting it does not have the power of not acting; and so, retaining the innate free faculty, it can be deprived of the use of freedom. It is confirmed, for all theologians teach that God can bring in necessity to our will; but then He would not take away the free faculty, because this is not distinguished from the will itself, but would impede its free use and change it into necessary. These two, therefore, are to be distinguished; and God can bring it about that a faculty of itself free, and remaining free in first act about some object, is not freely borne into it, but by some necessary motion which impedes the use of freedom. In which the theologians seem to agree, In II, dist. 15, and St. Thomas supposes it, I-II, q. 6, a. 4; and Scotus holds it, In IV, dist. 49, q. 6, § Duo ergo.

9. From which it further follows that what that opinion supposes is false: that for free use and act a faculty of itself free, and an object of itself indifferent or which per se does not suffice to bring in necessity to the faculty, are enough. For this opinion supposes that no other cause can bring in necessity to the will except the object or by means of the object, which is false; for God too can bring in necessity to the will, not as object, but as agent of infinite power. Indeed, if the will could suffer necessity only from the object, it could never be drawn out of its connatural mode of operating, or be moved necessarily, except when it itself from its nature and intrinsic impulse is borne necessarily. For the object, as object, does not move the will in a preternatural mode, but in the most connatural and intrinsic one; and therefore the object in its genus does not necessarily move a power otherwise free, except when with respect to such an object it is not free; therefore, if the will can be necessitated only by means of the object, in truth it is not necessitated about that to which of itself it was free, as in the fatherland the will is necessitated by God as object clearly seen, because with respect to such act it is not of itself free.

10. And thus it comes about that according to that opinion God could never necessitate the will to an act to which of itself it is free; for either God proposes an object of itself sufficient to move the will necessarily, and then in truth the will is not of itself free to such an act, and so suffers no extrinsic necessity; or He proposes an object which in its genus is not able to move the will necessarily, and by virtue of such an object the will will never be moved necessarily unless God brings in necessity from elsewhere. You will say: an object of itself insufficient to move necessarily can be proposed, yet in such a mode or under such a judgement that it brings in necessity to the will. I answer, first, that this cannot take place without a false judgement, namely, by judging to be the highest good or a necessary good what is not such, which judgement God cannot send. Next, even that being posited, the will would not then be moved as a power of itself free, but as a power determined to one, because, just as by its nature it is borne not only to the true good but also to apparent good, so by its nature it is apt to be borne necessarily to an apparent necessary good. And so it is never saved that the will can be necessitated by God to an act which of itself it would elicit freely. Which is surely false and against the common opinion, and derogates from the omnipotence of God. For, since He is the author and lord of the will, He can move and impel it however He wills so that it act necessarily, or impede it so that it does not act at all. And it is confirmed, for the power which the created will has for willing or not willing is not of infinite efficacy, since it is commensurate with the finite power of such a faculty; therefore in each it can be overcome and surpassed by an extrinsic agent of infinite power, as God is; the created will, therefore, can be so moved by God to will an object otherwise of itself indifferent that the will so moved is wholly unable to resist or to use the power which it has for not willing such an object. Indeed Augustine sometimes seems to teach that this pertains to the divine omnipotence, and not undeservedly, since no repugnance is involved in that effect or motion. Then, therefore, although the will is of itself free and is not moved of necessity by the object, nevertheless the use itself and the act is not free to the will, because it is not permitted by the superior agent to use its free faculty; nor does it have power with respect to the superior agent to resist it when He uses His absolute power.

11. Therefore for the free act or use of the will a faculty of itself free with indifference of object or of judgement is not enough, unless also the superior cause brings in no force or preternatural efficacy, but permits the will itself to operate in its connatural mode, as the Fathers of the Church also speak, whom I shall indicate at once. The foundation of that opinion, therefore, is not solid. Wherefore it now remains to be seen whether, that hypothesis being posited that God acted from necessity of nature, and that there were in man a faculty of itself free, it nevertheless rightly follows that there would then be no free use or act in the created will.

12. If God acted from necessity of nature, there would be no exercise of freedom in causes.—And in this sense it seems it must be said that, that hypothesis being granted, no use of freedom is left in the created agent. And in this sense too it is truly said by Scotus that the philosophers erred who posited that God acts from necessity of nature and admitted free and contingent effects from secondary causes. The reason of Scotus, however, neither proceeds in this sense nor is approved by me, as I shall say below. The proper reason, therefore, is to be taken from what was said a little before, because God by His infinite power can so move the will as to bring in necessity, as has been proved, and He could do the same even if He acted from necessity of nature, because then He is not posited to be of less power, but only of less indifference or freedom; but if God acted from necessity of nature, when He acted on the created will He would act with as much efficacy as He could; therefore He would always act bringing in necessity, and so there would never be use of freedom in the created agent. The minor is evident, because this is the condition of a natural agent, that it act as much as it can, because it does not have the faculty of tempering its action, or of applying it more or less, because this does not take place except through a free power.

13. An objection is satisfied.—But the philosophers would perhaps say that God, acting from necessity of nature, does not always act as much as He absolutely could, but as much as the nature of secondary causes demands, by which He is determined to act more or less and in this or that way. But in the first place we are speaking only from the hypothesis that the divine power has absolute necessity in acting. Next, we add that, in whatever way God is said to act from necessity of nature and not from freedom, He cannot have the determination of His action from the natural capacity of the secondary cause; for the power of God does not adequately regard that capacity, but a wider one; therefore it cannot be determined by it. For why would it be so limited by it that it could never do more, since it has greater power? I confess indeed that from that hypothesis, and from the infinity of the power of God, many impossible things follow; nevertheless, that being posited, it follows by an extrinsic topic¹ that God through His power always so moves the created will as to bring in necessity to it. And therefore the holy Fathers attribute to the divine wisdom and free providence that in acting and moving the created will He so accommodates Himself as not to bring force to it, but to permit it to move itself in its own way. As may be seen in Augustine, On Predestination and Grace, c. 15; Prosper, to the Objections of the Gauls, cc. 1 and 11; Cyril, bk. IV on John, c. 7; Damascene, bk. II De Fide, c. 30.

14. Nor does the foundation of the second opinion proceed against this decision of the question in this sense; because for the freedom of the act or contingency of the effect it is not enough that the secondary cause be in itself free or contingent, but it is necessary that, inasmuch as it is such, it be permitted to exercise its action; because otherwise it is only materially (so to speak) free, but does not act as free; but an act does not take its notion and denomination from the cause taken materially, but as actually inflowing. That reason, however, does not prove that the necessity of God in acting would not impede the free use of the created faculty. Nor does St. Thomas, cited there, contradict either in this or in the prior sense, because he does not treat of the absolute necessity of God in acting, but of the necessity of immutability, which does not exclude absolute freedom, as we shall declare below in the disputation on God.

The third sense of the question and its resolution

15. If God gave necessarily the concurrence which He now gives to free causes, they would remain free.—The third sense of the question is: if God acted from necessity of nature, and did no more nor gave any other concurrence or motion to the free created will than He now gives, whether He would then take away the contingency of action and impede the use of freedom. Which sense is very diverse from the preceding, and proceeds from several suppositions, as is sufficiently established. Hence in the immediately preceding assertion we said that from the necessity of the action of God there would be an impediment² to the use of freedom, because the motion of God would be greater than it now is, God concurring freely; now, however, we inquire, if we suppose that the motion is not greater nor diverse in magnitude (so to speak), but only in the mode of giving it—namely, because the same which is now given freely would then be given from necessity of nature—whether from this precisely it follows that the use of freedom is impeded and the contingency of things taken away. And in this sense the opinion and reason of Scotus seems to proceed.

16. I judge, however, that it must be said that, even if the first cause acted from necessity of nature in that way, it would not impede the use of freedom nor take away all contingency of the effects of secondary causes. And as to this I approve the second opinion adduced above, because, although several causes concur to one act, in order that it be free it is enough that the proximate cause be free and that through the cooperation of the other cause it not be drawn out of its natural mode of operating; but so it would happen in that case; therefore. The major is sufficiently proved by the foundation of the second opinion; for, although several causes concur, and all except one, so far as concerns themselves, operate necessarily, if one can by its sole freedom not elicit the act, that is enough for the effect to be free or contingent; because it can simply not be, nor does the necessary mode of acting of the other causes impede the use of this power in the other cause, as is supposed from the said hypothesis. And it is easily declared by proving the minor, because God in that case would not move the created will more strongly or vehemently than He now moves it; but now the motion of God does not draw the will out of its connatural mode of operating; therefore neither would it then change it; for whether that motion or concurrence is given freely or necessarily on the part of God matters nothing to the effect which it produces outside, if the concurrence or motion itself is not in itself greater.

17. Hence I argue, secondly, because otherwise it would follow that the act of our will is now free³ only because God concurs to it freely; but the consequent is false, both because formally and immediately I do not have dominion over my act on account of the freedom of God, but on account of my freedom; and also because otherwise the appetition of a horse or a lion would be free, because God concurs to it freely; an act, therefore, is free with respect to some cause which is so made by it that there is in it the power and faculty of not effecting it, notwithstanding other causes concurring to the same act, whether these, so far as concerns themselves, concur naturally or freely; but so the created will would behave in the aforesaid case, as has been shown; therefore.

18. Thirdly, the same can be proved not only by satisfying the foundation of Scotus but also by retorting it; for, if it were of any weight, it would prove that even now the contingency of effects and the use of freedom is taken away from every act of the secondary cause, inasmuch as it is from it, and that nothing is free except by relation to the freedom of the first cause. But the consequent is not only against natural reason but also against faith, because otherwise free acts could not be imputed to us. The sequel is proved, because even now the secondary cause does not act except as moved by the first, or with the first concurring, and now too the first cause inflows or moves prior in nature, with the same priority with which it would move if it acted from necessity of nature. This motion of God is also now equally efficacious, as is supposed, and it can also be proved by the very argument of Scotus, because it does not stand that God move and the creature not be moved; therefore, the motion of God being posited, the created will is necessarily moved; therefore, if such motion, given by God from necessity of nature, would take away freedom in the act of the human will, it also takes it away now, because it equally precedes. Or certainly, if now it does not take it away, because, although in some way it precedes, yet absolutely it is given dependently on the created will itself, as we shall explain shortly, by the same reason in the aforesaid case it would not take it away, because, although it would be given necessarily on the part of God, nevertheless it would also be given dependently on created free choice.

19. Nor does the reply of Scotus satisfy, namely, that if God acted from necessity of nature His motion would be simply necessary, and so would take away all contingency of the effect; but now it is free, and therefore does not take it away. This (I say) does not satisfy, both because at most it declares that the contingency or freedom of the effect is now saved with respect to the divine will, not with respect to secondary causes; and also because, if he understands that, that hypothesis being granted, the motion of God would be absolutely necessary, that is, necessarily to be posited in reality, he assumes something false; for it would be necessary only so far as concerns God; but because it would at the same time depend on the created will and could not be posited in reality without it, it would therefore not be absolutely necessary. Thus God would then be said to act from necessity of nature, because He would be from His intrinsic nature and of Himself determined to concur with the will; yet, because that concurrence is not posited in reality except with the will itself cooperating, it would therefore not be posited in reality with absolute necessity, but according to the demand of the cooperation of the free will.

20. And hence is gathered a general rule which confirms the proposed opinion, namely, that it is no obstacle to the freedom or contingency of an act or effect that some cause concur to it with natural necessity, provided that some cause effect it with indifference, with respect to which the effect is denominated free. The reason of this has been sufficiently declared in explaining the foundation of the second opinion; it can, however, be further illustrated by some examples. One is, according to a probable opinion, that cognition or the known object concurs effectively to the act of the will; for that concurrence, as it is from the cognition, is natural and without freedom, and nevertheless the act is simply free on account of the indifference of the will. Hence, although the cognition, so far as concerns itself, inflows from necessity of nature, yet, because its actual influx is not posited in reality without the actual influx of the will, it is therefore not absolutely necessary. Something similar can be said of the influx of a habit concurring with a free power; for a habit of itself does not have indifference or proper freedom, but operates from necessity of nature when its power operates. Another example is of the effects of natural agents, as they are from them and from God; for that action, although from the proximate agent it is from necessity of nature, is free with respect to the first cause, because according to the true doctrine God freely gives His concurrence. Hence from the power of God that action absolutely can be and not be, although this power is not in the proximate agent. In fact, however, that action is denominated simply natural, both because, just as it receives its determination and specification from the proximate agent, so also these denominations; and also because from a certain general law and definite will God now concurs to these actions according to the demand of nature or of the secondary cause. In which sense is to be taken what is commonly said, that the influx of the first cause is modified in the second or by the second. Thus, then, the hypothesis being granted in which we are engaged, the action would be free from its relation to the secondary cause, although the first gave its concurrence from necessity of nature.

21. Whether one and the same action can be free to one and necessary to another.—Wherefore what Scotus assumes above, that the same action cannot be necessary with respect to one cause and free with respect to another, because necessary and contingent are contradictorily opposed, either is not true or, in the sense in which it can be true, is not to the point. For that two causes can inflow into the same act, one freely and the other by natural impulse of nature, has been demonstrated; in this sense, therefore, it is not repugnant that the same effect be contingent and necessary with respect to diverse causes; for for the same cause there is no contradiction, since contradictories must be taken with respect to the same. But if the necessary is taken not only respectively but absolutely for that which simply cannot not be, in this way it is true that it is repugnant for an effect to be necessary and to have contingency from some cause; yet in this sense it is not true that that effect is necessary to which some cause acting necessarily concurs, because it is enough that respectively, and so far as concerns the force of that cause, it be made necessarily, with which it is consistent that from another head, or with respect to another, it can have contingency or freedom.