Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for the difficulty.—Concerning the doctrine handed down in the preceding sections, some shorter doubts remain to be explained. The first is that which is proposed in the title of this section, which can be understood universally both of the activity of accidents upon substance and upon other accidents; yet, because an accident does not effect a substance except with the preceding action of some accident, as has been said, the whole question can therefore be brought back to the proper efficiency which accidents have upon other accidents. And hence arises the reason for doubting, because an accident is said to be the proximate principle of producing an accident in order that it be proportioned; therefore the accident which is the principle of the action will have to be such as is the terminus of the action; therefore quantity will be the proximate principle of effecting quantity, and one Ubi of another Ubi, etc. On the contrary, however, is the fact that, according to the common opinion of philosophers, quality alone is the proximate principle of action, and not all qualities, but some; the reason of which must also be investigated.

2. An accident can naturally emanate from an accident.—In this the distinction set out above must be premised, about activity through natural resultance or through proper action, and it must be supposed that the discourse is only of the latter; which is said once for the whole disputation, because that resultance is counted as one with the production of the thing; but if sometimes something singular must be noted about it, we shall not omit it. In the present case, then, just as we said above that an accident can result from a substance, so from any accident another can result, distinct either really or at least modally, if it is capable of such a property; for thus from quantity results figure, or the relation of equality, if it is a distinct mode; and from one relation, as many say, another can result, as likeness from paternity, etc. And the reason is that each essence, whatever it be, can be the principle of its intrinsic property through natural resultance of it.

3. Among accidents, quality alone is the principle of true effecting.—Of proper accidental efficiency, then, it must be said, first, that quality alone can be its proximate principle. This assertion can first be proved by experience; for all actions which tend to substance are commonly produced by means of qualities, either primary ones or those which eminently contain the primary ones; vital actions too are produced by means of qualities; the faculty of moving locally, too, is always some power of the predicament of quality, so much so that even for the motion of projectiles philosophers think that an impressed impetus is necessary, which is a motive quality. Secondly, it can be proved by a brief discourse through the other predicaments; for quantity is not productive of another quantity, as experience proves. And the reason is, first, because quantity follows matter, and therefore imitates its nature and is for receiving and not for acting. Secondly, because quantity is in truth not producible anew per se; indeed (according to our opinion) not even concomitantly, so that what before was not now begins to be through the actions of natural agents, because we think quantity is coeval with matter. But it only comes about that the quantity which before belonged to one thing begins, together with the matter, to belong to another; whence, if it is added to a pre-existing thing, augmentation takes place, either proper or improper, according to the diverse modes of that change. That change or addition, however, always takes place with preceding alteration and generation or generation by addition, of which the proximate principle is quality; and therefore quantity has no action of which it could be the principle; for the termini of quantity, which sometimes result when division of the continuum is made, etc., are made rather by natural resultance than by proper efficiency, of which we are treating.

4. In relation.—Again, relation, by the opinion of all, is not active; and the reason is frequently given that relation is of the least entity; and a fortiori this is confirmed from the divine relations, which as to what is proper to them are not active, as theologians teach, from that certain principle that the actions of the Trinity ad extra are undivided. But setting aside the divine relations (of which I think the proper reason is that they are only for subsisting, and subsistence as such is not the principle of acting, but only the terminus of the nature, which is the principle of operating, as is discussed more at length in the matter on the Incarnation and the Trinity), of created relations the reason can be given, according to a probable opinion, that they add no thing to their foundation; hence they are not active except by reason of it; but if it is not active, there is no source from which they could have efficiency; but it will never be found active except when it is some quality. Add that relation, as relation, cannot be the principle of effecting an absolute thing, since they are of diverse orders, and it is a preposterous order that an absolute thing should follow upon a relative one. Nor can a relation make a relation, because a proper relation is not made per se, but inasmuch as it results when the foundation and terminus are posited.

5. In action.—Whether immanent actions are principles of true efficiency.—Further, action is not truly and properly a principle of acting; for, as we shall show below, it is the very causality of the agent, and in this its notion consists; but causality is not the principle of acting, but is from the principle which it presupposes. Likewise, if action is compared to its terminus, it is not the principle of acting it, but the way to it, or its dependence on its principle; but if it is compared to other things, it cannot by itself be the principle of anything, because it cannot be the principle of another action; for, speaking naturally, action does not immediately follow from action, but at most by reason of the terminus; nor can it be the principle of another terminus, because no principle reaches a terminus except by means of action. And no action can exceed its intrinsic terminus or by itself attain another, because it is identified with it and is only a certain mode of it. But someone will press about immanent actions, which are sometimes principles of effecting something; for many say that intellection effects a really distinct word; others think that cognition effectively causes love or delight; and truer examples are that immanent acts effectively cause habits, and sometimes one act causes another of the same power, as assent to the principles the assent to the conclusion, and the intention of the end the choice of the means. Those, however, are deluded who think that in this efficiency the immanent act does not behave as a principle of producing something else, but is the very production of it; for it is repugnant that actual production be a thing distinct from the thing produced; but the habit is a thing distinct from the act by which it is produced. Likewise, because, if act is compared to act, that which proceeds from another is intrinsically an immanent action; therefore intrinsically and of itself it is a certain production; therefore the other is not its production. Others, on account of this argument, limit the assertion, so that it holds outside immanent actions. But neither is the limitation necessary, nor can any probable reason for it be brought; for why will not illumination too be active, or why will not the effects which come from light be attributed to the illumination itself as to a principle of acting? It is therefore said more truly: just as illumination has its own proper intrinsic terminus, at which it is terminated, and this is the principle of every further action, if there is any, which follows upon the illuminated thing, so immanent actions, as they are actions, have their intrinsic termini, which are qualities, and these are the proximate principles of further action, when it happens to follow; and that this is so is to be proved below, more at length, in disputing about action; but now it is sufficiently confirmed by the argument alone that has been made; for how would an immanent act be the principle of producing a habit, which is a true quality, unless it were itself a quality? Or why do we distinguish in the habit itself the notion of quality from the intrinsic production or dependence by which it is made by the act itself, and in the same act shall not distinguish the notion of quality from the intrinsic dependence or action by which it is made by its power, since habit and act are proportionally compared?

6. In passion.—Of the predicament of passion almost nothing need be added, because, as I shall show below, action and passion are not actually distinguished in reality, but only fundamentally, where action has passion conjoined; hence, if action is not a principle of acting, much less passion; and the reasons given can be equally applied. Only an objection can be made about local motion, which is a certain change and consequently a passion; for passion and change, taken broadly, are the same; but motion causes heat, whence it seems to be its principle. It is answered, however, that local motion per se effects nothing, but is only the way to an Ubi; it serves actions, however, as a necessary or useful condition, either for applying the principle of acting or for removing impediments. And in this way it sometimes causes heat per accidens, sometimes also cold, of which elsewhere.

7. In situation, duration and habit.—Whence quality draws this activity in preference to the others.—Moreover, of place, or of ubi as such, it is established that it is not a principle of acting; for if place is taken for the containing surface, it is not a principle of acting for the same reason that neither is quantity, because such place is nothing other in reality than the surface, but adds some respect or denomination to an extrinsic thing, all which have nothing to do with the notion of acting. I said, however, that the discourse is of place as such, or inasmuch as it is place, because inasmuch as it is a place, either natural or violent, it can have some action upon the thing located, but it does not have it except by reason of some qualities, as is established from philosophy. If, however, we speak of the Ubi as it is the intrinsic presence or mode of the thing located, then it is already manifest that it is not the principle of any action; it is indeed sometimes a condition of acting on account of nearness, as we shall say later; yet it is not the notion or principle of acting, as is sufficiently established by experience itself. The reason, however, seems to be none other than that it is only a certain mode of a present thing and does not per se bring a proper entity, and therefore neither does it per se confer activity. Likewise, because it cannot be understood what it per se does; for it cannot produce another Ubi in another body; for Ubi is not made per se except by local motion; but one thing does not move another locally through its Ubi, but either by impelling or by attracting or in some other similar way. From which it is established a fortiori that neither situation, nor time or duration or when, nor habit or being clothed, are principles of acting according to those precise notions according to which they constitute predicaments; because situation in reality is not distinguished from Ubi except by some denomination, relation or figure; habit only adds a certain extrinsic denomination; but time, and universally duration, either is not something distinct in reality from the thing which endures, or at most is a mode; and therefore all these, formally and as such, are not active, but the things with which they are identified can be active; as, if the thing which endures is a quality or a garment, it can be active by reason of some qualities. It remains, therefore, that among accidents quality alone is per se a principle of acting. And the reason can be given that, in the first place, quality alone, besides quantity, has a proper entity distinct in reality from the substance, and therefore is most properly an accidental form and a proper act, which is necessary for the notion of a principle of acting and in order that it have proper activity. Next, it is such an entity as follows upon the form, and therefore imitates its nature and is attributed to it to be its instrument or proximate power of acting, especially since the substantial form by itself alone is not a sufficient proximate principle of actions of this kind.

8. How many and which species of quality are active.—Not figure.—You will say: if this reason is valid, it proves that every quality is the principle of some action, because every quality follows upon the form, and consequently must imitate its nature. Especially because, just as the substantial form is a certain act, so is quality; but every act, just as it gives being, so also operating. And it can be confirmed, because each thing is for the sake of its operation; otherwise it would be in vain, as is said in II De Caelo, c. 3, and I Ethic., c. 7. Nevertheless it must be said that neither all the species of quality numbered by Aristotle, nor all the qualities contained under the single species, are active, but only the first three species as to some qualities contained under them. I declare each: for in the first place, beginning from the last, figure per se is not the principle of any action, as the common opinion affirms, which is taken from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 96, a. 2, ad 2, and bk. II Cont. Gent., c. 76, and III Cont. Gent., c. 105; and in these places Cajetan and Ferrariensis. Scotus has the same, In IV, dist. 1, q. 4; and Cajetan of Thiene, IV De Caelo, last ch.; and it is taken from Aristotle, XII Metaph., c. 3, text 14, and VI Ethic., c. 4, and II Phys., text 2, in which places he says that artefacts as such do not have a principle of motion or action. The reason of which is none other than that the form which is made by art is only figure, which is not a principle of acting. Hence also St. Augustine, bk. X De Civit., cc. 9 and 11, refutes the error of those who thought that some power of acting was in astronomical figures or images, thence demonstrating that all those things take place by pact and power of demons. The reason, however, is that figure, as is also taken from Aristotle, bk. I Phys., c. 5, text 46, adds nothing to the thing but a certain composition or order of parts, from which arises a certain mode of quantity, which is figure; and therefore it cannot be a per se principle of acting, both because it is only a certain mode, and also because it is a mode of quantity and a property following upon it. Hence, since quantity is not per se active, neither can figure be. And it is confirmed finally, because there is nothing which figure per se does, because one figure cannot effect another like it; for a statue will not make a statue, nor can it make any quality or anything similar.

9. An objection.—It is solved.—You will say: figure at least serves local motion much, the sharp for cutting, the circular for circular motion; on account of which Albert, IV De Caelo, at the end, signifies that sharp figure is a power of acting motion, or at least that it, with other conditions, namely, gravity and hardness, composes that power; and Durandus thinks the same, In I, dist. 45, q. 2, n. 8, where he also adds that the figure of a seal is per se the principle of the like figure impressed in wax. It is answered, however, that figures of this kind are only dispositions on the part of the instrument or body, so that it may more easily be moved or move in such a way, either because it resists less while it is moved by the artificer, as in the motion of a sphere, or because it is resisted less, as in the motion of cutting; for the sharper the instrument, the fewer parts it touches, and therefore it finds less resistance. And conversely, when cutting takes place without motion of the cutting body, by the motion of another, as in a river, sharp figure is a disposition to that cleaving because it serves to resist the flowing water more easily, since through fewer parts it directly meets the sharp thing, and so impresses less impetus. And so also in the figure of a seal, because some parts are sharper than others, and some prominent, others as it were concave, they therefore more easily cleave or press down some parts of the wax than others, and thence figure arises, not because one is per se the principle of the other, but because, some parts being moved locally, such a figure arises. A sign of which also is that the figure arises in the wax in a way as it were contrary to what was in the seal. For the parts which stood out in the seal are as it were concave in the thing sealed, and conversely.

10. In the first species of quality some are active, some not.—In the other three species of quality, however, active qualities are found. For the habits of the powers are principles of eliciting acts, and conversely, acts (which are also placed in the first species and are dispositions) sometimes effect habits. Power, however, is active both of acts and of habits. Passible qualities too are active, as is established of heat. In all these species, however, some qualities are found which are not principles of acting, as in the species of habit, those¹ which are proximately ordered to some being and not to operating, in which order health is commonly numbered, which is called a habit quite improperly. Hence in natural things there is perhaps no example, which some undeservedly take from intelligible species; for those are in truth principles of acting. In supernatural things, however, the common example is of grace, which is in the essence of the soul; but it is more certain of the character, of which elsewhere. In the species of disposition likewise there are many acts which do nothing, namely, when the power either does not need a habit, as in vision, or not such a one as can be effected by acts, as in supernatural acts. Many acts too are not active of other acts or habits, as is evident in all the senses, and in the fruition of God, and similar things. Power likewise is commonly distinguished into active and passive, of which the passive as such is not a principle of acting; although it is uncertain whether there is any quality which is pure passive potency, as we shall see in its place, where we shall also treat whether the power of resisting is an active or a passive power. Among passible qualities too many are not active of things like themselves, as whiteness and other colours, although they effect intentional species. Others, however, effect both, as light or heat, etc. It is difficult, however, to give the reason for this variety. The general one seems to be that substance, for its consummated perfection, needs this whole variety, and therefore received from nature diverse qualities, which according to their diversity might be ordered to diverse effects; hence some were instituted for acting, others for informing or adorning the substance and as it were finally filling its capacity. All which pertain to the office of the form, and therefore the qualities which are not active are neither idle nor lack some participation or agreement with the form. And thus the reason for doubting has been solved. To expound in particular, however, which qualities are of this or that notion does not pertain to this place.