Disputationes metaphysicae

1. What the causes of doubt are on each side.—The reason for doubting is that a substance effects an accident either by means of an accident, or by itself alone and through itself. If the first is said, a process to infinity follows; for if one accident is made by means of another, I ask of that other by what principle it is made; if by means of another accident, the same question returns about that one; but if we stop at some accident which is made proximately by the substance, this ought to have been said of the first, because there is no greater reason for one than for another. If, however, on account of this reason, the substance is said to effect the accident through itself, it follows, first, that no accident is the principle of effecting another. It follows, secondly, that the powers and faculties for operating in created substances are nothing other than their forms. Or certainly, if, to avoid these drawbacks, some accidents are said to be made immediately by the substance through itself, but others by means of accidents, it will be necessary to give some reason for this distinction and difference, and to disclose which accidents are made in the one way or the other. And again it will be necessary to expound, when one accident is the principle quo of effecting another, whether it is principal or instrumental. For hence it appears that an accident can at most act as an instrument of the substance, because it is only a being of a being (as the philosophers say), and has its whole being from the substance and for the sake of the substance as for its end. From elsewhere, however, it seems that it must be a principal principle, since the effect does not exceed its perfection.

2. To explain this matter, I suppose that accidents can be made in two ways. In one way, by proper action, as when light is made by illumination, or an Ubi by proper local motion. Secondly, by natural resultance, as a relation results from the foundation when the terminus is posited (if it is a mode distinct from the foundation), or as figure results from division, or from motion or the terminus of local motion; and the proper passions of things are also thought to be made in this way. In a third way, however, an accident could be understood to be made concomitantly with the substance without resultance from it, as quantity, for example, with prime matter; which mode we now omit, because, if it is true, it can be brought back to one or other of the preceding, as we shall explain, and because in that mode of production, whatever was the principle of effecting the substance will be the principle of effecting the accident which is made with it.

First assertion, concerning natural emanation

3. I say first, then: when an accident is made by natural emanation, the proximate principle of it according to such a mode of efficiency, whatever that may be, can be the substance, if such an accident is immediately connected with it; sometimes, however, it can result by means of an accident, if it has a nearer connection with that. This whole conclusion is commonly received, and can, first, be declared by induction; for the intellect, for example, flows proximately from the substance of the soul, and quantity from matter or from form. Hence with respect to these properties no intrinsic accidental principle can be assigned; therefore it is a substantial one. But figure, for example, or Ubi, results by means of quantity, and whiteness results from such a mixture of the primary qualities. The reason for doubting set out at the beginning also proves this conclusion, because, if an accident belongs to a substance from within, it cannot always belong to it by means of an accident as its intrinsic principle; but some accident and the substance must necessarily be immediately connected; yet it is not necessary that all intrinsic accidents be of this kind. And the reason for the diversity among them is easy, because some of them have a more immediate order to the substance than others.

4. I see that it can be answered that, although some accident is intimately and immediately connected with the substance, it is not necessary that it be connected through effective emanation of the accident from the substance, but only on account of natural aptitude and inseparability, as we said above that we can probably think concerning matter and quantity. And according to this it will not be necessary that any accident emanate immediately from the substance, but that it be received immediately in the substance from the same agent by which the substance is produced. Nevertheless the conclusion laid down supposes the contrary opinion as more probable, namely, that accidental properties, especially those which follow upon, or are due to, the thing by reason of the form, are caused by the substance not only materially and finally, but also effectively by natural resultance, either immediately, if it is a first property, or mediately, if it is a second. This St. Thomas holds, I, q. 77, a. 6, where he speaks of the powers of the soul; but the reason is the same for any form whatever and the properties following upon it, or due by reason of it. And this is very likely, because, since the substantial form is as first act, but the accidental as second, it is probable that the substantial form has some power so that the accidents proper to it may flow from it. Likewise, because in this way the natural connection between form and properties, and the per se order between them, is better understood. And this is greatly confirmed by the sensible example of water bringing itself back to its former coldness; for that reduction cannot take place except by natural resultance from the form, as was shown above; therefore by the same reasoning the same must be thought of any property naturally connected with the form, especially if from elsewhere there is no repugnance or dependence on something extrinsic. And in that example of water it is manifestly established that the conclusion laid down is true, namely, that some accident can result effectively and immediately from a substantial principle. For that intensification of cold can have no nearer principle from which it results than the substantial form of the water.

5. What natural resultance is, is declared.—The opinion of Cajetan.—But before we proceed further, it must be declared once and for all what this natural resultance is, namely, whether it is true efficiency and active causality or not. Because, if it is true efficiency, a proper accidental action will intervene there; for effective causality consists in action, as we shall see below; and thus the substantial form will be the immediate and united principle of some accidental action, and actions will be multiplied in the production of a form and its properties, and there will be an action per se towards all these things which are co-produced or co-created with others; all which seems foreign to the common doctrine of philosophers. If, however, it is not true efficiency, then neither can it be called efficiency, because what is not true gold absolutely is not gold, nor can it be called such except on account of some analogy and proportion, which in the present case appears to be none; indeed it cannot even be understood what this resultance is, if it is not efficiency. On this, Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 3, indicates that this emanation is a natural sequel without a mediating operation; yet he does not declare what that natural sequel is, or how it takes place without mediating action or operation. And q. 77, a. 1, ad 2 and 3, he expressly says that this resultance is through efficiency without mediating action, and thinks it is the opinion of St. Thomas, there, ad 3, where, however, he does not say that the emanation of accidents from the subject is without action, but that it is not through any transmutation, but through natural resultance.

6. Wherefore, if we speak strictly, I think it more true that this resultance is not without true action, although it is not always reckoned an action distinct per se, nor a proper change. This, as I think, the reason given sufficiently proves in general, because either this is true efficiency or none at all; for there cannot be a middle. If, therefore, it is true efficiency, action intervenes. If it is not efficiency, neither is it resultance or a causal natural sequel, but only an illative one, because, one thing being posited, another is posited on account of a natural debt. As between the matter and the form of the heaven there is natural illation, yet not emanation of one from the other. Some seem to assign a middle between these, saying that this is not efficiency, but as it were efficiency, which consists only in this, that the cause effecting the substance is determined by reason of it to give it proportioned properties. But in the first place this is in truth no efficiency, but only connaturality, which intervenes also between natural passive potency and act. Next, the example of the reduction of water compels us to confess a greater and truer efficiency. Finally, even granted that, it must be said, as concerns the matter, that the efficient cause of the substance concomitantly effects a distinct property, yet not without a concomitant action, because it is repugnant that a distinct thing be made without a distinct action when the primary terminus of the other action is not itself composed of that thing; because action is only a certain mode of its formal terminus itself and per se, as I shall say below; which reason I shall declare more fully at once.

7. The twofold mode of natural emanation.—Moreover, I argue in this way: this natural resultance sometimes takes place by itself alone and separately from the production of the thing from which it results; sometimes, however, it is so conjoined with it that it is never later, but wholly simultaneous with it; as, for example, when water brings itself back to its former coldness, that is a natural emanation, as Cajetan confesses, the said q. 54, a. 3, at the end, where he also says the same of the motion of a heavy thing generated in a higher place, which, the impediment being removed, naturally results from gravity. But whenever resultance takes place in this way, it is most evident that it does not take place without efficiency and true action and change, as is manifestly evident in the said examples; and the reason is that there something begins to be in the subject which before was not. And it begins per se without new production of another thing; therefore it begins through some efficient cause and through proper action and change; whence that is a proper cooling and local motion. And the reason is the same whenever some accident newly comes to some pre-existing subject by itself alone, or without another prior accident; for if several mutually connected ones come at once, that which is first and the root of the others is thought to come per se, the rest concomitantly. You will say: then, when a relation comes to the foundation upon the positing of the terminus, a new action per se intervenes there, because only that relative accident then newly comes to such a subject. Some answer by granting the sequel; others deny it, because it is enough that it results from the positing of the terminus. Others think that no action intervenes there, because such a relation is not a thing or a mode distinct from the foundation by the nature of the thing, of which we shall see in its place.

8. From this resultance, however, which is separated in time from the production, judgment must be passed about any other, even if it is conjoined in the same instant; for simultaneity in duration does not take away distinction. Especially because, although these are naturally simultaneous, they could be separated supernaturally, which is a sufficient argument of distinction. The assumption is declared; for while God creates the substance of the soul, He could suspend the emanation of the powers from it, and after some time permit it, or give concurrence to such emanation, and then that later emanation would be proper efficiency and true action, by the same reasoning as was said of the cooling of water bringing itself back to its natural state; therefore, even when it takes place simultaneously in time, it is a proper and distinct action. Moreover, the a priori reason was touched upon above, because accidental forms or properties of this kind are things distinct from the substance; therefore, although they are made with the substance itself or result from it, it is necessary that they be made by a distinct action, although concomitant with or consequent upon another. The consequence is evident, because those two, namely, the substance and the property, are not made equally firstly as two parts of one composite terminus, but absolutely the substance is made prior in nature, and then the proper accident results or is added to it. As when the soul is created, the creative action¹ per se is terminated at the substance alone; for that alone is made from nothing and per se terminates that action; therefore, in order that some distinct thing be added to it, another efficiency is necessary, and consequently a new action, although from natural connection it necessarily accompanies the other. Add that the proximate principle of such efficiency, according to our opinion, is also distinct; for it is the intrinsic substance itself, which is the terminus of the prior action. Likewise, the material principle is often diverse; as in the said example of the creation of the soul there is no material principle, but the substance of the soul itself is the material principle of its powers. The proper terminus too is distinct in reality, as we suppose; therefore there intervenes there an action distinct in reality, although physically, and in the common way of speaking, they are counted as one, because they have intrinsic connection and emanation.

9. A difference to be noted between the aforesaid modes of natural emanation.—In which is to be noted the difference between the two modes of natural resultance which we distinguished above. For when the emanation is such that it can never take place per se and separately, but only as connected to the prior action and its terminus, then it is not reckoned a proper and per se action, and much less a change, but as it were an accidental complement of the prior action. And therefore to such accidents or properties it is said that there is no action or motion per se. But when such resultance takes place per se and separately, as in the reduction of water, then it is reckoned an action per se and a proper change tending per se to such an accidental terminus. Which difference is not so much in reality as in denomination taken from the separation or the concomitance of the actions.

Corollaries of the foregoing doctrine

10. And from the reasons given it is gathered, first, that this resultance is with true efficiency and action only when what results is distinct in reality from that from which it results. For if it is distinct only in reason, although metaphysically one is said to follow from the other, true efficiency cannot intervene there, nor physical emanation, but only metaphysical consecution. As if we say that from the fact that the form is the formal principle of being it results that it is also the principal principle of acting; and the same holds of all similar attributes, which according to our way of conceiving are attributed to a thing as its properties, although they are not actually distinguished from it in the thing itself. For in all these real efficiency cannot intervene, because this is not in concepts, but in the things themselves. Hence it necessarily requires distinction in reality between principle and terminus.

11. What accidents result from a substantial principle.—It is inferred, secondly, from the same principles, that this natural resultance from a substantial principle intervenes only among those accidents which are so connatural that they simply presuppose the very substance whose properties they are. Which I note for this reason, that, according to the probable opinion asserting that the dispositions preceding the form in time are, in the instant of generation, intrinsically terminated in such a grade as such a form requires, and remain numerically the same—according to that opinion (I say), these accidents in the instant of generation do not flow from the form, even though they are properties most connatural to it, as heat is with respect to the form of fire or cold to that of water; not because such a form would not be sufficient for that effecting by way of resultance, but because the quality is supposed to have been already produced per se by the agent through the whole change preceding in time and terminated in the instant of generation, prior in nature to the introduction of the form.

12. A little question is answered.—But you will ask, granted that this resultance does not intervene in the instant of generation, whether it intervenes immediately afterwards by way of conservation. I answer that this question is not peculiar to these qualities which precede in the order of nature; but of all properties which from the beginning result from forms it can similarly be asked whether that resultance is only by way of production in the first instant or time in which the thing is produced or co-produced, or whether it perseveres by way of conservation during the whole time in which the property itself lasts; so that, just as in illumination not only does the light persevere, but also the action of illuminating, so in the soul having intellect not only does the intellect persevere, but also the emanation of the intellect from the soul; and similarly in fire or water not only does the heat or cold persevere, but also the actual emanation from its form. In which doubt I see that nothing can be determined by certain reason, but that both can be made probable by conjectures; for after that property has once been effected by natural emanation, there is no reason why it should need continual conservation, since it already has perfect being and is in its connatural subject. From elsewhere, however, it appears probable that that actual emanation does not cease, because its principle is most present and most conjoined, and always has the same power to continue it. Likewise, it is necessary that that property be actually conserved by God; therefore, since there is there an intrinsic and proximate principle by means of which it can be conserved, it is more natural that it be conserved by means of it. Likewise, in this way the greater resistance is better explained, which, other things being equal, can exist in expelling a property from its proper subject than from an alien one. Hence this part seems more likely; and, it being supposed, it must consequently be said that, although in the first instant of the generation of water, for example, the coldness does not flow from its form, because the water already finds coldness produced by the generator, yet afterwards, the action of the generator having ceased, it is conserved by the intrinsic form through natural emanation, in the same way as if it had flowed from it from the first instant.

13. The unity and distinction of natural resultance.—It is inferred, thirdly, from what has been said, that this emanation or natural resultance is something distinct in reality both from the resulting form and from that from which it results, and also from the actual information; for all these can be present without natural resultance; therefore it is something distinct from them. The antecedent is evident; for cold is in the air, actually informing it, and is accidentally conjoined to its form; and yet it does not flow from its form; heat, however, is also conjoined and informs, and moreover flows from the form; therefore emanation adds something. You will say: although this seems so when comparing the proper accident with the extrinsic one, yet in the proper accident itself this resultance or emanation does not seem to be something distinct from it as actually informing. But against this is, first, that to inform is one thing, to emanate another; the former pertains to the notion of cause, the latter to the notion of effect. Secondly, in the example set out above of the ultimate disposition, which in the first instant does not flow from the form, a proper accident is found actually informing and conjoined to its proper form and not resulting from it, which yet in the subsequent time results or is conserved; therefore this resultance is something distinct from the proper accident as actually informing. Thirdly, it is declared in this way; for this resultance, since it is a certain kind of efficiency, does not take place without the concurrence of the first cause; God, therefore, can suspend this concurrence and prevent the intellect, for example, from flowing from the soul, and then by His efficacy alone place the intellect in the soul, because nothing is repugnant in His doing by Himself alone what can be done by means of the soul, the notion of effecting being precisely considered; there, therefore, the substance of the soul remains, and the entity and actual inherence of the intellect, without actual emanation of the intellect from the soul, but from God alone; therefore it is a sign that that emanation is something distinct; for whatever is separable in reality must also be distinct. And hence what we said above is confirmed, namely, that this natural resultance is not without some action; for what resultance adds over the entity of the inhering accidental form is only a certain mode of dependence of the intrinsic property on its form as on an active principle; but dependence on the acting principle and action are the same, as we shall see below.

14. An objection is met.—But you will object: then every action which takes place naturally and without freedom is a certain natural resultance, because, just as, the form of water being posited, such a property results through true action and dependence, and from one property another sometimes also results, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 77, a. 7, so, the sun, for example, being posited, light naturally results in the air by means of illumination. I answer that as to this there is some likeness; there is a difference, however, because natural resultance is wholly intrinsic and in a certain manner pertains to the consummated production of the thing, because it tends only to constitute the thing in the connatural state per se due to it by virtue of the generation; but action properly so called, and which is commonly distinguished from natural resultance, is more extrinsic, and supposes, speaking per se, the thing already constituted in its perfect and natural state. Hence it is also commonly said that natural resultance is attributed to the generator, and is not from the form or intrinsic property except inasmuch as it holds the place of the generator and is as it were its instrument. Hence that axiom: He who gives the form gives what follows upon the form, because it belongs to the generator to constitute the thing generated with its due properties; but in the remaining proper actions the thing now operates by its own power, and the action is attributed to it as to the principal agent in its genus. And hence arises another difference, which we shall touch on at once; for we think enough has been said about natural resultance.

Second assertion, concerning proper accidental efficiency

15. The conclusion is proved in the actions of bodies.—I say secondly: when an accident is made by a proper action distinct from natural resultance, the proximate principle of effecting it is always some accident. This assertion touches the common question about the distinction of active power from substance in created things, which is commonly treated both of the substance of the angel and its powers, and of the soul and its powers, and also of other forms and their active virtues. And the conclusion laid down is consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas, who everywhere establishes in all creatures a distinction between the proximate faculty of acting and the substantial form, as may be seen in I, q. 54, a. 3, and q. 77, a. 1, in which places Cajetan defends it, and Capreolus, In I, dist. 3, q. 4; Soto, in his Logic, ch. on Property, q. 2; Giles, Quodl. III, q. 10; Hervaeus, Quodl. I, q. 9; and it is proved, first, by induction made in all the effects which we experience. For in the first place we see that the elements exercise no accidental efficiency except by means of the primary qualities, which it is manifest are true and proper accidents. Next, they do not have even natural local motion itself except by means of qualities; for although that motion pertains to natural resultance, an argument a fortiori can yet be taken from it. Moreover, the heaven, so far as we can experience, acts through qualities distinct from its substance, namely, through light or illumination; and thence we take an argument that the other, more occult influences are proximately produced through accidental qualities; for if that which seems the greatest and most perfect of all is so produced, much more the others. Again, inanimate mixed bodies, such as metals, gems, and others of this kind, if they have any actions, seem manifestly to exercise them through accidental powers; a sign of which, among other things, is that those powers can be intensified, remitted and destroyed, in which they depend on the temperament of the primary qualities. Which argument can also be made in herbs and plants, which have powers for various wonderful actions of attracting or expelling, and some have virtual heat, others cold, etc.; which powers are remitted in them through the course of time or the change of their temperament, while yet the substance remains the same; it is a sign, therefore, that these powers are accidents. The mystery of the Eucharist too has confirmed this to us; for we see that, the substance being removed, the whole power of acting which was in the accidents is conserved.

16. Also in the actions of spirits.—Ascending further from here to the actions of the soul in each of its grades, so far as we can conjecture from sense, the principles of accidental operations are also accidents, as is evident of vital or nutritive heat and of the power of attracting nourishment or expelling excrement, and similar things; for in the first place the very diversity of actions seems to be a sufficient argument of distinction between powers. And moreover the argument made, that these powers are intensified and remitted, also has place here. Next, in the operations of the senses this seems manifest; for besides the diversity of operations, the very diversity of organs sufficiently indicates that the proximate powers of those actions are per se distinct, and hence are accidental. And in man they must certainly be distinct from the soul; otherwise they would be spiritual entities, which is not likely, as is to be proved more at length in its place. As for spiritual actions themselves and their principles, we cannot have so clear an experience of them; yet, because we cannot philosophize about them except from what we experience, a proportional reason being observed, we rightly gather that the same judgment is to be passed on them.

17. Every active power is really distinct from the substance.—From this induction, then, St. Thomas gathers with sufficient probability that in every created supposit the proximate power of acting and operating is distinct from its substance, and consequently is an accident. But it must be added that every efficiency of a substance, besides substantial generation, is the efficiency of some accident, because a substance cannot effect a substance except by generation; and therefore whatever it effects besides substantial generation, all that is an accident; therefore the proximate principle of effecting an accident is always another accident. Whence it is confirmed; for the proximate principle of effecting substantial generation itself is an accident, and that in two ways. First, by preparing the way for substantial generation, by means of some preceding accidental action. Secondly, by cooperating instrumentally with the substance itself in the eduction of the substantial form, as we saw in the preceding section. Therefore much more will it be the proximate principle of effecting every accidental action, whether principal or instrumental, which we shall see at once. The consequence is evident, because substance is more disproportioned to accidental action than to substantial generation; and conversely, an accident is a more proportioned principle for accidental action than for substantial generation.

18. Reasons for the aforesaid inference.—An a priori reason, however, is difficult to give, although St. Thomas brings several probable ones in the places cited, which Scotus and others attack with many arguments. Cajetan, however, after Capreolus, defends them at sufficient length and copiously; but I think this both laborious and useless, because in truth they are not demonstrations, nor is there reason why they should be demanded by a prudent philosopher in so hidden a matter. For unless it is proved that it exceeds the perfection of a created substance to be the proximate and sole principle of accidental action, no a priori reason can be given by us why these creatures, which now exist and operate, always need an accidental principle for operations of this kind, because we do not know the proper notions of these creatures so as to take from them the peculiar causes of this need or necessity; therefore, if we proceed a priori, we must necessarily stop at the common notion of creature as such, as St. Thomas wisely observed. But if the foundation is taken from the general notion of created substance, it must consequently be said that it is impossible for God to create a substance which operates immediately through itself alone. Which, however, can scarcely be persuaded or proved, because that mode of operating does not seem to require infinite perfection in the genus of being or of substance; but every perfection which does not require this unlimitedness seems communicable to a creature; but if it is communicable, whence is it established that it has not been communicated? Or how can the said necessity be shown from the general notion of creature?

19. Induction in actions ordered to substantial generation.—Nevertheless it must be said that, although this cannot be demonstrated, it is gathered with sufficient probability from the induction made that created substance has, from its limitation, that it cannot by itself be the total and proximate principle of accidental action or form. The reason of which seems to be the disproportion and distance between such a principle and such an action, so that they cannot be conjoined except through some proportioned medium, such as a faculty or accidental potency is. And therefore only an infinite substance, which exceeds every proportion and can overcome every disproportion, is sufficient through itself for every such effect or action. And we can confirm this thus: because every operation of a substance besides substantial generation either tends to effecting substantial generation or not. An action of the former kind rightly requires an accidental proximate principle, because it is an accidental disposition to substance. For if the substance which is generated is such that it cannot be made without preceding accidental dispositions, what wonder that the substance which generates it should also require accidental dispositions, which are at the same time powers of acting and of disposing towards the generation of a like substance? You will say that this reason proceeds rightly of a univocal agent and one of the same notion, but not of an equivocal one, in which there can be a power of a higher notion. It is answered that, if the equivocal agent is finite, as we are now treating of it, judgment must be passed on it proportionally as on the univocal agent; for if it eminently contains the substantial form of the thing to be generated through its substantial form, it will also contain eminently the accidental dispositions to that form through its nobler disposition or accidental property; for since the substantial form is limited and finite in its genus, it cannot by itself alone contain eminently the perfections of diverse genera, nor be per se apt for both actions. Which the mode of acting of all bodies, both lower and heavenly, also sufficiently declares, as was expounded by the induction made above. For just as there is no substantial form, of whatever order or perfection it be, which does not have in its matter dispositions or properties proportioned to it, so there is no form which, in order to dispose other matter to some substantial form, whether equal or inferior, does not use its own accidental dispositions or properties as its own principles of acting.

20. In operations not ordered to substantial generation.—The operations, however, which are not ordered to substantial generation, so far as we can conjecture from the experience of things, are only either the operations of sensitive and intellective life, or various and diverse local motions. I omit illumination and the intentional actions of sensible species, for of these it is sufficiently established that they are produced by sensible accidents. Nor do I number the operations of vegetative life, because all of them per se tend to some substantial generation by addition. Of which the reason is the same as of the first generation; for it too takes place with preceding alteration and accidental disposition, some local motions also intervening, namely, of attraction and expulsion. The other transient actions and operations, even if they take place through eminent powers, always take place either by alteration per se primo terminated at some one of the primary qualities, of which it has already been shown that their proximate principles are some accidents, or they consist only in local motion of attracting or impelling, etc. That, therefore, for the operations of knowing and loving in the sensitive grade accidental faculties are required, a reason can be taken, first, from the very variety of operations and from the varied disposition which they require in their organs. Likewise, from the fact that such actions are immanent in the very proximate principles from which they are elicited; whence, if those powers were nothing else than the substantial forms themselves, all those operations would remain in the substantial forms alone. From which it would further follow that such operations in man would be spiritual, as is the form itself. Indeed it would follow that they would always and in all have to be spiritual; for every form having a proper operation independent of matter as of a subject must be per se subsistent and independent also in its being of matter as of a subject; for independence in operation indicates what independence in being is. And this is the chief principle from which we gather the subsistence and immateriality of the human soul, namely, because its intellectual operation does not depend on the body as on a subject, although it depends on it as on that which supplies the species. If, therefore, the sensitive operation were in the same way independent of matter, every sensitive soul too would be independent, and thus both would be immaterial and spiritual. Therefore from the mode of such material operation it is very well gathered that the substantial form is not per se apt to exercise such an operation without a mediating faculty, which also must be material and come to the matter as already informed by such a substantial form.

21. In intellectual operations.—In intellectual operation, however, this reason taken from the materiality of the action does not proceed; but the other does, about the diversity of operations; and in the rational soul there is another peculiar reason, because by its substantial entity it informs the body; but it does not inform through the intellect or the will, because these powers are therefore not organic, because they do not inform matter. This reason does not comprehend the angels, and therefore in them this matter is more doubtful, as Durandus held and as we shall see below in its place. Nevertheless that general reason, which is taken from the diversity of operations, is sufficiently efficacious in them too; for wherever intellectual operation is accidental, there is great diversity in the operations of that grade, especially in the works of intellect and affection; therefore, since created substance is of itself indifferent to eliciting and receiving such operations, it is more likely that it is determined and as it were accommodated to them through proper faculties and powers. Likewise, every intellectual substance, by the very fact that it is created, necessarily has accidental intellectual operation, as is established of man, and as we shall show below of angels in its place. It also needs other accidental principles, such as intentional species and habits; what wonder, then, that it needs an accidental power proportioned to the operation? Especially because every intellectual nature must have in itself a power per se primo ordered to the operation of understanding or loving, because, since it is instituted for the sake of this operation, it must not be instituted without a power per se primo ordered to it. But a power per se primo ordered to an accidental operation, since it takes its species from it, is also accidental. And to this the reason of St. Thomas seems to tend, that the essence of created substance as such is ordered only to its being, while power is ordered to accidental operation, and therefore they are distinguished in the way in which powers are commonly distinguished by their various acts. For although this reason seems to suppose that the created essence is distinguished from being and is compared to it as a receptive or active potency to act, nevertheless, abstracting from this question, the reason can be accommodated in the way mentioned.

22. Powers moving locally are really distinct from the substance.—And hence finally it can easily be persuaded that the powers which are in created things for effecting various local motions are accidental. First, because if the chief operations, and those more intimate and vital, require faculties of this kind, then much more local motions. Secondly, because in natural things we experience that local motion, even the most natural, takes place by means of an accidental faculty, such as gravity or levity; therefore much more, when the magnet draws iron to itself or rhubarb expels bile, they do this by accidental faculties; therefore the same will hold in all similar cases. Thirdly, because local motion, although in this respect more perfect than the others, that it transmutes the substance or subject less, yet in this seems most distant from substance, that it is neither per se ordered to it nor has almost any agreement or likeness with it; and therefore it is no wonder that the substantial form is not apt by itself to effect this motion without an accidental faculty. It is established, therefore, universally, that created agents effect accidents through accidental proximate principles.

23. What the authors of the opposite inference asserted, and their foundations.—There have not been lacking philosophers and theologians who, at least in part, have contradicted this conclusion, either in treating of the powers of the soul or of the powers of angels, as is evident from Gregory, In II, dist. 16, q. 3; Scotus, q. unica, and In IV, dist. 45, q. 3; Durandus, In I, dist. 2, q. 2, and In II, dist. 3, q. 5; Marsilius, In I, q. 7, a. 7, and In II, q. 17, a. 2; and from other philosophers, In II De Anima, with whom we must deal there; and of angels we shall say something below. I note only now that there is a difference between Scotus and Gregory and their followers, in that Gregory posits no distinction at all in reality between forms and their faculties. Whence it comes about that he grants that the soul understands, wills, sees, hears, etc., through the same proximate principle, which is quite absurd. Scotus, however, to avoid this, posited a formal distinction between the powers and the forms. But if by formal distinction Scotus understands a distinction which is not actually in reality, but at most virtually and fundamentally, and is completed by the mind, he differs from Gregory and the others only in the way of speaking; but if he understands a true actual distinction which is in reality, at least modal, first, he does not contradict the conclusion laid down, because that mode will be a certain accident, which is enough for the truth of the said assertion. Next, he undeservedly denies a most proper real distinction; for, as I shall say at once, the proximate faculty of operating is not some mode, but some proper entity and true form; and therefore, if it is distinguished in reality from the substantial form, it is not distinguished as a mode, but as a thing, and hence properly really. Especially because, if there are any reasons which prove a distinction in reality, they prove no less a real distinction than a modal one; and conversely, if the reasons which he and others make against the opinion of St. Thomas were of any weight, they would proceed equally against a modal distinction.

24. I do not, however, think it expedient now to propose those arguments one by one, both because they do not seem to me difficult, and also because they are sufficiently solved by Cajetan and others, and finally because almost all of them tend to prove that things should not be multiplied without necessity; and they prove that sufficient necessity does not intervene here, either by solving the reasons of St. Thomas, or because substance, since it is nobler, could suffice for that for the effecting of which the accident is added. And the reason taken from the former assertion can press particularly against us; for if the powers flow from the essence through true efficiency, then it contains the powers themselves eminently; therefore it will be sufficient by itself to effect whatever it can through the powers. It is answered, however, that there is sufficient necessity for created substance to have principles accommodated to accidental actions, which necessity is sufficiently proved by the inductions and reasons made above; for demonstration cannot be made about all things. Nor does it matter that the substance is more perfect, both because what is more perfect cannot always effect whatever a less perfect thing can, and also because from this it is at most had that the substance is the principal or radical principle, not also the proximate; but it is more to be a principle in both ways than in one only. In which sense we can also say that the substance with its power is something more perfect than alone. Finally, the hand too is more perfect than the pen, and yet it cannot write without the pen. To the last objection we can, first, meet with a sensible example; for water through its form is sufficient for coldness to result from it, and yet without coldness it is not sufficient to cool other things. The consequence, therefore, is to be denied; and the reason can be given, first, because the power of a form or principle can be limited, both to the perfection of its own supposit and to such a mode of action or emanation, as gravity per se moves the heavy thing itself in which it exists, not another. Secondly, because sometimes the formal power or faculty is so accommodated to the action that not every virtual one suffices; as the agent intellect, either alone or with the phantasm, virtually contains the intelligible species, and yet cannot per se concur to intellection, but through the species which they effect. Thirdly and chiefly, because I do not think that the essence contains its passions eminently, but only instrumentally; for this is why, as I said, that effect is attributed to the generator; but it can happen that something is an apt instrument for effecting another thing or another faculty, and not for immediately effecting the action of that faculty, as is manifestly seen in the instruments of art.