Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Of all the questions which we treated of the substantial form, this alone remains about the accidental form which requires peculiar declaration; for, if the things which were said in the preceding section are attentively considered, there we comprehended all the things which pertain to the notion of physical form; but those which pertain to the notion of metaphysical form can be taken from the last section of the preceding disputation. For in its last part we showed that genera and differences are found in accidents by the same reason and proportion.

The sense of the question is explained, separating certain things from uncertain

2. Extrinsic denominations are not educed from the potency of the subject.—In order, then, that in the present doubt we may separate certain things from uncertain, that three-membered division proposed in the preceding section is to be supposed, of the proper entity of the accidental form, of the accidental mode, and of the accident only extrinsically denominating. And of this third member indeed nothing need be said, for it is certain that all these predicates which extrinsically denominate others are not educed from the potency of those things which are extrinsically denominated by them, since they are not in them as in a subject and either simply do not depend on them, as clothing on the man and the containing surface on the thing contained; or, if they depend, it is not in the genus of material cause, but either of efficient, as action on the agent, or of objective, as vision on the object. It is to be noticed, then, that the thing which extrinsically denominates another is always intrinsically in some other thing, for either it is some substance, and that is in itself, or it is an entity or accidental mode, and so it is necessary that it be intrinsically in some subject by which it is sustained. Whence, when any thing whatever which extrinsically denominates another comes about anew, the mode of its production or eduction is not to be considered with respect to the thing extrinsically denominated, but with respect to that thing or subject from which the denomination is. Whence, if that thing is a substance, in it there will be the production of the whole and the eduction of the form, as in other substances; but if it is an accidental form or mode, the reason will be the same as of the other accidents.

3. Various modes in which accidental forms come about.—Again it is necessary to distinguish a twofold mode in which accidents are wont to come about, namely either per se through proper action, or through resultance. Likewise, among accidental forms, some are of the natural order, but some are of the supernatural order, as grace, the light of glory and similar ones. And the same distinction can be applied to accidental modes, for some are natural, as the figure of the earth or where; others are supernatural, as the mode of existing of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. And we can add here a third member, for some modes are said to be neither natural nor supernatural, but artificial, which member does not have place in proper accidental forms or entities, because there is none which properly comes about through art, except perhaps either in so far as art helps nature, as in health, or in so far as through art active things are applied to passive, as if gold comes about through the art of alchemy, and in this way other mixed bodies come about, as liquors, etc. Which forms are all not properly artificial, except perhaps through a certain extrinsic denomination; for intrinsically they are physical and natural forms, not only accidental, but sometimes also they can be substantial and of the same notion with those which come about naturally. Whence that the application of agents and patients comes about through art does not stand in the way of their coming about through true eduction. Properly artificial forms, then, are only certain modes, for all consist in some figure; because human effective power, which can be ruled or directed by art, cannot extend further, whose reason we shall see below; but any figure whatever is only a certain mode of a quantified thing, as is self-evident.

4. Natural accidents which come about through transmutation are educed from the potency of the subject.—From all these, then, only one thing is certain, namely that accidental forms of the natural order which come about through proper action and proper transmutation of the subject are educed from the potency of the subject; for in these manifestly concur all the things which can be necessary for eduction from the potency of matter, which will be evident a fortiori from what is to be said. But many other things are doubtful and uncertain, which we shall touch upon one by one and dispatch briefly.

A doubt about intentional qualities

5. The opinion of some.—The first doubt is whether certain qualities which are natural, as natural is distinguished from supernatural (but they are called intentional, and by that reason are wont to be distinguished from altogether natural and physical qualities, as are intentional species and similar ones), the doubt (I say) is whether such qualities are educed from the potency of the subject. For some deny this, as Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 8; which opinion is followed, on the Second Book of the Sentences, by Giles, dist. 13, q. 2; Thomas of Strasbourg, a. 8; the Carthusian, q. 1, who extends this to the light which is produced from without in the air or another diaphanous body; which Alexander of Hales too taught, Metaphysics VII, text 13. Their foundation is that these forms come about in an instant and without resistance and casting off of a contrary, and consequently without transmutation of matter; and therefore they are called forms without matter; therefore they are not educed from the potency of matter. And it is confirmed, because these qualities come about not only in elemental bodies but also in heavenly ones; but no form can be educed from the potency of the heaven, otherwise the heaven would be alterable and would receive foreign impressions.

6. Unravelling of the doubt.—But this opinion relies on no firm reason, and therefore it must be said that all such accidents are educed from the potency of the subjects in which they are received. So holds Richard, In II, dist. 13, a. 2, q. 1; and Hervaeus, dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, and Quodlibet VII, q. 20. And it is proved, because these qualities come about from natural agents; therefore they do not come about from nothing; therefore they come about from a presupposed subject concurring through its natural power in the genus of material cause to the being and becoming of such forms; therefore they are truly educed from the potency of the subject. For all the other conditions which are required for eduction are voluntarily feigned without any reason. For, that the accidental form comes about in an instant, what prevents eduction? For the substantial form too comes about in an instant; thence, then, it only follows that there can be given instantaneous and successive eduction, as also change. Nor does it matter that to the eduction of the substantial form there precedes a successive previous alteration, for, as I showed above, the notion of eduction does not consist in the relationship to the preceding alteration, but in the intrinsic mode and causality of such action. Whence as regards this it is per accidens that the previous alteration precedes on account of the contrary form to be cast off. Next it is also said gratuitously that it is necessary for eduction that the form have a contrary, since this is not necessary for real action and change from a presupposed subject which concurs in the genus of material cause to the being and becoming of the quality itself. And it is declared moreover in light, which has no contrary, for illumination is such an action that through it there does not per se primarily come about the form of light, but the illuminated thing; whence that is a certain accidental generation, for there concur there the three principles of generation which are the same in all predicaments, proportion being kept, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics XII. But every generation through which a form comes about or is co-produced is the eduction of the same form, otherwise no certain notion of eduction could be assigned; therefore light is truly educed from the potency of the subject, and the reason is the same of other intentional qualities.

7. Finally, when these qualities are said to come about in the subject without transmutation of the subject, this can be understood in two ways: first, absolutely and simply without any real change, and this sense is false; for, since they really receive something and are reduced from potency to act, it is necessary that they be in some way really changed, that is, pass from the lack of some being to having it. In another way it can be understood of corruptive transmutation or that losing some proper and connatural perfection or disposition; and in this way these forms are truly said to come about in the subject without its transmutation; but such transmutation is irrelevant to eduction, whose notion does not consist in the casting off of another form, except when and as much as it is necessary for the induction of the other. But if the induction of a form can come about without the corruption or casting off of another, such transmutation will not be necessary for eduction, but perfective change will suffice. Which is declared in this way, for there there is a true induction of the form into the subject and it is not the induction of a form coming from outside (to use the words of Aristotle), that is, it is not the mere union of a pre-existing form; therefore it is a true eduction of the form which was contained in the natural potency of the subject and could not come about otherwise.

8. What change is repugnant to the heaven, what not.—And from these the answer has been given to the foundation of the contrary opinion. But to the confirmation it is denied that these forms cannot be educed from the potency of the heaven, for in its potency are contained both they themselves and the changes through which they naturally come about. Nor is every perfective or productive change repugnant to the heaven, but only that which in some way disposes to corruption or which draws the thing out of the connatural state due to it. But if the name of alteration is extended to instantaneous and perfective change, so it is not repugnant that the heaven be altered; yet in the usual way of speaking alteration is not said except of successive change which tends to one quality from the contrary, and in this way the heaven is said to be unalterable; but, the name of alteration being so taken, the eduction of quality extends more widely than alteration. Indeed I add that not only these corporeal qualities, but also the spiritual ones which come about through proper action in the natural mode, are educed from the potency of the subject in which and from which they come about. For so the agent intellect does not create intelligible species, but educes them from the potency of the possible intellect, in whose natural potency they are contained and on which they depend in becoming and in being; whence from it they are educed into act by the power of the agent intellect. And by the same reason the vital acts both of the intellect and of the will, both in men and in angels, come about through eduction; for before they were contained in the potency not only active but also receptive of their powers, on which they naturally depend in becoming and in being; but these only are of the notion of eduction, as we shall confirm more fully in the following doubt.

A doubt about supernatural qualities

9. The opinion of some and its foundation.—Secondly, it can be doubted whether also supernatural forms, which are called by the theologians per se infused, are educed from the potency of the subject in which they come about. Some absolutely deny it,¹ because to these forms there is not in the subject a natural potency; therefore they cannot be educed thence. And it is confirmed, for nothing is educed except whence it is contained; but the soul, for example, in no way contains grace in its substance; therefore it cannot be educed thence. And the reason is the same of all similar qualities. Finally by this reason some theologians say that grace and similar forms are created, others concreated; but all say at least that they are infused, in order to signify that they come from without, but are not educed. But, although it is true that the production of these qualities is not natural eduction, as the arguments made prove, I nevertheless do not judge that it is outside the breadth of the eduction of form from the potency of the subject, but rather, just as one quality is of the natural order, another supernatural, yet each is a true quality, so of that eduction of accidental form, one is of the natural order, another supernatural; yet each is true eduction.

10. Explanation of the doubt.—Wherefore it must be said simply that these qualities come about through eduction from the potency of the subject, and so the theologians commonly speak, especially the more recent, treating of grace and of the effecting of the sacraments, as I noted in tom. I and III of the Third Part. And it is proved by all the reasons made in the prior doubt, for all the conditions required for eduction and all the dependence, causality and mode of effecting are found in these forms. There is only the difference that to these forms the subject does not concur through natural potency, which condition the said authors require in the subject in order that the form be said to be educed from its potency; which nevertheless they do not prove; whence that condition seems only to have been added to exclude these forms, in the way in which anyone can think out another condition and add it to exclude other forms; and so nothing will be firm unless some notion of eduction is established from some general and firm reason. That condition, then, although it is necessary for natural eduction, is not necessary for eduction simply, under which supernatural eduction is contained, for which there is not required on the side of the subject natural receptive potency, but obediential suffices. For why, just as there is given natural and supernatural quality, and natural and supernatural intellection, and natural and supernatural effecting from a presupposed subject, will there not also be given supernatural eduction distinct from natural, both on the side of the active principle and of the passive, although they agree in the general mode of eduction? And finally it is declared by this reason, for the eduction of form is immediately and adequately co-distinguished from the creation of form in those things which come about through proper action; for thence the philosophers arrived at the knowledge of the eduction of form, because they understood that forms do not come about through creation; therefore they suppose that every form which comes about through proper action and is not created is educed from the potency of the subject. And indeed deservedly, for what is created comes about from nothing, that is, from no subject and without the concurrence of a material cause; but to be educed is nothing other than to come about from a subject with the aforesaid concurrence and dependence in becoming and in being.

11. But they can answer that creation requires that it be from no subject, or at least from no natural potency of the subject, but that it is not against the notion of creation as such that a form be produced or effected from a subject according to obediential potency only. But this is repugnant to the notion of creation as it is conceived and expounded by all the Doctors, namely that it is the production of being from nothing; for a form which comes about from a presupposed subject by whatever reason cannot truly be said to come about from nothing. Whence St. Thomas and all gather that proper creation is always terminated at a subsisting thing, because an inhering form, since it depends on the subject in becoming and in being, cannot terminate creation. Moreover, the action through which such a form comes about (whether it is educed from the natural or the obediential potency of the subject) is not terminated per se primarily at the form itself in itself, but at the composite or the thing informed by such form as such; therefore, just as what per se primarily comes about through the action by which heat comes about is not heat itself, but the hot, while heat co-comes-about or is co-produced, so what per se primarily comes about through the action by which grace comes about is not grace, but the one made pleasing; but that action, as it is terminated at the one made pleasing, cannot be creation, because creation is the production of the whole entity which is in the primary term of such action; but through that action the whole entity of the composite made pleasing does not come about, but it is only completed in the being of pleasing; therefore neither that action, as through it grace is co-produced, can have the notion of creation; for on this account no form depending on a subject in becoming is created, because it does not come about per se primarily, but co-comes-about through the action by which the composite is produced without creation. Which finally is declared from the contrary, because, when such a form ceases, it is not annihilated, because it only co-ceases (so to speak) at the ceasing of the composite, which is not annihilated.

12. Supernatural accidents are neither created nor concreated.—A saying of Augustine is expounded.—From these, then, it is sufficiently (as I think) convinced that these supernatural qualities are not created while they come about dependently on the subject, even if it is through obediential receptive potency; and thence it is more openly concluded that they cannot be said to be concreated, speaking per se and by force of such action. For, although sometimes they come about together with the creation of the subject and then are said to be concreated, nevertheless this is per accidens and only through extrinsic denomination; but speaking per se and by force of the proper action through which they come about in the subject, they cannot be concreated; because then a form is said to be concreated when through the action by which it itself is co-produced the whole composite which consists of such form is created; but the composite which consists of such form is not created through that action, because it does not come about absolutely and simply in so far as it is being, but only in so far as it is such composite; whence it does not come about from nothing, but from a presupposed subject; therefore neither can such qualities be said to be concreated, unless the name of creation is taken broadly for any effecting or temporal production whatever. If, then, these accidents are neither created nor concreated, it remains that they are educed; for (as I said) eduction is proximately opposed to the creation of form and is adequately divided against it. Nor does it matter that the production of these qualities is called infusion; for it was only so called to signify that it comes from an extrinsic and superior cause and is not acquired through intrinsic power and action, as acquired habits are wont to be obtained. But that infusion does not come about without dependence on the subject in becoming and in being; for it is not to be thought of as the infusion of water into a vessel, but as the infusion of light into the air; and therefore such infusion is not outside the breadth of eduction. And so satisfaction has been made to the motives of the contrary opinion and the mode of speaking of the theologians explained. Nor is it inconvenient to concede that grace is contained in the obediential potency of the soul; for to be contained in obediential potency is nothing other than what Augustine said: To be able to have faith is of the nature of men. And therefore it is also excellently said that grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul, because it is not apt by nature to come about per se, but dependently on the soul or another nature having a similar capacity.

Corollaries from the doctrine above

13. From what has been said it is understood, first, that an accidental form made supernaturally in the subject as regards the mode only and not as regards the term comes about much more through eduction and not through creation. Examples are of the visive power which is divinely restored to a blind man, and of health, which comes about miraculously without the order or disposition of natural causes. For in these, although the mode of acting is supernatural, nevertheless the form which comes about is natural and is received in the subject according to natural potency and capacity and depends on it in being and in becoming, even as it comes about in such a way, for that action, even if as regards other things it is miraculous, nevertheless as regards dependence on the subject comes about in the connatural mode, and therefore is true eduction. Whence this can be extended to the eduction of the substantial form when on the side of the agent it happens to come about in a miraculous way through sudden and extraordinary transmutation, as when Christ converted water into wine; for that miraculous mode did not exclude the true notion of eduction, on account of the said cause. And the same would hold of the action by which God would raise and vivify the corpse of a horse or of a lion, for that action too would come about through eduction, as the same reason proves.

14. Secondly, it is gathered from what has been said that every proper accidental form, if it comes about through proper action and in the connatural mode as regards the term, is always educed from the potency of the subject. This is evident from what has been said. First by induction, because both supernatural and natural form so come about; therefore any whatever. Secondly by reason, because every accidental form by its nature depends in becoming and in being on the subject as on a material cause; and this only is required for eduction, as has been shown. And therefore I said if it comes about in the connatural mode as regards the term; for, if God produced an accident outside every subject (for he can do this equally as preserve it), such accident would not come about through eduction but through creation; for it would come about after the manner of a subsisting thing, without dependence on a material cause, and so from nothing; yet that mode of production cannot be connatural to the accidental form, as being outside a subject cannot be connatural.

15. I said also if it comes about through proper action, in order to exclude the accidental forms which are concreated or co-generated with their subjects, of which, either as regards the thing itself or at least as regards the mode of speaking, there is a peculiar reason. For it happens in two ways that an accidental form is co-produced through the production of the subject. The first is through concomitance alone in duration, yet through a proper action altogether diverse from the action by which the subject is produced, without natural resultance of one from the other, in which way grace is said to be concreated with the angels, or light with the air, if it is illuminated in the same instant in which it is created, and then the action productive of the accidental form as regards the thing itself is true eduction altogether of the same notion with that which comes about at a later time, as is evident a fortiori from what was said above of the eduction of the substantial form. But as regards the mode of speaking it receives another extrinsic denomination, on account of the concomitance of the actions, as has been declared. The second mode of co-production of the accidental form with the subject is on account of natural resultance, such as is between the intrinsic property and the substantial form or essence. And then the accidental form is more properly said to be co-produced at the production of its subject; but, just as that co-production does not come about without some activity of the essence into its property, so it does not come about without some eduction of the same property from the potency of the subject in which it is received, because that activity, precisely considered as co-distinguished from the production of the substance itself, depends essentially on the subject in the genus of material cause. But, just as that activity is not thought a proper and per se action, because by its nature it follows and results from the term of another action, and this is the proper and connatural mode of such activity, so that is not thought a proper eduction, because by eduction absolutely said we understand an action which per se primarily tends to acting something from a presupposed subject; which difference too pertains rather to the mode of speaking than to the thing, as will be more openly evident from what is to be said below of the efficient cause.

16. Any accidental mode of any condition whatever is educed from the potency of the subject.—Thirdly it is gathered from what has been said that every accidental mode, whether natural or supernatural, as it participates the notion of form, so comes about through eduction, most of all if it comes about through proper action. This is evident speaking in general, because such a mode depends essentially in becoming and in being on the subject, so much so that not even through the absolute power of God can it come about outside the subject, in which it exceeds accidental entity, as was shown above, from which it comes about that it can never come about through proper creation; wherefore, if it comes about per se, it is necessary that it come about after the manner of eduction. And this is most of all evident in the predicament where, which consists in a certain accidental mode, and to it there is per se local motion, as is evident from the common doctrine on Physics I; but that motion, since it comes about from a natural agent, comes about after the manner of eduction, for it is effected from a presupposed subject and with intrinsic dependence on it. But we said above that these modes participate imperfectly the notion of form, and therefore they also participate imperfectly the notion of eduction, not indeed on the side of the dependence of matter, which rather is greatest, but on the side of the thing educed, which is an imperfect form. From which it is permitted to gather that those modes which do not put on the proper notion of forms can only most improperly be said to be educed; as, for example, local motion will not so properly be said to be educed from the potency of the subject as its term, because motion is not a proper form of the subject, but the way to the form. And therefore it is not properly educed, but is eduction itself. But, just as action does not properly come about, so neither is eduction educed, unless broadly speaking it is said to be educed by itself, as action is said to come about by itself. And almost the same judgement holds of the accidental modes which do not come about per se but result when others are posited; such as are the relations resulting when foundation and term are posited, if we suppose that such relations are modes distinct from the nature of the thing from their foundation; for in the way in which they come about, they come about dependently on the subject, and so are educed from its potency; yet, because they do not come about through proper action but only result, therefore that is not properly eduction, but is called by its proper name resultance.

The doubt about artificial forms is dispatched

17. Finally hence is dispatched the frequent doubt about artificial forms, whether they are educed from the potency of the subject. For some absolutely deny it, because the subject of these forms is not in natural potency to them, but obediential with respect to human art. But this reason stands little in the way, because it has already been shown that a form is truly educed from obediential potency. Secondly, because that obediential potency is not outside the breadth of natural potency, that is, which can be reduced to act by an agent of the natural order, whether such act is naturally due to such potency or not. Whence, when man effects such a form, he truly effects it through natural motive power, although he moves it through the will and directs it through art. Wherefore sometimes it happens that a similar form or figure comes about from a natural agent by chance or from the concurrence of several causes. Thirdly, because otherwise in the motion of a stone thrown upward by a man the where at which it is terminated would not be educed from the potency of the subject, because the stone too can be said to be only in obediential potency with respect to such motion; indeed in a certain way that potency is less, because that motion is violent; but the consequent is false, because the cooling of water, even if it is violent, comes about through eduction; for, although it is repugnant to the form, on the side of matter there is natural capacity; but so it is in the stone with respect to upward motion. But that that motion is impressed by a free or natural agent matters nothing to eduction.

18. Wherefore others absolutely teach that artificial forms are educed from the potency of the subject on account of the said reasons. But I judge that the judgement is the same of these forms as of the other modes which come about through resultance; for these artificial forms are only certain accidental modes, as was said above, and to them there is not per se physical action; for, although the intention of the artificer tends per se to them, and therefore he directs his action through art in such a way that he may induce the intended form, nevertheless the action itself, through which he executes his intention, is not terminated per se and immediately at such form, but at some other mode from which such form results. For these forms always come about through local motion, which is proximately terminated at where, and thence result the various figures of artefacts, either through the cutting and division of parts, or through their composition and ordered situation, and therefore in the effecting of these forms there is not proper eduction, but such as can be in natural resultance. But hence I gather that this is not proper to these forms because they come about through art, but is common to all figures, even if they are effected through merely natural action; for they always come about through resultance alone, either at the production or at the rarefaction, condensation or situation of quantity.