Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting is that the accident is neither the formal cause of its subject nor of the composite; therefore it has no effect; therefore neither true and per se causality. This last consequence is evident, because cause and effect are correlatives; but the first is evident from a sufficient enumeration of the parts; but the antecedent is proved as regards the former part, because the subject of the accident is substance; but the accident cannot be the formal cause of substance. But as regards the latter part it is proved, because, if the accident were the formal cause of the composite, such a composite would be per se one, because from a proper and per se cause there arises a proper and per se effect; but the composite of accident and subject is not per se one; therefore.

2. The opinion of Aureolus is rejected.—About this question can be reported the opinion of Aureolus, in Capreolus, In II, dist. 18, q. 1, saying that no accident has a proper entity of form through which it formally affects the subject, but is the actuation itself. Which can scarcely be understood what it signifies, unless perhaps he understood that no accident is a thing really distinct from the entity of substance, but only a mode, which in many ways is repugnant to and dissonant with the truths of faith. For who would understand that the accidents in the Eucharist are separated and remain without the entity of substance, and that they do not have some proper entity really distinct from the entity of substance? Likewise, how can the whole doctrine which faith teaches about infused qualities be rightly understood if those do not have proper entities distinct from the natural entity of substance? That opinion is moreover against experience, as much as a physical thing can be; for who, seeing the air now illuminated and afterwards losing the light, does not almost see with his eyes that light is a certain entity distinct from the substance of the air? I omit other things which we shall say in their places of quantity, quality, etc. Moreover, that opinion in that sense relies on no probable reason; for why is it repugnant to the notion of accident that it have a proper entity distinct from substance and naturally depending on it? Perhaps, however, this was not the sense of that author, but that the accident, whether it is a thing distinct from the subject or not, is not distinguished in the thing from the actuation or inherence in the subject; for all the arguments which Capreolus reports there seem to tend to this. According to which sense he does not exclude that the accident can truly and properly be a form, but explains badly its formal causality. And it is also in this sense a dangerous opinion, as Capreolus notes there; for, if the information or (what is the same) the inherence of the accident is not distinct in the thing from it, it cannot be understood how the accident is preserved without its actual inherence, which nevertheless faith teaches comes about in the Eucharist. Moreover, if the arguments which Capreolus reports there were of any moment, they would prove the same in the substantial form and its information; for all insist chiefly on this, that they inquire what that information is, whether it is something distinct from the accident, whether it is respective or absolute, and other things of this kind which are common in substantial information and in any union whatever.

3. The manifold division of accidents.—In order, then, that we may dispatch the proposed question, the various genera of accidents are to be distinguished. For some are those which properly and intrinsically affect the thing to which they are said to happen; others, which only extrinsically denominate, as action with respect to the agent and habit or clothing with respect to the man clothed. The former accidents again: some are having a proper entity and reality distinct both from substance and from other accidental entities. But others are only certain modes affixed to other entities, which sometimes are really the same with substance, as, for example, local presence, but sometimes are the same with other accidents, as figure with quantity, and the relation of likeness (if it is a distinct mode) with whiteness.

Accidental entities truly cause formally

4. I say, then, first: the accidents which have a proper entity distinct from substance exercise proper and true formal causality. I do not assert that this notion belongs to them univocally; for in this the reason will be the same as of the notion of being or of being itself; for, since the form is that which gives being, if the being which such a form gives is not univocally being, such a form will not univocally be a formal cause. Yet, just as the accident, although it is analogically being, is nevertheless truly and properly being and not metaphorically, and has true and proper real being, so the accident which gives such being is truly and properly a formal cause, even if it is not univocally such. Moreover, substance is truly in passive and receptive potency to such accidents; therefore conversely the accidents themselves are proper acts actuating and as it were filling that receptive capacity, and inhere in it and are sustained by it; therefore they are properly forms and exercise proper formal causality. And so think all philosophers and theologians, who call these accidents formal causes. And divine theology favours it, when it calls inherent justice the formal cause of our justification. Finally these accidents are causes of their proper effects, and not extrinsic but intrinsic, because through themselves they intrinsically constitute their effects. Whence it cannot happen through divine power that such effects come about without such causes, as the white, for example, without whiteness. Since, therefore, it is evident that these accidents are not material causes, it is necessary that they be formal causes; for there is no other genus of intrinsic cause besides these two.

5. Hence it is permitted to gather that those four things which were declared above in the substantial formal cause are found in the same proportion in this accidental formal cause, namely the formal and proximate principle of causing, the necessary condition, the causality and the effect. The principle, both principal and proximate, in this genus, is the very entity of such form, by its nature apt so to inform, which aptitude is not something in the thing distinct from the entity of such form, but is its intrinsic and essential difference, for to this it was per se primarily instituted from its nature, as was said of the substantial form. Likewise, because that aptitude is altogether inseparable from such entity, even through divine power, which is a sign that it is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing. Moreover, because, if the aptitude to inform were as it were a certain potency distinct from the nature of the thing from the accidental form, that would be a certain accident; of which again it must be asked whether it affects per se; which could not be denied unless we wish to proceed to infinity; nor could another reason be given why that aptitude proximately affects or is the proximate reason of affecting except because it was intrinsically instituted to this from its nature; but this very thing is most truly said of the accidental entity itself; therefore one must stop in it and say that it through itself is apt to provide this causality. Of the condition likewise necessary for causing nothing peculiar occurs to be said here besides the things which were said of the substantial form; for only nearness and indistance can be required as a necessary condition, for existence is not properly a condition, as was declared in the same place.

The said causality is explained

6. Of the causality likewise one must philosophize in the same way; for it cannot be denied that it is something distinct from the nature of the thing from the form and from the subject, since God can preserve the whole entity of the accidental form and of the subject without the accident exercising its formal causality about the subject; which can in no way be understood unless the actual causality is something distinct from the causing form and the receiving subject, for separation in the thing is an evident sign of distinction in the thing, as was shown above. But I add further that such causality is not other than the actual union or inherence of the accident in the subject, as was said of the substantial form; for the reason is proportionally the same.

7. The arguments of Aureolus are unravelled.—Yet it is necessary here briefly to satisfy the arguments of Aureolus. The first is that either that information is something absolute or respective; if absolute, then separable from the form through the absolute power of God, so that such absolute remains in the subject without the form, because God can separate any absolute whatever from another. But if relative, then to be informed, as, for example, to be white, is relative. Secondly, for if it is something distinct from the form, of what predicament is it? For it will most of all be of the predicament of action; but this cannot be said, because otherwise the causality of the form would not be formal but efficient. Thirdly, because, if the actuation of the form is something distinct, since it itself most of all actuates the subject, I ask whether it actuates through itself or through something else; if through something else, one will proceed to infinity; if through itself, then it would have been better to stop at the form itself. And to these arguments are reduced all the things which Capreolus reports there most fully, besides those which pertain to the distinction of quantity from substance, which we shall treat in its place.

8. But to these Capreolus answers by supposing the real distinction between being and essence and saying that the actuation of the form is something distinct from the form; but that that is not another accident, but is the being of the form itself, which is reduced to the species of the form from which it flows. But what he supposes is not necessary in the present case, nor can it satisfy in his opinion, if he speaks consistently; for it implies a contradiction that that actuation be separated from the informing form; but according to his opinion God separates being from the informing form in the humanity of Christ, and by the same reason could do the same in the accidental form. Nor does the answer satisfy which he insinuates there, namely that God cannot separate the proper being from the form unless he supplies it through some alien being. For granted that this is so, nevertheless that alien being through which God supplies the proper being is not the formal effect of the form. Likewise, the proper being being separated and impeded, the proper information remains; therefore it is something distinct from being. And so without doubt it would have to be said consistently in that opinion that that action does not pertain to the being of existence, but to the being of essence of the whole composite, and is something prior to the being of existence itself, as is evident in the humanity of Christ, in which, according to that opinion, there was only a proper being of essence, and yet in it there was the proper actuation of the soul, of which the soul was deprived in the death of Christ, although it was not deprived anew of any being of existence. And quantity in the Eucharist is deprived of its actuation and not of its existence. Those arguments, therefore, are to be solved abstracting from that question of the distinction of essence and existence.

9. To the first, then, it must be said that this information or actuation is something absolute, including essentially a transcendental respect. But it is something absolute not as an entity really distinct from the entity of the form, but as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing, and on this side it implies a contradiction that such a mode be preserved without the form itself, although not conversely. Moreover that mode includes the transcendental respect of actual union to the subject, and on this side it implies a contradiction that that mode remain in the nature of things without the subject remaining affected and informed by such accident. Nor is it new or singular that an absolute mode essentially include a transcendental respect, but it is very frequent and common to many entities, especially imperfect and incomplete ones. Nor does it follow thence that the denominations taken from absolute forms are respective, as white or to be white and similar ones; for these denominations are not taken from the unions (so to speak), but from the united forms; but the forms are absolute. To the second, it is rightly said that this mode of information is reduced to the predicament of the accidental form, because it is a mode completing in a certain way its being, as subsistence in its way completes the being of substance. But if anyone said that these causalities are reduced to the predicaments of action or passion, not as actions, but as causalities distinct in species, perhaps he would not err much; but we shall examine this in treating of the sufficiency of the predicaments. To the third I answer that the actuation does not properly actuate the subject, but unites the form to the subject, through which form the subject is actuated; as action properly does not act, but conjoins the acting cause to the effect in its genus. Whence, just as action, in the way in which it is from the agent, is not through another action but through itself, so that actuation, in the way in which it actuates or attains the subject, attains not through another but through itself. Nor as regards this is the reason the same of the form itself, because the form in its precise entity does not essentially include a transcendental respect of actual union, which nevertheless that actuation includes.

The effect of this form is declared

10. Of the fourth, namely of the effect, it must be said that the proper effect of this form is only the accidental composite, for that is what first and immediately arises from the accident informing the subject, and that alone is that which intrinsically and in its way essentially depends on such form; therefore this is the proper and only effect of such form. Next, the effect of this form cannot be the subject itself, since it is substance, which of itself is prior to the accident; therefore it is necessary that it be the composite, because there is nothing else which could be. It will perhaps be said that between these there is given a medium, namely that the subject is affected by the accidental form, as, for example, that the effect of whiteness is for the subject to whiten (so to speak), or to be white, which is the same; but this is something distinct from the whole composite of subject and whiteness, for it expresses only the effect left by whiteness in the subject; this, then, is the formal effect of the accidental form, and not the whole composite. I answer that for whiteness to render the subject white and to constitute with it such an accidental composite are altogether the same and differ only in the mode of signifying, as is evident from the terms themselves and from what was said above of the substantial form. It is only to be noticed that the accidental composite, although in the genus of formal cause it is the effect of the accidental form alone, nevertheless absolutely does not arise from the form alone, but at the same time and most of all from the subject itself. From which it comes about that that effect can be signified either precisely as it is caused by the form, and so we say that the effect of whiteness is to render the subject white; or absolutely, as from such subject and form there arises this white thing, and in this way the accidental composite is said to be the effect of the accidental form.

11. The reason for doubting is solved.—Nor does the reason for doubting posited at the beginning stand in the way at all; for there is an equivocation in that term per se when it is applied to the effect as it is effect or as it is one composite; for the accidental composite itself, although in the notion of being it is not per se one but per accidens, in the notion of effect is the per se effect of the accidental form; for these are diverse relationships and formal notions, and therefore nothing forbids that that composite which is not per se one but per accidens, in so far as it is such, be the per se effect of the accidental form; for that composite, of whatever kind it is, per se and essentially requires that form, in so far as it is such composite, whence it is caused per se by it in its genus.

Why from accident and subject one per se does not come about

12. The reason of some is disproved.—But, in order that this may be explained radically, it can be asked why from the accidental form and the subject there does not arise a being per se one, since such form through itself is truly and really united to such subject. Many think the reason is that the accidental form supposes in the subject some being of existence; and moreover it itself confers its proper and peculiar being of existence; but from a twofold being of existence one per se cannot be composed, but only per accidens. So Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 5; and Henry indicates it, Quodlibet X, q. 8, where he says that, if the accident did not have its proper being in the subject, but only the being of the subject, it would in no way compose a being one per accidens, but per se. Whence, as he reports in the same place, some even of those who posited several substantial forms per se ordered in the same composite, in order to save that one per se arises from them, said that the prior forms do not give being when they are actually conjoined to the last form. Indeed even Capreolus, In III, dist. 17, q. 1, concl. 2, thinks it probable that it can sometimes naturally happen that the substantial form gives being of essence and does not give being of existence, on account of a certain testimony of St. Thomas, in the opuscule De natura materiae, c. 8, although it is more probable that that opuscule is not St. Thomas's. Add that there have not been lacking Thomists who thought it probable that accidents do not have a proper being distinct from the being of substance, according to whose opinion (if the principle posited is true) it follows that from accident and substance one per se comes about, for things which have altogether the same being and per se one will deservedly be said to have unity per se, since one follows being and being is said from esse. Nevertheless all these are founded on and suppose the real distinction between being and essence, which we judge is not possible speaking of actual essence; and, although it were possible or true, it is nevertheless not necessary for defining the present question. For such as the essence is, such also is the being; whence, just as the essence can be one either through simple entity or through composition, so also the being itself. If, then, it is said that only those things constitute one per se which have one simple and not composite being, that principle is false and taken without foundation. But if the discussion is of one being through composition, so, although it is true that the accidental form gives its proper being, the same question remains, why from such being and the being of the subject there is not composed one being which is truly and properly per se one.

13. The efficacious reason of the conclusion.—Otherwise, then, it can be answered that the accidental form supposes complete and perfect substantial being, and therefore from the being of such form and of the subject one being per se is not composed. Which reason is excellent as regards the accidents which are subjected in complete substance. Yet, because we are of the opinion that quantity inheres in prime matter, with which it does not make one per se but per accidens, therefore it must be added that the accidental form, by the very fact that by its nature it regards a subject having being of another order and predicament and is not ordered to constituting or completing that being in that order and predicament, does not constitute with it one per se but per accidens, because what is per se one must be of one order and predicament. And by this reason from matter and quantity there does not come about one per se, because, although matter has incomplete substantial being, it is nevertheless not ordered to quantity as to the act by which that being is to be completed. And similarly from the soul and its powers there does not result one per se but per accidens, because, although the soul too has incomplete being, it is nevertheless not ordered to completing one being with its properties, which are of an inferior order, but is per se primarily ordered to matter as to a potency of the same order. So, then, just as we were saying above that the reason on account of which from matter and form there comes about one per se is none other than the mutual proportion and relationship which they have within the same genus, so conversely the reason on account of which from accident and substance there does not come about one per se is none other than that they do not have that proportion, but another far diverse, because, although substance is capable of accident, it is nevertheless not per se ordered to such act, as was also declared above; and conversely the accident itself is such an act that it is not ordered to completing substance in its genus, but to perfecting it in another genus.

14. From which too it is understood that this unity and its reason is to be considered not only in the being of existence but also in the being of essence (however these are distinguished); indeed first in essence as such, and by reason of it found in existence. For from matter and substantial form there truly comes about one essence on account of the said cause, and therefore its being is truly and per se one; but from the accidental form and the substantial subject one essence does not come about, and therefore neither does one being per se result from them. But although the accidental form is said to compose one only per accidens, nevertheless it composes it through a true and physical union; for we are treating of the proper accidental form, which intrinsically inheres in its subject; and therefore, as we were saying above in disputing of unity, this unity, although in comparison with unity per se it is analogically unity, is nevertheless not unity only by metaphor, but because it truly and intrinsically participates some notion of unity, in which it greatly exceeds beings per accidens which are called such through aggregation or coordination alone; for not every composite per accidens is equally one, as we said in the same place. And so satisfaction has been altogether made to the reason for doubting proposed; for, although this form constitutes one per accidens, nevertheless, because that is such that it includes some physical and real unity, therefore it can compose it through proper and per se formal causality proportioned to such a composite.

Other effects of this accidental form are examined

15. But there remains another objection against the exclusive part of the conclusion, because not only the composite but also the subject itself of the accident seems to be the effect of the accident informing it, and consequently this effect too seems to come from the formal causality of the accidental form. The assumption is proved, because the subject of the accident depends in being on the accident itself, and only in the genus of formal cause; therefore. The major is evident in the composite, which depends on the ultimate disposition; and more clearly in matter, which cannot be without its quantity; and in the soul, which cannot be without its powers. Moreover, beyond these positive effects this form can have a privative formal effect, which consists in the casting off of the contrary form; for heat formally expels cold, and so of others. Next, one accident seems able to be the formal cause of another accident, as quantity is said to be the reason of being in place, although being in place is an accident distinct from quantity itself; and similarly the object, either through itself or through the species, is said to be the formal cause of the act of vision, for example; indeed the visive power itself is said in some way to be the formal cause of its vision; for therefore God cannot make vision or a seer without the visive power or without the concurrence of such power, because there intervenes there a formal causality which God cannot supply.

16. To the principal objection the answer is that it is not universally and per se speaking necessary that the subject depend on such an accidental form, as is evident in light with respect to air and similar things which come from without. Wherefore, even if with respect to some forms there intervenes some dependence of the subject on them, nevertheless, speaking per se, the accidental form as such does not in its causality include the dependence of the subject on it. I add next that the subject never depends on the accident as on a proper formal cause, in which all authors seem to agree; for, if the substantial composite depends on its proper accidents, almost all reduce that dependence to the genus of material cause, which they call dispositive causality; and this has place most of all in the disposition preparing and fitting the subject. For that which is concomitant, as it were preserving the subject, cannot have the notion of dispositive cause, much less formal, since it absolutely supposes the being of the subject and emanates from it or is due by reason of it; and therefore these accidents are deservedly said to preserve the being of the subject, not a priori as causes, but a posteriori as properties concomitant with such subject, which can truly be said of all intrinsic accidents. For the reason is almost the same in all of them, and there can only be a difference in this, that some simply follow, others are supposed in the order of nature, not because they have a special causality besides their information, but because they are required on the side of matter, and therefore according to that notion they are said to be reduced to the material cause.

17. How an accident expels an accident from the subject.—To the first confirmation some think that the accident expels its contrary from the subject effectively and not formally. But, although this is true of the accidental form which is in the agent, with respect to the expulsion of the contrary form which was in the patient, nevertheless of the form which is received in the patient, and universally of contrary forms in so far as with respect to the same subject one through itself is repugnant to the other and expels it, that cannot be true, because no form expels another effectively, directly and per se effecting the expulsion, because (as they say) no agent operates intending evil; nor is there any action which per se tends to corruption, but per se it makes something positive from which the privation of another follows. But the accidental form which is in the patient does not cause effectively itself nor any other form through which it would expel its contrary; it exercises, therefore, no efficiency to that expulsion, but only by informing the subject expels the contrary form, because they have among themselves formal natural repugnance with respect to the same subject. To the argument, then, I concede that the expulsion of the contrary form pertains to the formal effect of the accidental form, not of every one, but of that which has a contrary. Nor is this repugnant to the conclusion posited, both because that is to be understood of the positive and proper effect which is per se primarily caused by the form; and also because an exclusive expression does not exclude concomitants; but this expulsion of the contrary form so accompanies the positive effect of such form that by natural necessity it follows from the force of the same formal causality by which the form affects the subject and composes the composite.

18. No accident causes formally another accident distinct from itself.—To the other confirmation the answer is that no accidental form properly causes formally another accident distinct from itself and from its union with the subject, because one form does not formally cause another form. Whence, if one accident is intrinsically connected to another, it will be either on account of the natural resultance of one from the other, which pertains to efficiency, or on account of the necessary subordination by which one is the reason of receiving the other, which pertains to the genus of material cause. So, then, quantity is said to be the reason of being in place circumscriptively in each of the said ways; for it both is the reason through which corporeal substance is capable of such a mode of being in place, and upon it naturally follows to be somewhere in the said way. But the object, if it is compared to the power, in so far as it flows into it the species or in so far as by means of the species it concurs to the act, does not have the notion of formal cause, but effective, as is self-evident; but if it is considered as it terminates and specifies the act, so it exercises no proper causality, but the pure notion of term, which some reduce to the formal cause and call it extrinsic, of which we already spoke above; but now we are only treating of the proper informing cause. Finally the vital power is in no way the formal cause of its act, but active and receptive; but to constituting the subject in the notion of actually living, that is, knowing or loving, or something similar, it can be said to concur in some part formally, because, although such actual life is consummated formally through second act, it nevertheless also includes the first, which the second per se and essentially supposes; and perhaps for this reason it cannot come about that someone sees without the visive power and its use, of which elsewhere.

19. There is only one formal effect of one accident.—Why several accidental forms can be in the same subject, but not several substantial ones.—From all which it is finally inferred that the formal effect of such accidental form is only one, and also conversely that to such formal effect only one formal cause can concur. In which there is some likeness between accidental and substantial form and some difference or dissimilitude. For they differ because substantial forms can be naturally conjoined in the same subject neither per se nor per accidens, but several accidental forms can in each way be at the same time in the same subject; because, since they do not constitute one per se nor give being simply but in a certain respect, it is not repugnant that such being be multiplied in the same subject, either altogether per accidens, that is, without any relationship among themselves, as when the white becomes musical, or in some way per se, because one is subordinated to the other as potency to act, or first act to second, in which way the quantified is coloured and the eye seeing. From which it comes about that in the former way accidents at least differing in species or genus can be multiplied in the same subject in any number whatever without any certain term; for, although they cannot be infinite from the general reason that it is repugnant that the infinite be given in act, and although perhaps also from the defect of natural agents these forms cannot be multiplied beyond some certain term, both in the same and in diverse subjects, nevertheless, as far as depends on the side of the subject and on the side of the accidental forms themselves, no term can be assigned in this, nor is there a greater repugnance in a greater multitude of these forms than in a lesser, because in those things which are related per accidens this matters nothing to their repugnance, unless from elsewhere a special contrariety or opposition intervenes. But it is otherwise in those which are per se ordered, for by the very fact that they have order among themselves it is per se necessary that there be given in them a first and a last, and consequently, if there are any intermediate, it is necessary that they be in a certain number by the same reason by which this was proved above of essential predicates.

20. But the likeness between accidental and substantial form consists in this, that, just as the substantial composite is constituted by a single form, so also the accidental composite, in so far as it is in its way one and of one species, is constituted by only one accidental form, because through the subordination of genus and difference there does not come about a multiplication of forms, even in accidental ones; but from many accidental forms of diverse species there does not come about one properly and immediately, but only by reason of one subject, which with various forms makes a manifold composition. You will say: sometimes one form arises from the conjunction and proportion of several, as temperament, health, beauty and perhaps one habit. I answer that these unities either are not proper or arise from some union of such forms among themselves, and such as that union is, such will that unity be; and under that notion that form is only of one total species, even if it coalesces from several partial ones. It could also be asked here whether to the same formal effect two accidental forms of the same species can concur at the same time; but this question was disputed above in common in treating of the principle of individuation. And next we add that, although such forms were conjoined in the same subject, they would not concur to the same formal effect, but each would confer its integral effect distinct from the other, as is easily evident from what has been said.

Whether and how accidental modes cause

21. It must be said, secondly, that the accidents which do not have a proper entity distinct from others exercise indeed formal causality, yet in a diverse way from other accidental forms. The former part is proved, first, by induction, for figure is the form of the figured thing, and so Aristotle names the fourth species of quality under disjunction form or figure, and yet figure is not a thing, but only a distinct mode. Likewise posture and where or local presence formally affect the subject, whence they denominate a man, for example, sitting, or standing, or present; yet they too are modes and not distinct entities. The same can be said of the passive change of a thing. Next a reason can be given, because these accidents through themselves truly and in the thing itself affect the subjects in which they are and with them compose one accidental composite; which, in so far as it is such, intrinsically depends on them as on a proper constituting act; and the accidents themselves depend on their subjects as on material causes; therefore they themselves exercise formal causality about their subjects.

22. The second part of the assertion is declared, for these accidents, since they are not distinct things but only modes, do not affect the subjects by means of some mode of union distinct from them from the nature of the thing through which they would be united to them, but are conjoined through themselves immediately, according to the doctrine handed down above of modal distinction and of the nature of mode. Whence it comes about in these modal forms that the formal cause itself is not distinguished from its actual causality, because the causality of the form, as I have often said, is not other than the actual union of the form to the subject; therefore, where the union is not distinguished from the form, neither will the causality be able to be distinguished. A sign of which too is that such modal forms cannot remain in the nature of things except actually causing their effects, even through the absolute power of God; for sitting cannot remain unless it constitutes one sitting, etc.; which was universally demonstrated of modes above, namely that they cannot be preserved separated from the things which they modify; but they cannot be conjoined to them without affecting them formally; they cannot, therefore, actually be without actually causing; it is a sign, therefore, that their actual causality is not distinct from them, but intrinsically and essentially included in their notions. In this, then, is the difference between these modes and other proper forms, but in all the rest they agree proportionally.

23. An objection against what has been said above.—It is dissolved.—One can only doubt about these modes, because from the aforesaid assertion it follows that the mode of union or inherence of the accidental entity is a form distinct from the nature of the thing from the inhering form, for example from whiteness; but this seems absurd, otherwise, as often as the form is a thing distinct from matter, it will be necessary that two forms intervene and be conjoined in order that the formal effect can arise. Next it follows that generation is a form of matter distinct from the nature of the thing from the form which is introduced through generation; and the same will hold of alteration and any change whatever, proportion being kept. The answer is, first of all, that, even if all these are conceded, there is nothing absurd in the thing, if the equivocation of words is taken away; for these forms both are of diverse notions and are ordered to diverse effects; wherefore there is nothing absurd in their being multiplied in the same thing, and in the same mode which is the way to the term being an imperfect form with respect to the subject, or in the same mode of information, which, as it is from the form, is its causality, as it unites and affects it, being some sort of form of it. But I add next, in order that we may speak better and more properly, that there are some modes which in the breadth of being do not constitute their proper species, but are reduced to the species or predicaments of other things or forms, because they are only as it were requisite conditions or their intrinsic causalities, and these modes do not have the proper notion of form, but retain the proper notion of substantial and accidental modes. And by this reason neither can the union of the rational soul, for example, be called a form, because it could be called neither substantial nor accidental. Likewise neither the union of the humanity to the Word nor proper subsistence can truly be called form, as we shall show below. So, then, neither can the inherence of the accidental form be called form nor a distinct accident, if we speak properly, but a mode of the accident. The conclusion posited, then, is to be understood of the former accidents; for those alone, speaking properly and absolutely, are to be called accidents or accidental forms. Finally it can be said that by that argument it is rightly shown that these modes, speaking universally, participate an imperfect formal causality and have another peculiar mode of affecting pertaining to the formal cause.

Forms extrinsically adjacent or denominating cause nothing

24. I say, thirdly: improper accidents, which only extrinsically denominate or lie alongside, do not exercise true formal causality, but only according to a certain proportion participate its denomination. It is proved by induction, for action is not the form of the agent, because it does not affect it nor give any being, nor compose with it anything truly one. The same holds of vision, for example, with respect to the object which it denominates seen; for who would say that vision is the form of the thing seen? The same holds of clothing with respect to the man clothed, and of the surrounding and containing surface with respect to the thing contained, and of all similar things. Of all which the reason is that all these confer no real being on those things which they extrinsically denominate; therefore they are not true real forms, since form is that which gives being. Likewise, because all these do not have a true and real union to the things which they denominate, but form does not cause except by means of union, whether it is distinct from the form or not; for, physical union being set aside, there is not a composite truly one; but where there is not a proper composition from which there results a composite which is one by some physical unity, there cannot intervene true and physical formal causality. Finally formal and material causality are as it were correlatives, for they correspond to each other; but in those things which are extrinsically denominated by others there does not intervene true material causality; for the agent cannot be called the material cause of the action, and so of others; therefore neither are the things so extrinsically denominating true forms. A sign of which too is that God is denominated agent or creator from the action or relation which is in the creature, and yet no one would say that such action is compared to God as his true form. But, true and physical formal causality being set aside from these things, nothing can remain in them on account of which they would be called in some way extrinsic forms, except some proportion, which consists in this, that such things express some relationships to other things which they denominate, in which they behave after the manner of an ultimate term or act, and therefore seem to denominate after the manner of forms. And so the conclusion remains explained and confirmed as regards each part. But how these are truly said to constitute some predicaments of accidents or some species of them will have to be declared below, when we discourse of the individual predicamental notions; how likewise in these denominations certain beings of reason are wont to be founded we shall say in the proper disputation; and therefore no difficulty remains about this to be treated in this place.