Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Several partial homogeneous forms are found in the same composite.—The causality of the form having been explained, it is necessary to expound unity or multitude in the same effect or composite, so that from this it may at the same time be evident whether within this genus of cause there is some subordination or dependence of causes with respect to the same effect. But it can be understood in two ways that in one substance there are several forms, namely either in diverse parts of matter or in the same matter. Of the former mode we do not dispute here, because, even if in diverse parts of matter diverse forms are given, nevertheless each of them has only one proper effect in its matter. But if from all those substances one is composed as from parts integrating it, it is necessary that those forms be not total but partial, integrating one total form. And so that multitude of parts will not prevent one adequate formal cause from being given of one total effect. And indeed, if such partial forms are of the same notion, there is no doubt that in material forms they can be multiplied according to the diversity of the parts of matter and be united to compose one substance. But whether forms of diverse notions can be partial and be united among themselves to compose one substance, and how great that union can be, namely whether through true mathematical continuation or through some lesser physical conjunction, all these do not pertain to the present matter but to the science of the soul; for all those things are chiefly wont to be asked on account of the heterogeneous parts of living things, and most of all on account of the blood and other humours existing in the animal, of which I touched upon some things in tom. I of the Third Part, disp. XV, sects. 5, 6 and 7.

2. The present question, then, is concerned with the formal cause with respect to altogether the same matter, namely whether in one matter there can be only one substantial form, in which question several are involved according to the variety of opinions which are briefly to be touched upon. But several forms in the same matter can be thought out in three ways: in one way, with per se and essential subordination, after the manner of superior and inferior form, of which the former, although with respect to matter it is act, is nevertheless with respect to the further form compared after the manner of potency. Secondly, with subordination not indeed essential, but after the manner of disposition to the form principally intended. Thirdly, merely per accidens and without any order among themselves. And to these three heads are reduced all the opinions which are or can be in this matter; and in the individual ones there is a variety of opinions.

3. For to the first head pertains the opinion treated above, Disp. XIII, of the form of corporeity per se necessary for the introduction of the ultimate forms, which it will not be necessary here again to report and attack.

The opinion of the multiplication of forms according to essential predicates is rejected

4. There too was treated and cursorily attacked the opinion which affirms that substantial forms are really multiplied in the composite according to the multitude of essential predicates, which is reported from Avicebron, in the book Fons vitae; and John of Jandun held it, Metaphysics II, q. 10, and De Anima I, q. 8; and Paul of Venice, Metaphysics VII. Nevertheless this opinion is now antiquated and rejected as altogether improbable; for, besides the general reasons which we shall make below for the unity of form, this reason convinces that opinion of falsity, that it multiplies forms without foundation and necessity; for in the foregoing it was shown that universals are not distinguished really from particulars, nor genera from species; therefore, since these predicates are multiplied only through the abstraction and prescission of our intellect, it is vain to think that forms really distinct correspond to them in the thing. Otherwise also in separated substances and in accidental forms forms really distinct and subordinated among themselves would have to be multiplied according to the multitude of essential predicates which our reason distinguishes also in these things. Indeed also matters would have to be really distinguished and multiplied in material substances, because from them diverse essential predicates can be taken, as to be a material thing, which is common to heavenly and inferior bodies, and to be a generable thing or something similar. Finally these predicates can be abstracted in very great number according to the various agreements of things; therefore it is impossible that forms be really multiplied according to their number. I omit other reasons which we made above, Disp. XIII, sect. 3.

5. That the parts of the thing correspond to the parts of the definition.—What order of inference essential predicates and substantial forms keep.—But you will object Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, c. 10, saying that to the parts of the definition correspond parts of the thing; but the parts of the definition are genus and difference; therefore to these parts correspond in the thing defined parts really diverse, which are not matter and form alone, for animal, for example, does not signify matter alone, but the composite of matter and sensitive soul. Likewise the same Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2, proves that there is no process to infinity in formal causes because there is none in quidditative predicates. Likewise, because the properties which belong according to these predicates are distinct in the thing itself, as, for example, to sense, to understand, to be moved, etc.; therefore also the forms from which those predicates are taken. To the first testimony of Aristotle the answer is either that he does not speak generally of every definition, but of that which is given in the physical way and through physical parts, as when man is said to be a being composed of soul and body; or, if he speaks universally, it is not necessary to understand it of parts distinct in the thing, but in thing or reason, as is taken from St. Thomas there and more clearly from Alexander of Hales, who calls them real parts or of reason. But to the other testimony the answer is that from the negation of several or infinite essential predicates the negation of several or infinite forms is rightly gathered, because from any form whatever at least one quidditative predicate can be taken; if, therefore, there are not infinite quidditative predicates, neither will there be able to be infinite forms. But conversely from the multitude of quidditative predicates the multitude of forms cannot be gathered, because from the same form several predicates can be taken according to the various agreements and differences which it has with other forms. Wherefore what is adduced from Aristotle is not similar.

6. But hence it is excellently inferred that, just as from the unity of the form it is not gathered that the quidditative predicates are not several but one only, so too it is not gathered that they are not infinite or that there cannot be a process to infinity in them, because, the unity of the form standing, these predicates can be multiplied; but whether from elsewhere there is a term in these predicates, and how Aristotle proved it, we shall say in the following section. To the last the answer is by denying the consequence, for, just as from the same cause several effects, so from the same form diverse faculties can arise, as is known by experience, for sometimes several faculties belong to the same thing not only according to the same physical form but also according to the same specific difference, as to man intellect, will, risibility; but sometimes these faculties arise from the same form according to its various grades, which are often distinguished by us through order to the faculties themselves or actions, although in the thing the grades themselves are not distinct in substantial forms, of which matter enough was said in treating of universals.

The opinion of Scotus on the form of corporeity is rejected

7. Thirdly, to this head pertains the opinion of Scotus and Henry touched upon above, Disp. XIII, who also posit a form of corporeity or of the mixed as per se necessary between matter and certain substantial forms, although not in the same way; for Scotus thinks that it intervenes between matter and every soul, but not between matter and the forms of inanimate things; but Henry requires that form in man alone. The foundation of Scotus, if it is explained a priori, seems to have been that the soul is a form transcending the common grade of body and requires in matter a disposition and a certain variety of organs which other forms do not require; therefore the soul as such does not give the being of body but presupposes it through another form, by reason of which matter is supposed capable of the organisation and disposition necessary for the soul; but in inanimate things this necessity ceases. And this can be confirmed from the common mode of speaking; for we say that the living thing consists of body and soul, yet we do not say that water or air consists of body and such a form, but of matter and such a form; it is therefore a sign that body, which in living things is said to be the other part of the composite, includes besides matter a certain substantial form intermediate between matter and soul. Of which body that definition of the soul is excellently understood: it is the act of a physical, organic body, having life in potency. For, since that body which is co-distinguished from the soul is a physical part, it does not include the soul itself, even as giving the superior grade, because otherwise there would not be physical composition of them, but metaphysical; nor does it express matter alone or bare, because in this way it is common to all natural things, or with accidents, because these do not pertain to the essence of substance; therefore it includes a special substantial form distinct from the soul. Secondly and principally Scotus was moved by an a posteriori argument, because in the death of an animal the soul recedes and a new form is not at once introduced; but it is not to be said that matter remains without form; therefore it is to be said that it remains under the form of corporeity which was present in the animal. The major is proved, because, if a form were introduced, it would be diverse according to the diversity of dispositions; but we see that it is not so, but in the death of man the same corpse remains whether he dies from excess of heat or of cold. There is added also that often there is no agent from which such a form is educed. Thirdly, Scotus uses a theological argument, which most of all moved Henry; for it cannot be said that the body of a dead man is always distinct in species or number from the body of the living; therefore it is necessary to confess that the same form of body in number remains without a new form, because, the form being varied, the individual is varied, indeed also the species. The antecedent is evident, because otherwise there would not have been in the sepulchre the same body in number which was in Christ living. And if a host had been consecrated before the death of Christ and kept during the triduum, the same body in number would not have remained in it, which seem to be against the sayings of the Saints.

8. Two principles of Aristotle which are destroyed by positing the form of corporeity are strengthened.—But this opinion too multiplies forms without sufficient foundation, and can be attacked by the same reasons which we used in the said Disp. XIII against Avicenna. And moreover Scotus in his opinion supposes two things which are repugnant to Aristotle. One is that sometimes substantial corruption comes about without subsequent generation, against Aristotle, De generatione I, c. 3. The second is that substantial corruption comes about while a complete sensible substance composed of matter and form remains, against the same Philosopher, De generatione I, c. 4. To which the Scotists answer that Aristotle speaks when integral corruption comes about; but when an animal dies, integral corruption does not come about until so great a transmutation comes about in matter that the form of corporeity too is cast off. But this same distinction of integral or halved substantial corruption is foreign to the doctrine of Aristotle, who always defines substantial generation and corruption to be the beginning and ceasing simply of the whole substance. And moreover it follows, thirdly, that there remains in fact in the nature of things an individual of the genus of the predicament of substance constituted under no species of body, which is no less impossible than to understand some animal in the nature of things of no species of animals.

9. It can be answered from Scotus that that composite of matter and that form of corporeity is not an individual contained under the genus of body of the predicament of substance, as Avicenna thought; for that individual must be a complete substance really including some specific form which body of the predicament of substance confusedly expresses, and therefore it is predicated in recto of its inferiors; but that body consisting of matter and the form of corporeity alone is only an incomplete and partial substance; for it is part of a certain substantial composite. Whence, just as matter, because it is a part, can be reductively under the genus of body and not under some species, so that body which is part of the composite.

10. But this answer does not satisfy, first, because in order that some individual be contained directly under some species, it is enough that it contain actually the whole actual essence of that species, nor is it necessary that it contain actually whatever the species contains in potency, as is self-evident; but body of the predicament of substance is a subaltern species contained under the genus of substance, of whose actual notion it is only that it be a substance composed of matter and substantial form, or that it be a substance existing per se and capable of quantity; but this whole actual notion belongs to that individual; therefore. Secondly, because, although a part of substance can reductively be under the genus and not under the species, nevertheless, if genera and species are directly and proportionately assigned to it, it is impossible that it be under the genus without being in some species of it, as we were saying above that matter, even preserved by the absolute power of God without form, cannot not be in some ultimate species of matter. So, then, that form which constitutes that body or corpse cannot be under the common genus of substantial form without being in some ultimate species of substantial form; therefore the composite of such form and matter will also be in some ultimate species of composite substance; therefore not only reductively in the genus of body. And this reason, as I was saying above, convinces also that that composite is not further actuable through a further substantial difference, nor through a form from which such a difference is taken, and therefore is not a part nor a potency per se ordered to a further substantial act, but is a complete substance constituted in ultimate act; for no substance is so complete in act except because it has some substantial form constituted in some ultimate species of such form.

11. Thirdly, there is an argument ad hominem against Scotus, because, if he does not think it inconvenient that this body, which he says is a part of substance, remain without a further form, there is no reason why he should judge it inconvenient that matter remain without form; therefore, to avoid this inconvenience he ought not to have introduced this form of corporeity. The antecedent is evident, because, just as matter is potency per se ordered to form, so that body is potency per se ordered to soul. And just as matter under that form of corporeity has some actuality, so through itself alone it has its proper entitative actuality, which suffices for existing; therefore there is no reason why the entity of matter should depend more on that form of corporeity than the form of corporeity itself on the further form, that is, the soul; if, therefore, the form of corporeity can remain without the soul, matter too will be able to remain without the form of corporeity. That form, therefore, is irrelevant. Fourthly, it follows from the opinion of Scotus that in substantial generation two forms really distinct are often introduced; since, therefore, changes are multiplied from their terms, there will be two substantial generations for constituting one substantial composite.

12. Fifthly, it can happen that the same body in number, consisting of the same matter and form in number, now lives the life of a man, afterwards the life of a brute; for, when a worm is generated from a corpse, there is no reason why the form of corporeity should be changed; for, if it remains in the corpse without the dispositions of man, it will be able better to remain under the form of any living thing whatever. Indeed thence it seems further to follow that this form is limited without cause to living things alone, but must at the least be extended to all mixed bodies, even inanimate; for, as Scotus himself also speaks, that is a form of mixture arising from the mixture of the elements; therefore, wherever this mixture is, there will be in matter a sufficient disposition to this form; it will therefore be in all inanimate mixed bodies; otherwise it is necessary that Scotus declare what transmutation made in the matter of the corpse suffices to expel this form. Certainly none can reasonably be assigned, except perhaps resolution into the first simple elements; for such a form seems indifferent to all other dispositions which arise from the mixture of the elements, since it is said to remain in wood, bone and flesh, etc. But if this consequent is admitted, scarcely will a reasonable difference be able to be assigned why such a form is not in matter with the form of gold or of another homogeneous mixed body, etc. Whence, if a form of corporeity had to be posited, he would speak more consistently who posited it in all natural beings with Avicenna than in some, as others do. And these reasons suffice also against the opinion of Henry; for the things which have been said of living things in common can easily be applied to man alone.

13. The arguments induced for the form of corporeity are weakened.—There is added that the reasons by which these authors were moved to introduce that form are very weak. For to the first the answer is that, although the soul is a superior form to the forms of inanimate things and requires in matter the organisation of members, the form of corporeity is not on that account necessary; for per se it suffices to actuate matter immediately and to preserve it in being or terminate its dependence, and consequently it is also enough that the composite of such matter and form be capable of threefold dimension, which is to be body of the predicament of substance; it suffices finally that such form require in diverse parts of matter diverse accidental dispositions, through which diverse organs are completed, whether because the soul itself, if it is divisible, has various parts of diverse partial notions, to which those dispositions correspond; or because, if the soul is indivisible, in its eminent and perfect entity it contains virtually that whole variety. But whether those accidental dispositions precede in matter in the order of nature or altogether follow the soul as regards the proximate and ultimate degree, the reason is the same of heterogeneous dispositions as of homogeneous; and therefore it is not necessary on account of this cause to introduce a particular form in living things, but one must philosophize in this according to what was said in the preceding disputation on quantity and accidents in prime matter.

14. In what sense the living thing is said to be constituted by body and soul.—To the confirmation, as regards the thing, when the living thing is said to consist of body and soul, if by body the physical part is to be understood, it includes essentially nothing besides matter, because, the form of corporeity being set aside, nothing else essential can remain in the body as it is a physical part, as the argument made there rightly proves. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 39: It is manifest (he says) that the soul indeed is the first substance, but the body matter; but man, or animal, that which is from both. And although in such matter organic dispositions are required as ultimate dispositions and necessary conditions, nevertheless they do not pertain to substantial composition; and consequently neither are they essentially included in the essential physical part. Yet there is nothing which compels us to understand by the name of body the pure physical part, which is matter, but as it stands under a certain metaphysical grade of form, or (what is the same) it expresses the composite of matter and soul, for example, not in so far as it is soul, but in so far as it gives the grade of corporeity; for in order to declare the proper notion of the soul and the singular grade of perfection which it adds beyond the common grade of body, we distinguish peculiarly in living things the soul from the body, and signify the body after the manner of a physical part, not because the form included in it is a physical part compared to the soul, but because it is so conceived and prescinded as if it were a distinct form. Of which matter more could be said, which I omit, because I wrote them in tom. III of the Third Part, disp. LI, sect. 4.

15. In the death of any living thing whatever the form of the corpse is introduced into matter.—Of what species it is and from what agent it comes about.—To the second the answer is that the assumption is false; for in the death of man and of any animal whatever the form of the corpse is introduced, lest matter remain without form. Of which form, and of its unity or distinction and its efficient cause, this is not the place to speak, and it matters little to the thing of which we are treating. It is probable, then, that in living things diverse in species the form of the corpse which is introduced in place of the soul is distinct in species, as is evident of plants and also of animals. But whether with respect to the same living thing a form of the same species succeeds, each can probably be said, as Cajetan disputes against Scotus, I, q. 76, a. 4. But as regards the efficient cause, it must be said that it is produced by some proximate temperament with the concurrence of some universal cause, as must generally be said of those things which are generated per accidens from putrefaction. To the third it must be said that the dead body is diverse in species, and consequently as regards the substantial form also distinct in number. Nor does what is adduced about the body of Christ matter; for that is said to be the same in number dead and living either sensibly, on account of the identity of matter, quantity and sensible accidents, or suppositally the same, on account of the identity of the supposit. Of which matter I spoke in tom. III, in the cited place, and more fully in tom. II, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 3, where I also declared whether the form of the corpse which was in the body of Christ during the triduum was hypostatically united to the Word. Which Henry too touched upon in the place cited above. It is not, therefore, necessary on account of theological expressions, which can have a convenient sense, to feign in man a new form without philosophical foundation, indeed against the true notion of substantial and essential composition, as has partly been shown and we shall show more fully in what follows. But the special physical reason which can be taken in man from this, that his soul is spiritual, will be treated in the following point. The opinion on the multiplication of forms according to the grades of things is treated

16. The last mode of speaking in this first head can be that in each thing as many substantial forms per se subordinated are multiplied as there are grades of natural things and according to the number of grades which are participated by one and the same substance. But there are four grades of material substances, namely of inanimate bodies, of vegetables, of sensibles and of rationals. Again some natural beings participate only one grade, and in them there is only one form, and these are inanimate bodies; but vegetating things participate two grades, whence they are constituted by two forms; animals by three, men by four. Which opinion so integrally declared I do not find; yet the authors who taught that there are in man three souls really distinct, if they speak consistently, must embrace the whole discourse made; for by the reason by which they distinguish three in man, they must also distinguish two in brutes; and by the reason by which they separate the souls themselves among themselves, they must also distinguish the grade of soul from the common grade of corporeal form; for in all these there is the same proportion. Nor can another reason of distinction be given except the subordination and distinction of grades. But that opinion of the distinction of three souls is held by Philoponus, De Anima I, text 91; whom Jandun follows, chapter De Anima, q. 12; and Paul of Venice, in the Summa de Anima, c. 5. Whose foundations I shall not report in this place, because they almost coincide with those which were touched upon in reporting the opinions of others.

17. Only in man there seems to be found a peculiar necessity of several souls, at least two, on account of two chief causes proper to man. One is that the rational soul is perfectly spiritual and indivisible and most distant from the imperfection of matter; and therefore extremes so distant do not seem able to be immediately conjoined; there is necessary, therefore, some form by means of which they may be united. And this reason peculiarly favours the opinion of Henry treated above, for the rational soul, since it is incorporeal, cannot give corporeal being; therefore neither can it be the form of corporeity. And by the same reason it cannot be the vegetative or sensitive form formally; for such forms are material and corruptible; therefore on account of these there is required in man some material form besides the soul, whether that be one or manifold.

18. The Manichees posited two souls.—The other cause is that in man there are contrary operations, for the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; but contrary operations cannot proceed from the same principle, but from contraries. Which argument Ockham uses, who teaches this opinion, Quodlibet II, q. 10, and in q. 11 he adds also that these souls are distinguished from the form of corporeity, and in brutes too he makes such a form distinct from their sensitive soul. But of the sensitive and vegetative soul he denies that they are distinct. In which certainly he does not speak consistently; nor does he declare either whether in plants the soul is distinguished from the form of corporeity. The Manichees too asserted that there are in man two souls, one spiritual, implanted by the good God, the other animal, contrary to it, and proceeding from a contrary principle, namely the evil God whom they feigned, as Augustine reported, in the book De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos, and De Genesi ad litteram X, c. 13, and the book De vera religione, c. 9; and that several Catholic Doctors followed this opinion of two souls in man, spiritual and sensual, Jerome testifies, Epistle 150 to Hedibia, q. 12, treating the place by which they were moved, 1 Thessalonians 5: May the God of peace sanctify you, that your whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. To which testimony they joined that of Daniel 3: Bless the Lord, ye spirits and souls of the just. Philo held the same, in the book That the worse attacks the better.

19. The adduced opinion is disproved with its explanations.—But this opinion is not only improbable in philosophical reason, but also little safe in our faith, as regards that part in which it posits in man several souls. And indeed, as regards that general reason of distinguishing several substantial forms from the grades of things, it is rightly disproved a posteriori from this, that from that principle it follows that souls really distinct are necessary in man, which is foreign to sound doctrine. Next, all the reasons by which we proved that in living things the soul is not distinguished from the form of body prove a fortiori that the addition of a new grade does not suffice for distinguishing forms really.

20. Indeed the reasons made against the first opinion, by which it was shown that forms are not really distinguished on account of diverse quidditative predicates subordinated among themselves, prove the same, even if one predicate adds to another a new grade, for, when those two grades are conjoined in one and the same thing, one is compared to the other as the specific difference to the generic, and so from both one substantial species is constituted as from universal and particular; therefore in the thing the grades or differences as conjoined in such a species are not distinguished; therefore neither are the forms, which are the principles of such grades or differences, really distinguished in such a substance. Which finally is declared by applying with proportion the reason made above, for, if in the horse, for example, there is a vegetative soul, it is necessary that it be contracted through some specific difference, for the vegetative soul as such expresses only a generic notion, which is distinguished through various species, as in trees and plants is most evident; but there cannot be in the horse an individual and real soul constituted under the genus of vegetative soul and not under some species of that genus; therefore it is necessary that it be contracted and constituted through some specific difference. Either, then, that difference would so constitute some ultimate and lowest species of vegetable thing, which would not be capable of a further difference and consequently neither of a further soul; nor would that grade be compared to the subsequent as genus to species, but they would be opposed as two co-distinct ultimate species; therefore it is necessary to say the second, namely that the vegetative soul according to its generic notion is contracted in the soul of the horse through the specific grade itself. From which it is openly concluded that the vegetative soul in the horse is not really distinct from the sensitive, because no thing can be really distinguished from the difference through which it is essentially constituted.

21. And this reason has the same force in the rational soul, and can be applied in the same way; for, if the sensitive soul, for example, were in man really distinct from the rational, that would be specifically contracted within the sensitive grade; whence it would be a certain irrational and bestial soul, which, the rational being set aside either by the intellect or really at least by the power of God, would truly constitute a certain brute as integral and complete in the species of animal as is the horse; in which way Augustine rightly says, Eighty-three Questions, q. 8, that Apollinaris, when he asserted that the Word assumed a sensitive soul without the rational, really said that he assumed a certain beast. How, then, could the composite constituted by such a soul be further informed by the rational soul?

22. Moreover there is an excellent reason, common indeed to all, but which is seen more evidently in man and is taken from the subordination and dependence of all human powers and faculties; for from too much attention to the action of one faculty, for example the intellective, the operation of sense is impeded, indeed even nutrition itself; and from the operation of one power, for example the operation of the phantasy, the heart is moved and other natural faculties are excited. From which experience we proved above that there is a substantial form distinct from accidental faculties, so that there may be one principle in which all faculties are rooted and from which that sympathy of actions comes.

23. There could moreover be adjoined here theological arguments, as is that which is taken from those words of Genesis 2: God formed man of the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul; for that spirit which God breathed was the rational soul, and through the same man was made living and consequently also sentient. Another is from the Eighth General Synod, which is Constantinople IV, can. 11, which has thus: It appears that some have come to such impiety as to dogmatize that men have two souls; such inventors of impiety, then, and those similarly wise, since the Old and New Testament and all the Fathers of the Church assert that man has one rational soul, the holy and universal Synod anathematizes. Whence in the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, c. 15, this too is handed down as certain dogma; but because Ockham says that there the discussion is of two rational souls, in order that it may be evident that this is false, I shall report the words: Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and others of the Syrians write, one animal, by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual, which ministers reason; but we say that there is one and the same soul in man, which both vivifies the body by its society and disposes itself by its reason. Augustine has similar things, De spiritu et anima, c. 3; Damascene, De fide II, c. 12. There is added that otherwise, when man died, some soul would cease to be, and Christ dying would simply have laid aside some substance united to the Word. Whence Ockham, in order to avoid this disadvantage, says that the sensitive soul of Christ was preserved in Christ, either with the rational or with the body. But if he understands that it remained united to the body, it is heresy, otherwise that body would not have remained dead, but would sense. But if he understands that it remained separated, he says an unheard-of miracle, that a material form was preserved without matter. Likewise it is unheard of in the Church that two souls of Christ were separated during the triduum. Wherefore it would be rash, not to say erroneous, to assert this.

24. Wherefore, when the spirit and soul of man are distinctly named in Scripture, they are not distinguished in substance, but in function and office, as Jerome indicates above, and we declared at length in tom. I of the Third Part, q. 6, in the Commentary on a. 2, and disp. XVII, sect. 4. But often the soul itself, as it absolutely vivifies the body, is called by the name of spirit, as Ecclesiastes 12: And the spirit returns to the Lord, etc.; which immortal spirit elsewhere is called soul, namely Matthew 10: Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. And of Christ the Lord it is said, Matthew 27, that he gave up the spirit, that is, the soul. Whence in the Clementine, sole chapter De summa Trinitate, Christ is said to have assumed the parts of our nature united, namely body and rational soul.

25. The rational soul, although unextended, is the form of matter.—Nor do the reasons made to the contrary have a difficult solution. For to the first the minor is denied, for, although the soul is indivisible and spiritual, it can be immediately united to matter, because it is essentially its act. For it does not matter that in the perfection of being matter and the rational soul are much distant among themselves, for for union one must not attend to distance or nearness in the perfection of entity, but to proportion and fittingness in the mutual respect of act and potency, which proportion is sufficiently found between matter and soul; indeed perhaps greater and more perfect than between matter and any other form whatever. Otherwise, even if matter is feigned already informed by any extended and material form or soul whatever, the soul will still be improportioned to be united to it; because, as regards extension, that form is as extended as matter; therefore, if improportion arose thence, it is not taken away, indeed it is increased from elsewhere. First, because, since that sensitive soul is a substantial and specific act, as has been proved, it is more distant from the rational soul as regards the proportion required for union than the soul and matter, and so rather impedes than helps union. Secondly, because, if a sensitive soul intervened, the intellective would be a pure principle of understanding; but a pure principle of understanding is not apt to inform a body, as we shall show more fully below, treating of separated intelligences. In order, then, that the rational soul be a true form of the body, it is necessary that it itself be the principle not only of intellections but also of the operations which are exercised through the body; therefore most of all of the sensitive operations, which are nearer to the actions of understanding. Which is so necessary that some have doubted whether the soul itself in so far as it is intellective informs the body. But there is no reason why they should have doubted, for the rational soul is essentially the form of the body according to its whole self and according to all its grades, which, although they are prescinded by us by reason, are nevertheless in the thing the same in the soul. Whence, although from the essence of this soul there do not emanate intellective powers which are received in the body, nevertheless the very sensitive powers, indeed also the vegetative, emanate with a certain singular perfection proper to the rational soul and proportioned to ministering to the actions of the mind. And this too is an argument that the sensitive soul is the same with the rational in man.

26. How the rational soul is the form of corporeity.—From which it is also understood how the rational soul, although it is incorporeal, can be the form of corporeity; for to be the act or form of corporeity is not to be itself corporeal or extended, but to be a form constituting with matter one composite substance capable of quantity. Whence, as I was saying above, Disp. XIII, it is altogether the same to be the form of corporeity as to be the substantial form of matter, because from the precise fact that it is the substantial act of matter, from both there is constituted an integral, material and corporeal substance. Since, then, the rational soul, even if it is indivisible, is the true substantial form of the body, it has whatever is necessary in order to be the form of corporeity. From which it can also be concluded that it also sufficiently contains the intermediate grades, namely the vegetative and the sensitive, so that it can confer them formally on the composite, because it cannot contain the extreme grades without these intermediate ones. But it is frequently wont to be said that the rational soul contains these grades virtually and eminently. Which nevertheless seems to others not to suffice for formal causality, although it is enough for efficient. And so without doubt it must be said that, just as it is not of the notion of the form of corporeity that it be formally corporeal, so it is not of the notion of the vegetative and sensitive soul that they be material and extended, but that they be the formal principle of vegetating and sensing, and that they constitute formally the living thing according to these grades of life, which the rational soul truly and formally has; yet it is said to contain eminently by comparison made to the forms of those grades which do not transcend their perfection, because it contains their perfections in a higher way. Whence, speaking generally, it is to be denied that it is of the notion of the vegetative or sensitive form that it be corruptible or educed from the potency of matter, but it would have to be added that this is of the notion of the soul which is only vegetative or only sensitive; but in man there is no form which is only vegetative or only sensitive. Wherefore there is in man no form educed from the potency of matter. Nor does this stand in the way, as others object, of the natural generation of man, because for this it is not necessary that the form come about through eduction; otherwise, even if there were in man a sensitive soul educed from the potency of matter, a man would not be generated, but that irrational animal constituted through such a soul. For natural generation, then, it is enough that the union of the soul to the body comes about in a natural way through natural disposition and action.

27. Contrary operations in man.—To the last reason of Ockham the answer is, first of all, that the diversity or opposition of operations indicates the diversity of proximate faculties, but not of forms, as was said above. Next it is said that it can be understood in two ways that there are in man contrary operations, namely either at the same time or at diverse times. This latter can happen not only in the same soul but also in the same power, as is self-evident; but the former is not true, understood of proper contrariety, for, when the will and the appetite are moved at the same time by contrary affections, they tend into the objects under diverse notions and also in a diverse way; for, if the affection of one is efficacious, that of the other is inefficacious, from which it is rather gathered that these appetites are rooted in the same soul, for the motion of one retards the motion of the other if it is in some way repugnant; but, if they agree among themselves, each comes about more easily and promptly. And these concerning the first head and mode of feigning several substantial forms in the same matter.

Of heterogeneous parts and their forms

28. The second mode of opining about the plurality of forms can be that it happens that two substantial forms remain in the same matter or in the same part of it, when one is imperfect and is compared to the other as a disposition preparing matter and not as generic and specific form; in which there is a great difference between this mode and the preceding, that in the former each form is essential to the composite, and the predicates taken from the individual forms are predicated quidditatively and essentially of one another, as that man is animal, etc., which would plainly be repugnant if the forms were distinct. But according to this second way, the form which is a disposition to the other is not of the essence of the substance composed of matter and the other form, as such accidental dispositions are not of the essence, but causes in some way extrinsic.

29. But I find two opinions which seem to pertain to this second head. One is that which in living things alone posits in the individual dissimilar parts individual partial forms distinct in species, disposing to the integral form, which is one, really distinct from all those partial ones. So holds Antonius Andreae, Metaphysics VII, q. 17; and Paul of Venice, in the Summa de Anima, c. 5; Niphus, De generatione I, text 78; and it is wont to be attributed to the Commentator, because, Physics VI, comm. 59, he says that heart, head and such parts differ in species; and Metaphysics II, text 17, where he says that the animal and its parts agree in the form of the whole and differ in their proper forms. And of these parts some understand what Aristotle says, De generatione animalium II, c. 3, that man first lives the life of a plant, afterwards of an animal, finally the life of a man. The reasons chiefly are that in these parts there are dispositions not only diverse but also contrary, and from the same come operations of diverse notions; therefore they also have partial forms of diverse notions. Likewise, because a heterogeneous part cut off retains the same nature of flesh or bone, and yet in it the form of the whole does not remain; therefore a partial form remains. Thirdly, because these parts differ in species; for on this account they are called heterogeneous or dissimilar parts; but they do not differ in the form of the whole; therefore they differ in partial forms.

30. But this opinion is deservedly rejected by all who deny the plurality of forms, whom I shall report below, and specially Javellus acts against it, Metaphysics VII, q. 16. And besides the general reasons which prove the unity of substantial form, it is attacked in this way. Either we speak of living things having an indivisible soul, or a divisible one co-extended with matter. If the discussion is of the latter, it can easily be conceded that in diverse heterogeneous parts there are diverse heterogeneous parts of the form; for in truth in a tree that part of the form which is in the leaf and that which is in the fruit, etc., are not of the same notion; yet those are partial forms apt to be united among themselves and continued, and therefore they compose one integral form of the whole. Wherefore it is false to feign another total form superadded to these partial forms and again informing all those parts; for to what end is such a form, or by what probable indication is it shown? For whatever is in the whole and in the individual parts, as regards accidents and operations, is sufficiently saved with those partial forms alone united among themselves, or (what is the same) with the integral form alone composed of those parts. Moreover I inquire whether that total form is indivisible or extended. The first cannot be said of these material forms; and, if it is said of some, that pertains to the second member proposed above. It will, then, be an extended form composed of parts; of which again I ask whether its parts which correspond to the diverse heterogeneous parts of the body are altogether similar and of the same notion among themselves or in some way diverse and dissimilar. The first cannot be said, especially speaking consistently in that opinion, for against it proceed the arguments on which that opinion itself relies, namely how a form which is in itself of the same notion requires in diverse parts diverse and contrary dispositions, especially since it is not whole in the individual parts, but according to diverse parts, which are altogether similar among themselves. Likewise, how that form has in diverse parts diverse actions; for, if this is attributed to diverse dispositions, then diverse accidental dispositions will suffice for that diversity of actions, since the actions themselves are also accidental; therefore it is superfluous to feign in the individual parts a twofold substantial form, namely partial and total, of which one would be a disposition to the other. And moreover against this mode of multiplying forms there will proceed a fortiori what we shall say in the following member.

31. The forms of all brutes are divisible.—In those living things, then, which have indivisible forms, there can seem to be some greater reason for doubting, which in truth only has place in the composition of man; for, although of the souls of perfect animals there is some controversy, I suppose nevertheless that it is more probable that no material form is truly and properly indivisible. For a form can be called indivisible in two ways: in one way, because, although it consists of parts, they nevertheless either cannot naturally be separated, as in heavenly forms, or cannot be so separated that they are preserved separated, but as soon as they are divided they are corrupted. And in this way perhaps the souls of perfect animals are indivisible; yet this indivisibility matters nothing to the thing of which we are treating, because it is enough that the soul itself consists of heterogeneous parts and arises whole from their inseparable union, so that it is superfluous to feign other partial forms in the individual parts, as the reason made above proves; for it proceeds equally whether that form is divisible or indivisible in the said sense, as is self-evident. In another way, then, a form is called indivisible properly and in rigour, because it consists of no parts, which it is necessary be whole in the whole and whole in any part whatever, and in this way we judge only the rational soul to be indivisible; although the reasons which will be made of it can be applied to any other whatever, if anyone thinks it indivisible.

32. In the heterogeneous parts of the human body there is a single form.—That such a form, then, does not require in the parts of its organic body diverse partial forms is proved, first, from the eminence and perfection of such a form, which, since it is in itself an indivisible act, per se primarily regards, as its adequate susceptive, that whole consisting of all those parts diversely disposed partially so that from them there arises an integral disposition consonant with the perfection of such form; therefore also in such a composite such partial forms are superfluous. The consequence is evident, both because the indivisible form itself is sufficient to actuate fully and perfectly any part whatever of that matter, even if it is variously disposed; and also because those partial forms do not take away that the indivisible form itself regards all those parts variously disposed as composing its adequate susceptive; nor do they take away that that same form is the radical and principal principle of all the actions which are exercised through those various members; in which genus it is also a sufficient principle of them; therefore those partial forms are superfluous.

33. Secondly, because it is repugnant that one substantial form be a proximate and permanent disposition to another substantial form. One form indeed can be a remote and transient (so to speak) disposition; for so the form of blood is a disposition and as it were a way to the form of flesh, yet remote and transient, because they do not remain at the same time, but flesh comes about from blood as from transient matter. Similarly the form of the embryo is a disposition to the form of man, and in the same sense is to be taken what we were reporting above from Aristotle, namely that man first lives the life of a plant, afterwards the life of an animal, etc.; for in this he signified the process of generation from the imperfect to the perfect through various dispositions, until one arrives at the introduction of the ultimate form; yet always the more imperfect form recedes when the more perfect comes. But that one substantial form be the ultimate disposition to another, remaining at the same time with it, can in no way come about; because each substantial form gives being simply and constitutes a complete essence in the genus of substance; therefore one form cannot be such a disposition to another. Nor does it matter if someone says that this is true of total forms, but not of partial ones; for, if in all the parts of the human body besides the soul there are such forms, from all those partial forms there will arise one integral form distinct from the rational soul; for, just as all the parts of matter are united among themselves and compose one integral body, so all those partial forms will be united among themselves, as the parts of matter which they inform; they will compose, therefore, one integral form constituted in its proper genus and species; therefore it cannot be a disposition to another total form of the same matter.

34. From which I argue, thirdly, for either that form composed of partial ones is a vegetative or sensitive soul, or it is the form of an inanimate thing. This latter cannot consistently be said, otherwise these partial forms would not serve the proper vital functions of the individual members, although it is said that they are posited chiefly for this cause. And moreover against such a form proceed all the things which were said above of the form of mixture or of corporeity. And in a similar way, if such a form is said to be a soul, against that position proceed all the things adduced above against those who posit in man two or three souls. Nor does it matter if someone contends that from those partial ones one is not composed, for then of each partial form taken by itself, as of flesh or bone, the same reason will proceed; because in truth in this consideration each of those forms is called partial in name only, since it is not a true part of some total form; in itself, then, it will be a certain integral form, of which it could be asked whether it is a soul or not, and the reason made will proceed.

35. And similarly it could be inquired whether these partial forms, or the integral one composed of them, remain in the body when the rational soul recedes, or perish. If the first is said, it follows, first, sufficiently consistently, that that body remains alive when the rational soul recedes; for (as I said) those forms, or that which arises from them, must be a soul, otherwise it would serve nothing for the operations of life. Likewise it follows that a part cut off and conjoined to the human body is univocally flesh or bone, etc., which is against Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 56, and more clearly De generatione animalium I, c. 19, and De Anima I, c. 1. But if all such partial forms recede when the soul recedes, first they are feigned without any indication or necessity. And next there follow the theological inconveniences which we inferred above, namely that in the death of Christ some substantial form was laid aside by the Word or remained separated together with the rational soul.

36. How Plato posited several forms in man, and he is refuted.—Add that Aristotle, De Anima I, text 91 and following, professedly attacks the opinion of Plato positing several souls in diverse parts of the body. But the reason is the same of many partial forms. It is true that Plato only posited diverse souls as it were partial in diverse parts, but not afterwards one integral one in the whole; but this mode of positing several does not pertain to the present disputation, because in truth according to it several forms are not posited in the same part of matter. But it is evident that it is altogether false, because from it it follows that the rational soul does not inform the human body, but some part of it, and consequently it follows that it is not the principle of all the vital acts of man, which is repugnant to sound doctrine, which defines that the rational soul is the true form of the body. And above too it was shown that from the connection of these operations their rooting in one principle is gathered. Finally the reason of Aristotle is that which most of all pertains to the matter; for so he gathers: either those souls informing diverse parts are united in one soul, or not. If they are not united, then they do not compose one per se. But if they are united in one soul, or are contained in one composite through one as it were common to all, that one suffices, and the several others are falsely and superfluously multiplied; and this reason proceeds equally of any partial forms whatever.

37. To the reasons of the contrary opinion the solution is evident from what has been said. To the first the answer is that those various dispositions of the organic parts complete one integral disposition of one total form, either divisible or indivisible, as has been explained. But as regards the operations of these parts, if the discussion is of merely natural and transient actions, as to heat, to cool, etc., these come proximately from the first qualities, by which these parts are diversely disposed and affected. But if the discussion is of vital operations, as are to attract, to expel, to touch, to see, etc., these come proximately from diverse vital faculties, which sometimes exist in the same, sometimes in diverse parts of the body; but of all the radical principle is one and the same form, because it is the universal principle virtually containing all these. And therefore on account of these dispositions or operations it is not necessary that partial forms be multiplied, especially since, these being posited, it is necessary to confess that the superior and total form informs those parts and requires in them those various dispositions, and can through them exercise those various operations.

38. If a part cut off is again united, whether this comes about substantially.—To the second the answer is by denying the antecedent, for in a heterogeneous part cut off the same form does not remain which was before, and therefore a hand cut off is equivocally a hand, as Aristotle said. But it is wont to be urged against this, that such a part cut off, if within a short time it is again conjoined to the whole according to the same part whence it was cut off, is truly and substantially united and lives as before; therefore it retained the same form, otherwise it could not again be informed by it, because from privation to habit there is no return. But this rejoinder has the same difficulty in every opinion, because it cannot be denied that that part through division lost the information of the total form, for example the rational soul; if, then, afterwards it is again united and informed by it, there comes about a return from privation to habit. But if it is denied that it is again informed by the rational soul, by the same reason we shall deny that it is again truly united. Whence Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 10, ad 7, thinks it more probable that a perfect physical union of such a part never again comes about. But to the experience, which is said to be that such a part again lives and senses, it will be answered according to this opinion by denying that there is sense in the part itself, but in the neighbouring ones; as in bones or teeth there seems to be a sense of pain from the nearness of other parts. But as regards nourishment and the conservation of the temperament, it will be said to come about through juxtaposition. But because these are difficult to believe, it is perhaps more probable that that part is again informed by the rational soul, nor is it inconvenient from that partial and as it were momentary privation to return to the habit, because the form remained integral in itself, and the dispositions which were in such part to that form in number remained the same, and in that short delay were also little diminished, and therefore it is not inconvenient that the same form at once return to that part of matter.

39. Whether heterogeneous parts differ in substantial species.—To the third the answer can be by denying the assumption, namely that heterogeneous parts differ in substantial species, but it is enough that they differ accidentally, whence they are called dissimilar on account of the diversity of dispositions. Nevertheless in living things having extended souls I judge it more probable that between the parts of the soul themselves which inform diverse organic parts there is some greater diversity than there is between the parts of a homogeneous form, and therefore that in the substance itself there is some diversity between these parts, which will rightly be called specific partiality. But in the human form it has a special difficulty how it informs these parts and is united to them diversely according to the notion of the dispositions. But this matter pertains to the science of the soul.

Of the forms of the elements, whether they remain in the mixed body

40. The second opinion, pertaining also to this second head, is that of Avicenna, the Commentator and others, who say that in all mixed bodies the forms of the elements remain; for it does not seem credible that they remain for another use than that they be dispositions to the form of the mixed body. But Avicenna holds this, Sufficientia I, c. 10; and the Commentator, De generatione I, chapter on Mixture, and De caelo III, text 67. Who differ, for the former posits the substantial forms of the elements indivisible, and therefore affirms that they remain in the mixed body integral and perfect substantially; but the latter thinks that those forms are intensible and remissible, and therefore says that they remain in the mixed body remitted, according to the proportion of their qualities. For he thinks that these forms of the elements are so imperfect that they are as it were intermediate between qualities and perfect substantial forms; on account of which perhaps they are called qualities by Plato in the Timaeus, and therefore they imitate qualities in gradual breadth, according to which they can be intensified and remitted; which opinion so expounded is followed by Niphus, De generatione I, text 118, and Metaphysics VIII, disp. IV, and Metaphysics XI, last disp.; Zimara, theorem 48. Many of the physicians too followed the same opinion, as can be seen in Thomas de Garbo, in the Summa medicinalis, Book I, tract. I, q. 1; and especially Galen, Methodus II, c. 2, and the book De substantia naturalium facultatum, toward the end; and of the theologians Aureolus followed the same, In II, dist. 15, as Capreolus and Gregory report there.

41. The opinion is explained in various ways.—But this opinion can be understood in various ways. First, that the forms of the elements remain in diverse very minute particles of matter. And in this way Avicenna posited that such forms remain in the mixed body, and perhaps he wished that the form of the mixed body inform all those particles and unite them among themselves, otherwise he could not save substantial mixture, but only through juxtaposition, as appears self-evident. For the individual particles, as they would be distinguished in matter and form, so also in quantity; therefore also in place, for they could not penetrate one another in place; therefore they would only be said to be mixed through juxtaposition, as water and wine while they remain integral in their substances; yet the individual particles would not be mixed, and consequently neither would the whole be substantially mixed nor be per se one, because the parts would not be per se connected; whence they would easily be dissipated through mutual action or local motion. There is necessary, therefore, another form proper to the mixed body, diverse from the forms of the elements, as again we shall show below against Aureolus. But this too is impossible. First, because the form of the mixed body and the form of the element require diverse and incompossible dispositions, to omit the general reasons against the plurality of forms. Secondly, because, since all the parts of the mixed body, especially in homogeneous things, have the same temperament of the first qualities, no reason can be given on account of which in one part of the matter of the mixed body there is the form of fire, in another of water, etc. Which reason proceeds also in heterogeneous things; for any heterogeneous part consists of homogeneous ones and is mixed. Thirdly, because, if in parts disposed in the same way diverse forms of the elements remain, it is a sign that that form in such a part is not a disposition to the form of the mixed body, since in a similar part there can be with a contrary form the substantial form of the mixed body; therefore it will equally well or better be able to be, even if in such part of matter no form of the element exists, provided there is there a proportioned temperament of the first qualities, which too cannot depend on the form of such element, since in another similar part it is said to be with a contrary form. From which it is also concluded that such a form is irrelevant to every action and conservation of that part of the mixed body in which it is said to be; and therefore from no effect or natural sign can it be gathered that the forms of the elements remain in this way in the mixed body.

42. In another way that opinion can be understood, namely that all the forms of the elements at the same time inform any part whatever of the matter of the mixed body, and afterwards the form of the mixed body supervenes, also informing that whole matter. And this mode contains so many absurdities that on that account it seems asserted by no one; for, first, it follows that formally repugnant forms are at the same time in the same part of matter in their integral and perfect being; for the forms of the elements formally fight among themselves; for, if their dispositions are formally repugnant, how will the forms themselves not be? Otherwise how will one element be generated from another? Or why will the generation of one be the corruption of another, if their forms are not repugnant in matter? Secondly, if such forms do not have their proper dispositions in the degree proper to themselves, and consequently not their proper actions either, they can confer nothing to the form of the mixed body; therefore they are not dispositions to it. Indeed it is impossible that the same form postulate in the same part of matter altogether repugnant dispositions and in their perfect being, as supreme heat and supreme cold; but no less repugnant among themselves are the substantial forms of water and fire, especially in their perfect being. Thirdly, the general arguments wont to be made against the plurality of forms most of all make against this opinion, because it posits in the same part of matter several specific forms per se sufficient to constitute a supposit having its proper being simply and requiring very repugnant dispositions; for the form of earth postulates the greatest density, but the form of fire the greatest rarity; this intense heat, but the form of water intense cold; how, then, can it come about that such integral and perfect forms at the same time inform the same part of matter?

43. The forms of the elements are most perfectly substantial.—In a third way this opinion can be understood as the Commentator expounded it, namely that all the forms of the elements are in the whole matter of the mixed body and in all its parts, refracted however (as he says) and in a remiss degree, and afterwards the whole matter so affected and disposed by those forms is informed by the form of the mixed body. In which opinion there is first wont to be attacked what the Commentator supposes, namely that the forms of the elements are not perfectly substantial but intermediate between accidental and substantial. Against which St. Thomas argues, De generatione I, text 84, because it is impossible that there be a medium between substance and accident, both because between contradictories there is no medium, but substance and accident are distinguished by immediate contradiction; and also because a medium is between extremes of the same genus, but substance and accident are of diverse genera. Next we can add that the substantial form of fire and of any element whatever is per se sufficient to actuate matter so that it constitutes or preserves it in being, and to constitute with it one supposit which is properly and univocally substance; therefore such a form is as properly and univocally substantial as any other whatever. And this very thing was confirmed above, when we showed that there are substantial forms.

44. Intension is repugnant to substantial forms.—But if perhaps the Commentator does not deny this, but calls them intermediate only because among substantial forms they have the least perfection, whence it comes about that in some properties they can have likeness with accidental forms, against this, the controversy about the mode of speaking being omitted, I show, secondly, that he falsely attributes to them likeness with accidental forms in this condition of intension and remission, because this condition is so proper to accidents or qualities that it is directly repugnant to substantial form in so far as it is such; if, then, the forms of the elements are truly and properly substantial, as has been shown, they cannot be similar to accidents in this condition. The antecedent is proved, first, from the Philosopher, in the Categories, chapter on Substance, saying that substance does not receive more and less; but if the substantial form of water were intensified and remitted, in truth, as water is more or less cold, so it would be more or less water.

45. Secondly, St. Thomas argues, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, because the substantial being of any thing whatever consists in the indivisible, and every addition or subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as is said in Metaphysics VIII, text 10. But this reason can suffer cavil, because by a similar reason it would be proved that quality cannot be intensified and remitted, since also in accidental forms it is true that their essences consist in the indivisible and that their species are as numbers, and consequently that any subtraction and addition varies the species; but it is to be understood of essential and formal addition, not of intensive; the same, then, could be answered of substantial forms. The answer, however, is that the reason is diverse of substantial and accidental form; for the former is that which first constitutes the essence of the thing simply, and therefore it is necessary that it be altogether indivisible and invariable as long as it remains in the same matter. Which is declared a posteriori from that effect from which we gathered above that there are substantial forms, namely from the reduction of water to its pristine coldness; for, if the substantial form of water were remissible, certainly it would be remitted when the coldness was remitted, because, just as the form depends on the disposition, so the intension of the form on the intension of the disposition; therefore it would be impossible that the water afterwards by intrinsic power should bring itself back to its pristine state, because a remitted form cannot intensify itself; nor does it have another prior principle from which that intension would emanate. In order, then, that water, however much heated, can, extrinsic agents being removed, restore itself from within to its connatural state, it is necessary that it remain integral and perfect in the notion of water, and consequently that the formal principle itself constitutive of water remain intact (so to speak) as long as it is not altogether corrupted. And in this sense we say that it is of the notion of substantial form that it be invariable and immutable in its entity when it essentially remains the same and in the same matter, because it is the radical principle of all the properties and constitutes the first essence of the thing.

46. And it is confirmed, because for this cause, on the testimony of the Philosopher, Physics V and De generatione I, the substantial corruption or generation of the elements does not come about successively with the alteration itself, but in a moment at the end of the alteration, when the sufficient disposition is completed, namely because the substantial form is not remitted nor taken away by parts, but whole at once; but if it were intensible and remissible, certainly it would be introduced successively, and similarly expelled; indeed, as often as water is heated by fire, so many degrees of the form of fire would be introduced into the water as of heat, which is incredible. Add that, if the forms of the elements can so be intensified and remitted, why will the forms of mixed bodies too not be intensified and remitted according to the intension and remission of the simple forms? especially since these are said to be required for those as necessary dispositions. For example, if the form of gold requires in its matter six degrees of the form of fire and two of water in order to be in its connatural state, if through contrary action those degrees of the form of fire are further remitted in the gold and the form of water is intensified, why will the form of gold not also recede from its natural perfection and be diminished in its very entity? Certainly no sufficient reason can be given; for that it is more perfect is not enough; for thence it only follows that the degrees of its breadth will be more perfect. It must be said, then, that it is of the notion of substantial form that it have or constitute an essence intensively indivisible, and therefore this belongs equally to the forms of the elements and to the others.

47. The forms of all the elements can in no way be in the same matter.—Thirdly, this opinion is to be principally attacked from the matter which we are now treating, because it is impossible that so many substantial forms be at the same time in the same matter. For, although they are said to be remitted, nevertheless each, if it is substantial, gives being simply and constitutes a true substance and substantial supposit; but it cannot be understood that one supposit is at the same time in four or five distinct species, and that there are many individuals of diverse substantial species consisting of the same matter. Which reason we shall declare more fully below. There is added moreover against Averroes that, if the forms of the elements in remiss degrees filling the breadth remain at the same time in the same matter, then the potency of matter is sufficiently actuated by them and the mixture too is sufficiently completed from them alone; therefore it is both superfluous and impossible that a new mixed form be added to all those forms.

48. The form of the mixed body is distinct from that of the elements.—Whence Aureolus (as Gregory above reports) said that the form of the mixed body is not some simple form, but only that commixture or aggregation of the forms of the elements in remiss being. But how absurd this opinion is is self-evident; for from it it follows that mixed substances are not true substances per se one. Next it follows that animals, even man himself, do not have one simple form. Finally it follows that all mixed bodies do not differ substantially and essentially, but only according to more and less, nor have properties or actions of a more perfect notion than are the qualities and actions of the elements. The very properties and faculties of mixed bodies, therefore, evidently indicate proper substantial forms of a nobler notion than are the forms of the elements.

49. And hence, by retorting the argument, it is concluded that those forms of the elements conjoined at the same time in the same matter and as it were supposed to the form of the mixed body are superfluous, even if per impossibile otherwise they were not repugnant, because both for the being of matter and for the substantial being of the composite, and for every physical action which can be known by experience of such a composite, the form of the mixed body suffices with the faculties which emanate from it and the temperament of the first qualities by which matter is disposed. Which temperament indeed, although it is not some simple quality virtually containing the first ones, as Avicenna thought, but is formally composed of the first in remiss being, as the true and common opinion holds, which is treated at length in De generatione I, nevertheless does not require the substantial forms of the elements formally existing there, but the form of the mixed body suffices, to which such a temperament is connatural and which has power and efficacy to preserve or recover it, if extrinsic impediments are taken away.

50. And as regards this the elements are rightly said to remain, as regards substantial forms, virtually in the substantial form of the mixed body, but as regards accidental ones formally, although they do not remain integral but remitted. Which Scotus declared well, In II, dist. 15, whom Gabriel and Gregory follow there; Giles, De generatione II, and others; and he is undeservedly attacked by Cajetan, I, q. 76, a. 4, at the end; for it is not repugnant to the doctrine of St. Thomas; for nowhere did he deny it, but rather indicates it in the sense expounded by us, Opusculum 33. Nor is there any difficulty in it, because the form of the mixed body is not said to contain the forms of the elements in the genus of formal cause or according to the whole perfection eminently contained, as Cajetan seems to have thought, but only according to a certain participation and fittingness, as has been declared.

51. From these, then, it is sufficiently concluded that it does not follow from the mixture of the elements that there are in the mixed body several substantial forms, because the forms of the elements do not remain in the mixed body formally, but in power only, which is the opinion of Aristotle, as I shall show below, and commonly received, as is evident from Alexander, Philoponus, St. Thomas, on De generatione I; and the same St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, and De potentia, q. 5, a. 7, and other scholastics, In II, dist. 12, especially Capreolus and Gregory in the places cited; and Scotus, q. 1; Hervaeus, tract De pluralitate formarum, q. 15; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 11; Soncinas, Metaphysics X, q. 27, and Book XII, q. 68. But the discussion is of the substantial forms of the elements; for the accidental remain formally, but this matters nothing to the present question. Whence the philosophers who denied substantial forms in the elements consistently said that the elements remain formally in the mixed body, and in this way Galen proceeded, for, as we saw in sect. 1 of this disputation, he does not recognize substantial forms in the elements, but only the first qualities. Whence, as regards the present matter, he does not contradict us, but rather favours us. See him, Methodus I, c. 2, and the little book De substantia naturalium facultatum, a little from the beginning, and De placitis Hippocratis VIII.

52. An objection.—But they object Aristotle to us, who, De generatione I, c. 10, defines mixture as the union of altered miscibles; when, therefore, the elements are mixed, they are not corrupted but only altered; and so in that whole chapter Aristotle often repeats that the miscibles are not corrupted; but if one has perished, they cannot be mixed; for things which are not (he says) are not received into mixture. Secondly, the same Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 3, defines the element to be that from which something comes about, so that it is present in it, and into which the resolution finally comes about; therefore, if the elements do not remain in the mixed body, they are not elements, nor will the mixed body be able to be resolved into them, which is false and against experience; for, when wood is burned, we experience both smoke and a watery humour and ashes and fire to come forth from it. Nor is it enough to say that all those are contained in the wood virtually or in potency, otherwise even water would be called mixed, at least of air and water, both because it has in itself a certain quality of air, and also because when water is heated an airy vapour is exhaled from it. And it is confirmed; for from virtual containment it only follows that the elements can be generated from the mixed body; but this is not enough, for also the mixed body can be generated from any element whatever, and one element from another. Whence Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 3, says that the elements are contained in wood and flesh, because they are manifestly segregated from them; but conversely that flesh and wood are not contained in fire, because they cannot be segregated from it. It is one thing, then, to be segregated, another to be generated; therefore segregation requires formal containment. Thirdly, Aristotle says, De caelo I, c. 7, that the mixed body is moved by the motion of the predominant element; therefore it remains in it. Fourthly, De caelo III, text 67, and De partibus animalium II, c. 1, and Meteorologica IV, c. 12, he says that the elements are the matter of the mixed body.

53. The opinion of Aristotle, that the elements remain in the mixed body in power only.—The definition of mixture is elucidated.—The answer is that Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 3, asserts under a disjunction that the element is present in the mixed body in potency or in act; for this, he says, in which way it is, is still doubted; but the question which he left undecided in that place he resolved in De generatione I, c. 10, when he expressly says that the things which are received into mixture in a certain way are and in a certain way are not; for in act (he says) they are not, but in power or capacity they remain, and in this he constitutes the difference between mixture and other changes; and De partibus animalium II, c. 1, he says that the first composition of bodies is that which is made from the primordia which some call elements; I mean earth, water, air and fire, but perhaps it can better be said to be made from the powers¹ of the elements; for humidity, dryness, heat and cold are the matter of composite bodies. Of the opinion of Aristotle, then, it is sufficiently evident. When, therefore, Aristotle says that mixture is the union of altered miscibles, he said altered rather than corrupted in order to denote that they do not altogether perish, but remain in power and according to qualities. Nor did Aristotle in that chapter deny that in true mixture the miscibles are corrupted; nor could he deny it, for, since through mixture a new substantial form of the mixed body is introduced, it is necessary that the substantial corruption of the miscibles come about, because the generation of one is always the corruption of another. But he said that they do not altogether perish, because they remain in power.

54. The description of the element is explained.—To the second it can be answered, first, that that definition of element does not belong to these simple bodies which are commonly called elements, but to the first principles of which the natural thing is composed. Which opinion Averroes favours, Metaphysics V, comm. 4, saying that prime matter is properly element, but the simple bodies only in the opinion of men, for, because the ancient philosophers did not know another matter except these simple bodies, therefore they called them elements. And so Aristotle, De partibus animalium II, c. 1, does not call them elements absolutely, but which some call elements; and he speaks in the same way De generatione II, c. 1, and in other places. And this can be confirmed from that particle of the definition of element, namely that it is that from which something is first composed. But these bodies are not those from which something is first composed, since they themselves are composed of other prior things. Likewise Aristotle in the same place says that the element must be something indivisible; but these bodies are not indivisible, as is evident. And according to this opinion it is easily answered to the argument that it is not inconvenient that that particle of the definition of element, namely that it is present, does not properly belong to these bodies, because they are not properly elements. Secondly, lest we seem to stick at the word only, we admit that the name and definition of element properly belong to these bodies; indeed St. Thomas, In Metaph. V, lect. 4, will have them to be more properly elements than matter or form. For he will have it of the notion of element that it be directly and properly in some species. Which nevertheless I do not see why it pertains to the propriety of that word and why it is not enough that the element be in its species something partial or incomplete. So, then, element in Latin seems to be the same as the principle of some thing which in its order is first in composition and last in resolution, and therefore it is also of the notion of element that it be indivisible, not simply and in every way, but in its order and breadth. And similarly it is of the notion of element that it be present not always formally, nor always in power only, but in a mode accommodated to its composition. So, then, the four elements truly participate the notion of element, because in that genus of composition by which one body can be fused from many bodies they are first, because they do not consist of other bodies, and from them the rest consist. And similarly they are simple and indivisible, because they are not resolvable into several bodies. Finally they are also present in that mode which is necessary for that genus of composition which comes about through mixture. And so Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 3, expressly posits under a disjunction in the description of element that it is present in potency or in act.

55. The name of element belongs properly to prime matter.—Sometimes attributed to form.—Whence it does not stand in the way that prime matter is prior to these bodies and formally is present or remains in its composite; for thence it only comes about that matter too can truly and properly be called element, by another reason however and perhaps a prior one, in so far as matter is prior in composition and simpler, as St. Thomas noted, In De caelo III, lect. 8, where he seems to retract the opinion which he had held on Metaphysics V, as Soncinas noted, Metaphysics V, after q. 9, about text 4 of Aristotle, who also, Book XII, q. 27, ad 1, adds that the form can be called element, and so Aristotle names it, Metaphysics XII, c. 4; and St. Thomas, in the cited place. For, although the name of element seems chiefly to be attributed to the material principle, as is evident from common usage and from the propriety of that particle of the definition, from which something comes about, nevertheless, speaking more broadly, it is extended to any part whatever, as the whole too is said to be composed of its parts, both formal and material. Indeed by this reason any parts whatever, if they are considered absolutely under the common notion of parts, are said to have the notion of matter with respect to the whole. By this reason, then, any part whatever, if in its order it is first and indivisible, can be called element.

56. From which it follows, in order that we may answer the other part of the argument, that it is not of the notion of element that the composite or mixed body can be so resolved into it that the element in the thing itself is preservable separated from the elemented thing; for in this way every natural composite cannot be resolved into matter and form. And by equal reason, it is not necessary that the mixed body be resolvable into the same elements in number of which perhaps the mixed body was made, but it is enough that it is resolved into similar ones; which sometimes will happen if the efficient causes are accommodated and near to making that resolution; but often it does not so come about, but the whole mixed body is converted into some element, especially into earth. Wherefore, although the experience which is adduced in the argument were true, it would conclude nothing, because it is not necessary that the things which are seen to come about from wood when it is burned preceded formally in it, but in power according to some less remote disposition, by reason of which all those are generated anew; yet in truth those are not elements, but imperfect mixed bodies, because neither is smoke air nor ash earth.

57. In mixed bodies sometimes lesser little bodies are imbibed.—Add also that in these mixed bodies there are often several substances accidentally intermixed through the pores or through the division and interposition of parts, which substances afterwards through the action of some agent are not so much generated anew as separated, as happens in the concoction of wine and in the corruption of blood outside the veins, and perhaps so it happens also in that action of fire on wood, although it can also happen that not the same substances which were there are separated, but others which are easily generated from them according to their diverse dispositions. But this commixture of substances does not matter to the thing of which we are treating, because, although there are there several forms, they are nevertheless in diverse matters and make diverse composites, although locally conjoined.

58. How the mixed body is moved by the predominant element.—Nor finally does what was inferred in that argument follow hence, that one element is resolved into another or consists of another; for, although water agrees with air in humidity, it does not have it participated from air, but from itself and its simple nature. But when through heating a humid vapour is exhaled from water, water is not resolved into air; for that vapour is not air, but a certain imperfect mixed body; but when it happens that water is transmuted into air, it is not a resolution into miscibles, but a certain generation and corruption. Whence the elements are far otherwise in the mixed body than one element in another; for this is true only in passive potency; but that not only in this way, but also in power and by a certain participation of active potency; for in this way Aristotle is to be understood when he says that the elements are in the mixed body in act or in potency. And hence too the solution is evident to the third testimony. For, in order that the mixed body be moved by the motion of the predominant element, it is enough that it contain it in power and participate more of its qualities than of another's. Finally the elements are called the matter of the mixed body, transient formally, but remaining in power. Whence the same Aristotle, De generatione II, c. 5, denies that the elements are the matter of natural things. For if air (he says) remained, it would not be generation but alteration. It is evident, then, that on account of the disposition of one form to another several substantial forms never happen to be conjoined in the same matter.

Whether two forms not subordinated can at the same time inform the same matter

59. Matter can divinely be informed by two forms.—It remained to speak of the third mode of feigning two substantial forms in the same matter without any relationship among themselves or with respect to some third form to which they dispose, but by mere accidental concomitance, as whiteness and sweetness are related in the same subject. But it is not necessary to linger in attacking this mode; first, because I find no opinion in this matter; for no philosopher (as far as I know) has hitherto said that two substantial forms can in this way and naturally inform the same matter at the same time. But I say naturally, because of absolute power I do not think it implies a contradiction, whether that matter is posited in diverse places with diverse forms, which I showed elsewhere can come about,² or has each form in the same place; for unity of place does not add a special repugnance. Secondly, because from those forms existing at the same time in the same matter in truth one essence or one substance would not be composed, because neither form would be of the essence of the composite of matter and the other form, nor conversely. Whence, if we feign that one is the form of gold and the other of wood, neither would the wood be gold nor the gold wood, because essentially diverse forms are not predicated of each other, even in the concrete, except by reason of the same supposit in which they agree; but those forms would not agree in the same supposit, but only in the same matter, with which, as diverse natures, so also they would make diverse composites, other miracles being set aside. Whence, although matter could be called informed by the form of wood and of gold, nevertheless the wood would not be gold, because the wood is not matter, nor is the gold matter. And so, even that case being admitted, there would not be given two formal causes of one effect, which we are now inquiring, but each would constitute its own effect, which would have only one formal cause.

60. Why naturally the same matter cannot be actuated by several substantial forms at the same time.—Hence, however, is understood the natural repugnance on account of which such forms cannot at the same time inform such matter; for that one and the same matter successively composes essences even distinct in species with many forms is not inconvenient, indeed it naturally happens, because it is indifferent to any form whatever and can be actuated by any whatever. But that the same portion of matter at the same time compose diverse essences with diverse forms is repugnant to the natures of things for many causes. First, because the potency of matter is sufficiently actuated by one form and its dependence sufficiently terminated. Secondly, because diverse forms require naturally incompatible dispositions, which is a sign that their natural effects too are naturally incompatible. Thirdly, because matter serves the form for its natural motions and actions; but the same matter cannot at the same time serve distinct forms, which have diverse natural inclinations. Fourthly, because otherwise, if matter could in this way be under distinct forms, by the same reason it could be under any multitude of them to infinity, because things which are per accidens can be multiplied to infinity; nor can a greater repugnance be assigned in three than in two, and so of any number whatever. But this both is of itself very absurd and is repugnant to the end and institution of matter, for so it would be inept for the generations and corruptions of things. Whence this very thing, that the generation of one is naturally the corruption of another, sufficiently declares that matter is naturally incapable of several forms.

The true opinion and conclusion of the whole question

61. It remains, therefore, that that opinion is most true which asserts that of one composite substance there is only one formal cause and in one natural composite there is only one substantial form. Which St. Thomas holds, I, q. 76, a. 4; and there Cajetan and all the Thomists; most fully Capreolus, In II, dist. 15; and Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles II, c. 58; Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 7. Likewise Gregory has it, In II, dist. 17, q. 2; Giles, De Anima II, q. 6, and the tract De pluralitate formarum; Hervaeus too treats it at length, De pluralitate formarum; Marsilius, De generatione I, q. 6. But from Aristotle we have nothing expressly on this matter; yet from his principles this opinion is clearly gathered; for he never attributes to the natural composite except one form, and in this sense he assigns three principles of the natural thing, namely matter, privation and form; for by this reason he says that as often as one is generated another is corrupted and conversely; he says moreover that the substantial form is the proper, per se and immediate act of matter, and therefore from them most of all one per se comes about, as is taken from De Anima II, text 7, and Metaphysics VII, text 49.

62. But the reasons can easily be taken from what was said in attacking the other opinions. The first is taken from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, because there cannot be in matter several forms essentially subordinated as act and potency, nor ordered as disposition and form, nor yet altogether through concomitance without any order among themselves; but besides these modes another cannot be thought out; therefore in no way can several substantial formal causes concur to the same effect.

63. The second reason is taken from the sufficiency of any substantial form whatever; for any substantial form whatever is necessarily such that through itself alone it suffices to constitute one complete substantial supposit in some ultimate species of substance; therefore not only does it not require another form concausing that effect, but neither can it admit it. The antecedent is evident from what has been said; for it has been proved that every substantial form must necessarily be constituted in some ultimate species of substantial form, and consequently that it is of its notion that it give being simply and complete up to the ultimate notion in the genus of substance. But the consequence is proved, because either the second form would come to the composite as constituted by the prior form and immediately actuating it, or it would come at the same time and as it were concomitantly to matter itself. The first is repugnant to the notion of substantial form, which per se regards substantial potency; but complete substance is no longer in substantial potency, but in accidental only; for of it most of all is true what Aristotle said above, namely that that which comes to a being in act does not come per se, but per accidens. But the second is repugnant both to the substantial forms themselves and to the capacity of matter; for those according to their specific differences are repugnant among themselves; for, by the very fact that each substantial form constitutes a complete substantial nature, it so determines for itself the matter which it informs and as it were draws it to its being that it does not admit in it another substantial form, or one of the same order. Matter likewise has a limited capacity and as it were power of causing, so that it cannot at the same time sustain more than one substantial form, nor concur except to composing one essence, which can also be seen in heavenly matter; and this is no less necessary in this inferior matter, which is the principle of corruption, in so far as it so underlies one form that it necessarily deserts it if it receives another.

64. The third principal reason can be put together from those things which we said above for proving that there are substantial forms in natural things; for the strongest reasons by which substantial form is shown rely on this, that for the perfect constitution of a natural being it is necessary that all the faculties and operations of the same being be rooted in one essential principle, which connection and rooting the natural effects themselves also show, as we deduced there; therefore the plurality of forms is altogether foreign to the constitution of nature. Nor is there in the whole of nature any indication for asserting it; for the subordination of essential predicates is no indication, as we have said; and therefore Aristotle said, De Anima II, text 31, that the posterior form contains the prior ones, because that which gives the ultimate difference gives also the superior ones. The multitude too of actions, faculties or organs not only is not an indication, but rather most of all requires the unity of the form. Finally the vicissitude or succession of generation and corruption indicates and requires the same unity; therefore there is nothing why we should doubt that one formal cause suffices for each natural effect. Nor do new objections occur against this truth which it is necessary to satisfy.

From what has been said it is concluded that there is no process to infinity in formal causes

65. And from these in passing is resolved that question which is wont to be raised about the formal cause, namely whether in such a genus of cause there can be a process to infinity. For, speaking of the proper physical formal cause, it is evident from what has been said that this question has no place; for it can only be asked when several causes can concur to the same effect; for where there is a single cause, what process can there be? But it has been shown that the formal cause can only be single; therefore in this cause the question of a process to infinity has no place. Next, this process is wont to be either between causes per se and essentially subordinated or between causes subordinated per accidens; but it has been shown that no substantial forms are per se subordinated. Whence those who distinguish them according to the order of essential predicates can suffer some difficulty in this; for perhaps in these predicates it is not repugnant that there be a process to infinity, as we shall touch upon in the following section; but according to our opinion this matters nothing, because we judge that these predicates, in whatever number they are multiplied, not only do not require distinct forms per se subordinated, but also that such predicates cannot be taken with respect to the same composite except from one and the same form, so that not only from the nature of the thing, but also by absolute power, formal causes cannot be given per se subordinated in this way, because there cannot be given a substantial form which is not constituted in some ultimate species of such form, and consequently which does not essentially include all the superior grades of such forms. Nor does it matter that Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2, proves that there is no process to infinity in these forms from this, that there is no process to infinity in quidditative predicates, because, although from that negation this negation is excellently inferred, nevertheless from the opposite affirmation the opposite affirmation is not, as was said above. Again, neither in this genus are there given causes subordinated per accidens, because it has also been shown that several forms cannot concur at the same time, even altogether per accidens, to informing the same matter. But if anyone says that there can be given a process to infinity in forms contained under the same genus or species, and calls them formal causes subordinated per accidens, let him notice that it is necessary that those are not causes of one and the same effect, but each has its distinct effect; but when the subordination of causes is investigated, it is to be understood with respect to one and the same effect, otherwise it is not subordination but the multiplication of things or effects. Whence, even if by the absolute power of God forms were multiplied per accidens in the same matter, there would not be there subordination of causes, because, as I said above, they would not constitute one and the same effect, but diverse ones, and moreover would have no order among themselves, but would be multiplied altogether per accidens. In this genus of cause, then, there is no process of causes, neither to infinity nor in any finite number. A process to infinity is excluded from the material cause

66. From which finally it is understood that much less can there be a process to infinity in matter, because, if there were, it could only arise from the infinity of forms; for, as was demonstrated above, there must necessarily be given one prime matter which is not in another subject; but this prime matter in each composite can only be one, because one matter cannot be received in it, since this is against the notion of prime matter; nor yet can several matters be conjoined in the same composite and be informed by the same form unless one of them is united to the other so that from both one potency comes about, which can in no way be understood; therefore in substantial matters not only can there not be a process to infinity, but neither can there be any process at all or any plurality.

67. But if the discussion is not of prime matter but of proximate, either proximate substantially and as a potency immediately and per se receiving the form is understood, or proximate accidentally, that is, as affected by dispositions accommodated to the form. In the former way in truth only prime matter through its simple entity is also proximate matter to any form whatever, and so there is no process; and it could only be feigned if between prime matter and the ultimate substantial form some substantial forms intervened, of which one would be compared to the other as proximate potency to its act; but these forms are not given, as has been shown, and, although they were given, an infinite progress in them would not be intelligible, both because an infinite multitude of forms is no less repugnant than an infinite multitude in act of any beings whatever; and also because it is necessary that there be given some first form, that is, first informing matter; for, since matter of itself is immediate potency, it is necessary that it be immediately informed by some determinate form, otherwise information would never begin. Again, on the side of the other extreme it is also necessary that there be given a last form; otherwise information would never be finished nor would the thing be constituted in some certain and determinate species; therefore between those two extremes an infinite multitude of forms could not intervene, because to each there must necessarily be some immediate one which is compared as proximate potency and act. I omit other reasons which Aristotle makes in the cited place, because the matter is clearer than that it needs proof.

68. But if we speak of proximate matter by reason of accidental dispositions, the same reasons prove that in those dispositions one cannot proceed to infinity, because, if they are not subordinated among themselves but related concomitantly, as the four first qualities, in them such a process cannot be given, only because qualities actually infinite in multitude cannot be at the same time, and much less can a finite form postulate them; but if the dispositions are subordinated among themselves as act and proximate potency, as quantity and quality, the reason made of substantial forms proceeds, that in them it is necessary to give a first and a last, otherwise the disposition would neither be begun nor consummated; but between those extremes there cannot be an infinite multitude. Nor is what can be adduced about the infinite points contained between two extremes similar, because points are only infinite in potency, that is, constituting with the parts one finite continuous quantity, but the multitude of forms would be actually infinite. Likewise, because one point is not immediate to another, and so all the points intermediate between two extremes cannot be numbered;³ but one form, whether substantial or accidental, if it is compared to another as potency to act, must necessarily regard it proximately; in no way, therefore, can there be a process to infinity between matter and form.

69. But the reasons made proceed of permanent matter from which the thing comes about so that it is present in it; but Aristotle, in the said place of Metaphysics II, also speaks of the transient material cause when he denies that there is a process to infinity in material causes, because, if from water earth is generated, and from earth grass, and from grass something else, one does not proceed to infinity, but a circle comes about. Nevertheless, whether this process is given or not, it matters nothing to causality, because that process is merely per accidens, and therefore nothing would stand in the way of causality if it tended to infinity. But if it does not tend, it is only because there are not given infinite species of generable things nor a process to infinity in the generations of such species, but always a circle and return to the same species comes about. Which some think necessarily follows from this, that each of these species expresses a limited perfection. But this is no argument, because at least by divine power it is not repugnant that the species of mixed bodies be multiplied to infinity, even if each species is finite and in fact there is always given a highest and lowest species contained under that genus, although of the possible another could be made, either more perfect than all those made or more imperfect. Others say that it is established by experience that one does not proceed to infinity in the generation of one species from another, but that always a return to the same species comes about, of which experience I very much doubt whether it is evident to us; for many things are perhaps generated anew by the power of the heavens and the concurrence of the elements which lie hidden from us. Add that St. Thomas, III, q. 10, a. 3, says that infinite things are contained in the potency of the creature. And he speaks of substantial things; for of these he had said that the soul of Christ does not see infinite things in act. Whence, explaining that place there, we said that it can be understood both of infinite species and of infinite individuals. If, then, in the potency of the creature infinite species of mixed bodies are contained, it will not be repugnant to proceed to infinity in their generations. And perhaps Aristotle in the said place is not repugnant; for he only proves that this process is not necessary for the causality of things, because the generation of one is the corruption of another, and in this a reflection according to species easily comes about, although it does not come about according to the individual. Nevertheless it seems more probable, speaking naturally, that there is a stop in the generations of things according to species, because the powers of natural causes are finite and the modes or aspects and concurrences by which they are applied are determinate and finite; and therefore, although in the absolute potency of the creature infinite things are contained, if in created things and causes all the conditions and mixtures come about which absolutely can come about, nevertheless in fact according to the order of the universe they can only come about in finite ways, and therefore it is also more likely that in this process there is given a stop and term.