Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The rational form can be preserved separated naturally, the others supernaturally.—As regards the dependence of form on matter, one can only doubt of the material form; for of the immaterial it is evident that not only by divine power but also naturally it can remain without matter. But of the other forms Aristotle and the philosophers would perhaps deny that they can in any way subsist separated from matter, because they would think that actual dependence and inherence in matter is essential to them. But we Catholics, who believe that God preserves accident without subject, cannot doubt (although some moderns doubt) that God can also preserve the material substantial form without matter, because the dependence of accident on subject is greater, in so far as accident has less of entity and actuality than substantial form. Whence all the Doctors to be cited at once agree in this about the substantial form, although they dissent about matter.

The former opinion about matter is treated

2. Of matter, then, the first opinion is that denying that God can preserve matter without substantial form. St. Thomas holds it in the places cited in the preceding section, with the other followers of his cited there, and moreover Quodlibet III, a. 1; and the Master indicates it, In II, dist. 12, c. 5, where he only says that matter at the beginning of creation was not first lacking every form, because no such corporeal thing can exist which has no form; yet he does not declare whether he speaks of absolute power or according to the natures of things. And Hugh of St Victor seems to speak in the same way, De sacramentis I, part I, c. 4. More openly speak Bonaventure, in the said dist. 12, a. 1, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodlibet VI, q. 1; Giles, at the beginning of his Hexaemeron, cc. 1 and 2; Jandun, Physics I, q. 26; Zimara, theorem 15. The chief foundation of this opinion is that matter formally of itself has no existence, but receives it formally from the form. But God cannot give a formal effect without the formal cause, nor can he preserve matter without existence; therefore he cannot preserve matter without form. Nor does it matter that the being of existence, according to this opinion, is not the primary formal effect of the form, both because, although on account of this cause the primary effect could by divine power remain without this secondary one, nevertheless conversely the secondary cannot be given without the primary, for it depends essentially on it; and also because to the primary effect of the form it pertains to be or to constitute the proximate susceptive of existence, which effect is never separated from it; for even in the humanity of Christ it has it; but God cannot constitute an act outside its proper susceptive. Secondly, from the Commentator, because matter is pure potency; but whatever exists is in act; therefore it is repugnant that matter exist without act, because otherwise it would at the same time be in act and without act; but the act of matter is the form; therefore it is repugnant that it be without form. Thirdly, even if matter has some partial existence, it has it dependent on the form in the genus of formal cause; but God cannot per se supply the effect of the formal cause; therefore. Fourthly, this reason is wont to be made, because, if matter were preserved without form, there would be in the nature of things some individual under the genus of substance and not under some species; for matter would be in the genus of body, for example, and would not pertain to any species of it. Fifthly, all accidental being is from accidental form, and therefore nothing can have such being without it; therefore all substantial being is from substantial form, and cannot be without it; but matter has some substantial being; therefore that cannot be without substantial form. Other reasons are wont to be multiplied, but they do not bring in a new difficulty, and therefore I judge it useless to linger on them.

The latter opinion is treated and preferred to the former

3. The contrary opinion is sufficiently common. Henry holds it, Quodlibet I, q. 10; Scotus, In I [recte II], dist. 12, q. 2; and there Lychetus, Mayronis, Bassolis and other Scotists; Richard, q. 4; Gregory, q. 1; Gabriel, q. 1; Marsilius, In II, q. 8; and Soto inclines to it, Physics I, q. 6; and to me this opinion seems altogether true, because I find not only no clear implication of contradiction, but not even a sufficiently likely reason which would persuade it. And first of all, even if we held that existence is a thing distinct from essence, no sufficient reason could be given why God could not posit that act in matter alone; because, although according to the connatural order that act would have to be received in the whole nature or integral supposit, nevertheless by divine power it could be constituted in one part, just as accidental existence cannot naturally be received except in the accidental composite or in the substantial supposit by means of the accidental form, and yet God can make it remain in the separated accident alone, and with greater reason could preserve substantial being in the material substantial form alone; therefore also he could posit the act of existence in the essence of matter alone, because, although matter is potency to form, it is nevertheless truly a certain partial substantial essence; in so far, then, as it is some essence, it will be able to be actuated by existence; for existence is the act of essence. Nor is there any reason which proves that order between substantial form and the act of existence, or the dependence of that existence on the form, to be so essential that it cannot be changed or supplied by God; for the form is not so the cause of existence that it intrinsically composes it, since they are supposed to be simple co-distinct entities; but the causality of the form which is not through intrinsic composition, but either through emanation or another similar reason, can be supplied by God, as I shall show at once.

4. Nor can it be said that matter existing through an act of existence really distinct already has a form, because every act is a form. For this axiom is false according to that opinion, even of actuating act; for the authors of that opinion posit in one substantial supposit the substantial form and the act of existence really distinct, and do not admit two substantial forms; therefore substantial existence is not a substantial form. And therefore they also say that the existence of the created humanity can be supplied by the uncreated existence of the Word, because existence is not a form; therefore, if matter were preserved with an act of existence really distinct from its essence without another form, it would truly be preserved without form, and so would be in act without informing act, but not without terminating act. Add that some of the authors who posit existence really distinct from essence concede that God can preserve essence in the nature of things and outside causes without existence. In which, although they say an open contradiction, nevertheless, the false principle being supposed, they seem to speak consistently. Why, then, will they not also admit that the essence of matter can be preserved in the nature of things and outside causes without a distinct act of existence? For in order that a thing be in the nature of things and outside causes, the being of essence suffices according to them; but matter of itself and through itself formally has some being of essence, although partial and diminished.

5. The genuine and a priori proof of the conclusion.—But these proceed as it were ad hominem from others' principles; but from our own the a priori reason of this opinion is that matter, as it has its partial entity of essence, so also of existence; for the existence of substance is so composite as the essence of substance, and therefore without any implication or repugnance God can preserve matter without form as he can form without matter. Because, although the proper susceptive (so to speak) of complete and integral existence is the complete nature or substantial supposit, nevertheless the part of the nature or partial nature is capable of a partial existence proportioned to itself, in which it can by divine power partially subsist alone, as quantity exists separated by divine power in its proportioned existence. For no greater repugnance can be brought forward in the partial existence of matter than in the partial existence of the form or the accidental existence of quantity. For this partial existence of matter does not emanate intrinsically from the form, but only naturally depends on it, either as on a condition or actual disposition naturally due, or at most as on a cause informing and through its information per se concurring and helping to the being of matter; but this mode of dependence can easily be supplied by God without repugnance. And of the former indeed, which seemed to us more probable, the matter is clear, because that mode of dependence is very extrinsic and a posteriori, and consists only in this, that to a thing constituted in such a state or lacking such a disposition or act being is not naturally due. But God can confer being even beyond the natural debt or beyond the natural order, and so can preserve the form in matter without the natural disposition and the soul in the body without natural organisation.

6. But of the latter mode of dependence the same is proved, because, although according to that mode the form concurs in some way as a cause to the being of matter, yet not as a cause intrinsically composing that being or its proper subject, but as a cause only informing or actuating and as extrinsic, in this sense, that it is altogether co-distinct from the effect itself; but God can supply such a cause by effecting, even if it causes by informing. Which is proved from the contrary of the material cause, which is intrinsic as is the formal, and therefore God cannot supply it with respect to that effect which it intrinsically composes. Yet he can supply its causality with respect to the other component or form, even if matter in its genus flows per se and as a true cause into the being of the form itself. And in this way God supplies the dependence of accident on subject, even if it is in the genus of material cause; and in the same way he can supply the dependence of the corporeal substantial form on matter; because, although it is truly per se and material causality, nevertheless it is not altogether intrinsic, that is, such that matter itself is an intrinsic part of such effect, but is about a thing altogether co-distinct, by sustaining it. But this causality which matter provides by sustaining God can supply by effecting; therefore by the same reason he will be able to supply the causality of the form, not into the composite but into matter, nor by informing but by effecting. The consequence is evident, because the whole reason of repugnance equally ceases, which consists in this, that God cannot be united after the manner of form to matter, which would be necessary for preserving or composing the composite, but not for preserving one part of the composite without the other. In which the reason is equal of matter and of form, because it is not of the notion of an essential part actually existing that it be form or have form, because neither does the essence of such part postulate this, since it consists only in aptitude to form, but not in actual union, nor yet existence, since it only extrinsically depends on the form in the mode already explained. And then matter would indeed be in entitative act or of existence and in potency to formal act, in which there is no repugnance or difficulty, since receptive potency necessarily includes some entity and entitative actuality, as was declared above.

7. What new thing God must provide in order to preserve matter without form.—And hence it is understood in passing through what action God could preserve matter without form, or what new thing he must exhibit in order to preserve it. For one must speak diversely according to the diverse modes of dependence of matter on form touched upon above. For, if matter depends on the form only as on an act or consequent disposition, no new action is necessary on the side of God for preserving matter without form; but, if from the beginning he created matter alone without form, the action would be altogether the same as that by which God actually created matter under forms, and the miracle or preternatural work would only have consisted in this, that God would make that action without the concomitance of the other through which he would induce the form into such matter. As, if God created the substance of the soul without the intellective power, he would create it by the same action, and the miracle would only be to impede the natural emanation of the faculty from the essence; indeed in fact the soul of Christ was created by the same action without proper subsistence as the others are created, and in it only the action or emanation of proper subsistence was impeded. And in a proportional way one must speak if God wills to preserve without form matter which already is under it; for, by expelling one form and not concurring to the introduction of another, it would only be necessary that God continue that very action by which he now preserves matter, because through it he would sufficiently preserve the entity of matter in the nature of things and outside causes; and the miracle would only be placed in this, that God would continue the conservative action of matter in that state in which being would not be due to it and without those conditions which are necessary for the natural mode of existing.

8. But if matter depends on the form as on a proper cause per se flowing into its being, then it will be necessary that God supply that causality of the form by another genus of efficiency and action; because, if that causality of the form is per se necessary besides the common influx by which God now preserves matter, matter could not be preserved with this common influx of God alone without the causality of the form unless the necessity of this is supplied by another genus of causality. As, when God preserves quantity without the material concurrence of the subject, it is necessary that he supply by special efficiency that concurrence of the subject without which quantity naturally could not be, and therefore we say that God preserves quantity without subject by a far diverse reason from that by which he preserved it in the subject, as I treated at length in tom. III of the Third Part. So, then, it would be necessary in the present case, proportion being kept. But what that new action would be which God would apply to preserving matter without form is not easy to explain; but we say that it would be an action after the manner of absolute and altogether independent creation, and would be distinguished from the action by which matter is now preserved, because this is after the manner of concreation; which indeed in heavenly matter, if it had to be preserved without form, can easily be understood; but in this matter of generable things it is more difficult, for the action through which it comes about is truly absolute creation, as was declared above, and therefore the former mode of speaking always seems more likely as regards this matter.

The reasons of the former opinion are satisfied

9. The reasons of the contrary opinion have almost all been solved from what has been said. For to the first it has already been answered that it assumes something false, namely that all existence is from the form as from an intrinsic and as it were essential cause (for this is true of complete substantial existence, but not of any partial one whatever), and that the inference is not necessary, because, granted that that natural order intervened between form and existence, it would not thence be immutable by the omnipotence of God. To the second Scotus and others answer that an equivocation is committed in the name of potency and act; for matter is called pure subjective potency, which, if it is in its purity, will lack informing act; but when it is said that every existing thing is in act, it is understood of entitative act, which is not opposed to subjective potency, but only to objective. Which answer Javellus and others think sufficiently excluded by attacking objective potency; but there is no reason why we should stick at the word of objective potency, about which perhaps the controversy is about a name, as Javellus too confesses, and it is to be treated below; but we must attend to the thing signified, which is the thing in possible being, whether it is called possible from objective potency or from the active potency of the agent; for now it matters nothing. But to the possible thing so taken the thing in act is opposed, and in this sense it is true that the existing thing must be in act; but this being in act is not opposed to pure subjective potency. But if in this sense matter already created is called pure potency, the assumption is false. To the third it has already been sufficiently declared how God can supply the natural dependence which matter has in its partial existence on the form.

10. Matter claims for itself a proper and stable substantial species.—To the fourth the answer is that that argument does not proceed more in matter without form than in formed matter. For matter does not have another substantial and essential species for itself on account of this, that it is under form or under this or that form. But I say substantial and essential, because we are treating of prime matter, not of proximate matter, which includes accidental forms or dispositions, by reason of which it is sometimes said to differ in species; but that in truth is not diversity in the substantial difference of matter, but in accidents. The form, then, does not give the specific difference to matter, but to the composite. Whence, just as the same matter in number remains under diverse forms, so also the same in species; if, then, matter existing without form would be an individual of a genus contained under no species, it is so now too; or certainly, if now it is not such an individual (as in truth it is not), neither would it be then. Whence the sequel is to be simply denied, because to the notion of matter it does not pertain that it be in the species of man or of horse, but in the species of matter; but that matter would be in some ultimate species of matter, either heavenly or elemental. Wherefore it is one thing to say that in that case there is given matter which in its breadth of incomplete essence would be contained under no ultimate species proportioned to itself, and it is false that this follows; another to say that there is given matter of which no complete individual contained under some ultimate species of complete substance would actually be composed, and this we confess follows; but it is no inconvenience, but is our assertion itself, because it is not of the essence of matter that it actually compose such an individual, but that it be apt to compose it. To the fifth the answer is that there is a difference between substance and accident, that accident and accidental form taken in their whole breadth are convertible, because every accident in some way inheres, and therefore it is repugnant that accidental being be given without accidental form; but substance and substantial form are not convertible; for there is given a substantial subject which in no way is form, and therefore substance is divided into matter, form and composite. Wherefore it is not necessary that every substantial being be intrinsically and formally form; for in the breadth of substantial being there is given being simply and complete, and this is from the form properly and per se in its genus; there is given also partial being, which is not always from the form, except speaking broadly, in so far as it depends in some way on it, which dependence God can supply, as has been shown.