Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reasons on each side inducing difficulty.—Here we are no longer treating of matter as informed, for of this it was said in the preceding section, but of matter as regards its entity or as regards its being. And the reason for doubting is that the whole entity of matter is supposed to the eduction or introduction of the form; therefore that entity cannot be caused by the form, especially since matter receives being through creation, to which the form cannot cooperate by concausing. But on the contrary is the fact that it is not repugnant that the form be the cause of matter, since causes are causes of one another, Physics II, text 30, and Metaphysics V, text 2. Likewise, because, if the form were not the cause of matter, matter could naturally be without form; because, if there is no causality, there is no reason why there should be dependence.

Opinions are reported

2. About this question there are various opinions, according to the diverse mode of thinking about the being of matter. For those who think that matter of itself has no being of existence say that the form is properly the cause of matter, because that is the cause of a thing which gives being. This opinion seems to be St. Thomas's, I, q. 66, a. 1, and De potentia, q. 4, a. 1, which all the Thomists hold: Capreolus, In II, dist. 13, q. 1; Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 5, under q. 9; Ferrariensis, on Contra Gentiles III, c. 4; Soncinas and Javellus, Metaphysics VIII, q. 1. Durandus followed the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2; and Thomas of Strasbourg, q. 1. But the mode of explaining this formal causality according to the opinion distinguishing really the existence from the actual essence of the creature must here be that the partial entity of the essence of matter is of itself incapable of existence until it is informed by substantial form; but the form itself according to its entity of essence is per se primarily united to matter and with it composes one integral essence; and this is the primary formal effect of the form. From which it further follows that the form communicates the being of existence which it brings with it per se primarily to the composite and by participation to matter, whether that being emanates actively from the form or through resultance, or only formally, which can consist in this alone, that to such a form or to the thing informed through it such being is due by natural necessity, even if it is conferred by the extrinsic cause alone from which the form comes about. And this explanation Cajetan indicated in the said place, nor does it seem able to be more conveniently expounded in the principles of that opinion; for, if existence is an entity distinct from the form, the being of existence itself cannot be the first effect of the form, but the being of essence, which is distinct; for the first effect of the form is essential to the thing, because the form as form is of the essence of the thing; but existence is outside the essence according to this opinion; it does not, therefore, pertain to the first formal effect.

3. Whence according to the principles of this opinion the rational soul in Christ the man has a proper and primary formal effect; for it cannot be deprived of that if it actually informs, and yet according to this opinion it does not have a proper created existence; therefore the form can only give existence formally secondarily, namely because it itself is or constitutes the proper susceptive of substantial existence, or (which comes almost to the same) because to the essence completed through the form substantial being is intrinsically due, and not to another. But this opinion so declared is proved, first, because matter is pure potency; therefore of itself it does not have act, but from the form; therefore, since existence is a certain act, it cannot belong to matter except through the form. Secondly, because existence is a posterior act, if it is compared to essence; therefore it supposes essential act; but this act is the form. Thirdly, because substantial being is complete and perfect being; therefore per se it is due only to a complete and formal nature; therefore it is due only to the form or by reason of the form.

4. But Durandus adds that, even if existence is said not to be distinguished in the thing from essence, it is nevertheless to be asserted that the form is the formal cause of the actual existence of matter; for, although the essence is its existence, that nevertheless must be understood with proportion; for essence in potency will be existence in potency, and actual essence will be actual existence; therefore the form alone will be the actual existence by which it formally is in matter. And from this opinion, explained in either way, it follows that matter naturally depends on the form in its whole entity, so that it cannot remain without it, because it cannot remain without existence; but it does not have existence except from the form and through the form, on which existence itself depends; therefore. Whence too it comes about that, the form being changed, matter changes its existence, although under diverse forms and existences the same essence of matter is preserved. But whether this dependence is so great that it cannot be supplied by God without the form we shall say in the following section.

5. The second opinion, altogether contrary, is that the form does not give being to matter nor is its proper cause. So holds Henry, Quodlibet I, q. 14; and for that opinion Avicenna is cited, Metaphysics VI; and Scotus holds the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, at the end; and Gregory there, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 Aureoli, and q. 2, a. 3. The foundation is that matter has its proper being, which it formally receives from no cause, since it is simple and partial being and co-distinct from the being which the form gives, but has it effectively from God alone, and according to that being matter is supposed to the form absolutely and simply in the order of nature; therefore in no way is that being caused by the form, but is completed or actuated through the form.

6. Who assert, and how, that matter can be naturally without form.—But if against this opinion you infer that matter can naturally be without form, since the form is not its cause, some answer by conceding the sequel, which Marsilius seems to have thought, In II, q. 9, a. 2, when he asserts that in the beginning God created the matter of generable things without any substantial form and after some time formed it. Which also pleases Gabriel, In II, dist. 12, qq. 1 and 2; and seems sometimes to have pleased Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos I, cc. 5 and 7, and Confessions XII, c. 8. But if God did this in the creation of the world, it is to be thought that it is not beyond the natures of things, because, as Augustine notes at the beginning of his exposition of Genesis, God then did not operate as a worker of miracles but as the author of nature. Nor does Henry above seem to dissent from this opinion, when he says that matter according to the common course of nature cannot be stripped of every form, because the corruption of one thing does not come about without the generation of another following. If, then, corruption could naturally come about without the generation of another, as far as depends on the side of matter, it would naturally remain without form. Which Marsilius holds happened in fact in the death of Christ, In III, q. 3, a. 1, and q. 13, a. 1, and Henry judges it probable, Quodlibet I, q. 4, indeed even true as regards this, that there the separation of one form was made without the introduction of another; which nevertheless he thinks was singular and preternatural in Christ, Quodlibet II, q. 2, ad 4. But Scotus thinks it natural in any death of man, especially violent, indeed also of other animals, as is evident In IV, dist. 11, q. 3. These, however, do not say that in that case matter remains without form absolutely, but without specific form and with the form of corporeity which they posit. Others use a distinction: for something is called natural either according to the particular or according to the universal nature; for to water according to its private condition it is not natural to ascend; yet to fill a vacuum this is natural according to the propensity of universal nature. So (they say) to matter according to its private nature it is not repugnant to be preserved without form, if it is deprived of it; but from the due order of universal nature this cannot come about, because, if it is repugnant that a vacuum be given in local space, much more in the capacity and potency of matter. Others finally say that even according to the particular condition of its nature matter cannot be without form, although the form is not its proper cause, unless every condition necessary for existing is called a cause. And this mode of speaking seems to approach more nearly to the truth.

Resolution of the question

7. I say, then, first: the form is not the proper cause of matter, giving formally the proper being by which matter exists. It is proved, because the form does not give to matter that partial essential entity which it has in itself, as was shown above, and which it retains under all forms; but that entity includes its partial¹ existence distinct from every existence proceeding formally from the form; therefore. The major is evident, both because that entity of matter, as regards its proper partial being of essence, is simple and co-distinct from the form; and also because it is supposed to the form, and remains unvaried as regards that being under any form whatever; whence too the authors of the first opinion say that the form constitutes with matter one complete essence, but does not give its proper essential being to matter, which it rather supposes; therefore the form cannot be the formal, proper and intrinsic cause of that being of matter. But I say proper and intrinsic, because extrinsically after the manner of a term this being of matter can be said to be taken from the form, because the essence of matter consists in aptitude to form, but this respect is not to the form as actually informing, but in aptitude. Whence the same specification would remain in matter even if it were without form. But the minor is proved, because the real being of essence, if it is actual, that is, outside its efficient cause, is intrinsically the being of existence, as will be proved at length below in treating of being and essence; but matter, as it is supposed to the form according to the proper being of partial essence, has actual being, as it is distinguished from potential objective being, because without such being it could not be a true and real subject of transmutation and of form; therefore. And it is confirmed and declared; for God, by the same action by which he created and preserved matter under the first form, preserves it under all the forms which afterwards succeed; therefore that action of God is terminated at some being of matter which remains the same under all forms; for creation and the corresponding conservation are terminated at some being, and the action cannot remain the same unless the term is the same; therefore that being is not given formally by the form, for the being which the form gives is varied when the form is varied; but that being is the being of existence, because it is temporal and actual being outside the efficient cause; therefore.

8. Wherefore Durandus does not speak consistently when he says that, even if being is not distinguished from essence, matter has being from the informing form. But he labours in an equivocation when he says that matter has only essence in potency, and therefore of itself has only being in potency; for matter according to itself has in potency the essence of the form or of the composite; but the essence of matter it does not have in potency but in act, by the very fact that it has been created; for it is one thing for matter to be essentially potency, another to be only essence in potency. For the first is universally true, even of actually existing matter, because in it nothing else is signified than that matter is essentially the subject or receptive potency. But the second is false of actually created matter, even as it is pre-understood to the form; for, although the essence of matter of itself, that is, efficiency being removed, is only in potency, which is common to every created essence, nevertheless through its creation it becomes essence in act, although partial and subjectively potential; therefore as such it has its proportioned being of existence; that, therefore, does not emanate formally from the form. But of this point, that is, of the existence of matter, more below.

9. Matter depends on the form and cannot naturally be without it.—I say, secondly: nevertheless matter depends in its being in some way on the form, in so far as it cannot naturally be without it, not only from the order of universal nature, but also from the debt and need of the proper and peculiar nature of matter itself. The former part is more frequently received by philosophers and theologians, who by this reason say that there is a mutual and necessary connection between matter and material form, as can be seen in the authors cited, and Avicenna, Metaphysics II, cc. 2 and 3; the Commentator, Physics I, comm. 56, and Book II, comm. 13; Themistius, Physics I, last digression; Plotinus, Enneads III, Book VI, c. 14; Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 1. And it is proved by reason, because the entity of matter would be idle in the nature of things if it remained without form; for it could exercise no operation; but nature abhors this; therefore it is against the order of nature that matter be without form. Many use this reason; yet it does not seem efficacious, because, although that is in vain in nature which is not apt for some function of nature, nevertheless that is not in vain nor simply idle which of itself is apt to exercise some function to which it was instituted by nature, although sometimes it does not execute it. So, then, although matter sometimes remained without form, it would not be idle in nature, because of itself it would be apt to receive it, if an agent were present who would introduce it, and it would happen by accident that it lacked it, because perhaps the agent which was disposing to introducing it first took away the disposition necessary for the conservation of the other before it could introduce the other. As Scotus thinks happens in the death of man or of another animal; nor on that account does the corpse remain idle, or would the matter remain, especially because little by little it will again be able to be disposed to receive another form.

10. Whence neither does the reason seem efficacious which is wont to be given from the continual succession of generation and corruption, both because it is not certain that generation immediately and in the same instant follows every corruption, as is evident from the said opinion of Scotus; for, although nature per se does not intend corruption but generation, it can nevertheless happen that a thing is corrupted before another can be generated. Wherefore what Aristotle said, namely, the generation of one is the corruption of another, perhaps is not converted, or will have to be understood speaking per se, although by accident it could fail.

11. Another reason is wont to be made, because what is not apt per se to operate without another is not apt either to be per se without it; but matter by its nature can operate nothing without form; therefore by its nature it needs form in order to exist, nor can it be without it. But I ask whether the discussion is of operation properly taken, which expresses a relationship to the efficient principle; and in this way it is not to the point; for matter neither under form nor without form can have any operation. Or operation is taken broadly for any causality whatever; and so the assumption is false; for often one thing needs the company of another in order to cause and not in order to exist, as the agent intellect needs the company of the phantasy for abstracting species, and yet remains without the phantasy and is not thought to be idle, even if then for that state it does not exercise its operation. The rational soul too needs the company of the body for exercising formal causality, but not for existing, and so of others; so, then, matter could need the company of form for exhibiting material causality, even if it does not require it for existing. And the reason is that causality expresses a relation or transcendental relationship, and therefore can postulate the company of another; but the thing from which the causality is can be more absolute and postulate the society of another not in act but in aptitude only.

12. From which too another common reason seems weak, which is thought to be most of all a priori, namely that matter is pure potency, and therefore by its nature must depend on the act of the form. For what is called pure potency does not exclude the actual entity of matter itself, but only expresses that that entity is such that it is essentially potency and altogether instituted for the function of receiving and sustaining form; but it is not of the notion of potency, speaking generally, that it always be under its act; whence, then, is it shown that this is of the notion of this potency? For from this, that it is substantial potency, this cannot be gathered, since thence rather it is had that it is subsisting potency, although partially and incompletely, and therefore can exist per se, even if it does not actually exercise its causality, as the rational soul remains, because it is subsisting, although it does not actually inform.

13. A reason proving that matter cannot naturally be without form.—It seems difficult, then, to give a reason which convinces this natural dependence of matter on form, on account of which at this time it pleases many, especially in Italy, that matter indeed is never separated from form on account of the necessary order of natural agents, both inferior and heavenly, which always introduce one form when another recedes, but not on account of the intrinsic dependence of matter, which they say would not be reduced to nothing if, one form being taken away, another did not succeed in it, but naturally would have remained with its entity and existence. Nevertheless one must not recede from the ancient and common opinion, which we can explain and confirm in these ways. First, it is not likely that this inferior matter is more independent of the form of a generable thing indefinitely taken than is each matter of the heaven of its proper form, since it is less perfect; but each matter of the heaven depends naturally on its form; therefore. Secondly, it is not likely that this matter depends more on accidental forms than on substantial, since it regards this per se primarily and principally; but this matter so depends on accidental form that it cannot naturally be without all of it, as is evident, at least of quantity.

14. Augustine finally asserted that formless matter preceded by no real duration.—Thirdly, there is an excellent physical conjecture that this matter was instituted to this, that it always be under some substantial form and never be separated from them; it is therefore a sign that it was also made such that from its nature it postulates the company of form in order that it can be. The antecedent is evident by induction, because matter, from the beginning in its creation, was founded under forms. Nor is the contrary opinion likely; for Scripture does not say that God in the beginning created matter, but heaven and earth; which words cannot be expounded of matter, as was shown above. And although Augustine sometimes seems to have doubted in this, nevertheless, Confessions XII, cc. 17 and 29, he rejects the former opinion and concludes that matter preceded its formation not in time but in nature only; whence, Confessions XIII, c. 33, he so concludes: Since the matter of heaven and earth is one thing, the species another, the matter indeed from altogether nothing, but the species of the world from formless matter, yet thou madest both at the same time, so that form followed matter with no interval of delay. He has the same, De Genesi ad litteram I, c. 19, and Book IV, c. 22 and following, and City of God I, c. 7. But after that first creation matter never lacked every form; and so natural causes have been disposed by the author of nature that one form can never desert matter without another being introduced. For that axiom of Aristotle, De generatione I, text 17: the generation of one is the corruption of another, is universally true, nor can it be true of generation that corruption always follows it unless generation too always follows the corruption of one; for, if something were corrupted and no generation came about, afterwards from the same matter something could be generated without a new corruption. And since it is true that there is in matter no form of corporeity or generic form, as was shown above and we shall also show below, it is necessary that in matter form always succeed form, unless we wish to say that in fact matter often remains without any substantial form with accidental ones alone. Which would be absurd and paradoxical in philosophy.

15. This matter, then, has been made so that it be perpetually under form; therefore it is likely that it was made such that it needs form in order to exist. The consequence is proved, because it is not repugnant to understand that prime matter is such that it has this need, which that reason rightly proves, namely because it is pure potency, that is, imperfect in its entity, and incomplete and potential; for with these imperfections that need and dependence does not fight, indeed fits excellently. Nor does it matter that it is partially subsisting; for subsistence excludes dependence on a subject, but not on an act or form. Nor in this is matter to be compared with the subsisting soul, because this is far more perfect and more actual and simply immaterial. This mode of dependence, then, not only is not repugnant, but is also most of all consonant with the entity of matter and its imperfection and function; therefore it is more likely that the nature of matter is such. Finally, in physical things, what always happens in the same way and not otherwise, it is likely is naturally necessary; but that matter is under some form naturally always so happens; therefore it is from the necessity of nature and not from the necessity of the form, because, when one form perishes from defect of dispositions, there was no necessity on the side of the other of introducing a new form. Nor likewise can the necessity be attributed to the extrinsic proximate agent alone, because often there is no private agent from which such a form is; therefore that necessity is founded in the intrinsic need of matter itself. Nor is it enough to say that this effect is natural from the order of the universe or from universal nature, or that that necessity arises from universal agent causes, which are always ready to introduce some form when particular ones fail; for this universal institution of nature is founded in the proper need of matter; for, because it pertained to the universal good that no portion of matter ever fail or be reduced to nothing, therefore nature provided that it could never be deprived of every form, but, one receding, another would always succeed, because this was necessary in order that matter could be naturally preserved perpetually. Otherwise why would nature have been so provident in the succession of such forms, especially when the form which succeeds was not per se necessary for expelling the other, which recedes on account of the defect of the necessary disposition or organisation?

16. Nor is what was adduced about the ascent of water to fill a vacuum similar; for universal nature avoids a vacuum on account of the perfect unity and integrity of the universe and on account of the necessity of action and influence, and not on account of the advantage of some private being. But that matter be as it were void of every form, if nevertheless it could be preserved and undergo and be disposed to generation and in its genus concur to it, would be no disadvantage to universal nature. Therefore the universal reason is none other than the conservation of matter. I confess that this whole discourse supposes that in fact matter never remains without substantial form, and thence gathers that this comes from the need of matter, which collection I judge to be sufficiently proved; but I doubt whether the antecedent has been sufficiently demonstrated; for we do not experience substantial form except from effects or accidents; but often there is no effect which evidently shows the introduction of a new form after the receding of the prior, as in the death of man; and therefore Scotus and others deny that a new form is introduced, although, lest they confess that matter remains without form, they posit a form of corporeity or of mixture, which being set aside, we convince by no other reason that in every death or corruption a new form is introduced except because otherwise matter would remain without form; and so we seem in these proofs to commit a circle. But, although it is true that this is not evidently demonstrated from effects, nevertheless that axiom is so consonant with the natures of things and with the end and use and imperfection of matter that by the unanimous consent of almost all ancient and recent philosophers it has been received as certain and undoubted, which is enough for founding a philosophical reason.

Of what kind is the dependence of matter on form

17. A twofold mode of dependence.—Arguments proving that matter depends on the form only as on a condition.—But it remains to explain of what kind this dependence is; for it can be understood in two ways, namely either as on a proper cause or as on a condition so necessary that without it being is not due to such a thing, which two modes of dependence I explained at length in tom. I of the Third Part, disp. VIII, sect. 1, and Fonseca seems to signify them, Metaphysics V, c. 2, q. 3, sect. 1, when he says that matter can be understood to depend on the form either as on a true cause or as on something concomitant; and in sect. 3 he seems to make mention of the same, when he says that accidents preserve substance, not a priori, but a posteriori. It can be doubted, then, in which of these modes matter depends on form. And indeed, that it is only dependence a posteriori and on a necessary condition seems probably to be persuaded. First, because this mode of dependence is possible; for the substantial form or its union to matter, and therefore the whole composite, depends in this way on some accidental forms as on necessary dispositions by way of conservation, as they say, not because they are proper and direct causes of such conservation, but because they are dispositions so connatural that they are also necessary; therefore with greater reason matter can have such dependence on the form as on a necessary and primary disposition. Likewise in this way matter depends on quantity; therefore it can also depend on the form. Next, this mode is sufficient to save all the things which are said of the dependence of matter on the form, and all the reasons made prove no more. It is also an easy and clear mode; for according to it the two conclusions posited are easily reconciled. It is also rightly understood how in turn the form depends on matter and matter on the form: for one will be said to depend a priori and the other a posteriori; one as on a true cause, and the other as on a concomitant condition.

18. But according to the other mode this mutual dependence is difficult to understand; for, since matter is simply supposed to the form in order that this can be educed from its potency, it can scarcely be understood how matter can depend a priori on the form. And the difficulty is explained more fully and increased from this, that matter comes about through true creation and is preserved by the same permanent action; therefore it does not depend in its becoming on the form as on a true cause, because no created cause can naturally concur to creation. Some answer that this is true of the efficient cause, but not of the other genera of causes; for a creature cannot be the efficient cause of creation; yet it can be a final cause, as is self-evident; and by the same reason it can be a formal cause, indeed also material; for, when the whole is created, the parts concur to its being and becoming in the genus of material cause. But, the final cause being omitted, whose causality has a peculiar notion, because it is not through a real and proper motion distinct from the action of the efficient cause, and therefore does not prerequire real being in the thing which exercises such causality, of the material cause its concurrence seems directly repugnant with creation as it is proper and true creation; which is easily evident from what was said above of the eduction of form from the potency of matter, and will be shown more fully below in the proper disputation on creation. But I speak of creation as it is properly creation; for under the notion of concreation it can have dependence on a material cause, as was declared above in treating of the matter of the heaven, because concreation as such supposes creation in the order of nature, and therefore can have some dependence. By the same reason, then, creation as such cannot have dependence on a formal cause, because the formal cause supposes the material, although concreation can have dependence on the form, as was declared above in the cited place. But the matter of generable things is truly and properly created, and not properly concreated, that is, it is not produced by one and the same action by which the whole is created; therefore the form cannot concur as a true cause to its creation.

19. Which is declared and confirmed in this way from what has been said; for the creation of this matter of generable things and the induction of the form are distinct actions, both now in the conservation of matter and the generation of things, and in the first production of sublunary things; but the action inductive of the form cannot be a true cause of the action creative of matter; therefore much less can the form which is induced through that action be a true cause of the creation of matter. The minor is evident, both because the induction of the form altogether supposes the creation of matter or matter created, nor can it be understood that the induction or union of the form is supposed in some genus of cause to the creation of matter, because the induction of the form as such expresses a transcendental relationship to matter already created; whence, just as a relation cannot be presupposed to its term in some genus of cause, so neither the induction of the form to the creation of matter. And also because otherwise the creation or conservation of matter would per se depend on the eduction of the form; therefore also on the agent educing the form; and so natural agents as true effective causes would preserve matter. Whence too it would come about that as often as the form is changed in matter the action by which matter is preserved by God would be changed, because, the dependence of the action being changed, the action is changed, because it itself is essentially dependence, as we shall declare below. But the consequent is false, because matter, as it is the first subject of generation, is something ingenerable and incorruptible, because it is supposed to generation and corruption; therefore by the same reason it is something immutable as regards the action through which it comes about and is preserved, because it is supposed made and preserved; otherwise through any generation of a natural being whatever matter would be concreated, or would be related as if it were concreated, because through a new action terminated at the whole it itself would begin to be preserved, which is plainly repugnant to the action of a natural agent; otherwise by the same reason it could be said that through such action new matter is always co-produced. Therefore the creation or conservation of matter does not depend on the eduction of the form as on a proper cause or per se action; therefore much less can it depend on the form as on a true cause, since the form in every genus of cause is posterior to the action through which it is educed from the potency of matter; therefore from first to last, neither can matter itself depend on the form as on a per se cause, but only as on a concomitant cause or condition well disposing and actuating matter itself.

20. Reasons persuading that matter depends on the form as on a proper cause.—Yet arguments are not lacking by which it seems to be persuaded that matter can depend on the form as on a proper cause which through its information holds it in being. And especially because the material substantial form depends on matter as on a proper and per se cause in its genus; therefore conversely matter depends on the form as on a true cause, because, although it does not sustain it as a subject, it can as act hold it. For, just as effective act holds the effect in being through its causality, so informative act can in a mode proportioned to itself hold its subject in being; therefore the substantial form is so compared to matter. The consequence is proved, first, because the material form is more perfect and more actual than matter; therefore matter depends more per se on the form than the form on matter. Secondly, because such a mutual bond between matter and form as between causes which mutually and in turn are per se causes of each other is not repugnant. Which is evident both from that general reason, that in diverse genera of causes mutual priority is not repugnant, and also because in the heaven there seems to be this mutual connection between matter and form; for both in becoming and in being they depend mutually and per se, as was said above, so that the concreation of one depends per se on the concreation of the other, and conversely. From which example a third reason can be taken, because the matter of the heaven depends on its determinate form as on a per se cause; therefore the matter of these inferior things too will depend in the same way on the generable form, although indefinite. The consequence is evident, because the matter of the heaven is more perfect; therefore, if that depends, much more the other.

21. Judgement on the question and on the reasons proposed on each side.—These reasons are indeed probable, and so each part can probably be sustained from what has been said; to me, however (to confess the truth), the former seems more intelligible and easier, and, if the reasons made are attentively weighed, the latter can more easily be dissolved. Which task I leave to the reader, because the matter seems easy, because below, in explaining how causes are causes of one another, it must be declared radically what mutual priority can intervene between some two things and what cannot, on the understanding of which the present resolution most of all depends.