Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Only two effects can be attributed to the form, namely the composite and matter; for of generation or uniting it has already been said that it cannot properly be its effect. But of the union itself in completed being it is evident from what has been said that it cannot properly be called an effect, except perhaps in the way in which action is called the effect of the agent, in so far as it is from it, although more properly it is called the way to the effect.

The former effect of the form is explained

2. The primary effect of the form is the composite.—As regards the composite, then, it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that it is the proper and primary effect of the form; for it consists intrinsically and essentially of it, and from it has its species and (so to speak) its beauty; for it completes its essential nature and notion, as is evident from the definition of Aristotle handed down above. Likewise matter is the cause of the composite, as was shown above; therefore much more the form, because it confers more to the being of the composite; therefore conversely the composite itself is the effect of the form, for in its being it depends most of all on it.

3. By a single union the form causes both matter and the composite.—But some object: for, if the composite is the proper and primary effect of the form, then the proper causality of the form will be to constitute the composite; but this cannot be true, because the form prior in nature actuates matter before it constitutes the composite; for, since it is essentially the act of matter, it regards matter first, and through it the composite; therefore the composite is not the primary effect of the form, but matter as actuated or as informed; from which effect the composite follows as a posterior effect. I answer that by these words two causalities as two effects of the form are not explained, but only one under diverse relationships. For the union of the form to matter is single, and, that being posited and every other thing or real mode being prescinded, matter remains informed by the form, and the composite results from both, although in the form itself diverse relations can be considered with respect to matter or the composite. Again, that matter is actuated by the form is not an effect distinct from the nature of the thing from the composite, because by matter as informed we do not understand matter alone with some as it were extrinsic denomination; for this concept is either none or is not a concept of some real effect, but of a denomination which the intellect can feign from concomitance or relationship to the form as present; but by matter informed we understand matter as intrinsically affected by the form; matter as informed, therefore, includes both matter itself and the form and the union. But the composite includes these three and nothing else; therefore these are not distinct in the thing; therefore they are not two effects, but one, diversely conceived and declared by us.

4. And it is confirmed and explained by a like case; for in the accidental form it is not one thing to inform the subject and another to compose with it the accidental composite; as in whiteness to whiten the snow and to constitute this white thing as such are the same; therefore the same holds proportionally in the substantial form. They answer that the reason is unlike, because from subject and whiteness there comes about one per accidens, which is not something distinct from the extremes taken together and united; but from matter and form there comes about one per se, which must be something besides those three, even taken together, in order that it can be more one. But this answer supposes a false doctrine; for it is impossible that composite substance in the thing include something besides those three taken together, which I shall show below, disputing of the essence of material substance. Nor can the difference between being per se and per accidens consist in that, but in this, that the union itself and the extremes of the union are all of the same order in a being per se one, but not in a being per accidens. Whence too it comes about that in a being per se one the union is more intimate and arises from a greater proportion of the unitable things among themselves. But that the difference is placed in this alone and not in another can be demonstrated, because both a being per se one, as we are now treating of it, and a being one per accidens are not one by the unity of simplicity, but by the unity of composition or union; therefore the greater unity of the composite being per se consists in a nobler union and a greater proportion of the unitable things, and not in the addition of a third intelligible entity, which, if it is simple and it alone precisely taken is said to be per se one, will not be one by composition, and so will not be that composite which is constituted through the form. But if that third is one intrinsically including matter and form and their union, nothing must be added to these in order that it be per se one; indeed thence this unity would rather be diminished, for more things would be aggregated in that composite without any necessity. The reason made, then, retains its force, that, if in the accidental form for the subject to be actuated and for the accidental composite, for example the white, to be constituted are the same in the thing, also in the substantial form for matter to be actuated and for the composite to be constituted are the same. Nor does unity per se prevent this, but with greater reason postulates it.

5. To the reason to the contrary, then, the sequel is to be conceded, namely that the composite substantial essence is the primary effect of the form in its genus, and consequently that the chief causality of the form is to constitute the same composite, not in any way whatever, for this absolutely said is common to matter, but as perfecting and completing the essence; for matter begins it, but form completes it. But when it is added that the form prior in nature actuates matter before it constitutes the composite, the assumption is denied, because those are not two, but one in the thing, whence there is not causality between them and consequently neither order of nature, but at most there can be an order of reason according to inadequate concepts. Nor does it stand in the way that the form is essentially the act of matter, for it is equally essentially part of the composite; indeed, if a comparison had to be made between these, it is more essentially part of the composite than act of matter, because the form is not for the sake of matter but for the sake of the composite; yet in truth these are not two in the form itself, but one founding two relations. From which the argument is rather retorted; for, just as the form by one and the same aptitude is part of the composite and act of matter, so by the same exhibition it gives its whole self to matter and to the composite, to the latter as to the whole, to the former as to the co-part; therefore also in the effect it is the same and altogether simultaneous that matter be informed by the form and that the composite be constituted; the composite, therefore, is the proper and primary effect of the substantial form, and perhaps the only one in the genus of formal cause; but of this last point one must speak in the following section.

Whether the form is more perfect than the composite

6. But first an objection which occurs must be solved; for the cause must be nobler than the effect, on the testimony of the Commentator, Physics II, comm. 4; but the form is not nobler than the composite; therefore the composite cannot be the proper effect of the form. To this objection some answer by denying the minor; for Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 7 and 8, prefers the form to the composite, saying that it is more being and prior to it. And so the Commentator thinks there, and Zimara absolutely defends it, theorem 10, who also reports Lincolniensis. And he proves it because whatever of perfection is in the composite is in the form alone, and matter adds no perfection; and from elsewhere that whole perfection is in the form as in a cause, and it is that which brings being with it, which does not belong to the composite except by reason of it; therefore it is simply more perfect. But this answer relies on a false foundation; for without doubt the composite is more perfect than its form. Which is the open opinion of Aristotle; for in De Anima II, at the beginning, and wherever he distinguishes substance into matter, form and composite, he prefers the composite to the form and the form to matter; indeed below, treating of substance, we shall show that they are said analogically of them, and so the Commentator explained, De Anima II, comm. 3; and therefore Aristotle said in the predicament of substance that first substance is most of all substance, where, although he compares first to second, he nevertheless also prefers first and complete substance to parts and incomplete substances. Whence the Commentator too, Metaphysics XII, comm. 15, says that the composite is of greater nobility than is matter or form, and Alexander is reported for the same opinion. Which Simplicius too holds, Physics I, text 70, and Physics II, text 4.

7. But the reason is that the composite includes whatever of perfection is in the form, and adds something; therefore it is more perfect. The antecedent is proved by some¹ because the composite includes being, which the form does not include. But this reason is of no moment; for either existence is distinguished in the thing from actual essence or not; if it is not distinguished, just as the composite essence includes its adequate being, so the form its proper being; but if it is distinguished, first that reason has no place in man, because being belongs to the soul before the man. Next, in order that the comparison be rightly made, it must be made between the essence of the form and the essence of the composite precisely, and so that reason does not proceed; or, if the comparison of the form is made to the composite as it includes being, the form too must be taken as including in its way being; for per se primarily it is due to it as to the first root of being itself; which also exists through it, although the denomination of existing simply is attributed to the composite on account of the mode of subsisting. The antecedent, then, is proved, because the composite includes the perfection of the form and moreover includes the perfection of matter. Zimara answers that from matter no perfection is taken, but rather every imperfection. But he is deceived, because, as was shown above, matter has true reality and partial essence; whence it is necessary that it have some perfection in the breadth of being, and greater than accidents. Likewise subsistence is a perfection; but material substance has this most of all by reason of matter. Likewise matter brings with it its partial being, all which will be evident below, treating more fully of subsistence and existence. And applied in this sense the prior reason is efficacious; for the composite has complete being, but the being of the form is incomplete. Finally the union of the form to matter is some perfection; otherwise why would the form naturally desire it? But this perfection the composite includes, but not the form. The said author answers otherwise, that, although the composite formally includes some perfection besides the form, it does not follow that it is more perfect than the form, because all that perfection is from the form and is virtually contained in it. As (he says) God and the world are not something more perfect than God alone. But first of all, at the least, what he asserts will be false, that the form is more perfect than the composite; as God alone is not more perfect than God and the world together. Next it is false that the form contains eminently or virtually the whole perfection of the composite; for it does not have in power the perfection of matter, nor can it in any way supply its causality, especially since it itself depends on matter. Finally the form is for the sake of the composite as for its proper and chief end; but such an end is something more perfect than that which is ordered to the end, Physics II, text 31.

A place of Aristotle from Metaphysics VII is expounded

8. The first exposition.—To Aristotle in Metaphysics VII the answer is that that place is expounded variously. The first exposition is that Aristotle in that text 7 does not speak of the priority of perfection, but of the priority of causality; for so the Philosopher virtually gathers: the form is prior to matter and matter prior to the composite; therefore the form is prior to the composite. But if he spoke of the priority of perfection, the minor would be false; he speaks, therefore, of the priority of causality. So Albert the Great and Scotus, and St. Thomas indicates it. But the exposition does not please. First, because that reason of arguing is not formal, since the genus of cause is changed. Next, because he would conclude better and more briefly that the form is prior to the composite because it is its cause. Thirdly it is proved, because Aristotle does not only say that it is prior, but also that it is more being. It is true that Aristotle in the inference does not repeat that it is more being, but only that it is prior; and therefore Javellus there, q. 4, says that the comparison between form and matter is made in priority and perfection, but between form and composite in priority only. But this is beside the exposition of all; for from the mode of gathering and arguing which the Philosopher uses it is evident either that for the sake of brevity that particle was omitted in the consequent, which was understood from the force of the antecedent, or certainly that under priority the priority of perfection was comprehended. The second exposition is that the form is prior and more perfect not simply but in a certain respect, so that the Philosopher virtually so gathers: the form is prior and more perfect than matter, because the former is act, the latter potency; therefore the form is also more perfect and prior than the composite, at least according to something, namely because the form is simple act not including potentiality; but the composite includes the potentiality of matter. So St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales there; and Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 28. But two things stand in the way of this exposition: one is that on account of an excess in a certain respect Aristotle ought not to have affirmed and gathered it simply, especially since in the antecedent the comparison is absolute, because the form is simply more perfect than matter. The other is that even in a certain respect the composite does not seem less perfect than the form, for to include the potentiality of matter is not an imperfection in the composite in comparison with the informing form, but only in comparison with complete immaterial substance. As for a thing to be simpler is not always greater perfection, even in a certain respect, when such a thing is ordered to composing something one simply more perfect.

9. Wherefore I judge that Aristotle in no way there prefers the form to the composite, but either makes no comparison between them, or rather prefers the composite to the form, which Simplicius noted in the cited place, and is evident from the version of Argyropoulos, which has thus: If the form is prior to matter and more being, that too which is from both will be prior for the same reason. Whence the ancient version deceived the expositors, because in place of the nominative it has the ablative ipso. And as regards the context, this reading too is more consonant with the intention of Aristotle; for he chiefly intends against the ancients to show that matter is not most of all substance, but is less perfect than the others. Whence afterwards, in text 8, he reports the ancients saying that matter is most of all substance; but he himself teaches that it is impossible, and concludes: on account of which the form and that which is from both seem to be substance more than matter. Whence in the prior comparison, when he concludes that the composite is prior for the same reason, formally indeed and immediately the composite seems only to be compared to matter, yet virtually he also prefers it to the form, while he so gathers: the form is prior to matter; therefore also the composite, by the same (I say) reason, namely because it includes the form itself; and consequently it is also prior in perfection and nobility to the form itself, since it is compared to it as whole to part.

10. Not every cause is nobler than its effect.—To the objection posited at the beginning, then, the answer is by simply denying the major; for it is not necessary that every cause be nobler than its effect, but only in some efficient and final cause; but not in the material, as all confess, nor also in the formal, for almost the same cause, namely because these intrinsic causes are so causes that they are also parts, and neither per se gives to the effect its whole entity or perfection, but constitutes it by giving it that which it has of entity; but it, because it arises from many, turns out more perfect than each. Whence it can also be added that the effect does not exceed the cause according to that which it receives from it, but can exceed according to that which it has from another cause. Of which more fully below, Disp. XXVI, sect. 1.